House Rule/Discussion Topic: Unit Modifications
One thing I’ve thought about on occasion is whether tanks in E&W should just flatout cost 4 IPCs instead of 5.
- The USSR still has almost no incentive to build anything other than infantry, even with the change
- Western Europe needs all the “hit points” it can get, meaning… also no incentive to build anything other than infantry
- UK would need to build transports, or else a new industry in India in order to add tanks
- US (similarly) finds itself in the position of always needing to use transports to move tanks (or transports and new industry, in the case of Japan or the Philippines.)
So I think it’s pertinent to breakdown the economics, for the UK and US in particular.
As said many times before, the UK can rely on an income of 32, and the US can rely on 41. (This is where an India IC would be handy, since for the cost of 2 transports, it can “transport” 3 tanks.)
Now, comparing 4-IPC tanks vs. infantry:
- 32 IPCs = 10 infantry, requiring 5 transports
- 32 IPCs = 8 tanks, requiring 8 transports (or an IC in India + 5 transports)
- 41 IPCs = 13 infantry, requiring 6.5 transports
- 41 IPCS = 10 tanks, requiring 10 transports
The obvious conclusion is still(!) that infantry are cheaper (in terms of transports) and add more “hit points” – the only place where tanks start to pull ahead is in attack power:
- UK: (infantry) 10 attack power vs. (tanks) 24 attack power
- US: (infantry) 13 attack power vs. (tanks) 30 attack power
Again, keep in mind that the tanks still require more transports while providing fewer HP – it’s one thing to go “all tank” armies as Germany or the USSR, but for US or UK it’s a completely different thing altogether.
If a tank costs 4, it still takes 8 IPCs to ship it – meaning you’re spending 12 IPCs to get 3 attack power, and 1 HP
Compare that with 2 infantry + 1 transport – spending 14 IPCs for 2 attack power, and 2 HP
So let’s say we want to “spend it all” every round (just to narrow things down) and examine the possible combinations of tanks and infantry:
32 IPCs:
- 8 tanks (8 transports) – 24 attack power, 8 HP
- 5 tanks, 4 infantry (7 transports) – 19 attack power, 9 HP
- 2 tanks, 8 infantry (6 transports) – 14 attack power, 10 HP
41 IPCs:
- 8 tanks, 3 infantry (9.5 transports) – 27 attack power, 11 HP
- 5 tanks, 7 infantry (8.5 transports) – 22 attack power, 12 HP
- 2 tanks, 11 infantry (7.5 transports) – 19 attack power, 13 HP
So what we’re finding is that reducing the number of tanks significantly reduces the attack power, but does not significantly reduce the HP or number of transports. Now, I would argue that we cannot reduce the infantry to zero, but the mid-point option in each of these examples is certainly a lot more viable.
This leads into my other point of discussion: does the USSR have too much defense power?
What I’m finding is that the number of ground units that the Soviets have (on land, in the Eurasian continent) tends to be about 1 full round’s worth of production more than NATO (about 30 infantry.) This seems to be a deficit that NATO simply can’t make up.
If this assertion holds, then something would need to be done about a) increasing NATO’s attack power (such as decreasing the cost of tanks), or; b) decreasing the USSR’s defense power.
I’d argue that the 2-IPC infantry mechanic is necessary for the USSR to function as a global superpower – and leaning on E&W’s supposed origins in World at War, I’d offer that it is a simple, quality-of-life improvement over the model of having cheap partisans available to the USSR, in addition to regular infantry. If the price isn’t going to be changed, then perhaps the defense value should be. Since infantry currently defend at 2, that would mean a decrease down to 1.
The other thing to consider with this, is the fact that the US and UK are basically locked into their supply pipelines – effectively capping the maximum possible amount of attack power they can project into any given theatre, lest they have to rebuild the pipeline from scratch. The USSR simply doesn’t have this problem; they can place infantry anywhere, anytime. There aren’t many theatres where they cannot out-produce NATO simply by choosing do to so – their supply lines are not at all complex.
So, this begs a third question: Should the placement rules be changed?
Perhaps territories with industrial complexes would follow the current rules, but other territories with an IPC value could only produce 1 infantry (regardless of IPC value.)
Typically, I’ve seen the USSR place 12 infantry in Europe (and a further 4 in Karelia) pretty reliably every round. With this rule in place, the USSR would need to spread those 12 infantry around to:
- 1 each in West Germany, East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania
- 6 infantry in Ukraine
Effectively, this would add one whole round of movement to the USSR’s supply lines, meaning NATO would have a more meaningful chance of contesting the border territories in Europe. In Karelia and East Siberia, the USSR would still be at a distinct advantage – but an advance towards India would be slowed much like Europe, perhaps even making China (finally) a worthwhile vector of attack for the Soviets.