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    Posts made by KurtGodel7

    • RE: Most over-rated WWII Leader

      @Lazarus:

      He did not. The quote has been distorted and half of it ignored to falsely claim Patton was ‘the best’.
      The actual words were:

      ""Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met.

      The above quote does not ring true. Based on everything I’ve read, Montgomery was a significantly inferior general to Patton. For me to accept a quote such as this, I will need to see a citation to a reliable source.

      As for the rest of your post, I have already provided historical references from Wilcox and Alan Axelrod to support my statement that Patton was the most highly respected American general among the Germans. If that is not enough, however, I’ll provide you with a quote from his obituary, which appeared in the New York Times in December of 1945.

      “Nazi generals admitted that of all American field commanders he was the one they most feared.” See http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1111.html

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Most over-rated WWII Leader

      @Lazarus:

      Incorrect. There is no verifiable German source that rates Patton as ‘the best’ Allied General.

      General Rundstedt said that “Patton was your best,” and even Hitler described Patton as “the most dangerous man [the Allies] have.” See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Patton#Relations_with_Eisenhower

      According to Wilcox and a number of other historians, Patton was the American general most feared by the Germans. See: http://www.amazon.com/Target-Patton-Assassinate-General-George/dp/1596985798

      That Patton was the American general the Germans respected and feared the most is also a statement I have seen in other history books. If you feel some other American general deserves the credit for being the most highly regarded by the Germans, please provide both that general’s name and citations to support your claim.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: What If Hitler Had Used Nerve Gas?

      @calvinhobbesliker:

      Where did you get that FDR wanted a 100% income tax?

      The Mackinac Institute’s essay about FDR–entitled “Great Myths of the Great Depression”–contains the following text:


      As pointed out earlier in this essay, Herbert Hoover’s own version of a “New Deal” had hiked the top marginal income tax rate from 24 percent to 63 percent in 1932. But he was a piker compared to his tax-happy successor. Under Roosevelt, the top rate was raised at first to 79 percent and then later to 90 percent. Economic historian Burton Folsom notes that in 1941 Roosevelt even proposed a whopping 99.5 percent marginal rate on all incomes over $100,000. “Why not?” he said, when an advisor questioned the idea.[40]

      After that confiscatory proposal failed, Roosevelt issued an executive order to tax all income over $25,000 at the astonishing rate of 100 percent. He also promoted the lowering of the personal exemption to only $600, a tactic that pushed most American families into paying at least some income tax for the first time. Shortly thereafter, Congress rescinded the executive order, but went along with the reduction of the personal exemption.[41]


      Sources 40 and 41 from the above text are from the following:


      Burton Folsom, “What’s Wrong With The Progressive Income Tax?”, Viewpoint on Public Issues, No. 99-18, May 3, 1999, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, Midland, Michigan.


      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: What If Hitler Had Used Nerve Gas?

      @calvinhobbesliker:

      Oh, god. Another “think tank” that thinks all democrats are communists

      I drew from several sources, including The Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, the CIA website, the Mackinac Institute, and elsewhere. As for The Wages of Destruction, The Times (London) labeled it as “A magnificent demonstration of the explanatory power of economic history.”

      To the best of my knowledge, no one from any of the sources I have quoted has asserted that all or most Democrats are communists. This is a discussion about FDR and his administration, specifically, and not of differences between American political parties in general. If I have labeled FDR pro-communist, it is because of the following actions (among others):

      • Warmly referred to Stalin as “Uncle Joe,” and cultivated a consistently pro-Soviet foreign policy throughout his administration.
      • Engaged in a pro-Soviet propaganda effort, as I described in my earlier post.
      • Built his foreign policy largely on the long-term goal of cementing an alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union
      • Allowed his administration to become influenced by Soviet agents, including Harry Hopkins, Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, and others. There were also significant numbers of people in FDR’s administration who, while not Soviet agents, were nonetheless Soviet sympathizers or fellow travelers.
      • Directly participated in Soviet mass murder through the Yalta Conference. One of the provisions to which FDR agreed involved handing over most German POWs, all Soviet POWs, and all Soviet and Baltic States refugees, to the Soviet government.
      • Adopted the Morgenthau Plan, which had initially been proposed by Harry Dexter White. That plan resulted in the starvation of millions of Germans after the war. According to the Hoover Report, that number would have increased to tens of millions had FDR’s postwar plan been allowed to remain in place. As a result of this postwar genocide, West Germany was starting to turn to communism out of desperation. It very well could have become communist had the Republicans not passed the Marshall Plan in 1948.
      • Back in the U.S., FDR raised the top income tax rate first to 79% and later to 90%. He once proposed a top marginal rate of 99.5%; and later issued an executive order increasing the top marginal rate to 100% for all income over $25,000 a year. (That executive order was later rescinded by Congress.)
      • Empowered the National Recovery Agency (NRA) and other federal agencies to use thug-style tactics to enforce restrictions on free enterprise.
      • When the NRA was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, FDR attempted to neuter the court by packing it with additional justices. Had he been successful in that plan, it would have eliminated what up until then had been one of the largest obstacles to making the U.S. more like the Soviet Union.

      Please do not construe my reference to Republicans’ support for the Marshall Plan as an indication that I think that all Republicans of the era were humane in their treatment of Germans after the war. As I have noted elsewhere on this board, Eisenhower strongly supported JCS 1067 and its implication of postwar starvation in Germany. He even went so far as to remove Patton from command due to the latter’s opposition to JCS 1067.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Is Germany gonna be strong enough?

      @SgtBlitz:

      It was a combination of strategic indecisiveness and the later invasion date and early winter (i.e. the late drive to Moscow) that doomed the Nazi invasion in 41 (it was the Nazis best chance).  If Barbarossa had gone on in early April or May 1941 as planned the Germans might have gotten a lot farther. Russia would have been taken by surprise regardless since Stalin was a big unsuspecting fan of Hitler and there were no plans for defending Eastern Europe from German attack.  But since in AAE40 war is auto-dec on Round 4 and the territories have little IPC numbers attached to them that you automatically collect without partisan or civilian interference, there is no real reason for dragging the conflict out.

      But yeah, LOL, I know what you mean, in real life the Reds and Nazis could have formed the new Commie-Nazi empire if Hitler had just waited and not backstabbed Russia when it was convenient.  Or when the battle for England started going not so well.(Hell, I think the Brits were at war with Germany for upsetting the European balance of power (that was in UK’s favor pre-1941) more than anything.  A unified Europe, whether Napoleanonic or Hitleresque, was the only real threat to the Empire, and Churchill knew it.  Guess Hitler didn’t care, or realized the US with Lend-Lease was just itching for a reason to enter the war.)  Why oh why did Hitler bite the Russian hand that fed him in 1941?  Petulance, I guess?  Or I guess the whole narcissistic megalomaniac dictator thing was taking over.  It was ironic that the Germans started having trouble with supply after their invasion of Russia, when before June 1941 the Russians were giving their war machine enough raw materials to last for ages.

      Well, how about not starting WWII at all?  If Hitler had just waited until 1945 when the German military planners said they really could roll over the world the Germans would have done better (imagine a tricked out German fleet in the Baltic, with 3-4 Bismark class battleships and aircraft carriers, with subs running amok everywhere).  Would the US have really developed the A-bomb without WWII?

      In 1939, Germany was a relatively small nation that had access to comparatively few natural resources. Britain and France were, combined, spending significantly more on the military than Germany was. The fact that Germany was falling behind, in terms of the military situation, was one reason why Hitler decided to launch the war in '39. Also, Allied diplomacy had become far more warlike after '38; with France promising Poland a French offensive against Germany if Germany declared war against Poland. Combined, the armies of Poland and France were significantly larger than those of Germany; and Polish military planners believed they could win a war against Germany if France launched its promised attack. That belief, in turn, gave the Polish government a significant incentive to avoid diplomatic cooperation with Germany.

      After Poland fell, it had initially appeared (based on the balance of forces) that Germany would reach a stalemate with France in the west over the short-term; with the combined Anglo-French industrial capacity being used to crush Germany in a long war. Obviously, that scenario was changed by the rapid fall of France. (An outcome caused not by French incompetence, but by the brilliance of a few German generals, the effectiveness of the Wehrmacht, and a fair amount of good luck for the Germans.)

      However, in 1940, Britain produced more military aircraft than did Germany. Moreover, the U.S. shipped very large numbers of military aircraft and aircraft engines to Britain. Plans had been put into place to dramatically expand American aircraft production capacity, with fully half the aircraft produced sent to Britain. Germany lacked the industrial capacity and access to raw materials to compete against this long-term threat, or to prevent its cities from being destroyed by that combination of American and British industrial strength.

      It was under those circumstances that Germany decided to invade the Soviet Union. Under its previous arrangement with the Soviets, German manufactured goods were to be traded away for Soviet raw materials. But by conquering the Soviet Union, Germany could have access to a far more significant amount of materials and manpower. This was an opportunity to put the (then) undefeated German Army to work in order to help solve the long-term air war problem it then faced.

      Also, Hitler was suspicious of Stalin, and believed the Soviet dictator would launch a war against Germany as soon as the Soviet Army was ready. While Hitler was correct to suspect Stalin and his motives, Stalin’s actual plans were somewhat different than Hitler had believed. Stalin regarded both Germany and the Western democracies as equally enemies of the Soviet Union. Stalin therefore hoped for a long, bloody war between the two sides: a repeat of WWI. After both sides had been bled white, the Soviet Army would move westward into Europe; with neither Germany nor the Western democracies able to resist its advance. Over the short-term, however, this meant that Hitler could have gotten several years of Soviet neutrality, had he wanted it.

      In planning the invasion of the Soviet Union, German military planners had believed the Soviet Army would consist of 200 divisions. In the spring of 1941, the German Army had 150 divisions–but they were qualitatively superior to their Soviet counterparts. However, the Soviet Union had vast reserves of manpower; and by the end of 1941 had expanded its army to the staggering size of 600 divisions.

      In 1942, the Soviet Union out-produced Germany 3:1 or 4:1 in major land weapons categories, and produced nearly twice as many military aircraft as did Germany. There were several reasons for this, including the fact that Germany was somewhat behind the Soviet Union in terms of industrializing its weapons manufacturing effort. By 1944 German military production slightly exceeded that of the Soviet Union. But by then it was too late to matter.

      Had Germany not invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, there is a very significant chance Germany would have been slowly crushed, and its cities destroyed, by the Anglo-American aircraft manufacturing effort.

      posted in Axis & Allies Europe 1940
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Most over-rated WWII Leader

      @LilTheo:

      I guess how one treats his soldier is irrelevant?

      Patton was nearly court martialed for slapping a crying soldier in the face. I think that puts him front and center for " Worst World War II General " ever.

      I think the most overrated leader is definitely Montgomery.

      Nobody liked him, not even Churchill. He considered Operation Market Garden, as noted in his after battle reports to be a " moderate success. "

      Patton felt that if one soldier did less than his fair share, it meant some other soldier would have to do more than his fair share. To allow soldiers to abandon the front, therefore, represented an injustice to the other soldiers left behind to do the fighting and the dying.

      There were two slapping incidents, including the one you mentioned. In both cases, Patton had encountered a soldier who had abandoned the front; and who had refused Patton’s command to return to combat.

      Patton’s attitudes about this subject are largely a product of the culture in which he was raised. The U.S. has traditionally had four major cultural groups: the Puritan, the Cavalier, the Quaker, and the Borderer. Of those four, the Borderer is the most warlike. The Borderers are descended from people who lived in the six northernmost English counties, the Scotch Lowlands, and northern Ireland. For many hundreds of years, that region was a constant war zone. As a consequence of all that war, Borderers adopted warrior values; including the kind of contempt for personal cowardice Patton displayed in the slapping incidents.

      The Quaker group was by far the most pacifistic, and tended to oppose all wars on principle. Eisenhower was raised in that cultural group, and adopted a milder version of that group’s distaste for war. His initial reaction to the slapping incident–a desire to remove Patton from command–was typical of how a Quaker would see such a situation.

      Given the cultural backgrounds of the two men, one would expect that the warrior (Patton) would favor harsher treatment for postwar Germany than the one with qualms about war (Eisenhower). Oddly enough, the opposite proved the case.


      Patton was relieved of duty after openly revolting against the punitive occupation directive JCS 1067.[49] His view of the war was that with Hitler gone, the German army could be rebuilt into an ally in a potential war against the Russians, whom Patton notoriously despised and considered a greater menace than the Germans. During this period, he wrote that the Allied victory would be in vain if it led to a tyrant worse than Hitler and an army of “Mongolian savages” controlling half of Europe. Eisenhower had at last had enough, relieving Patton of all duties and ordering his return to the United States.


      See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Patton#Relations_with_Eisenhower

      JSC 1067 was specifically intended to starve the German people, as indicated in the below quote:


      On March 20, 1945 President Roosevelt was warned that the JCS 1067 was not workable: it would let the Germans “stew in their own juice”. Roosevelt’s response was “Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy sink!” Asked if he wanted the German people to starve, he replied, “Why not?”[45] . . .

      In his 1950 book Decision in Germany, Clay wrote, “It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revive industrial production”.[48] [Those steps were specifically forbidden under JCS 1067.]


      See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgenthau_plan#JCS_1067

      The fact that Eisenhower supported starving the Germans (JSC 1067), and Patton sacrificed his career to oppose the measure, tells me a lot more about the relative degree of kindness and morality the two men had, than does a mere slapping incident.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: What If Hitler Had Used Nerve Gas?

      @MrMalachiCrunch:

      Some interesting points Kurt and some key words and citations to search on in order to broaden my knowledge for which I thank you.

      Hoover did state that and although he had a fair bit of experience with the German economy that statement was an opinion with some slanting, Hoover (Republican) did lose his presidency to FDR (Democrat) and also did preside over the initiation of the great depression (questions about economic policy prowess and predictive accuracy).  Stating FDR as being pro-communist and Hoover as uberHero I think treads closely on the avoidance of political talk and that of factual accuracy.

      The initial Morgenthau Plan had been modified with the influence of Winston Churchill who was against it and was considered 'The real Morgenthau Plan".  Still nasty and stupid in my humble opinion but not as….   It can be found here: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id=FRUS.FRUS1944

      After FDR died, the Morgenthau Plan died, granted, aspects did influence allied planning.  Stating Germans were starving due to allied planning is indeed correct and a travisty.  Stating it was done under the “Morgenthau Plan” is factucally inaccurate.  The intimation in the form of the socractic path from FDR to Morgenthau Plan to Genocide ergo one political spectrum being better than the other I hope is merely a phantom of my paranoid mind.  But just because I am paranoid does not mean they are not out to get me…

      I think we’re in agreement on most points. There are a few things I’d like to address, however. First is my assertion that FDR was pro-communist. That assertion is based on a number of facts. Consider, for example, the information contained in the following text:


      Davies even contrived to make a brief for bugging. In one scene, set in the American Embassy in Moscow, the Ambassador’s assistants warn him of listening devices, but he rebukes them severely:

      I say nothing outside the Kremlin that I wouldn’t say to Stalin’s face. Do you? . . . We’re here in a sense as guests of the Soviet government, and I’m going to believe they trust the United States as a friend until they prove otherwise. Is that clear?

      When the assistant persists that still, after all, there may be microphones, Davies, played with aplomb by FDR’s favorite actor, Walter Huston, cuts him off: “Then let ’em hear! We’ll be friends that much faster!”4

      This cinematic scene was based on an actual incident. In 1937, when a bug was discovered directly over the Ambassador’s desk at the US Embassy in Moscow, the real Davies laughed it off. If the Soviets wanted to listen in, he told his incredulous staff—which included George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and other skilled State Department diplomats—they would only obtain proof of America’s sincere desire to cooperate with them.5

      FDR strongly approved of the film. In his assessment of Soviet politics, he was much closer to Davies, his second Ambassador, than to his first, William C. Bullitt.


      From https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article02.html

      The propaganda film Mission to Moscow was openly and unabashedly pro-Soviet, and was specifically approved by FDR himself. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mission_to_Moscow . The film’s producer described it as “an expedient lie for political purposes, glossily covering up important facts with full or partial knowledge of their false presentation.” This film was the first in a series of movies FDR had arranged to be distributed to the American people as part of his wartime pro-Soviet propaganda effort. The nature of that overall effort is summed up fairly well by the below propaganda poster:

      http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc230/small/

      The aforementioned CIA article hinted at the overall theme of FDR’s foreign policy in the following paragraph:


      When [future U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] Davies arrived in Moscow, Amb. Standley, not informed of the mission in advance, resigned in disgust. Davies met Stalin in the Kremlin and read him the letter. He emphasized the US government’s disapproval of British imperialism and broadly hinted that the USA and the USSR, without the British, could rule the world together. Having betrayed British allies and destroyed the incumbent Ambassador, Davies then retired with Stalin to the Kremlin screening room to watch Mission to Moscow, where his cinematic glorification of the dictator, to his disappointment, did not win a rave review, but only a grunt or two. However, Davies got what he came for: Stalin agreed to meet FDR in Alaska. Davies’ biographer, Elizabeth Kimball MacLean, calls it “the coup of his diplomatic career.”10


      The twin pillars of FDR’s foreign policy were the destruction of Nazi Germany, and a Soviet-American alliance that would largely control the postwar world. FDR believed that his New Deal and Soviet communism were two sides to the same coin; and that whatever differences existed between the two systems were differences of degree, not differences of kind. That view of the subject is far closer to being correct than many realize; as indicated by the following link:

      http://www.mackinac.org/5176

      Below is a quote from the Mackinac Institute:


      The man Roosevelt picked to direct the NRA [National Recovery Administration] effort was General Hugh “Iron Pants” Johnson, a profane, red-faced bully and professed admirer of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Thundered Johnson, “May Almighty God have mercy on anyone who attempts to interfere with the Blue Eagle” (the official symbol of the NRA, which one senator derisively referred to as the “Soviet duck”). Those who refused to comply with the NRA Johnson personally threatened with public boycotts and “a punch in the nose.” . . .

      A New Jersey tailor named Jack Magid was arrested and sent to jail for the “crime” of pressing a suit of clothes for 35 cents rather than the NRA-inspired “Tailor’s Code” of 40 cents.

      In “The Roosevelt Myth,” historian John T. Flynn described how the NRA’s partisans sometimes conducted “business”:

      –---------------
      The NRA was discovering it could not enforce its rules. Black markets grew up. Only the most violent police methods could procure enforcement. In Sidney Hillman’s garment industry the code authority employed enforcement police. They roamed through the garment district like storm troopers. They could enter a man’s factory, send him out, line up his employees, subject them to minute interrogation, take over his books on the instant. Night work was forbidden. Flying squadrons of these private coat-and-suit police went through the district at night, battering down doors with axes looking for men who were committing the crime of sewing together a pair of pants at night. But without these harsh methods many code authorities said there could be no compliance because the public was not back of it.[27]
      –--------------


      The above text is from the essay “Great Myths of the Great Depression.” Unfortunately, you have to give them your email address before you can see the text.

      FDR’s domestic agenda was one of several ways in which his government’s behavior was like a milder version of the Soviets’. In his foreign relations, he became a direct participant in Soviet atrocities. The provisions FDR agreed to at Yalta included the following


      German [postwar] reparations were partly to be in the form of forced labor. . . .
      The Polish eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, and Poland would receive territorial compensation in the West from Germany. . . .
      Citizens of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia were to be handed over to their respective countries, regardless of their consent.


      See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yalta_Conference

      The first of the three above-mentioned provisions was a polite way of stating that Germans would be converted into slave laborers.


      [General Patton] commented in his diary, “I’m also opposed to sending PW’s to work as slaves in foreign lands (in particular, to France) where many will be starved to death.” He also noted “It is amusing to recall that we fought the revolution in defence of the rights of man and the civil war to abolish slavery and have now gone back on both principles.”


      See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Patton#Relations_with_Eisenhower

      The second-noted provision regarding the westward movement of the Polish and German borders effectively meant the ethnic cleansing of millions of Poles from lands being transferred from Poland to the Soviet Union. It also meant the ethnic cleansing of 13 million Germans from lands being transferred from Germany to Poland. The democratic government of West Germany estimated that 1.8 million people died as a result of the latter ethnic cleansing effort.

      The third-listed provision is in many ways the most sinister single thing to which FDR had agreed. In 1940, the Soviet Union had annexed Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. When Germany invaded in 1941, many people from those three nations rose up against Soviet rule. For the most part, these were ordinary people who wanted to liberate their homelands, and protect their families, from the brutality of Soviet occupation. As the Soviet Army pressed westward, large numbers of people from the Baltic States fled into Germany for protection. Those people were to be turned over to Soviet authorities.

      During WWII, about 1 million citizens of the Soviet Union had fought against it. Those people were generally motivated by anti-communism; and many were also motivated by nationalism, the desire to defend Christianity against Soviet mass murder, or other motives. Whichever of those people fell into British or American hands were to be turned over to the Soviet government. More generally, anyone who had taken refuge from the cruelty and barbarism of the Soviet Union by fleeing westward into Germany would now be placed at the mercy of Stalin. FDR’s agreement to that provision represented direct American participation in Soviet mass murder; and demonstrated exactly how far FDR was willing to go to help the Soviet government punish those who had opposed communism.

      Another provision of the Yalta Conference, not mentioned in the above article, was that surrendered German servicemen would be turned over to whichever Allied nation against which they had done most of their fighting. In practice, this meant that 80% or more of captured German servicemen were to be turned over to the Soviet Union. See the first sentence of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Hartmann#Imprisonment . The section describes how the highest scoring fighter ace in history (with 352 victories) was turned over to the Soviets for torture as part of a more general program.

      To address your point about Herbert Hoover: Truman appointed him to ascertain the situation in postwar Germany. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Hoover#Post-World_War_II .) I doubt Truman would have done this if he had expected Hoover to exaggerate the severity of the situation for political gain. I’ll grant that what Truman expected Hoover to do, and what Hoover actually did, are not necessarily identical concepts. However, the conclusions reached by the Hoover Report (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_President’s_Economic_Mission_to_Germany_and_Austria ) appear neutral; were shared by General Clay, and have been echoed by historians. On page 675 of The Wages of Destruction Tooze noted that


      By the early summer of 1946 rations in many parts of urban Germany were below 1,000 calories per day. . . . The evidence of serious malnutrition was unmistakable. Mortality increased as did the incidence of hunger-related diseases. Infection rates for diptheria, typhoid, and tuberculosis in the British and American zones doubled. The birth rate for babies fell drastically. . . . Germany’s former enemies thought it better to forget the sense of rage that clearly motivated much of Allied policy in the immediate aftermath of the war.


      On page 675, Tooze wrote,


      As early as the autumn of 1943, after the Battle of Kursk, the United States had realized that the dominant power in Europe for the foreseeable future would be the Soviet Union, not Britain, let alone France. At first Roosevelt’s administration had hoped to adjust to this new reality in cooperation with the Soviets. Together the two superpowers would rule both Europe and the world, under which circumstances it might have been possible to ‘do without Germany’.


      The last phrase refers to doing without Germany as a national power, and does not refer to any effort on FDR’s part to employ genocide against the Germans themselves. Nevertheless, genocide against the Germans was clearly a major part of FDR’s policy, both during and after the war. The terror raids against German cities, and the “shoot anything that moves” air missions conducted in the German countryside, were clearly intended to eliminate large numbers of Germans. The genocide of Germans that took place during the war was to be followed up by the Morgenthau Plan. Even though the brutal provisions of that plan were only partially implemented, it nonetheless caused widespread starvation among the German people. As for the Anglo-American food blockade that had been imposed during the war–it is not immediately clear (at least, not to me) whether FDR and Churchill had hoped Hitler would allocate the resulting starvation to the Germans (thus helping to destroy the German people) or whether they hoped for him to allocate the starvation to the Jews and Slavs (thus handing the Allies an enormous propaganda weapon). Given Hitler’s statements in Mein Kampf and elsewhere, the Allied leaders had to know that Hitler was far more likely to choose the latter option than the former.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: What If Hitler Had Used Nerve Gas?

      @MrMalachiCrunch:

      Obviously that random post by immundLig was SPAM.  Notice the links in the body of the message, no doubt the attempt is to have people open said links, I suggest you don’t.

      I should google this to get exact details but I have to run for now.  There was a US proponent of the idea of turning Germany into basically an agrarian based economy and de-industrialize it to prevent it ever from having the means to threaten it’s neighbours.  The threat of the USSR prevented this, Germany’s industrial prowess was required to balanced the Warsaw Pact nations.

      Good call about the spam-like post from immundLig. As for the rest of your post, the stated rationale behind the Morgenthau Plan was as you have described. However, it is not always wise to accept each of FDR’s claims at face value.

      As Adam Tooze pointed out in his book Wages of Destruction, Germany ran at both a food deficit and a raw materials deficit. To achieve a balance of payments while adequately feeding its people, the value it obtained from the sale of exported manufactured goods had to balance out the payments it made for imported food and imported raw materials. To “pastoralize” Germany by eliminating its manufacturing capability, as the Morgenthau Plan was designed to do, would prevent Germany from obtaining the money it needed to pay for food imports. Also note that during the initial postwar period, relief organizations and others had been forbidden from importing food into Germany.

      In a report from March of 1947, Herbert Hoover wrote,

      | “There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a ‘pastoral state’. It
      | cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it.”

      One of the strongest supporters of the Morgenthau Plan was FDR. FDR was pro-communist, and he wanted to kill large numbers of Germans both during and after the war. FDR’s death meant that the responsibility for implementing the Morgenthau Plan shifted to Truman; who was less radical in political outlook than FDR had been. This is not to suggest that Truman’s policies should be even remotely confused with humanitarianism. However, Truman was more willing to bend to political pressure than FDR had been. The cruelest and most genocidal aspects of the Morgenthau Plan were gradually eliminated due to political pressure.

      The radical shift in American postwar policy came in 1948. Because the German people were being deliberately starved to death under the Morgenthau Plan, many were turning to communism. Motivated by some combination of compassion for the starving Germans, and a desire to stop the spread of communism, the Congressional Republicans pushed through the Marshall Plan.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: U.S. Marine Raiders vs. German S.S.

      @Adlertag:

      @zerohour49:

      Who would win Marine Raiders or S.S.?

      I think you might find some answers here :

      http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/

      click > Publications, then > TDI-reports, and then the choice is yours.

      I will recommend this TDI-report:
      http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-4epw1and2final.pdf

      scroll down to chapter 6, or F=Conclusions on page 61.

      It looks like the US forces combat effectiveness was 20 % inferior to the German performance.
      UK combat effectiveness was 50 % inferior to the Germans, and USSR was 300 % inferior. The Italian combat performance was even poorer than the russians.

      Very good info. Thanks!

      Just to add to what I’d written above–I looked at the study in question, and it appears the data for the U.S. versus German soldiers is based mainly on the Battle of the Bulge (late '44 - early '45). Elsewhere, I’ve seen it noted that the German Army of 1944 was a shell of what it had been in '41. All else being equal, one would suppose the Americans would look better against the dilapidated version of the German Army (what they encountered in '44 and '45) than they would have against the German Army of '41 or even the summer of '43.

      I partially agree with the study authors’ conclusion that the Soviet Army might, on a man-for-man basis, have been below average by WWII combatants’ standards. But a lot of the differential was probably also due to the German Army being significantly above the man-for-man standards set by any of its major adversaries; especially when the German Army was in its prime.
      @Wikipedia:

      Among [the German recruits for the Battle of the Bulge] were Volksgrenadier units formed from a mix of battle-hardened veterans and recruits formerly regarded as too young or too old to fight. Training time, equipment, and supplies were inadequate during the preparations.

      See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_bulge

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Most over-rated WWII Leader

      I’m surprised to see General Patton’s name pop up in this discussion. The Germans considered him (correctly) to be the most capable, aggressive, and outside-the-box general the Anglo-American force had. It was precisely that belief which led the Germans to conclude Patton would be in charge of the D-Day invasion.

      Patton was clearly superior to the slow, plodding Montgomery, or even to any of his American contemporaries (including Eisenhower). Many are aware that Patton’s performance in the Battle of the Bulge was brilliant. What is somewhat less well-known is that his performance in France as a whole was first-rate. Joseph Stalin said that the Red Army could neither have planned nor executed Patton’s advance across France. (And that was after many years of the Red Army fighting and gaining experience.)

      Of all the generals the British or Americans had, Patton was the closest to a Guderian, a Rommel, or a von Manstein. Those four generals are characterized by a flexibility of thought, an understanding of the value of combined arms and of mobile warfare, and a skilled aggressiveness which made each of them highly formidable adversaries.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: What If Hitler Had Used Nerve Gas?

      @dinosaur:

      Remember that we didn’t know about radiation poisoning before we used the bombs on Japan.  Also, reflect on what the US did with the Marshall Plan after the war.

      I am sure if Germany used mustard gas or some other chemical agent we would have dropped it on them in greater quantities and with more effect.  I can’t imagine what we would have done during the middle of the war if we had truely understood the conditions in the German POW camps.  War is about winning.  Please don’t moralize about it after.

      The Marshall Plan was implemented in 1948. It represented a radical departure from the previous Allied postwar plan, which was intended to starve millions of Germans.


      Unhappy with the Morgenthau-plan consequences, in a March 18, 1947 report former U.S. President Herbert Hoover remarked:
      “There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a ‘pastoral state’. It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it.” [10]


      From the same article:


      Germany was closed to relief shipments until December 1945. The given reasons were that they might tend to negate the policy of restricting the German standard of living. CARE package shipments to individuals remained prohibited until 5 June 1946. U.S. troops and their families were also under unders to destroy their own excess food rather than letting German families have access to it.

      In 1945 the German Red Cross was dissolved[58][59] , and the International Red Cross and other international relief agencies were kept from helping ethnic Germans through strict controls on supplies and on travel.[60] The few agencies permitted to operate within Germany, such as the indigenous Caritas Verband, were not allowed to use imported supplies. When the Vatican attempted to transmit food supplies from Chile to German infants[61] the U.S. State Department forbade it.[61]


      These policies represented a continuation of the Anglo-American food blockade that had been imposed on Germany during the war. The effects of that food blockade were eloquently described by Adam Tooze in his book The Wages of Destruction. From page 477:


      As we have discussed, the ‘bread basket of the Ukraine’ played a key role in all the various military-economic assessments of the Barbarossa campaign prepared over the winter of 1940-41. For Hitler, it was the key priority, to be achieved prior to any other military consideration, the importance of which was only reinforced by the alarming decline in German grain stocks. By December 1940 the military was convinced that this was the last year in which they could approach the food question with any confidence. Nor was this simply a German problem. All of the Western European territories which had fallen under German domination in 1940 had substantial net grain deficits.


      The food shortage which Tooze described led the Nazi regime to starve or otherwise exterminate those groups which it liked the least, or which were the least useful to the war effort. From pages 539 - 541:


      Bread rations had only been sustained by making severe inroads into grain stocks. By the end of 1941, these were nearing exhaustion. WHen the order to ship large numbers of Eastern workers to Germany for work was first given by Goering in November 1941, Backe protested vigorously. The 400,000 Soviet prisoners of war already in Germany were more than he could provide for. Goering had spoken casually of feeding the Eastern workers on cats and horse-meat. Back had consulted the statistics and reported glumly that there were not enough cats to provide a ration for the Eastern workers and horse-meat was already being used to supplement the rations of the German population. . . .

      Backe was in an impossible position. The Fuehrer had demanded more workers. Gauleiter Sauckel was dedicated to delivering them. Hitler and Sauckel now demanded that the workers be fed, which was clearly a necessity if they were to be productive. And yet, given the level of grain stocks, Backe was unable to meet this demand. What was called for was a reduction in consumption, not additional provisions for millions of new workers. The seriousness of the situation became apparent to the wider public in the spring of 1942 when the Food Ministry announced cuts to the food rations of the German population. Given the regime’s mortal fear of damaging morale, the ration cuts of April 1942 are incontrovertible evidence that the food crisis was real. . . . [The morale effect of the ration cuts was], reported the SD’s informants, ‘devastating’ like ‘virtually no other event during the war’. Studies by nutritional experts added to the leadership’s concerns.


      To prevent the slow starvation of the German people, the Nazi leadership took the following action. (Described on page 544:)


      By the end of May 1942 Backe had met both with Hitler and General Governor Frank and had agreed that food was to be redistributed on a massive scale. . . . Entire groups were to be excluded from the food supply, most notably the Jews. As Goebbels noted in his diary, the new regime would be based on the principle that before Germany starved ‘it would be the turn of a number of other peoples’.


      These measures did not entirely eliminate the food problems within Germany. They allowed the German government to avert the slow starvation of the Germans themselves, but were not enough to prevent the starvation of many Soviet POWs. (A group which, as noted earlier, Hitler had ordered to be fed because he needed their labor.)

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Strategy Talk: Is the German Wehrmacht of World War II Over Rated?

      @balungaloaf:

      without US aid assistance via lend lease, without the allied strategic bombing campaign tying up much of the luftwaffe and anti air defenses, and without the threat of invasion keeping millions of german soldiers in europe, the soviets would have been smashed before they could ever set up a counter attack.  if moscow was taken, the people would give up on their communist overlords and capitulate.

      You alluded to the pressure the U.S. and Britain put on Germany; and I fully agree that pressure was immense. Even in 1940–before the U.S. was technically at war–its industrial production created profound implications for the balance of power in Europe. With massive numbers of American aircraft being produced and sent to Britain, Germany had to either a) find a way to keep pace, industrially, with the U.S. and Britain combined, or b) watch its cities and people be destroyed by waves of British and American bombers. The invasion of the Soviet Union was largely precipitated by the desire to allow Germany to attain the raw materials and industrial capacity to achieve outcome A.

      However, keeping pace with the production capacity of the U.S. and Britain also required Germany to invest heavily in its own production facilities. That investment diverted effort from what would have been immediately useful production against the Soviet Union. During 1942, the Soviets out-produced the Germans 3:1 or even 4:1 in all major land categories of production, and even out-produced the Germans 2:1 in planes.

      Prior to launching Operation Barbarossa, the German military staff had incorrectly believed that the Soviet Army consisted of 200 divisions. Divisions which had fought very poorly in the Soviets’ 1940 invasion of Finland. In the spring of 1941, the German Army consisted of 150 divisions; 100 of which were used for the invasion of the Soviet Union. But in the months after the invasion, the Soviets were quickly able to expand the size of their army to about 600 divisions. Given the imbalance of sheer numbers, it is very unlikely Germany could have prevailed in a war against the Soviet Union even despite its military’s advantage on a man-for-man basis.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: How to balance a round 1 Japanese Declaration of War

      I’d like to throw one additional idea into the mix. (I’m not necessarily saying this is the best possible idea or anything.) While at peace, the U.S. could collect income at half its normal rate. That would simulate the fact that the U.S. peacetime economy was less focused on military production than it later became. The Japanese player would want the U.S. to collect income at this reduced rate for as long as possible, and so would have a strong incentive to postpone the declaration of war. Also, the lower American income would reduce the extent to which the Japanese player fell behind in the cold war with the U.S. in the absence of war.

      There are, however, several disadvantages to this strategy.

      1. Implementing it online would be slightly cumbersome, and would require editing American IPCs for the first few rounds. (Not a huge deal though.)
      2. It would affect the balance of the game. I know you wrote that game balance issues can be dealt with via bids; but this is a fairly big issue. Probably if you were going to do this increasing the Americans’ base income by a moderate amount would also make sense.
        3. This, alone, still might not be enough to balance the J1 attack with the J2 - J4 attacks. Moving that British fleet away from the Japanese might be a good thing to do in conjunction with this.
      posted in Axis & Allies Pacific 1940
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: U.S & Germany

      In some of my other posts on this forum, I’ve described how even in 1940 (when the U.S. was still technically at peace with Germany), it had devoted a significant amount of industrial potential toward winning the air war against Germany; with plans to considerably expand the effort over the next several years. America’s strongest single asset was her industrial potential, as Hitler clearly understood. But that potential was going to be increasingly turned against Germany, whether the U.S. was technically at war or not.

      Hitler’s plan to counter this was to expand Germany’s industrial output over the short-term, so that he could at least keep pace with the air war over Germany in the long haul. His method of expanding Germany’s output included industrialization and conquest. The industrialization aspect of his plan meant that instead of putting everything he had into weapons output for 1941 or 1942–in a massive effort to crush the Soviet Union–he had to divide his nation’s economic activity between short-term military production and long-term output increases. The result of all that industrial investment was that Germany increased its aircraft output from 16,000 planes per year in 1941 to over 40,000 planes per year by 1944. It also increased its military production in other categories, such as tanks and V2 rockets.

      In late 1941, Hitler knew that his window of opportunity to win the war was relatively slim; and that 1942 would be critical. Germany had to win a decisive victory over the Soviet Union in that year, both to take pressure off its eastern front, and to provide it with the raw materials and manpower it needed to hold its own in the air war over the long haul. Hitler believed that the overwhelming majority of America’s naval strength would be needed in the Pacific to counter the Japanese; at least until the end of 1943. That gave him what he believed was a two year window with which he could sink the American Lend-Lease Aid pouring into Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Sinking those ships would increase Germany’s chances of obtaining the victory over the Soviet Union it desperately needed.

      However, the Japanese Navy proved less adept than Hitler had hoped. The Battle of Midway occurred six months after Pearl Harbor. That battle took the naval pressure off the U.S. in the Pacific, and allowed it to focus more of its efforts on convoy protection in the Atlantic. More generally, the failure of the Japanese military meant that Japan would be far less successful in taking military pressure off of Germany than Hitler had hoped.

      In 1942, the Soviet Union outproduced Germany 3:1 - 4:1 in tanks, artillery, and other land combat categories, and even 2:1 in military aircraft. It also fielded a much larger army than Germany. Thus evaporated Hitler’s hope of a decisive victory on his eastern front.

      Had Hitler not declared war against the U.S., large amounts of American Lend-Lease aid would still have flowed to his enemies in Europe. Over the long-term, he still would have needed to devote a significant portion of his military production to defending German skies and German cities against American-made bombers. He would have lost out on the Second Happy Time (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Happy_Time ), which would have resulted in a stronger Soviet war effort for 1942. On the other hand, he wouldn’t have had to deal with the U.S. invasion of Algeria in 1942, its invasion of Sicily and Italy in 1943, or the Normandy invasion of '44. It’s easy to say in hindsight that the harm of the American invasions exceeded the benefit of sinking that Lend-Lease shipping in '42. But that distinction was less obvious at the time.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Having Italy as the 6th player in revised axis and allies

      @Imperious:

      3 years latter?

      Needed a little time to mull things over.

      posted in House Rules
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Having Italy as the 6th player in revised axis and allies

      @Flashman:

      My take on Italy, in reference to my map:

      IPC Value totals

      Each of three Allied powers and Japan each = 50
      Germany = 45
      Italy = 22
      Vichy France = 13

      The Italian player also controls Vichy, collecting it’s income and spending this how it sees fit.

      However what I call the “Vichy Variable” allows different levels of Axis income to be brought to bear depending on how VF is treated.
      At one extreme Vichy is treated as an integral part of Italy, much as Nationalist China is effectively part of the USA.
      At the other Vichy is Neutral, adds no income to Italy, and will only fight by defending itself against allied attacks.
      Which of the Vichy rules is adopted dictates the difficulty levels for the Axis, and could even be used as the basis of bidding.

      http://66.125.84.108/web1/flashman/Complete1942jun.jpg

      Wartime aircraft production represents a decent proxy for overall military production. In 1941, the aircraft production figures were as follows:

      U.S: 19,000
      Germany: 12,000
      U.S.S.R.: 16,000
      U.K.: 20,000
      Japan: 5,000

      In 1942, the numbers were:

      U.S.: 48,000
      Germany: 15,000
      U.S.S.R.: 25,000
      U.K.: 24,000
      Japan: 9,000

      By 1944, those figures had risen to the following numbers:

      U.S.: 96,000
      Germany: 41,000
      U.S.S.R.: 40,000
      U.K.: 26,000
      Japan: 28,000

      Okay, I realize that the above production figures spell almost certain doom for the Axis. So any map designer will need to ignore–or compensate for–the gross imbalance between Axis and Allied production. But you can at least use the above figures to determine production proportions within teams. If you use the '42 numbers, British and Soviet military production should be about equal. But if you go with the numbers from '44, the Soviets should have nearly double the income of the British. The U.S. should (apparently) represent half or more of the Allied total production effort, which seems a little high to me. For the Axis, Japan’s income should be between 60% and 70% of Germany’s. (Depending on whether you use the '42 or '44 production figures.)

      From 1939 - 1945, Italy produced a total of 18,000 military aircraft, as compared to 120,000 for Germany. But 48,000 of Germany’s aircraft were produced in '44 or '45, at a time when Italy’s aircraft production had been disrupted by the overthrow of Mussolini and the Allied invasion. If one compares Italy’s total aircraft production during the war to the 72,000 Germany produced before '44, the ratio is four German aircraft for every Italian aircraft produced. This implies an Italian income 1/4 that of Germany’s.

      posted in House Rules
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Germany first

      @Imperious:

      When they took Singapore in 1941 with full strength the infantry rode on bicycles and bluffed the British into surrender. They exhausted ammo and food and other supplies just marching from Indo China. They had no idea what logistical support meant and could never sustain long lines of supplies. They were jungle fighters and not snow fighters. The land of eastern Soviets was a natural barrier. I don’t think anybody would have been in any position to support a 5-6 thousand mile long logistical train and the enemy would have easily destroyed anything to facilitate movement/ resources.

      Japan had no business in Russia. It offered nothing to them except one port ( Vladivostok)

      If Japan could not defeat a backward country like China that still practiced things like foot binding for all women, thats the only indication you need to qualify their abilities. China had a untrained army with no modern equipment and still Japan fights her for 14 years and gets maybe a 5th of China proper. If they attacked Russia it would take about 60 years before they made even moderate progress.

      The only allies they pushed out were in Philippines, Burma, and Malaya. one of these were token defenders, and the others were pinned into a corner with no room to fight. In open country Japan would melt like ice cream in hell.

      Your analysis of the Japanese Army’s backwardness is dead-on accurate. But that said, the situation in China was a tough nut for them to crack. Imagine the Vietnam War except on a much larger scale. China’s various factions used both conventional warfare and guerrilla warfare, and nothing stayed conquered unless held down by a Japanese garrison. China’s population reserves were almost unlimited, and its army was able to obtain some help from its neighbors. Outright victory in a situation like that is difficult to obtain, especially for a nation with only a fraction of China’s population size.

      But as you’ve pointed out, Japan’s logistics were second- or third-rate, and its overall Army was not up to the standards of the Soviets or the Germans. To give a specific example, Japan’s main tank design was a light tank, intended to take out Chinese infantry. It was no match for a Sherman; let alone a T-34-85! To fight a war against the Soviet Union effectively, Japan would have had to make peace in China (where its army had been hopelessly bogged down), significantly increase its industrial capacity and commitment to its army. Japan produced 2,500 tanks during WWII, as compared to 105,000 for the Soviet Union. Japan produced 13,000 artillery pieces during the war, compared to 516,000 artillery pieces for the Soviets. Even apart from the logistical problems you described, those numbers don’t add up to a successful Japanese invasion of Siberia. Then there was also the problem of tactics. Japan, not having been a major participant in WWI-style trench warfare, did not appear to have learned the lessons from that war. In several instances, its soldiers would charge strongly defended American positions, much like French troops charging German machine gun emplacements in 1914. The results were the same in both cases.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Alternative History WWII

      That’s a really cool link, and has given me some intriguing ideas for an alternative rules set. Thanks for the read! :)

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Strategy Talk: Is the German Wehrmacht of World War II Over Rated?

      One of my strongest objections to the piece is the sentence,

      | To use a sports analogy, it was as if a Major League Baseball franchise, in seeking to win
      | the World Series, decided to model itself not on the New York Yankees but rather on the
      | Chicago Cubs.

      I’ll begin with the following quote, from pages 405 - 406 of Adam Tooze’s book Wages of Destruction


      London by the end of June 1940 was expecting delivery from the United States of no less than 10,800 aircraft and 13,000 aero-engines over the next eighteen months. This was in addition to Britain’s own production of 15,000 military aircraft. . . . By way of comparison, total aircraft production for Germany in 1940 came to only 10,826 aircraft and in 1941 it expanded to only 12,000. . . On 23 July 1940 British procurements agents in Washington were invited to a clandestine meeting with American industrial planners, from which emerged a scheme to expand the capacity of the United States aircraft industry so that it would be able to deliver no less than 72,000 aircraft per annum, guaranteeing to the British a supply of 3,000 planes per month, three times the current German output.


      The scale of Anglo-American aircraft production left Germany with a brutal choice. If it attempted no further conquests, its aircraft production would, over time, be dwarfed by that of the British and Americans. If Germany were to lose control over its own skies, it would mean the loss of its cities, and of a significant portion of its population. To prevent that outcome, Germany needed more manpower, industrial capacity, and raw materials. All of which could be found to the east, in the Soviet Union. Conquering the Soviet Union would also provide Germany the farmland it needed to feed its own people–a must in light of the British food blockade. Finally, the conquest of the Soviet Union would have the obvious advantages of destroying communism and of securing Germany’s eastern border from a land war.

      When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941, the total German Army consisted of 150 divisions. Of those, 100 were used in the invasion. German military planners had believed they would face 200 Soviet divisions. They were off by a factor of three. In the months immediately following the German invasion, the Soviet Army had expanded itself to a staggering 600 divisions. This advantage in manpower was compounded by its edge in industrial output.

      From page 588 of Tooze’s book:


      The Soviet Union in 1942 managed to out-produce Germany in virtually every category of weapons. The margin for small arms and artillery was 3:1. For tanks it was a staggering 4:1, a differential compounded by the superior quality of the T34 tank. Even in combat aircraft the margin was 2:1. . . . To avoid misunderstandings, this is emphatically a story of Soviet success not German failure.


      Despite these disadvantages, the German Army achieved significant success. In Operation Barbarossa, the German military killed over 800,000 Soviet soldiers, and captured another 3.3 million, at the loss of only 275,000 German soldiers killed or missing. Even later, when the Soviet military had learned from its past mistakes, and the fortunes of war were turning against Germany, it still maintained favorable ratios. In the battle of Kursk (1943), Germany experienced 170,000 casualties, as compared to 860,000 for the Soviet Union. The German military of WWII included the highest-scoring fighter ace of all time (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Hartmann ) and the highest-scoring tank commander ever (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_Knispel ). To compare a military like this to the Chicago Cubs is a major stretch, even for the most avid and diehard Cubs fan. Germany fought extremely well on a man-for-man basis, and was beaten only because the Allies had several times as much industrial capacity and available manpower for infantry as the Axis nations had.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: German WWII Technology

      I voted for the Me 262, though I have to admit I was tempted by the Type XXI U-boats. The Western Allies’ efforts to destroy Germany’s production, demolish its transportation system, wipe out large numbers of civilians in firestorms, and destroy its fuel supply were devastating. Moreover, the air superiority attained by the Western Democracies played a key role in making the Normandy invasion work. On Germany’s Eastern front, both sides used bomber aircraft primarily in a tactical role, and in support of the army. Control of the skies on that front meant that your dive bombers would be free to destroy the enemy’s tanks and artillery from the air, while your own tanks and artillery would be protected. At the battle of Kursk, for example, the Soviets had more military aircraft present than did the Germans; with both sides’ planes being roughly comparable in terms of quality. The avian situation on Germany’s eastern front progressively deteriorated, with the Soviets attaining first parity, and then superiority, in the skies above the battlefields. The Me 262 would have solved that problem.

      On the other hand, the Type XXI U-boat represented a dramatic leap forward from any previously encountered sub design. These subs had more in common with the first nuclear subs of the postwar era than they did with their WWII contemporaries. They had the potential to make sub raiding a far more effective strategy than it had been in the past. But from a strategic perspective, Germany needed aerial superiority a lot more than it needed better sub raiding.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
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