Posts made by KurtGodel7

Creeping deth wrote:

every single one of them paints the same picture for the Luftwaffe and the state of German logistics in general: stretched bare with never enough to go around.

I’ll go along with that. But limited logistics would have been at least as much a problem for German tanks as it was for the Luftwaffe. If (for example) adequate amounts of fuel could not be delivered to the front, the effectiveness of German tanks would have been reduced. In discussing the merits and demerits of your argument and mine, the limited state of German logistics is not evidence either way. Limited logistical support would have, and did, hamper all aspects of the German war machine (not just tanks only, and not just Luftwaffe only).

I never once stated that more panzers were produced than either T-34 or KV series vehicles, just that they were definitely a minority in the Soviet armoured forces.

Fair enough. But my argument is that the Soviet tank force was stronger than the German tank force in June of '41; and that Soviet industry produced more tank strength during '41 than did German industry. The 1,500 KV series tanks and T-34s which the Soviet Union had on June 22nd, alone, represented more combat power than Germany’s entire tank force (of slightly over 3,000 tanks). Any combat value the Soviets derived from the BTs or T-26s was just a bonus.

Throwing production numbers around is only going to get you so far in this argument, there is much more to it than raw numbers.

Granted. A Panzer III or Panzer IV was certainly a better tank than a BT or a T-26. If the Soviet tank force had consisted only of BTs and T-26s, an argument could be made that Soviet quantity was counterbalanced by German quality. But the Soviets could have celebrated the summer solstice of ‘41 by scrapping every BT and T-26 they had; and at the end of that celebration they still would have had a stronger, better tank force than the Germans’.

Oh this is rich. I’m not the one making the assertion, you are.

Your unsupported assertion was that the Luftwaffe “was only capable of local air supremacy. It absolutely could not be responsible for destroying the vast bulk of the T-26 series tanks.” I have presented evidence that the Luftwaffe enjoyed air superiority in the central and northern portions of the eastern front, and that it destroyed large numbers of ground targets during Barbarossa.

YOU are the one saying that the existence of all these amphibious tanks is evidence the Russians were going to invade in 1941.

From my previous post: “A light, amphibious tank is far more useful on offense than on defense. The fact that Stalin had more tanks in that category than Germany had total tanks is evidence that Stalin had planned on invading Germany sooner or later. Obviously, pinning down the year of the invasion is not something which can be achieved by pointing at sheer numbers of amphibious tanks.” You are putting an argument in my mouth after I had specifically contradicted that argument.

By the way, I’m still waiting for an explanation as to how the Red Army was going to invade in the middle of their herculean reorganization and refitting efforts taking place in 1941.

Suvorov did not address this point in detail in the book of his I’ve read. However, he’s also written another book on this subject, and it’s possible he’s addressed it there. In the book I did read, Suvorov pointed to the excellent success the Red Army had enjoyed in its undeclared war with Japan in 1939. He expressed the view that, by August '41, the Soviet Union could have employed a greatly scaled-up version of its Khalkhin Gol offensive; directing this larger offensive against Germany. If the Red Army was ready for war in 1939 (as seemingly indicated by its success at Khalkhin Gol), it’s reasonable to suppose it might also have been ready for war in '41. However, it had prepared for an offensive war against Germany only, and was completely unprepared for the defensive war it actually faced.

Three [Soviet] infantry divisions and a tank brigade crossed the river, supported by massed artillery and the Soviet Air Force. Once the Japanese were pinned down by the attack of Soviet centre units, Soviet armoured units swept around the flanks and attacked the Japanese in the rear, achieving a classic double envelopment.

We tend to think of BT-7s and T-26s as being of little use. Such tanks were of little use in a defensive war. But they would have been well-suited to the task of attacking the flanks and rear of German forces, just as they had done to the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. You will recall that German tanks were no match for French Char-Bs. But that didn’t stop Germany from using its tanks to cut off and encircle Allied forces in France. The Soviet Union would have used its T-26s and BT-7s in a similar manner. A single Panzer III or Panzer IV could probably have taken out several BT-7s or T-26s before being destroyed. But Stalin began with a better than 7:1 advantage in the starting number of tanks, including a force of T-34s and KV series tanks half as numerous as Germany’s entire tank force. The BT-7s and T-26s were probably not a major component of the plan to destroy the German tank force. But those Soviet light tanks were a major component of the Soviet plan to encircle and destroy German armies.

Prior to Barbarossa, Soviet tanks and the fuel intended for them had been moved very, very close to the front. Suvorov points out that there were places where the Nazi-Soviet border jutted westward, and other places where it jutted eastward. There were large concentrations of Soviet forces (including tanks, fuel, and ammunition) wherever that border jutted westward. Just as there were large German concentrations of forces wherever it jutted eastward. (The Germans wanted to begin their offensive from as far east as possible.) This starting deployment of forces ensured a tremendous advantage for whichever side struck the first blow. Moreover, Stalin’s troop movement was still weeks away from completion when Germany struck. On June 22nd, Soviet tanks and their crews were often in widely disparate locations. The fuel intended for those tanks was often destroyed, or captured by the Germans. With the Soviets facing rapidly advancing German forces, and with the fuel needed to evacuate their tanks mostly gone, the typical decision was to fuel the medium and heavy tanks only, while abandoning/destroying the light tanks. Light tanks would have been far more useful for the war Stalin expected than the war he actually had.

Creeping Deth wrote:

Most of your posting so far has contained irrelevant information on the specifications of the Soviet Union’s
armoured vehicles, as if these alone are proof that Stalin was planning to invade in 1941.

The specifications are evidence of the correctness of my earlier assertion: that the Soviet Union had more and better tanks.

My VERY NEXT SENTENCE after the one you quoted above was an admission that the T-34 and KV series tanks were objectively better vehicles.

Yes, but you then minimized that admission by stating that the KV series had been produced in small numbers. In 1941, the Soviet Union produced more KVs and T-34s than Germany produced total tanks. The fact that Stalin’s tank force was much stronger than Germany’s is not itself evidence of an intention to invade.

I didn’t click your link because I’ve read enough scholarly work and memoirs on this subject to know that your assertion was erroneous.

You’ve claimed this several times, and thus far haven’t supported your claims with evidence. Several sources I’ve read have indicated that the Luftwaffe destroyed large numbers of Soviet tanks and artillery pieces in 1941. I am not going to disbelieve those sources based on your unsupported assertions. According to page 132 - 133 of this book:

In July 1941 the Luftwaffe was undisputed mistress of the sky on the Eastern front. The Russians were in full retreat from the Baltic to the Black Sea, harassed by the Stukas that blasted a path for advancing armor. . . .

On the third day of the invasion [Barbarossa], General Ewald von Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group suffered heavy losses near Kovel during a tank battle with the Soviet Fifth Army, but the Luftwaffe’s overwhelming air superiority saved the situation and the Russian armored formations were broken up by concentrated Stuka attacks.

(See Hitler’s Stuka Squadrons by John Ward.)

Below is a quote from a different book

1. . . . On this date [June 22nd, 1941] [the Soviet Air Force] had no less than 20,450 combat aircraft. . . . As we have seen, the attacking Luftwaffe forces contained only 3,297 combat aircraft on 21st June 1941. The magnitude of the task facing the Luftwaffe forces in June and July 1941 cannot be overstated. . . . Given these numbers alone, it is rather astonishing that the Luftwaffe was able to conduct effective offensive operations at all without being eliminated. . . .

2. Remarkably, the Luftwaffe managed to rapidly establish air superiority along most of the East Front by mid-July 1941. It had established air superiority among almost all major front sectors by late July, especially in the most critical central and northern sectors, and the approaches to Moscow. Post-war reports by Red Army units in these sectors reveal that they repeatedly complained of enemy air support destroying and/or disrupting a particular defense line or attack formation. It was only in the far south (around Odessa) that the Axis air-forces achieved what could only be described as air parity.

3. This level of air superiority and air interdiction against Red Army units was maintained until late October and early November 1941, when Luftflotte 2 and II. Fliegerkorps, along with almost a third of Luftwaffe strength in the East, was ordered to the West. . . . In fact the OKW . . . didn’t even rate the VVS [Soviet Air Force] as a serious threat at the operational level until late 1942. . . .

5. The Luftwaffe achieved an incredible kill to loss ratio of over 5.5 to 1 (including aircraft destroyed on the ground) on the East Front from June to December 1941, and it was probably considerably higher.

See Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation by Nigel Askey.

[The Luftwaffe] absolutely could not be responsible for destroying the vast bulk of the T-26 series tanks as you earlier stated.

In my earlier statement, I wrote that the bulk of T-26s were destroyed by the Luftwaffe and German artillery. (Not the Luftwaffe only.) The above quotes confirm the Luftwaffe was in a position to destroy large numbers of Soviet tanks and other land units in 1941. I will add that the highest scoring fighter ace in history, Erich Hartmann, had 352 victories. (Almost all of which were against Soviet aircraft.) The highest-scoring anti-tank pilot in history, Hans Rudel, destroyed 519 Soviet tanks. The idea that the Luftwaffe couldn’t have destroyed very many Soviet tanks because it was too busy fighting the Soviet Air Force seems far-fetched. Rudel only had nine aerial victories against Soviet planes, consistent with the fact that the Stuka and other dive bombers or attack planes were better-suited to the destruction of land targets than air-to-air dog fighting. During Barbarossa a fairly large percentage of Germany’s total air units were dive bombers or ground attack planes. Those air units were given the primary task of destroying targets on the ground.

The fact that you believe the Soviets would have walked through the Germans without [the presence of
air and other non-tank units] shows how elementary your understanding of the Eastern Front really is.

I’m rapidly losing patience with your failure to grasp the fact that in June ‘41, the Soviet tank force was stronger than the German. On June 22nd, 1941 the Germans had 3,266 tanks on the eastern front. Of those, only 1,146 had a 50 mm gun or larger. On June 22nd 1941 the Soviets had 1000 T-34s and 500 KV series tanks, giving them 1,500 tanks which could cut through any German tank like a knife through hot butter. What effect did the Germans’ 50 mm guns have against the T-34?

Half a dozen anti-tank guns fire shells at him [a T-34], which sound like a drumroll. But he drives staunchly through our line like an impregnable prehistoric monster… It is remarkable that lieutenant Steup’s tank made hits on a T-34, once at about 20 meters and four times at 50 meters, with Panzergranate 40 [50 mm caliber] without any noticeable effect. [-a German battle report from Barbarossa.]

Again you’re harping on the amphibious tanks. The existence of these vehicles is not evidence of a Soviet
invasion in 1941. I don’t know how many times i’m going to have to say that.

Repeating an unsupported assertion over and over does not make it any more convincing the fifth or tenth time than it had been the first time. A light, amphibious tank is far more useful on offense than on defense. The fact that Stalin had more tanks in that category than Germany had total tanks is evidence that Stalin had planned on invading Germany sooner or later. Obviously, pinning down the year of the invasion is not something which can be achieved by pointing at sheer numbers of amphibious tanks. To pin down the invasion date as best as possible, Suvorov looked at troop movements.

Suvorov also pointed out the following. During 1941, Germany had moved large numbers of soldiers to the Nazi-Soviet border. Those soldiers were not ordered to construct winter quarters for themselves, because the German high command believed its soldiers would be someplace else by winter. The Soviet Union had also moved large numbers of soldiers to the Nazi-Soviet border in '41. Newly arrived Soviet soldiers were also not ordered to construct winter quarters for themselves. Where did the Soviet high command expect its soldiers to be by the time winter came?

Creeping Deth wrote:

Kurt, you’re making counter-points to arguments I’m not making

Not everything I’ve written in the last few posts was intended as a counterpoint. Suvorov painted a clear picture of a Soviet Union preparing for the invasion and subjugation of Europe, and presented large amounts of data in support of that picture. My intention here had been to give people a glimpse of that picture; a task which seemed more worthwhile than getting into a nitpicky, point-by-point argument with someone who hasn’t yet read Suvorov’s book.

I must also take issue with the assertion that the Soviets started the war with better tanks.

The Soviet Union’s best tanks (KV series) were much, much better than Germany’s best tanks (Panzer IVs). An argument could be made that in 1941, a KV-1 or KV-2 was worth about ten German tanks. The Soviets’ production of 1300 KV-1/KV-2 tanks in 1941 could have balanced out a total German tank production of 13,000 for 1941. Germany produced 3,600 tanks in 1941, which means that Soviets’ KV production for 1941, alone, provided about 3.5x the combat value of Germany’s total tank production for that year.

The Soviets’ second-best tank in 1941 was the T-34. Obviously a T-34 was more than a match for Germany’s best tank of 1941 (the Panzer IV), let alone Germany’s second-best tank (the Panzer III). The Soviets built 2,800 T-34s in 1941, almost as many as Germany’s total tank production for the year (3,600). The combat value of those 2,800 T-34s greatly exceeded the combat value of the 3,600 obsolete tanks Germany had produced in '41. Combined, KV production and T-34 production for 1941 was 4,100; 500 more than Germany’s total tank production for the year. The worst of those 4,100 tanks (the T-34) was worth several times as much as the best of Germany’s 3,600 (the Panzer IV). Even if we ignore all the tanks the Soviet Union produced in 1941 that weren’t T-34s or KVs, it still produced more and better tanks than Germany.

Of the 3,600 tanks Germany produced in 1941, less than 500 were Panzer IVs. Another 2,200 were Panzer IIIs, and the rest (about 900) were weaker than Panzer IIIs. The Soviet Union could have countered every Panzer IV produced in 1941 with 2.5 KV-series tanks produced that same year. Bear in mind that a KV was many times better than a Panzer IV. The Soviets could have countered every Panzer III produced in 1941 with 1.25 T-34s produced in '41.

In addition to the 4,100 KVs and T-34s the Soviet Union produced in '41, it also produced 2,300 light tanks. Granted, Soviet light tanks weren’t particularly well-suited to tank-on-tank combat. (Though they were better at this than German light tanks.) But tank-on-tank combat was not the purpose for which those light tanks were intended. The idea was to use medium and heavy tanks to achieve breakthroughs, then use light tanks to exploit the breakthroughs.

As for your Wikipedia facts, I’m not sure if you’re misrepresenting your source

Rather than idly speculating on whether I’d “misrepresented” that or any other source, you should have clicked on the link (which I’d provided) to see for yourself what the source had indicated. Had you done so, you would have seen that I’d simply copied and pasted a sentence from the Wikipedia article; and that the surrounding context did not negate the clear and obvious meaning of the sentence in question.

but the Germans certainly did not enjoy aerial supremacy or artillery support to such an extent that they explain away most of the T-26s lost in action.

On June 22 1941, the Soviet Union had 13,500 military aircraft near the Nazi-Soviet front, as opposed to 4,400 for Germany. During the ensuing months, the Soviets would lose 21,000 military aircraft, as opposed to 3,800 for Germany. From a different article

The VVS [Soviet Air Force], although continually resisting, was powerless to prevent the Luftwaffe inflicting heavy losses to Soviet ground forces, and for the rest of 1941 the Luftwaffe could devote much of its energy to these ground support missions. . . .

The Luftwaffe was particularly effective in breaking up and destroying Soviet armored divisions. The Soviet tank force had an estimated strength of 15,000 tanks at the beginning of the invasion. By October that force had, in the central sector, been reduced to 150.[51]

There is absolutely no way air attack and artillery support account for the poor performance of the T-26.

Had both sides’ aircraft, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and other non-tanks somehow been excluded from the eastern front, the Soviets’ tanks would have annihilated the Germans’. The T-26 was not a great tank, but neither was it horrible. The main gun of a T-26 could penetrate 35 mm of vertical armor from a distance of 1000 meters. The main gun of a Panzer III could penetrate 44 mm of vertical armor from a distance of 1000 meters. The Panzer III had significantly thicker armor than the T-26. (As one would expect, given that the Panzer III was a medium tank, and the T-26 was a light tank.) I’m not trying to suggest that a somewhat older Soviet light tank, like the T-26, was the equivalent of a German medium tank like the Panzer III. (It wasn’t.) But the fact that the (light tank) T-26’s armament was 80% as good as the (medium tank) Panzer III’s suggests that even the Soviet Union’s least powerful, light tanks were still pretty good.

Finally, I will add that the existence of 4,000 amphibious tanks does not prove that Stalin was planning to invade Germany in the summer of '41.

I had to read a very big chunk of Suvorov’s book before becoming convinced Stalin had planned to invade Germany in '41. Light, amphibious tanks were far better-suited to offense than defense. In '41, the Soviet Union had more light, amphibious tanks than Germany had total tanks. But that datum was just one puzzle piece in Suvorov’s larger picture. (And not the most convincing puzzle piece, at least not to me.)

@Private:

The answer depends on the objective.

If the objective was to stop the axis winning by keeping Britain and its Empire in the war while at the same time reducing the UK from a flagging super power to near-bankruptcy then the right amount was clearly given.

In light of Roosevelt’s underlying antipathy towards Britain it would appear likely that this was his intention. That same antipathy lead to his belief that Britain would be a greater threat to US security than Russia after the war.

From a British perspective, those who lived through the war can harbour some bitterness over our country’s emasculation. They witnessed first hand a dramatic decline in Britain’s standing and it’s always good to blame someone else! However, they forget that this US support (despite the strings) was critical in helping the UK avoid a far worse fate.

Machiavelli was an Italian, and lived at a time when Italy had been divided into relatively small pieces. The Machiavellian tactics he described were not intended to exist in a vacuum. He felt that such tactics were tools to be used for a higher purpose: the purpose of re-unifying Italy. Often when reading about how a collection of small European states had become united into a single nation, one reads that Machiavellian tactics had been used. Machiavellian tactics appear effective at achieving their desired goal (of unifying smaller states into larger nations). I would also argue that traditionally, British leaders were no strangers to Machiavellian tactics, and used these tactics to build and maintain their empire. Machiavelli’s underlying goal had been to do what was best for Italy; just as British leaders had in the past often been motivated by the desire to do what was best for Britain.

Traditionally, Britain pursued a policy of balance on the Continent. If there was a European struggle between two nations or two alliances, Britain would side with the weaker party, in order to prevent any one nation or entity from gaining too much strength. The British understood that a divided Europe posed a much graver invasion risk to Britain than a Europe united under any one banner.

The Soviet Union had about 2.5x the prewar population of Germany. In 1942 the Soviets produced 3x - 4x as many land weapons as the Germans, and nearly twice as many military aircraft. (Germany caught up by 1944.) The Soviet Union also had a much greater land area than Germany, and much better access to farmland, oil, and raw materials. On top of all this, the Soviets had signed a defensive alliance with the French in 1935. In the cold war between Germany and the Soviet Union, Germany was clearly the weaker party. So why did the British abandon their traditional foreign policy of pursuing European balance in favor of a pro-Soviet, anti-German foreign policy? That abandonment cannot be explained in Machiavellian terms, because a Europe dominated and controlled by the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin did not serve Britain’s national interest.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, the Soviet Union had murdered about 1,000 times as many people as had Nazi Germany. Britain’s pro-Soviet, anti-Nazi foreign policy cannot be explained in humanitarian terms. Nor did that policy stem from an altruistic desire to help the Polish. British and French leaders had lied to the Polish, and had promised them that France would launch a general offensive against Germany within 10 days of mobilization. The promised offensive never materialized. Lying to one’s own allies would typically be considered a Machiavellian tactic. But that tactic did not serve a Machiavellian purpose, because the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Poland did not serve the British national interest.

Prior to the start of WWII, Chamberlain and Stalin had discussed the possibility of ganging up on Hitler. Stalin expressed openness to the possibility. But he said that his price for entry would be the annexation of the eastern half of Poland, and all of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I don’t recall whether he did or did not also demand a slice of Romania. Chamberlain refused this proposal. In a speech in the House of Commons, Churchill said that Chamberlain had made the wrong decision, and that Stalin should have been paid the price he’d asked. Churchill’s motive for wanting to enter WWII had nothing at all to do with protecting Poland, or any other nation in Eastern or Central Europe, from hostile foreign domination.

In a modern Western democracy, running for political office is very expensive. Politicians typically require large donations from very wealthy people. In the absence of such donations their political careers typically come to a screeching halt. We typically spend far too much time analyzing what makes politicians tick, what they are thinking, and why they make the decisions they do. We are acting as if they are the people who wield real power. I would argue that the most powerful category of people are not the politicians themselves, but rather the economic elites who fund those politicians’ campaigns. A standard-issue politician is little better than a paid shill for those economic elites.

A hundred and fifty years ago, Britain’s economic elites probably wanted what was best for Britain. But at some point, Britain’s national interests ceased being a relevant consideration for those elites. The disappearance of patriotism and loyalty among Britain’s ruling economic class explains both the pro-Soviet, anti-Nazi pre-war foreign policy, and explains Britain’s loss of its empire in the postwar period, and explains the decision to flood itself with Third World immigrants in the postwar era.

Ants are very loyal to their colonies. But sometimes loyalty is not enough. For example, a red ant queen will use scent to disguise herself as a member of a colony of black ants. She will invade a black ant colony. Because she has disguised her scent she is unmolested by any of the black ants. She heads straight for the black ants’ queen, kills her, and takes her place. Having done this, the colony’s black ants loyally serve their queen’s murderer, and the killer of their own genetic futures. Gradually, the red queen’s offspring replace the black ants to whom the colony had once belonged.

Back when I was in high school, I devoted a considerable amount of time to reading Shirer’s 1400 page time. More than once, I might add. The book was worth the time, I’d felt, because I was getting the real scoop on WWII. The New York Times book review said so!

But then I saw some assertion–I don’t remember which one–debunked. I felt a little surprised, but did not question the veracity of the book as a whole. Then I learned of some key datum which Shirer had omitted from his book. Shirer can’t use the space constraint excuse, because the book is 1400 pages long and contains plenty of content of relatively minor importance.

I also began wondering why Shirer had omitted any reference to the crimes against humanity committed by the Soviet Union before, during, and after the war. On the other hand, the New York Times (which had given him that favorable book review) had also denied the Ukrainian famine, while doing its best to get the U.S. to fight on the same side as the Soviet Union. Neither Shirer nor the New York Times gave a fig’s leaf for absolute truth. That much is clear. They both had the same (very specific) political agenda. There is a reason why Shirer had been blacklisted as a communist in the 1950s, and that reason does not involve any honesty or good character on Shirer’s part. If there are those here who want to be lied to, so that they can more effectively spread lies to others, Shirer’s book will give them everything they want and more. I personally have grown tired of being lied to, manipulated, and used by America’s narcissistic, immoral, self-centered ruling class. But if there are others here who enjoy that experience, who am I to judge?

To anyone thinking of buying William Shirer’s Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, I recommend the paper version over the eBook. If you own a wood burning stove, the paper version can be used to heat your home.

Shirer strongly opposed the American anti-communist movement, and had little patience with, or tolerance for, those who wished to reduce the (considerable) influence communists had on the American government and American media. Shirer denied that he himself was a communist.

Whether one believes the denial or not, Shirer’s book contains as many lies, half truths, fabrications, misinterpretations, and selective omissions as one would expect from a communist. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich is a work of fiction.

If you do choose to read this book, it will also be necessary to read a number of other books to correct the lies and distortions Shirer spreads.

Suvorov argues–convincingly–that all of the tanks Germany had in June of 1941 were obsolete by Soviet standards. As of June '41, the only German tank with a prayer of standing up to Soviet medium tanks was the Panzer IV. Germany produced fewer than 500 Panzer IVs during 1941, and had produced less than 400 Panzer IVs in 1940. By the end of '41, total production for the Panzer IV (including those produced during the prewar period) was less than 1,200 examples. (A number of which had been destroyed in France or other theaters.) As of June '41, the Soviet tank force consisted of over 25,000 tanks. German initial frontline strength in Barbarossa consisted of 3,350 tanks. Of those 3,350, the vast majority were inferior to the Panzer IV.

The main armament on the BT-7 was a 45 mm gun. The main armament on the Panzer III was typically either 37 mm or 50 mm. The maximum armor thickness of the Panzer III was 50 mm; the maximum armor thickness of the BT-7 was 40 mm. The BT-7’s armor was sloping, much like the T-34’s. At least on paper, the BT-7 should have been able to hold its own against Germany’s second-best tank, the Panzer III. The Soviets had many thousands of other tanks which were more than a match for Germany’s best tank of 1941 (the Panzer IV).

According to the Wikipedia article on the T-26, “The T-26 (mod. 1938/39, especially) could withstand most German tanks in 1941 but were inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV.”

As of June '41, Stalin had a better than 8:1 advantage in total tanks. Stalin’s best tanks of '41 were the KV-1 and KV-2. A KV was worth about ten of Germany’s best tank of '41 (the Panzer IV.) The U.S.S.R. produced over 1,300 heavy tanks in '41, as compared to a total tank production for Germany of 3,600 for that year. Germany did not produce any heavy tanks prior to 1942. Given these data, it would have been reasonable for Stalin to have concluded that the Soviet Union would begin its war against Germany with a crushing superiority in tank warfare.

The obvious question arises: if the Soviets started the war with more and better tanks than the Germans, how on earth did the Germans achieve so much initial success in Barbarossa? The Wikipedia article on the T-26 provides the answer: “all of the Red Army’s tank models suffered severe losses due to the air supremacy of the German Luftwaffe. The majority of the Red Army’s T-26s were lost in the first months of the German-Soviet War, mainly to enemy artillery and air attacks.”

The Soviet Union started off with a 3:1 advantage in available military aircraft. The fact the Germans were able to achieve air supremacy under those circumstances was something of a surprise. Much of that air supremacy was due to the fact that Soviet aircraft were deployed as far forward as possible, and were quickly destroyed on the ground by German aircraft, or by advancing German land forces. The Germans produced 7,000 artillery pieces in 1940, and 11,000 artillery pieces in 1941. The Soviets produced 15,000 artillery pieces in 1940, and 42,000 in 1941. Stalin had every reason to be confident of an overwhelming numerical advantage in available men, planes, tanks, and artillery.

When Operation Barbarossa began, the Soviet Union had more amphibious tanks than Germany had total tanks. Suvorov (pp. 54-57) provides the following explanation for the utility of amphibious tanks.

What are they needed for? What use comes from amphibious tanks? If we are defending our own territory, if we are conducting strictly defensive warfare, amphibious tanks are not really needed. We can get by without them. In order to stop the enemy, one wants to have tanks with heavy armor and powerful weapons–the heavier and more powerful, the better.

If we cannot stop the enemy in defensive warfare, we are forced to retreat. We retreat using our own bridges. Wen threatened with a takeover, we can detonate our bridges and send them up into the sky. There is little use for tanks with light armor and machine guns in a defensive war. Their ability to float also remains completely unused: there is nowhere to sail to in a defensive war.

But if we are conducting a crusade for world domination, then in order to herd the population of the planet into concentration camps, labor armies, and barracks, we have different needs. In order to break through the enemy’s front, we need heavy tanks, more armor, and more powerful cannon. If a battle occurs, if two waves of tanks collide, once again, we need the most powerful tanks. Once the front line is broken and the enemy’s tank waves are defeated and crushed, our task becomes to take advantage of the moment and complete a thrust deep into the enemy’s rear, in order to split up his defenses, to have access to his communications and supply lines, to reach the aortas in order to cut them, to cut the enemy off from his supply bases, to reach his capital, his industrial regions, his sources of oil, and his ports. A heavy tank is not very good for such a thrust. Due to its weight, it breaks roads and bridges and gets in the way of all those who are following. A heavy tank consumes a lot of fuel–try to provide fuel to several thousand tanks and artillery tow trucks and tens of thousands of automobiles, which are pushing forward deep into enemy territory. Aside from all this, a heavy tank is also slow and not very agile. It slows down the movement of your columns. Moreover, it quickly wears out and chokes, like a heavyweight in a marathon. For a forward thrust, medium and light tanks are ideal. They have less armor, weaker weapons, but they have much higher speed, maneuverability, and cross-country ability, and they are more economical with their fuel.

Now our armored armada is standing before a water obstacle. Here all heavy and medium tanks, and those light ones that have not been taught how to float, lose all their aggressive options. Their value is zero. They need a bridge. But the enemy protects the bridges, and blows them up when threatened with a takeover. Bridges have to be fought for. And it is better to fight for them not on our side, but from the side of the enemy, where they are not anticipating it. In this situation, the value of light amphibious tanks grows tremendously. If two, three, five, ten such tanks sail across the river during the night in the direction of the bridge, and with a sudden attack from the rear seize the bridge, this can decide the fate of an entire operation, or even an entire war. Now you can send to the enemy shores, across the newly seized bridge, your heavy and medium tanks, along with artillery, infantry, staff, hospitals, thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts. You can use the seized bridge to send in reserves, and to send the wounded, prisoners, and trophies to the rear, to send damaged machinery back for repair.

If it is impossible to seize the bridge, the amphibious tanks become truly priceless. If there are no enemy bridges, we need to establish our own temporary bridges and means of sending goods across the river. For this we need to establish a bridgehead on the other side. The infantry is sent into battle. On logs, wooden planks, and inflatable rafts, they swim to the other shore. Meanwhile they are being fired upon by machine guns, mortars, and automatic rifles. Here, among the swimming men, imagine having ten or twenty light tanks. Their armor is not harmed by bullets and shell fragments, while their machine guns are capable of firing when none of the swimming men can.

Now we have reached the other shore. The most important thing is to catch hold of something, to dig our forces into the ground into the next twenty minutes or so, so that no counterattacks can hinder us. . . . Our wet, wounded, and exhausted infantry does not carry heavy weapons or ammunition. So, in these very first, most frightening minutes on enemy shores, the presence, help, and support of even one of the lightest tanks with just one machine gun is far more valuable and important than ten more powerful heavy tanks that would be forced to remain on our side of the river. . . .

By June 22, 1941, Hitler had on the eastern front 180 tanks in the under-six-ton category. Not one of them was amphibious and not one could compete with the Soviet light tanks. Stalin, on the other hand, had more than 4,000 tanks in this weight category. All of them were amphibious. . . . The T-40 [light] tanks were still in production, the paint not yet dried on many of them. . . . The vast majority of T-40s were less than a year old. . . . When did they have time to become obsolete? When did they have time to become worn out? On June 22, 1941, on the eastern front, Hitler had 3,350 tanks in total of all types, all of them obsolete and among all of them not a single amphibious one, while Stalin’s amphibious tanks alone numbered over 4,000.

By overcoming stormy Lake Ilmen, even the oldest of Soviet amphibious tanks proved the possibility of crossing the English Channel. But these tanks were designed for lakes and rivers. For crossing the English Channel, Stalin had other designs in the works for the future–the amphibious PT-1 and its variants. It weighed 14 tons, had a 500-horsepower engine, a speed of 6 km/hr in the water and could reach 62 km/hr on land, and 90 km/hr when it shed its caterpillar tracks. This was a hybrid of a highway and an amphibious tank. . . . It was armed with a 45 mm cannon and four machine guns. . . .

The fate of Soviet amphibious tanks is a sad one: they were of no use in a defensive war. Where would they sail? . . . Commanders easily parted with them: they ordered what was left of the fuel to be pumped into the medium and heavy tanks. The light ones were blown up, burned, broken, sunk, or just abandoned. . . . Why did Stalin need four thousand amphibious tanks, which he could not use in a defensive war? Where was comrade Stalin planning to sail?

Flashman:

I mean, just look at us!

Indeed. 75% of Americans are overweight or obese. There are more obese Americans than Americans who are overweight without being obese. Back before we began fluoridating our water supply, the overwhelming majority of Americans were neither overweight nor obese.

Of course, a correlation between A and B is not evidence that A caused B. It could also be that B caused A, or that C caused A and B. Or it could just be coincidence. There are a number of non-fluoride explanations for America’s obesity epidemic (such as fast food, bad gut bacteria, reduction in agricultural quality standards). But the effect of a fluoridated water supply should be included in that discussion as well.

Fluoride is like arsenic in two ways: both are poisonous, and both build up in your system over time. This is a link to a three minute news documentary about some of the harmful effects of consuming fluoride-contaminated water. Note that, among the deleterious health effects they mention, they include the fact fluoride exacerbates hypothyroidism. The main effects of hypothyroidism include reduced metabolism, tiredness, feeling cold, and weight gain.

CWO Marc wrote: The basic problem with impartiality is that there are no impartial definitions of impartiality.

I agree that’s a serious problem. Even if everyone was trying his or her very best to be impartial, there would still be points of significant disagreement. One person’s sincerely held beliefs will not always completely overlap another’s. Your example was a good illustration of that.

As big a problem as that is, there is another that’s even more basic. Everyone wants to claim credit for being objective and impartial. But not everyone actually wants to be objective or impartial. Sometimes, disagreements are due to the fact that one or both parties lack interest in being impartial. Without the ability to read people’s minds, it’s sometimes difficult to determine which disagreements are due to that cause, and which are due to differences of opinion among those sincerely trying their best to be impartial.

Consider an advertiser’s claim that its own product is amazing, and that a competitor’s product is trash. Are such claims impartial? Do they represent a sincere attempt at impartiality?

We recognize bias when someone has an obvious, immediate financial interest in arriving at a particular conclusion. But when the economic motive is absent or hidden, we often have a tendency to assume that others are making a good faith effort to be impartial. That assumption is of course justified some of the time. But it is typically a mistake to make that assumption about the actions or motives of the members of our economic and political elites. Those elites have not demonstrated the desire to be impartial, they have not demonstrated benign intent toward the nation they rule, and they have done precisely nothing to have earned the benefit of the doubt. “Innocent until proven guilty” is an absurd standard to apply to those elites, because their typical pattern does not consist of innocence. Of course, I’m not suggesting that we should send anyone to jail based on guesses or speculation. That would be both absurd and illegal. But in analyzing the elites’ past actions, one finds that guilt is a far more common theme than innocence. It is silly to say things like “at least their intentions must be good,” or “they are probably innocent this time around” or any other such statement that ignores or explains away the clear and consistent pattern of past guilt.

The core argument I’ve seen advanced against the September 11th attacks having been an inside job is that Middle Eastern terrorists have malignant intent, whereas our own elites have benign intent. The second half of that argument is of course absurd. It is so patently false that it’s not even worth the time to refute. Both the terrorists and the ruling elites have malignant intent, both gained power as a direct result of those attacks, and both should be considered as possible suspects in the September 11th attacks. Either the terrorists or the ruling elites should be eliminated from suspicion based on evidence only. It would be extremely naive to believe that either the terrorists or the ruling elites would hesitate to murder 3,000 people, if such murder would advance their respective agendas.

The utter absence of benign intent on the part of the ruling elites is of course not proof, or even evidence, that the attacks were an inside job. On the other hand, the U.S. government’s claims that the attacks were committed by terrorists are not evidence either of that government’s innocence or of the terrorists’ guilt. They are simply claims, and carry neither more nor less weight than bin Laden’s claim that he was not responsible for the attacks.

Creeping Deth wrote:

There is no way anyone is going to convince me Stalin had plans to invade Germany
around the time Barbarossa occurred, not with the sheer scale of the reorganization
the Red Army was going through and certainly not with the gradual phasing out of the
obsolete BT7 and T-26 tanks that made up the bulk of the Soviet Union’s tank fleet.

Suvorov addresses the subject of tanks in great detail. A search for the word “tank” in his Kindle book yielded over 200 results. He makes some very good points:

1. Prior to WWII, no nation in the world had heavy tanks–except the Soviet Union. The Soviets began producing heavy tanks in 1933 (the T-35). By June '41, the Germans had begun working with pencil and paper to design their own heavy tanks. Germany would become the second nation in the world to have heavy tanks. At least as of 1943, there was no “third place” nation, because no third nation had heavy tanks.

2. Prior to WWII, no nation had amphibious tanks–again with the exception of the Soviet Union. When Hitler invaded, Stalin had more amphibious, light tanks than Germany had total tanks. Light, amphibious tanks are very poorly suited for defense, and thousands of such tanks were abandoned when Germany invaded. But if you are on offense, such tanks are an absolutely vital tool: for crossing rivers, securing bridgeheads, and for pushing deep into the enemy rear.

3. In 1941, no German tank or other non-Soviet tank was the equal of the Soviets’ T-28 medium tank.

4. The Soviets had begun producing the KV heavy tank in 1940. (At a time when, again, no one else in the world had heavy tanks.)

5. In 1941, no non-Soviet nation had anything comparable to the T-35. The T-35 was nevertheless labeled “obsolete” by a Soviet government trying to explain away Germany’s successes in Barbarossa.

6. In September of 1939, Germany had 3,195 tanks. As of January 1st 1939 the Red Army had 21,000 battle-ready tanks.

7. BT stood for bystrokhodnyi (high speed) tank. The T-34 was a direct descendant of the BT. The BT had sloped frontal armor. The 45 mm gun on a BT could penetrate the armor of any non-Soviet tank. Later versions of the BT were armed with 76 mm KT-26 cannons: a better weapon than any non-Soviet tank at the time. (In 1941, the most powerful American tank had a 37 mm cannon.) Germany’s Pz-I had no cannon, the Pz-II had a 20 mm cannon, and the Pz-III had a weak 37 mm cannon. The Pz-IV had a 75 mm cannon, but the shortness of its barrel made it unsuitable for tank-versus-tank battles. The BT-2 had a 400 horsepower engine. Germany would not have a tank engine that powerful until the end of 1942. The BT had a specific power of 36.4 horsepower per ton of mass: a better specific power than any non-Soviet tank. The German tank with the highest specific power was the T-IIIJ tank; with a specific power of 13.9 horsepower per ton of mass. Early BTs had a top speed of 69 mph, or 110 km/hr. Again, that is better than any non-Soviet tank. Unlike non-Soviet tanks, the BT could cross rivers underwater. The BT’s armor was merely “bulletproof,” which was no worse than the armor of German tanks of comparable size. (And in terms of firepower, mobility, and top speed it was significantly better than non-Soviet tanks of its size, including German tanks.) Due to its wide treads, the BT was excellent at dealing with mud, snow, and other such conditions.

8. At the beginning of WWII the Red Army had 6,456 BT tanks–as many BT tanks as all other nations in the world, combined, had total tanks.

9. The BT was unsuitable a defensive role, and was not optimized for warfare on Soviet soil. Its main advantage was its speed. But to achieve ideal speed, it would be necessary to remove its treads and replace them with wheels. Then, it would drive on well-paved highways. (Of which the Soviet Union had few.) Germany, however, had an excellent highway system. There was general agreement that the BT was at its best when using wheels rather than treads. (But it was considered necessary to have both available.)

Below is a quote from Zuvorov’s book

Polesye–the biggest region of swamplands in Europe, possibly even in the world–lies between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Polesye was unsuitable for the mass movement of troops and the conduct of military operations. The area divided the [Soviets’] western theater of operations into two strategic directions. . . .

Invasion into Central Europe, north of Polesye, would be a direct blow on Berlin. However, in the attacker’s way lay heavily fortified Eastern Prussia and Koenigsberg. A blow to the south, however, was a diversion to the side, a roundabout route. However, it would be a blow to almost unprotected Romania, the oil heart of Germany. On synthetic fuel alone, Germany could not survive. Therefore, it was decided to play two games, compare the results, and make the choice. In the first game, the main attack on Central Europe was carried out north of Polesye, from Belarus and the Baltic. In the second game, the invasion was carried out from Ukraine and Moldova. If Germany were crushed, the rest of continental Europe would shower Stalin with flowers and his tanks would have an open road right up to the Atlantic Ocean.

In the second game, Zhukov, in command of Soviet troops, attacked Romania and Hungary. He found it easy to advance. First of all, there were no modern fortifications there, like those in Eastern Prussia. Zhukov had indisputable superiority of aviation, tanks, and paratroops. “The second game . . . ended with the ‘Eastern’ decision being made to attack Budapest.” . . . Zhukov himself already said that the games did not have an academic character, but were directly tied to the imminent war. Stalin was not present at the second game and did not conduct its debriefings, because he had already made his choice after seeing the results of the first one. The Soviet invasion of Europe would be conducted south of Polesye.

Herr KaLeun wrote:

But that’s probably just me. I also believe that Lee Harvey Oswald shot John F. Kennedy, that terrorists
and not the US government blew up the World Trade Center, and that Neil Armstrong did walk on the moon in 1969.

I would argue that the human desire for social, economic, or sexual rewards is typically much, much stronger than the human desire to impartially seek absolute truth. To give an example, imagine the following scenario. You are a college student. You are convinced that religion/belief system X is objectively true. So you go to a few meetings associated with X. You are very disappointed with the quality of person at those meetings. On the other hand, you find yourself very attracted to many of the students at the Mithras worship sessions. So you take one of them aside, and try to convert her to X. She sees your efforts as an attack, and avoids you in the future. You try this on one or two others, and they respond the same way.

Undaunted, you persist in attending the meetings of X, while eschewing Mithras worship. Then you get out into the real world and start looking for work. One of the hiring managers you talk to is very pro-Mithras, and openly states his desire to hire only other Mithras people. You mention your dissatisfaction with that encounter to some other hiring manager. That other hiring manager completely shares your disgust. Then he adds that it’s completely obvious that Mithras is a joke, and that everyone should be worshiping Thor. He sees your story as confirmation of the rightness of his own decision to hire Thor worshipers only. Displeased by all this, you decide that you’ll only get hired if you network through other members of X. You do plenty of networking, but never come across anyone within X who has the authority to hire you.

Displeased by your love life (due to only being able to date believers in X), and displeased with your vocational situation, how long will it be before you begin to proclaim your enthusiastic devotion to Mithras? Even if you, personally, would never get pushed to that point, the average person would. In environments where there is strong social, economic, or sexual pressure to profess a belief in ____________, most people will profess that belief, completely irrespective of that proposition’s truth.

Take the September 11th attacks for example. Supposedly, it was the journalists’ job to investigate the government’s claims rigorously and impartially before accepting them. Did the journalists in question do that research? Or, might they have been pressured (with threat of job loss or otherwise)? If such pressure existed, their apparent consensus on the September 11th issue should be seen as a social consensus, not an intellectual consensus. (An intellectual consensus is the result of analysis of facts and data. A social consensus is the result of social pressure.) Obviously, a social consensus communicates information about social factors only, and does not communicate information about the underlying truth or falsehood of any given proposition.

I do not claim to know whether the consensus on the September 11th attacks is a social consensus or an intellectual consensus. If the former, it is noise to be ignored. If the latter, the data and logic which led to that consensus can and should be carefully examined. If both are found solid, then and only then can we safely join that consensus. This is the approach one should use toward every historical consensus, not just the September 11th attacks only.

@creeping-deth87:

Just going to touch on a few things here as this discussion has moved towards Eastern Front fighting and most of my research has been in this particular theater of the war. Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous. The Red Army was orders of magnitude larger and better equipped than the Finnish army, there is no level of preparedness that could have come even close to bridging the gap between those two armies. That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership and it was rightly seen by the rest of the world, and Stalin himself no doubt, as a failure. Furthermore, the assertion that this blunder was intentionally made known to the rest of the world by Soviet propagandists is erroneous. There was no covering that up, that’s how badly that campaign went.

I must also take issue with the assertion that Stalin attempted to downplay the accomplishments of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa for two reasons:

1. Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s

2. There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets

Additionally, Stalin had no reason to downplay the quality of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa. Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first. In fact, Stalin held this belief so ardently that he refused to believe intelligence given to him not only by the British but also his own staff, and even believed Hitler when he informed Stalin that Axis troops being redeployed to the Eastern frontier were simply training for the invasion of the United Kingdom.

On top of THAT is the fact that the Red Army was being completely reorganized and reequipped at the time that Barbarossa occurred, and Stalin knew that that was going to be a dangerous time for any major confrontation with his neighbours. It literally makes zero sense that he would try to downplay the quality of his troops and their accomplishments given these facts. If anything, they’re reasons that he would have been much more overt about the strength of the Red Army.

Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.

Creeping Deth wrote:

Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face
with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly
discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.

No apologies necessary. Prior to having read Victor Suvorov’s book, I would have agreed with the majority of your post. I was frequently surprised by the information Suvorov had brought to light, and gradually came to modify my perspective as a result of that new data. As for Suvorov’s credentials: he had been a member of the KGB, until defecting to Britain in the '70s. As a member of the KGB he had been given access to Soviet archives denied to all non-Soviets, and also denied to the vast majority of Soviet citizens. Suvorov pointed out that the Soviet Union had been a criminal regime, and that therefore the tactics of a criminal investigator were appropriate. Historians–with their reliance on journalists to write the “first draft” for them–do not always use the tactics needed to penetrate the Soviet veil of secrecy. Suvorov’s bias is anti-communist but pro-Russian. He is proud of the military achievements of the Red Army–his fellow Russians–while strongly condemning Stalin’s evil legacy of terror and mass murder.

Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous.

Finland had built very powerful defenses on the Karelian isthmus. Those defenses were seized during the Winter War, leaving the nation helpless against any subsequent Soviet invasion. The objective of the Winter War was (according to Suvorov) to seize those Karelian defenses, and that objective was achieved. (Despite having been considered a military impossibility.) Having rendered Finland defenseless, why didn’t Stalin grab the nation as a whole? Suvorov believes that Stalin had planned to do exactly that–after he had invaded Germany. To grab it ahead of time would be to alert Germany to Stalin’s aggressive intentions.

That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership

In comparison with the Germans, the Red Army’s leadership was indeed inept. (Probably to a much greater degree than Stalin had realized.) But in the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Red Army won a series of stunning victories. Anyone looking at the results of that undeclared war would conclude the Soviets had a very high level of military preparedness in 1939; which of course had significantly increased by 1941. The favorable exchange ratio the Finns achieved during the Winter War could be seen as evidence of the strength of Finland’s defenses and the difficulty of the task of conquering those defenses.

1. Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent
   and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s

I remember having read something along those lines myself. However, Suvorov pointed out that on the domestic front, Stalin had a habit of allying with B against A. Then he’d align with C against B. Finally, he’d eliminate C. Suvorov believes that Stalin took exactly that same approach to Soviet foreign relations. The fact that the Soviet Union and Germany had cooperated during the '30s is not evidence of benign intent on the part of Stalin. Suvorov believes that it was more of the same “align with B against A, then align with C against B” strategy seen so often in Stalin’s domestic political affairs.

2. There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets

Suvorov points out that all mention of the Soviets’ victories over the Japanese were censored from the Soviet media. Also, the Soviet propaganda machine sold the Winter War as a “defeat,” even though the Red Army succeeded in conquering Finland’s defenses. (Leaving Finland with no means of defending itself from subsequent Soviet attack.)

Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first.

It is true that Stalin believed Germany would not attack first. Soviet officers were given sealed packets, to be opened in the event of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. When Germany invaded, each officer opened his packet. Upon doing so, he found plenty of information on what to do if the Soviet Union invaded Germany. And nothing at all on how he should act if Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This surprise effect was pivotal in Germany’s achieving a 10:1 exchange ratio during Operation Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 ratio which would become normal later in the war.)

Stalin’s certainty about his theory was not based on blind faith only. He was also conducting an extensive spying campaign within Germany. To create proper winter uniforms, it is absolutely necessary to use sheepskin. Stalin’s spies monitored German sheep markets, and found no evidence of preparation of such winter uniforms. Also for winter war it is necessary to have winterized fuel supplies and lubrication oil supplies. Stalin’s spies found no evidence to suggest Germany was winterizing any of its fuel or lubricant supplies. Further, Stalin’s spies had found that Germany had only enough fuel reserves for two to three months of active campaigning, after which its military operations would slow down precipitously due to lack of fuel. Finally, Stalin had a considerable numerical advantage on that front, including (IIRC) a better than 10:1 ratio in available tanks. Based on these data Stalin reasonably concluded that Hitler would be a fool to invade. According to Suvorov Hitler understood the basic logic of not invading. And he added that Hitler had had no plans to invade, until he’d gotten wind of Stalin’s plan to invade Germany. Even though Germany’s massive troop movements to the Eastern front began after Stalin’s, Germany’s were finished first. This was due to a variety of factors: Germany had a good transportation system, Germany had to send its soldiers a shorter distance than did the Soviet Union, and Germany had fewer soldiers to send. Germany’s troop concentration was therefore completed several weeks ahead of the Soviet schedule, allowing Germany to strike first.

Lists of this nature are seldom 100% accurate, and this list is no exception. On the one hand, I give the author credit for having dispelled a number of myths (such as carrots causing better night vision, Hitler having only one testicle, and Polish cavalry charging German tanks). On the other hand, the author apparently did little or no research before writing “myths” 5, 12, 24, and 29.

“Myth” 5: “Nazi Germany only invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 because the Soviets were about to invade Germany.”

This “myth” is actually true or probably true. Had the author read Suvorov’s (very well-researched, convincing) book, he would know that. A clear case of having dismissed something as a “myth” without having done his homework.

“Myth” 12: “President Roosevelt had advanced knowledge that Japan was going to attack Pearl Harbor, and allowed the attack to take place as a pretext for war.”

Fact: During the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, FDR embraced a two pronged strategy of escalating provocations against Japan and consistent refusal to negotiate in good faith with the Japanese. (Or even to meet with the Japanese prime minister at all, despite his repeated requests for a meeting.) That FDR wanted to provoke Japan into throwing the first punch is clear and obvious. That he knew the blow was coming is also obvious, in light of the fact that we had broken Japan’s diplomatic codes. Whether he expected to get hit at Pearl Harbor is more speculative.

The claim (#24): " Nobody knows how many died in total at the hands of the ‘gentleman soldiers’ of the German Army, but it could be as high as 10 million."

Fact: the 10 million number was apparently pulled out of thin air. That number is a propaganda claim, not a historical statement.

The claim (#29): “Also, six decades of use have found [fluoride] to be safe and extremely effective for whitening teeth.”

Fact: Fluoride is a neurotoxic byproduct from industrial processes (such as the production of fertilizer). Proper disposal of this toxic substance is expensive. Large corporations had the thought that, rather than pay money to dispose of their toxic waste, why not receive money from its disposal? They therefore conducted a massive publicity campaign to persuade the gullible public that fluoridation of the water supply is perfectly safe, and results in improved dental health. “Research” on the supposed safety of a fluoridated water supply was either not done at all, or was performed by groups funded by fluoride waste producers. On the back of any tube of fluoridated toothpaste, you will find the phone number for Poison Control, and instructions to call that number if toothpaste is swallowed. That is clear evidence that fluoride is toxic, and that those contaminating our water supply with it realize its toxicity.

@Gargantua:

Kurt.

I think you mean Diesel.  And it should be noted that the Germans were the ones with the patent and design to make diesel from Wheat.

But of course… the “FOOD CRISIS” meant there was no wheat to convert to diesel! :)

Good catch!

I hadn’t known about their ability to turn wheat into fuel. Thanks for pointing that out! But as you also pointed out, that ability is fairly useless when you don’t even have the wheat with which to feed POWs conscripted to work in German weapons factories.

What Germany did have was a reasonably good supply of coal. It has also developed the ability to convert coal into synthetic petroleum. Well prior to the war, Hitler demanded the construction of synthetic oil facilities. He was told he was being unreasonable, and that such facilities were an economic impossibility. According to one historian, those who’d told Hitler this underestimated his “sheer bloody-mindedness.” During the war, Germany made a significant portion of the petroleum it needed synthetically. (However, synthetic oil production never equaled the output Germany received from Romanian oilfields.)

General von Manstein was the best general of WWII. But before I get into the explanation as to why that is the case, I’d like to address the points CWO Marc made about him and his memoir.

Erich von Manstein’s brilliant reputation needs to be viewed with a certain amount of caution because part of the mystique surrounding him originated in his memoirs, which are controversial because in them he simultaneously: a) depicts himself very favourably; b) takes no responsibility for any of the war’s morally reprehensible aspects; and c) blames Hitler for everything that want wrong.  In fairness, he was hardly alone in doing so in his memoirs; Admiral Doenitz wrote a similar account of his own involvement in the war.

I have read von Manstein’s book Lost Victories. Yes, there was a strong, recurring element of him showing frustration at having his ideas rejected by those whose intelligence and/or military judgement were significantly inferior to his own. Maybe his critics view that as “depicting himself favorably.” I view that frustration as a natural, human reaction to be expected of someone whose bosses are far less competent than himself.

As for b), it is false to assert that von Manstein failed to take responsibility for any of the war’s morally reprehensible acts. On the contrary: he acknowledged Germany committed serious sins. He also opined that, whatever Germany’s sins may have been, the Soviet Union’s were worse. However, his book was intended to be about military matters only. As such, he provided no detail about Nazi or Soviet war crimes. The fact that he confines his discussion almost exclusively to military matters does not lessen its credibility.

I regard c) as an exaggeration. Manstein regarded Hitler as a military amateur. Hitler made himself commander of Germany’s military forces. Von Manstein felt Hitler was out of his depth in that role, and pointed out a number of military errors he’d made. It’s hard to see why von Manstein’s decision to point out Hitler’s military errors should detract from von Manstein’s credibility. It should also be noted that, despite von Manstein’s very obvious frustration with Hitler’s military mistakes, he also acknowledged examples of Hitler having made good military decisions.

Why was von Manstein the best general of WWII? In 1939, Hitler asked his generals to prepare a military campaign against France. (To be started after Poland had been conquered.) The plan they came up with did not involve any attempt to actually conquer France, or to destroy the French Army. Instead, his generals set their sights much lower. Germany would conquer ports along the English Channel, so that Germany would be better-positioned to engage in sub warfare against Britain.

Von Manstein pointed out that time was not on Germany’s side. It was better, he felt, to reach a military decision quickly, than to let things drag out. Therefore he prepared a plan to invade and conquer France. The German generals who’d prepared the “Channel ports” plan didn’t want Hitler to see von Manstein’s plan. Von Manstein was finally (despite those generals’ best efforts) able to get a meeting with Hitler. In that meeting he persuaded Hitler to adopt his own, rather ambitious plan to conquer France. France fell because von Manstein’s plan had been chosen. It would not have fallen had the Channel ports plan been adopted.

Von Manstein felt that even with the fall of France, time was still not on Germany’s side. He therefore proposed an Operation Sea Lion plan–a plan that was every bit as bold and daring as his plan to conquer France. However, Hitler (incorrectly) felt that Germany was in the lead in after the fall of France, and had become more risk-adverse than he’d been when he’d approved von Manstein’s earlier plan. He rejected von Manstein’s plan to conquer Britain, and adopted a more tactically cautious approach. Von Manstein pointed out that, in avoiding a moderate amount of tactical risk, Hitler accepted an enormous quantity of strategic risk.

After the Battle of Stalingrad, Germany’s entire Eastern front was in danger of collapse. (In danger of being rolled up from the south, near Stalingrad.) In the Third Battle of Kharkov, Germans under von Manstein’s command achieved an 8:1 exchange ratio against their Soviet opponents. 52 Soviet divisions ceased to be effective. The southern portion of Germany’s eastern front was stabilized. That set the stage for Germany’s summer offensive against the Soviet Union in 1943. That summer offensive failed. But the fact Germany was strong enough to even attempt it was the result of the Third Battle of Kharkov.

During the previous year–1942–von Manstein had achieved another notable success against the Soviet Union. In the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula, forces under von Manstein’s command killed or captured 170,000 Soviet soldiers, for a loss of 9,000 Germans. While a number of other German generals also achieved favorable exchange ratios on the Eastern Front, I have not found any other German general whose ratios were as good as von Manstein’s.

Good points Marc.

Would Germany have benefitted from large numbers of jeeps and military trucks? Yes, absolutely–as long as it had sufficient gasoline for them. Germany had significant shortages of gasoline throughout WWII. Without a plan to address that gasoline shortage, all the jeeps and military trucks in the world would have been so much scrap metal.

ABWorsham wrote:

Had this battle not been in one of the most remote places on earth; where the Soviet Union’s impressive victory over
the Japanese was largely unnoticed would Hitler have refrained from invading the USSR in 1941?

As you pointed out, the Japanese took it on the chin in that war. It was very one-sided!

The Japanese were of course hardly eager to publish news of their own defeat. They were very quiet about it. That makes sense on two levels. First, Japan’s culture places a strong sense of stigma on military defeat. In ancient Japan, a defeated general might be expected to commit ritual suicide. Apart from the shame of having lost, Japan had another reason to keep quiet. If the weakness of Japan’s army was advertised to the world at large, Japan’s neighbors might conclude they could take advantage of Japan’s weakness. To give a specific example, in 1941 the Dutch East Indies agreed to join America’s oil embargo against Japan. It would not have made sense for them to provoke Japan in this way, unless they believed that in the long run America could exert much more military strength in the Pacific than could Japan. To advertise weakness was to invite more behavior of that type.

Stalin prevented his own press from making any mention whatsoever of the Soviet Union’s impressive victory over Japan. There was total Soviet media silence. As Suvorov pointed out, that silence in a case of military triumph was out of character. In the Soviet Union, even very small accomplishments were celebrated with plenty of hoopla and fanfare. The Red Army’s accomplishments at Khalkhin Gol were by no means small, so why keep silent about them?

With both Japan and the Soviet Union remaining silent about Khalkhin Gol, it makes sense that the battles made little impression on Hitler. Those battles seem to have made little impression on anyone outside the Soviet Union or Japan!

Finnish military planners knew that if Stalin invaded, he would have to invade through the Karelian isthmus. They therefore turned that isthmus into the most heavily fortified place on Earth. Their defenses were better (and more intelligently planned) than the French Maginot Line. Breaching the Finnish defenses was considered a military impossibility. The Red Army achieved that impossible task in only a few months. While Soviet losses were high, the Winter War was in many ways every bit as impressive an accomplishment as the battles of Khalkhin Gol. However, Stalin ensured that the Soviet propaganda machine reported poor performance by the Red Army. Anyone reading Soviet descriptions of their invasion of Finland would conclude the Red Army was nowhere near ready for war. While Hitler was not normally one to swallow Soviet propaganda wholesale, in this case he believed it. Perhaps he remembered Russia’s poor performance in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, or its unimpressive showing in WWI; or the Red Army’s unsuccessful attempt to invade and annex Poland back in 1920. The idea that Russians fight poorly was consistent not just with Nazi ideology, but with his own prior experience.

Each Soviet officer stationed near the German border was given a sealed packet of orders. That packet was to be opened only upon commencement of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. In June of '41 those packets were opened. The officers found plenty of information about what they should do if the Soviet Union attacked Germany. And nothing at all about how to respond if Germany invaded the Soviet Union!

Suvorov presents a considerable body of evidence that the Soviet Union was planning to invade Germany during the summer or early fall of 1941. The exact month of the invasion is unclear, but August 1941 seems as likely as any. After invading Germany, the Red Army would “liberate” France; thereby establishing Soviet hegemony over nearly all of mainland Europe. According to Suvorov, Hitler got wind of this planned Soviet invasion; which is why he launched his own invasion several weeks before the Soviet preparations were complete. Assuming Suvorov’s theory is correct, knowledge of strong Soviet performance at Khalkhin Gol would not have deterred Hitler from invading. On the contrary: it would have lent added urgency to the need to attack the Soviet Union before the Soviets attacked Germany.

@Herr KaLeun: thanks for the correction and the link. Using the link you provided, I found the following quote from Franklin:

Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins.

The earlier quote was misattributed, and I’m glad you brought that to my attention. But the distinction between democracy and liberty stands. Democracy without liberty is tyranny.

Der Kuenstler:

The history most of us have been exposed to was written by the victors.

That’s certainly true! After any war, it’s normal for the victors to present themselves in a far more favorable light than the one used for the vanquished. There’s certainly a lot of that going on in terms of WWII history. But a standard-issue description of WWII (from the Allied perspective) contains a far greater level of bias than one would typically encounter in a “victors’ narrative” description of some other war. (Such as the Napoleonic wars or the Seven Years War.)

During the Spanish Civil War, the communists broke new ground through their utter departure from the truth. If their propaganda effort required them to fabricate an imaginary battle, they would. They were also willing to deny actual battles which had really happened. George Orwell was himself a socialist, but he was shocked by the dishonesty shown by the Spanish Communists. In his book 1984 the government abrogated for itself the right to declare that black was white, up was down, and so on. That was based on what Orwell had seen the Spanish Communists do during their civil war.

Under Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union engaged in a massive effort to penetrate major foreign governments. That effort achieved considerable success in Western Democracies. Communist influence in FDR’s administration was greater than the mere number of Soviet agents might suggest. If (for example) communist and anti-communist elements of FDR’s administration disagreed with each other’s policy recommendations, FDR typically chose the communists’ advice. The more important the matter under discussion, the more likely FDR was to be guided by the advice of men who owed their loyalty and allegiance to Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union.

Nor was communist influence limited to the American government. While most members of the media were not necessarily Soviet agents, they were nonetheless extremely sympathetic to the Soviet perspective. Witness The New York Times’ efforts to deny the Ukrainian famine (7 million murdered, including 3 million children). Even though the Soviet agents in the American government and media were greatly outnumbered by non-agents, many non-agents created a pro-Soviet echo chamber. In that environment concepts such as “objective truth” went out the window. A Soviet agent could make a recommendation or factual assertion, and have it echoed by any number of people in powerful positions. Even many reasonable people fully or partially believed the Soviet-inspired propaganda being recklessly thrown around.

People were being whipped into a frenzy, so that the United States would get involved in the war. Even before the Pearl Harbor attacks, FDR was able to launch an undeclared war against Germany in the Atlantic. Captains of American warships were told to shoot German submarines on sight. They were also told to accuse the Germans of having fired the first shot.

Imagine a fanatical religious cult. Its leaders and core followers are deeply familiar with its teachings. The members of this cult decide to create a large event, open to the general public. The outsiders who join the event are not members of the cult. They have not accepted, and may not even be aware of, many of that cult’s core teachings. But neither have they rejected those teachings! On the contrary, this particular batch of outsiders has a very favorable view of the cult, are predisposed in its favor, and are very open to learning more. On the other hand, they hate anyone who opposes the cult. And they are getting caught up in the excitement of the event the cult is putting on.

During the 1930s and '40s, a relatively small minority of the American government and media were outright members of this cult (Marxism). Most members of the media and government could be described in the same terms I’ve used for the “outsiders” described above. They got caught up in the spirit of things. They believed it was perfectly okay to lie, as long as the lie in question was directed against Hitler, or helped move the U.S. closer to war. These outsiders were told–and genuinely believed–that WWII was a war between evil (Nazi Germany) and good (the Soviet Union).

The Marxists who created the Antiracism religion did not necessarily intend for that religion to be permanent. The long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy had always been world conquest. Because the United States was too strong to be conquered by military means, it had to be destroyed from within. It was for that reason that the Soviets involved themselves so heavily in internal American affairs. The Soviets propped up and supported various American political movements: radical feminism, a pro-crime movement, an effort to abolish traditional morality, attacks against religion (especially Christianity). Their sponsorship of Antiracism was just another thing on the list.

Suppose Mr. Smith slips a little arsenic into Mr. Jones’ food each day. The arsenic dosage Mr. Jones receives over any given day, month, or even year, will not necessarily be enough to kill him. However, Mr. Smith knows that arsenic builds up over time, and that eventually his efforts will be fatal to Mr. Jones. I would argue that Mr. Smith is in the process of murdering Mr. Jones. I would also argue that the Soviet Union went to war against the United States during the 1920s, and remained in a constant state of war against us until the fall of the Soviet Union. I would further argue that under the FDR/Truman administrations, the Soviets successfully used their (very considerable) influence in the United States to turn one of their intended victims (us) against another intended victim (Nazi Germany).

Benjamin Franklin once said that democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the outcome.

The politicians that the United States and Britain had during and shortly after WWII believed in democracy. But they did not believe in liberty. The fact those politicians did not value liberty is why, in the government they created for postwar West Germany, they did not give the Germans freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or freedom to peaceably assemble.

During the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church provided the dominant moral narrative for Western Europe. One of the pillars for that narrative was the Bible. Members of the laity were not allowed to own or read Bibles. Only clergy were allowed to own or read Bibles. A priest would interpret the Bible on behalf of those within his parish. The priest would also read selected passages from the Bible at mass.

The dominant religion among Western economic elites is not Christianity. It is Antiracism.

The category of person who, roughly, reads The New York Times and The New Yorker and listens to NPR, would be a deeply religious person indeed, but as an Antiracist. . . .

The call for people to soberly “acknowledge” their White Privilege as a self-standing, totemic act is based on the same justification as acknowledging one’s fundamental sinfulness is as a Christian. One is born marked by original sin; to be white is to be born with the stain of unearned privilege.

The proper response to original sin is to embrace the teachings of Jesus, although one will remain always a sinner nevertheless. The proper response to White Privilege is to embrace the teachings of–well, you can fill in the name or substitute others–with the understanding that you will always harbor the Privilege nevertheless.

The core value of Antiracism is white guilt.

Typically, the followers of a major religion will have a text or story. A description of how their own religion came into being, why that religion should be considered good, and why that religion’s enemies should be seen as evil. Judaism follows that pattern (Torah and Talmud). So does Christianity (New Testament). So does Islam (Koran).

Antiracism follows that pattern as well. WWII is described as a war between good (Antiracists) and evil (Nazis). Antiracism and Nazism are the opposite. For an Antiracist, proving the evil of Nazism is the same thing as proving that Antiracism is good. That is why Antiracists are so heavily invested in proving the evil nature of Nazis, and the evil nature of anyone else who seeks to preserve the existence of the white race.

The contents of Mein Kampf are almost as important to the Antiracist religious narrative as the contents of the Bible had been to the Catholic narrative. The Catholic Church forbade non-clergy from reading the Bible, fearing that their interpretations of what they read might sometimes differ from official Catholic interpretations.

The official Antiracist interpretation of Mein Kampf is that the book is unreadable drivel, written by a madman so consumed by his own hate he was unable to think of anything else. If that interpretation was accurate, the Antiracist priesthood would have every reason to favor widespread distribution of Mein Kampf. Such distribution would reinforce an important Antiracist religious narrative. If on the other hand the Antiracist priesthood had chosen to give the general public an exaggerated or false notion of Mein Kampf, it would be in that priesthood’s interest to suppress that book’s distribution. To allow distribution would be to allow exposure of some of their religious narrative’s falsehoods.

Narvik wrote:

On top of that, the average and casual Italian at this point had a very low morale, since they by now knew that Italy would loose, even if the Axis won the war.

That statement rings false. Germany did not have plans to enslave Italy after the war. In his writings, Hitler pointed out that if a nation wants allies, it must establish a reputation for treating its allies well. It was a logical conclusion for the leader of any nation, and I have seen no evidence to suggest Hitler had deviated from that logic.

I agree Italian morale was low. There were several reasons for that.

1. Mussolini seized power through military means. His views were not necessarily representative of those of most Italians.
2. Mussolini did not build a strong relationship with the Italian people after seizing office. He had no reason to rely on the Italian people to stick with him through thick and thin.
3. Most Italians did not believe in Mussolini’s dream of a revived Roman Empire, and thought his foreign adventures were rather pointless.
4. Italy was unprepared for war. It lacked a strong military culture and strong military traditions. Its army was not afforded the weapons which would have been necessary to destroy Britain’s Matilda tanks. Its military leadership was lacking. It’s hard to maintain high morale when it’s obvious that your opponent has a much better sense of what he’s doing than your own military has of what it’s doing.

Note that all four problems existed before Hitler came to power in Germany. It’s not as though Mussolini’s Italy had a great military tradition, which then collapsed once Hitler and Mussolini became allies. On the contrary: Italy’s military tradition and military preparedness were greatly lacking both before and after Hitler and Mussolini became allies.