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The Siege of Tobruk lasted for 241 days in 1941, after Axis forces advanced through Cyrenaica from El Agheila in Operation Sonnenblume against the British Western Desert Force (WDF) in Libya, during the Western Desert Campaign (1940–1943) of the Second World War. In late 1940, the British had defeated the Italian 10th Army during Operation Compass (9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941) and trapped the remnants at Beda Fomm. German troops and Italian reinforcements reached Libya, while much of the WDF was sent to Greece and replaced by a skeleton force, short of equipment and supplies.

Operation Sonnenblume (6 February – 25 May 1941), forced the British into a retreat to the Egyptian border. A garrison was left behind at Tobruk, to deny the port to the Axis, while the WDF reorganised and prepared a counter-offensive. The Axis siege of Tobruk began on 10 April, when the port was attacked by a force under Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel and continued during three relief attempts, Operation Brevity (15–16 May), Operation Battleaxe (15–17 June) and Operation Crusader (18 November – 30 December). The occupation of Tobruk deprived the Axis of a supply port closer to the Egypt-Libya border than Benghazi, 900 miles (1,400 km) west of the Egyptian frontier, which was within the range of RAF bombers; Tripoli was 1,500 kilometres (930 mi) to the west in Tripolitania.

The siege diverted Axis troops from the frontier and the Tobruk garrison repulsed several attacks. The port was frequently bombarded by artillery, dive-bombers and medium bombers, as the RAF flew defensive sorties from airfields far away in Egypt. British Mediterranean Fleet and Inshore Squadron ships ran the blockade, to carry reinforcements and supplies in and wounded and prisoners out. On 27 November, Tobruk was relieved by the 8th Army (the name of British, Commonwealth, Imperial and Allied forces in the Western Desert since September 1941), during Operation Crusader.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tobruk

I have decided to no longer post polls, but instead post questions for discussion instead.
Might make your answers to my questions easier to give an opinion on.

The Siege of Tobruk began in April 75 years ago.
Rommel was tenacious, and the British certainly did not want to give up this important port to the Axis powers.
History says that this was one of Rommel’s greatest victories when Tobruk finally fell.
History also says that this one of Britain’s finest hours, holding out as long as they did.
Tell me your impressions as we now enter the heart of the Western Desert Campaign in North Africa.

Note that the typical Allied excuse for terror bombings and mass aerial exterminations of German and Japanese civilians was that such actions might “shorten the war” and “save the lives of Allied servicemen.” Had FDR cooperated with the German generals who’d wanted to overthrow Hitler, he could have shortened the war in Europe by two years, and saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Allied servicemen. FDR was not interested in shortening the war, or in saving the lives of Allied servicemen (black ants). Nor was he interested in preventing Soviet hegemony in the postwar world (which the German generals’ plan might also have accomplished).

No. They needed Hitler alive to guarantee victory, to kill him would result in some smarter leader taking over and extending the war. Thats why they didn’t kill him in 1940. Read your History. Heydrich was killed because he was too dangerous. Same reason they didn’t kill Goering. They just had to bomb the nearest Shakey’s Buffet, but they didn’t. That fat idiot was the best weapon the Allies had. And Carpet Bombing is not “extermination”. Gets the facts straight. Hitler destroyed Rotterdam for nothing as well as many other cities by bombing.

The Allies didn’t have “a” plan to wage the Battle of the Atlantic, and neither did the Germans.  The Battle of the Atlantic was a complex battle of attrition on a gigantic scale which lasted all the way from September 1939 to May 1945, and it was characterized by constant changes of plans and tactics and weaponry on both sides as it progressed, with each side trying to overcome every new enemy development with a suitable counter-development.  The campaign see-sawed several times, with one side or the other gaining the advantage at various points; some methods of waging the campaign became ineffectual as time progressed, but were highly effective in earlier stages and therefore were entirely correct to use at those points.

Wise words, Worsham.

Like Model , he would have done very well in the halcyon days. I believe he would have done less well, defensively, unlike  Model, though. He would have worried his Army commander, like Guderian, never wanting to pause to regroup. But that would not have mattered to him or to the result.

To be a traitor he would need to have betrayed his country. Nothing in the summary posted suggests this to be true.

Instead prior to US involvement in the war he espoused views that are open to quite a negative perception. His thoughts on race and Semitism do him no credit - to quote from his diary: “We must limit to a reasonable amount the Jewish influence … Whenever the Jewish percentage of total population becomes too high, a reaction seems to invariably occur. It is too bad because a few Jews of the right type are, I believe, an asset to any country.” He was also very slow to condemn the Nazis for acts such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia. More debateable is whether he was a fascist sympathiser, as Roosevelt thought.

He was certainly an isolationist - but in itself that is not a “crime”. Once the US was involved in the war he tried to “do his bit”.

So I think he was both a patriot and misled. Only being able to vote for one option, I chose the latter.

Narvik wrote:

On top of that, the average and casual Italian at this point had a very low morale, since they by now knew that Italy would loose, even if the Axis won the war.

That statement rings false. Germany did not have plans to enslave Italy after the war. In his writings, Hitler pointed out that if a nation wants allies, it must establish a reputation for treating its allies well. It was a logical conclusion for the leader of any nation, and I have seen no evidence to suggest Hitler had deviated from that logic.

I agree Italian morale was low. There were several reasons for that.

Mussolini seized power through military means. His views were not necessarily representative of those of most Italians. Mussolini did not build a strong relationship with the Italian people after seizing office. He had no reason to rely on the Italian people to stick with him through thick and thin. Most Italians did not believe in Mussolini’s dream of a revived Roman Empire, and thought his foreign adventures were rather pointless. Italy was unprepared for war. It lacked a strong military culture and strong military traditions. Its army was not afforded the weapons which would have been necessary to destroy Britain’s Matilda tanks. Its military leadership was lacking. It’s hard to maintain high morale when it’s obvious that your opponent has a much better sense of what he’s doing than your own military has of what it’s doing.

Note that all four problems existed before Hitler came to power in Germany. It’s not as though Mussolini’s Italy had a great military tradition, which then collapsed once Hitler and Mussolini became allies. On the contrary: Italy’s military tradition and military preparedness were greatly lacking both before and after Hitler and Mussolini became allies.

@WraithZer0:

Wow, man.  You really did want the Nazis to win.  You wanted us to help them conquer Stalin, and, in turn, probably cede to letting them take over most of Europe.  Until this long-storied analogy, I believed you were just defending a well-read argument for the hindsight of the goings on of WWII.  I was really intrigued by taking a neutral look in to things, but I knowingly can’t ever choose any side other than my own country in this venture.  I am sure you say patriotism be damned, but out of your “3 evils” of the western allies, Russia, and Nazi Germany, I will always choose the allies.  Sorry, Kurt.   :-(

I appreciate the sincerity and candor of your post. I also respect your patriotism.

When a soldier turns traitor, you shoot the soldier. When a general turns traitor, you hang the general if you possibly can. But what happens when a nation’s leader betrays the nation he’s charged with ruling? What happens when, as a result of that cynical treason, he leads his own nation down the road to its own destruction?

When FDR died, Truman inherited his administration. A number of the members of that administration owed their loyalty to Joseph Stalin and to communism–not to the United States. According to Herbert Hoover’s book Freedom Betrayed, members of Truman’s state department talked about their desire for South Korea to fall to the communists. But they wanted to avoid the appearance of having pushed it over.

In 1946 the U.S. government embargoed weapons deliveries to the Chinese nationalists, because members of Truman’s administration thought those weapons shouldn’t be used in a civil war against the communists. Also, the nationalists were pressured to cede more and more to the communists–to meet them halfway. But the United States government never pressured the communists to be more reasonable to the nationalists. After WWII ended, Stalin had plenty of American Lend Lease weapons lying around. He gave a large portion of those weapons to the Chinese communists. The communists also received Japanese weapons caches which the Red Army captured during its invasion of Manchuria. Chinese communists had access to more and better weapons than did the nationalists–which proved an important factor in the ultimate communist victory in China.

That same cynical, deliberate treason against the United States was also seen toward the end of WWII. Harry Dexter White was a known Soviet agent within the FDR administration. (One of many.) He was also the original author of the Morgenthau Plan. The central objective of the Moregenthau Plan was to create hunger (and outright starvation) in the democratic portion of postwar Germany. Partly, that was intended as revenge against Germany for having gone to war against the Soviet Union. But the main (communist) reason for formulating the Morgenthau Plan was so that West Germany would go communist.

It took two years (1945 to 1947) of death and disease, and fears that starving Germans might “go Communist” before U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made his Stuttgart speech.

Given the Soviets’ stated long-term goal of world conquest, starving West Germany into the acceptance of communism represented deliberate treason in the face of an avowed (and very powerful) enemy. The Morgenthau Plan was formulated under the FDR administration, and FDR himself was a strong supporter of the plan. It was implemented under the Truman administration, in the form of JCS 1067. Not only was JCS a crime against humanity, the apparent motive for that crime was the advancement of a treasonous objective.

At what point did the “contain Germany, appease the USSR” crowd knowingly commit treason? When did they first decide to cynically betray the nations they were tasked to lead? For the most part, I do not think that the “contain Germany, appease the USSR” politicians of the Versailles Treaty era were guilty of treason. Many or most of those politicians were fairly despicable human beings, granted. But they were not (so far as I can tell) traitors.

At least in the United States, the transition from non-treason to treason probably occurred in the election of 1932. FDR (deliberately?) allowed his administration to become a rats’ nest of Soviet agents, fellow travelers, and sympathizers. Whenever there was an internal disagreement within FDR’s administration, FDR typically sided with the Soviet agents. The Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin were therefore able to exert considerable control over the FDR administration, especially when the most important decisions were being made.

Stalin wanted a one front war, in Europe. It was therefore important that Japan be distracted. Fairly early in the Chinese civil war, Mao captured Chiang Kai-shek. Mao’s instinct was to shoot him. But before doing so, he radioed Moscow for instructions. The instructions came back: “Do not shoot him. Force him to fight the Japanese.”

But the war between the Chinese nationalists and the Japanese was not alone enough to distract the latter from a possible attack on the Soviet Union. Stalin used his (considerable) influence in the United States, and his influence in Japan, to encourage war between the United States and Japan. The United States government embraced eight separate provocations against Japan; the most serious of which was the oil embargo. (Some of the provocations included moving the U.S. Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii, basing American strategic bombers in the Philippines, and deliberate violations of Japanese territorial waters by American destroyers and cruisers.) These provocations ultimately resulted in the Pearl Harbor attack. Once the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, Stalin knew that the Japanese could no longer afford to launch a serious invasion of the U.S.S.R. He transferred 100 divisions from his eastern front to his western front. Given that the Germans had used only 100 divisions in their initial invasion of the Soviet Union, the appearance of 100 additional Soviet divisions proved devastating.

After the end of WWII in Europe, General Patton began speaking out against the Soviet-influenced war crimes then being committed by the American government. He strongly disagreed with the decision to ship many or most American-held German POWs to France or the Soviet Union. He pointed out that in French or Soviet custody, many of these men would die of starvation.

Patton died a few months after having first pointed out the Truman administration’s war crimes. Evidence strongly indicates, but does not prove, that he was assassinated. Patton was the patriot, the men who ordered his assassination were traitors. Traitors who deserved to be hanged not just for the war crimes they had committed, but for having betrayed the nation they’d sworn to protect.

The Soviet Union was stronger than Nazi Germany in terms of population size, industrial capacity, and access to raw materials. Perhaps even more importantly, it was also much stronger than Nazi Germany in terms of its ability to influence the behavior of Western democratic governments.

When a man contracts rabies, the rabies virus overrides some of his brain’s programming. Specifically, the virus causes the man to want to bite the people and animals around him. Biting allows the virus to spread. Eventually the rabies virus will kill the man’s brain; and therefore the man. But unless the man has been physically restrained, odds are that before he dies he will have bitten a significant number of victims. His infected saliva will seep into his victims’ wounds.

The governments of Western democracies had been infected with the communist virus. Due to that infection, they experienced a strong desire to “bite” any nation which stood up to communism. That desire to bite was motivated not by patriotism, but by a treasonous illness.

The Barbarossa aspect of this could be argued two ways. Would a six week head start been to Germany’s benefit? The attack caught the Soviet Union completely off guard, and resulted in the rapid encirclement and surrender of millions of Soviet soldiers. Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange rate during Barbarossa.

The problem with starting all that six weeks earlier was that spring rains were worse than usual that year, and persisted later into the spring than expected. The effect of surprise would, at least initially, have been largely counteracted by muddy roads. That would have given the Red Army the chance to get the worst of the surprise over with, and at least begin the process of getting its legs back underneath itself, at a time when Germany could not take maximum advantage of the situation. It’s possible that they could have accelerated the beginning of Barbarossa by a week or two without running into the muddy roads problem. But not six weeks.

A second point to bear in mind is the value of not having the British military on the European mainland. Italy might have eventually been able to defeat the Greek army. But as Britain sent more and more reinforcements to Greece, the combined Anglo-Greek force would have quickly become too tough a nut for Italy to crack. Britain could draw troops not just from its home islands, but also from its enormous colonial empire. The last thing the Axis needed was for Egyptian or Indian soldiers to gain a stronghold in the Balkans. If that force grew strong enough Germany might eventually have been forced into a two front land war, even without American involvement. There was also–as I mentioned earlier–an absolute necessity to keep British bombers from bombing Romanian oilfields. Without that oil the German war machine could not function.

I don’t think that the invasion of Greece was responsible for the full six week delay in Barbarossa. If Hitler had gone for Greece only, maybe it would only have been a three to four week delay. That’s acceptable due to the late spring rains. Unfortunately for the Axis, the government of Yugoslavia was overthrown in a military coup. As Hoover pointed out in his book, FDR encouraged that coup by falsely promising members of the Yugoslav military that, if they overthrew their own government, the United States would provide military aid against German retaliation. With perfect foresight, the Germans would have allowed Yugoslavia to remain neutral, instead of pressuring it to join the Axis.

But let’s say their foresight wasn’t quite as good as that decision would have implied. The next-best decision would have been to launch Barbarossa even while mopping up opposition in Yugoslavia and/or Greece.

I don’t think so much was a French duping as it was the unrestricted sub warfare in the Atlantic shipping lanes, involving a lot of US ships.  But hey, wars have been fought over less, and I would not be in the least bit surprised by propaganda usage.

I voted advantage Axis. As others have explained, the Allies didn’t have very good methods of detecting u-boats–at least not after the first year of the war. However, that changed as the war progressed. The Germans did not anticipate the Allies miniaturizing radar to the point where it could be equipped on board an aircraft. (Even though they later duplicated that feat.) When the British began using such aircraft against u-boats, it fundamentally altered the equation in the Atlantic.

During the last year of the war, the Germans were taking steps to reclaim the edge in the war of the Atlantic.

One of those steps involved torpedoes. A standard-issue WWII era torpedo involved a diesel engine, as well as fuel and compressed air so that the engine could work. The compressed air took up plenty of space. Early in the war, Germany’s torpedoes were based on this model. But there are problems with diesel-powered torpedoes. They are noisy, and can be detected by enemy ships. As they burn diesel fuel, they leave a telltale trail of bubbles in the water. If this trail is observed from the air, it alerts the target ship a torpedo is coming, and guides planes back to the sub which launched the torpedo in the first place. Something better was needed–or at least desired.

The Japanese dealt with these problems by providing their torpedoes with compressed oxygen, not compressed air. Separating the oxygen out from the rest of the air was very difficult, and the Japanese closely guarded their secret of how to do it. A diesel engine requires only 1/5 as much compressed oxygen to burn a given quantity of diesel fuel as it would compressed air. Due to the enormous space savings gained by using compressed oxygen, Japanese “Long Lance” torpedoes had about triple the range of anyone else’s. Also, the air bubble trail they left was much less pronounced than typical for a WWII-era torpedo. This was particularly important for the South Pacific at night, because the presence of luminescent algae meant that those bubble trails glowed in the dark!

The Germans dealt with the torpedo problem in a different way. As the war progressed, they began making use of battery-powered electric torpedoes. At first these torpedoes represented a very serious trade-off. Their range was much shorter than a standard-issue diesel torpedo’s. On the other hand, the electric torpedoes left no bubble trail, and were very, very quiet. They were therefore a mixed blessing–at least until the Germans began to improve their range. Later in the war, Germany’s electric torpedoes had about the same range as standard-issue diesel torpedoes. (Japan’s torpedoes, of course, had a much longer range than anyone else’s.)

Good torpedoes were useful, but not alone enough to swing the Battle of the Atlantic back in Germany’s favor. What it needed was a submarine much harder for the British to detect than the submarines it had. In addition, the submarine in question needed a long range, and it needed to be mass produceable in large quantities. The Type XXI u-boat was all these things and more.

The Type XXI was fast. Its hydrodynamic shape allowed it to actually travel faster underwater than it could on the surface. It had a very advanced (for the time) electronics suite and sonar system. Its electric torpedoes had a range comparable to most diesel-powered torpedoes of the era. Its hull was coated in a layer of rubber, making it very difficult to detect via radar or sonar. It had a very large complement of batteries–batteries which allowed it to remain submersed for 2 - 3 days at a time. When it did finally have to emerge, it didn’t need to come all the way to the surface. Instead, it would go most of the way to the surface, then raise its snorkel. With the snorkel above the surface it could run its diesel engines. (Necessary to recharge its batteries.) This submarine was much, much quieter than almost any other sub of WWII. The Type XXI u-boat and associated models were by far the most advanced submarines of the war. In many ways they had more in common with nuclear submarines of the postwar era than with their WWII contemporaries.

Albert Speer began producing this type of submarine in large quantities in 1944. These subs were built in sections to make them easier to mass produce. However, there were some initial glitches in the production process, slowing things down. Also, a submarine this sophisticated required a relatively long working up period. No Type XXIs saw action before the war ended. Had the war lasted another six months, the story would have been very different. :o

A sister ship–the Type XXIII–was put into service, in limited numbers, before the war ended. The Type XXIII was very similar to the Type XXI in most ways, except much smaller and with a shorter range. The Type XXIII could hold only two torpedoes (compared to twelve for the XXI). The Type XXIII was intended for use in coastal waters. Type XXIIIs sank or damaged five Allied ships; and the Allies did not sink or damage any Type XXIIIs. The rather one-sided track record of the Type XXIII reinforces the suspicion that it would have been very, very difficult for the Allies to detect or destroy the Type XXIs.

From the OP: please explain what you do at this time if you are the Axis or Allies?

Am I allowed to use 20/20 hindsight? If I am, my choice would be to accelerate the development and production of the Type XXI as quickly as possible. Had the Type XXI appeared in the Atlantic in large numbers in 1943, it could have decisively tipped the Battle of the Atlantic in Germany’s favor.

@CWO:

Italy didn’t hold on to British Somalia for very long.  Britain recaptured it in early 1941, and likewise liberated Ethiopia and conquered Italian Somaliland.  Germany didn’t save Italy’s rear end in that part of Africa, nor did it even intervene as far as I know;

I believe the Suez Canal was closed  :wink:

@ABWorsham:

Had the Channel been abandoned, I would then focus on mining the trade routes around Scotland. Then step up bombing the western port cities.

Would be nice to have a four engine bomber fleet.  :cry:

How would you mine the routes around Scotland? They could just keep going around them…

Thanks Marc. As always an informed and informative response.

The peace terms that France accepted caused an unavoidable perception that Vichy was a puppet regime. Events proved this right, despite the no doubt honourable intentions of some.

I don’t see how the British could have taken the huge risk of leaving the French fleet in the Med.

Mussolini (and many others) thought the war all but won by Germany - hence the quote you post. From that starting point, with his political views and territorial aspirations, declaring war was an easy decision.

When you say “at this day and age” I think you mean with the largely pro-facist Italian mindset of 1940? So ignoring hindsight and my own morality?

Please clarify RJL.

Thanks
PP

@Gargantua:

I saw a documentary one time, that discussed the halt order.

The conclusion was that it was to do with the power dynamic of who was in charge of the Wehrmacht.  Hitler, or the High command.

The Dunkirk thing basically became a pissing match between the two parties, with Hitler winning the “halt” order, and exerting his will over total command.  At least… that was the opinion of the documentary, and I don’t know remember what the dynamics behind why Hitler wanted the halt order were, and why the Wehrmacht forces didn’t.

My impression–and I could be wrong–is that a large portion of the German general staff wanted the halt order. However, its most able, creative, aggressive generals–such as von Manstein–were strongly against the halt order.

Maybe the scale of the evacuation came as a surprise to many. On the other hand, it was common knowledge that Britain was a sea power with plenty of boats in or near the English Channel, so the idea that the soldiers might be evacuated should not have been a surprise. Perhaps more importantly, those Allied soldiers were on the run. The halt order gave them time to regroup, assume defensive positions, and to become a much harder nut to crack.

Von Manstein wrote that there are times when very important–but very fleeting–opportunities present themselves. When such is the case, it is often necessary to push soldiers to the absolute limits of human endurance. While this may seem cruel, seizing the opportunity in question is absolutely necessary to save your own soldiers’ lives.

The halt order was one of the two most important deviations from von Manstein’s original plan to conquer France. (Both deviations occurred over his objections.) The other deviation was that von Manstein had wanted to proceed to phase 2 (the conquest of Paris) even before having completed phase 1 (the encirclement and destruction of the BEF and nearby French forces).

You will recall that after the Germans reached the Channel, the French counterattacked from the south. Von Manstein didn’t want Germany to sit around waiting for that counterattack. Instead, he wanted to attack the French in their assembly areas, before they were ready to strike. That German attack would have secured the German path to the Channel, while also constituting the first part of phase 2.

@CWO:

I did in fact take note of your previous question about the “honourable peace” concept, but I was reluctant to offer any opinions on the subject because I wasn’t sure from what angle the question was being posed.  Your new post today still leaves me unsure about what’s behind the question, but I get the impression – perhaps incorrectly – that it’s related to a subject that’s been raised in this forum many times: the theory (with which I disagree) that France, Britain and the U.S. should have realized that Soviet Russia was more dangerous to the world than Nazi Germany, and therefore that the western democracies should have been sensible enough to make a deal with Hitler rather than going to war against him – a deal that, at minimum, would have given him a free hand in dominating central and eastern Europe, and which ideally would have involved their joining him in a crusade against the USSR.  As I’ve said, this subject has been debated ad nauseum in numerous threads, so I’m not going to restate any of my previous arguments on the subject.

On the general concept of Germany offering France an “honorable peace,”  however, I will venture a couple of comments.  As I’ve said in one or two other threads, one of Hitler’s most powerful motivations for conquering France was to avenge Germany for its defeat in WWI – a defeat he had taken very personally in 1918, and which he resented deeply for the rest of his life.  He didn’t just want to defeat France, he wanted to humiliate it too…which explains such theatrical touches as the surrender at Compiegne in Marshall Foch’s old railway car, or the German victory parade through Paris which followed the exact route of the French victory parade after WWI.  Given all this, and given that the French government under Petain had no desire to keep fighting, why would Hitler have made any concessions to France when he was able to get everything he wanted without having to bargain?  Going easy on France would actually have contradicted one of his strongest motivations for subjugating the country in the first place – the revenge motive – and going easy on France wasn’t required to achieve the purely military objectives of the campaign because Petain’s government caved in and signed away the mortgage without any great fuss.

The theory (with which I disagree) that France, Britain and the U.S. should have realized
that Soviet Russia was more dangerous to the world than Nazi Germany

The more I learn, the more convinced I become that that theory is true. However, it is not relevant to this thread; and I will not debate it here.

As I’ve said in one or two other threads, one of Hitler’s most powerful motivations for conquering France was to avenge Germany for its defeat in WWI

Hitler’s most obvious motive for conquering France was that France had declared war on Germany. A second motive was that in 1935, France and the U.S.S.R. had signed a defensive alliance. Most people are not taught to see things from the German perspective. But when such an effort is made, it becomes clear that France represented a very serious security threat to Germany. Especially given the pro-war sentiments of its prime minister, Daladier.

After Poland fell, Hitler sought peace with France. Daladier refused. After Hitler failed to end the war with diplomacy, an end through military means was the next logical option.

He didn’t just want to defeat France, he wanted to humiliate it too…

There are several points worth bearing in mind:

Germans often went hungry during the interwar, pre-Nazi years, due in large part to the massive reparations required under the Versailles Treaty. During the interwar years, the French government did little to prevent its soldiers from raping German women in French-occupied Rhineland. French insistence on a weak, disarmed Germany (the Weimar Republic) meant that Germany would be helpless against any sort of Soviet invasion. Neither France nor any other major Western democracy sent soldiers to Poland when the Soviet Union invaded in 1919-'20. For the past several centuries, France had pursued a consistently anti-German foreign policy. And had typically tried to keep Germany weak and divided.

Given these provocations, the French were extremely fortunate that during the early occupation years Hitler limited himself to victory parades and demolitions of monuments the French built to celebrate their victory in WWI. The early German occupation was considerably milder than the French had anticipated.

Going easy on France would actually have contradicted one of his strongest motivations for subjugating the country in the first place – the revenge motive

At least during the early stages of the German occupation, any German soldier accused of raping a French woman would be given a military trial. Conviction would result in the immediate execution of the soldier. Instead of repaying the French for the Rhineland rapes, Hitler’s initial occupation policy rejected “an eye for an eye.”

Things got uglier after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. At that point, a number of pro-Soviet French resistance units appeared. Those units operated well outside the normally established rules of war. In Hitler’s view, that justified a German decision to operate outside those laws as well.

In his history of the war Churchill expresses regret that operation Jupiter, the liberation of Norway, never was carried out.  The Brits would never have invaded Sweden.

It is pretty obvious that if UK bombed Russia, then Russia had no other choice than to declare war against UK, and the only way Russia could stop the air raids was to occupy Iran, where the UK airfields were. So yes, the War would have taken a different path

As I recall, when the Norwegains protested to the British that Britain had violated Norwegian neutrality by entering Norwegian waters and boarding the Altmark, the British retorted that the Altmark had violated Norwegian neutrality by anchoring in Norwegian waters while retaining a cargo hold full of prisoners of war.  The British also apparently implied that the Norwegians had been either openly complicit in this action or, at the very least, negligent in not discovering the German ruse.  My understanding of international law is that belligerent ships entering neutral waters are required to release any prisoners of war they are carrying – a good example being, ironically enough, the British prisonners who were released in neutral Uruguay by Captain Langsdorff when the Graf Spee (the ship supplied by the Altmark) anchored in Montevideo harbour.  At any rate, the British position vis a vis Norway was basically, “You drop your protest and we’ll drop ours.”  Which they did.