@ABWorsham:
@KurtGodel7:
The initial invasion would deal the Soviets a hammer blow, and German strength would mean that there would not be the opportunity for them to recover. The German war machine would push eastward like a steamroller, destroying all resistance in its path.
You still have the problem in Russia of attacking with a Mechanized force across extreme conditions- little to no road systems, rivers, swamps, forest and fighting an enemy that will leave stronghold behind to be dealt with.
You will be asking your men to fight a battle with no chance chance of a quick victory. There are no vital targets, no death blows targets the first 400 miles inside Russia. Your army will have to fight an epic battle, near Moscow, with a 800 mile supply line; facing an enemy that is getting supplied a few miles away. That’s risking a lot.
Your post is absolutely correct. There can be no argument that conquering the Soviet Union would have been a gargantuan task. You’re right about the terrain, the length of the supply lines, and the implication that the required battles would be of epic proportions. In addition, the Soviets an overwhelming numerical advantage in available infantry. My impression is that the Soviet numerical advantage was 3:1 over the Germans, but declined to 2:1 after taking into account the Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, Italians, and anti-communist Soviet citizens who fought alongside German soldiers on Germany’s Eastern Front during WWII.
In the historical war, Germany lacked oil. As a consequence, its supply lines had to be largely oil-free. Coal-powered trains would deliver supplies most of the way to the front, and horses would take them the rest of the way to where they were needed. This transportation method can work well during a relatively static war, but is inadequate for the kind of mobile war necessary to conquer the Soviet Union. During the invasion of the Soviet Union some gasoline-powered transportation was available to supplement the horse and coal method. But this supply delivery mechanism was wholly inadequate because of Germany’s lack of oil. Germany’s inability to adequately supply its troops was why its soldiers often lacked winter uniforms during the winter of '41 - '42.
In the scenario I outlined, Germany would have control of the Persian oilfields for several years leading up to the invasion. That oil would allow military trucks to play a much greater role in supplying Germany’s soldiers than had been the case in the actual war. I realize this supply effort would become less effective in fall (muddy roads) and winter (freezing engines). Even so, this would still represent a dramatic improvement over the supply situation Germany faced in the historical war.
I envision the Soviets’ quantitative advantage being offset in three ways.
By outproducing them. Germany experienced a nearly threefold increase in its aircraft production between 1942 and 1944. My scenario envisions putting this kind of efficient production into effect several years before the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Largely offset the Soviets’ quantitative advantage in available infantry. Even if some group of foreign recruits proved one fifth or one tenth as effective as Germans on a man-for-man basis, it would still be better than nothing. And if, due to poor motivation or lack of discipline, foreign soldiers proved relatively ineffective, that problem could be solved through sheer numbers. A large non-German force invading northward from Persia could tie down a significant amount of the Red Army’s strength; and indeed could kill or capture a large number of Soviet soldiers. While the main hammer blow would be the German Army attacking from the west, it would be logical to create as many problems for the Soviet Army as possible.
By building a qualitative advantage over them. On a man-for-man basis, Germany’s infantry were about three times as combat effective as their Soviet counterparts (see http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-4epw1and2final.pdf ). But for most of the war, Soviet soldiers were, on average, as well or better armed than their German counterparts. That problem could be solved by the assault rifle. It was introduced late in the war, and in very small numbers. It proved exceptionally effective at allowing German soldiers to mow down their Soviet counterparts. The improved supply situation (Persian oil) and manufacturing situation means that German infantry and artillery would have plenty of ammunition.
By far the best handheld anti-tank weapon of WWII was the Panzerfaust. The first version of the Panzerfaust could penetrate the frontal armor of any widely deployed Allied tank, but only had a range of 30 meters. That range was soon doubled to 60 meters. By 1945, Germany had deployed a few Panzerfausts with a range of 150 meters, and with a better sighting mechanism and even better armor penetration than their predecessors. Germany was in the process of developing a Panzerfaust with a 250 meter range when the war ended. Had the invasion of the Soviet Union taken place in 1947 or '48, the Panzerfaust 250 could have been put into widespread deployment, making German infantry devastating against Soviet tanks.
Another important aspect of the qualitative situation involves tanks. The T-34 was an exceptional tank by the standards of 1941. But by 1944, even the upgraded version (T-34-85) was getting long in the tooth. In the Korean War, it had become clear that the T-34-85 was obsolete in competitions against the tanks Britain and the U.S. had begun deploying in 1945 and '46. In subsequent Arab-Israeli conflicts, T-44/54 model tanks would also prove highly ineffective/obsolete against very early postwar British and American tanks.
This is where the Entwicklung Series (E-Series) tanks could have been immensely valuable to Germany. Just as Panthers were qualitatively superior to T-34-85s, the E-50 would have been qualitatively superior to the T-44/54. The E-Series was designed to be much more easily manufactured and more mechanically reliable than its predecessors. Instead of a handful of Panthers against a horde of T-34-85s, it would have been a very large number of E-50s against those T-34-85s! Additionally, the E-50 would have been a better tank than the Panther or Tiger I, and the E-75 would have been superior to the Tiger II. Panthers and Tigers were often lost to mechanical problems or lack of fuel rather than enemy action. But with the increased mechanical reliability of the E-Series, and with the Persian Oil, German tanks would become much less likely to be lost to such causes.
The Soviet Union did not develop jet engines during WWII. In 1946, Stalin was able to license jet technology from a pro-Soviet British Labour government. That technology was then put to use in the Korean War; where the MiG proved an effective aircraft.
During the Korean War, the democracies’ most effective jet fighter was the F-86 Sabre. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to call the Sabre a knockoff of the Me 262, except with better engines. The Germans had begun using Me 262s in combat in 1944; and had already begun work on designing their next generation of jet aircraft. Had that next generation been deployed in the Korean War, both the Soviets’ and democracies’ aircraft would have been obsolete in comparison.
Had the German invasion of the Soviet Union occurred around 1947 or '48, German aircraft would have had a commanding qualitative edge over their Soviet counterparts, even if the Soviets had been able to license jet technology.
Not only were German air designs more advanced than their Allied counterparts. Late in WWII, Germany began developing advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. Waiting until 1947 or '48 to invade would have given Germany the chance to refine these designs and to put them into widespread deployment. Germany would have controlled the skies above the battlefield. It would have used that control to destroy Soviet tanks and artillery, to strafe retreating columns of Soviet soldiers, to take out bridges and trains, and generally to wreak havoc.
While the Soviet military’s strength was immense, not even they could have withstood an onslaught such as this.
