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    Posts made by KurtGodel7

    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @Lazarus:

      @KurtGodel7:

      Secondly, you wrote that “The claim that the stealth bomber is a german invention is laughable.” You didn’t cite any source to support that claim. Germany developed a prototype of a flying wing bomber during WWII. Back when Germany was under the Versailles Treaty, prohibitions against powered aircraft caused a lot of German aeronautical talent to be diverted into gliders. The Germans learned a lot about aerodynamics as a result–learning which helped considerably with the subsequent invention of the Horten Ho 229’s flying wing design.

      It seems I am not permitted to link anything so I can not give you the page where this was posted in National Geographic Magazine.

      I  wrote a letter to a curator at the facility inquiring about the rumored stealth properties of the Ho 229 aircraft and received a detailed response: “I have examined the aircraft and many primary and secondary sources of information about the Hortens’ work, and I have found no reliable evidence to confirm this idea. Reimar Horten described these low RCS [radar cross section] techniques during the early 1980s as news reports began to appear that described the stealth qualities of the Northrop B-2 bomber. I have examined the Ho 229 V3 numerous times and found no evidence of a “mixture of charcoal and glue” applied to the skin that would lower the RCS. I believe Horten ‘invented’ the notion of the stealthy Ho 229 to draw attention to other interesting and innovative aspects of his work.”

      .

      I had interpreted your earlier post to imply that you disputed the existence of the Horten Ho 229 itself. I now realize your earlier claim was far narrower; and that you are merely disputing whether charcoal dust had been mixed into the glue of the Horten Ho 229 for the purpose of reducing its radar cross section. I acknowledge that the evidence for the charcoal dust is weaker than the evidence for the existence of the flying wing German bomber itself. (The latter is beyond all reasonable dispute.)

      Regardless of whether charcoal dust was or was not mixed into the Horten Ho 229’s glue, the aircraft still had stealthy characteristics. The flying wing shape produces a weaker radar signature than does a standard-issue aircraft shape. (Which is why the B-2 also employs the flying wing shape.) In addition, wood was used for a great deal of the Horten Ho 229’s construction; and wood is largely invisible to radar. Together, these two factors would have given this aircraft a stealthier radar profile than standard WWII aircraft, even without the charcoal dust. Understand here that “stealthier” does not mean completely invisible to radar–rather, it means the effective range for any given radar station would have been reduced when searching for this aircraft. It is also worth noting that the flying wing shape was chosen for aerodynamic reasons, not because of the desire to create a stealthy profile.

      More important than the Horten Ho 229’s stealth characteristics is the fact that it met or came close to meeting Goering’s 1000/1000/1000 goal. Goering had demanded that any future twin-engined German bombers must be able to fly 1000 km/hour, and must be able to deliver a 1000 kg payload to a target 1000 km away. The Horten Ho 229 had a top speed of 977 km/h (607 MPH), compared to 703 km/hr (403 MPH) for a P-51 Mustang. It could deliver 1000 kg (2200 lbs) of bombs to a target 1000 km (620 miles) away. This aircraft therefore had strong potential as a fighter/interceptor, as well as a medium bomber that could deliver its payload without being shot down.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @Pvt.Ryan:

      I’ll let Kurt take over as he’s one of the forums history buffs but first I’d like to say this. I NEVER SAID IT WAS A GERMAN INVENTION! THAT WAS KURT! If you can’t even argue with the right person then leave the forum! (I had a better response but the mods wouldn’t have agreed with me  :evil: )

      If you want my help, you’ve got it! I’ll start with jets. Lazarus was inaccurate to state that the first jet was the Meteor. The Me 262’s first flight (with jet engines) was in July of '42. The Gloster Meteor’s first flight was in March of '43. The Me 262 was introduced in April of '44. The Meteor was introduced in July of '44.

      Far more important than the minor differences in introduction dates is the fact that the German Me 262 used an advanced form of jet engine (axial flow jets), as opposed to the more basic and limited centrifugal flow jet engines employed by the Meteor. In addition, the Me 262’s design demonstrated a significantly more advanced understanding of aerodynamics than did the design of the Meteor (let alone the U.S. Shooting Star). A planned improvement to the Me 262–the Me 262 HG III–would have had wings swept back at a 45 degree angle.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @Lazarus:

      @KurtGodel7:

      . In addition, Germany achieved the below list of developments–developments which were significantly ahead of their time.

      Wartime jets + axial flow jet engines --> postwar axial flow jet fighters.
      Wartime advanced jet designs (Me 262 HG III) --> postwar efforts to break the sound barrier
      Wartime stealth bomber design --> 1980s era B2 stealth bomber
      Wartime type XXI U-boats --> postwar nuclear submarines
      Wartime air-to-air missiles --> postwar air-mounted weaponry
      Wartime guided air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles --> postwar guided missiles
      Wartime cruise missile (V1)  --> postwar cruise missiles
      Wartime V2 rocket --> postwar ICBMs
      Wartime assault rifle --> postwar assault rifles
      Wartime infrared vision equipment for tanks --> postwar night vision equipment
      Wartime handheld anti-tank weaponry (Panzerfaust) --> postwar handheld anti-tank weaponry
      Wartime Fritz guided bombs --> postwar smart bombs
      Wartime Wasserfall surface-to-air missiles --> postwar SAMs

      Ah I see. If Germans had something then it follows that all post-war development stemmed from them.
      This is silly.The claim that the stealth bomber is a german invention is laughable. It is long shown to be a history channel invention.
      Let us take one example above. The claim Germany led in IR development.
      Is that so? How then did the US develop and deploy a rifle with IR scope  when Germany failed?
      IR was not a German invention and even the Soviets had a pre-1939 version.

      I’ll address your bolded statement first. I did not state nor imply that “If Germans had something then it follows that all post-war development stemmed from them.” I listed German “developments which were significantly ahead of their time.” Please do not misrepresent my statements.

      Secondly, you wrote that “The claim that the stealth bomber is a german invention is laughable.” You didn’t cite any source to support that claim. Germany developed a prototype of a flying wing bomber during WWII. Back when Germany was under the Versailles Treaty, prohibitions against powered aircraft caused a lot of German aeronautical talent to be diverted into gliders. The Germans learned a lot about aerodynamics as a result–learning which helped considerably with the subsequent invention of the Horten Ho 229’s flying wing design.

      The shape of the Horten Ho 229 was not its only stealthy characteristic.


      After the war, Reimar Horten said he mixed charcoal dust in with the wood glue to absorb electromagnetic waves (radar), which he believed could shield the aircraft from detection by British early warning ground-based radar known as Chain Home.[5] . . .

      Northrop-Grumman built a full-size reproduction of the V3, incorporating a replica glue mixture in the nose section. After an expenditure of about US$ 250 000 and 2 500 man-hours, Northrop’s Ho 229 reproduction was tested at the company’s classified radar cross-section (RCS) test range at Tejon, California, where it was placed on a 15-meter (50 ft) articulating pole and exposed to electromagnetic energy sources from various angles, using the same three frequencies in the 20–50 MHz range used by the Chain Home in the mid-1940s. RCS testing showed that a hypothetical Ho 229 approaching the English coast from France flying at 885 km/h (550 mph) at 15–30 metres (50–100 ft) above the water would have been visible at a distance of 80% that of a Bf 109. This implies an RCS of only 40% that of a Bf 109, from the front at the Chain Home frequencies.


      The Wikipedia article to which I’ve linked provides some pictures of the Horten Ho 229. (Though unfortunately, another picture of a complete Ho 229 is no longer included in the article.) But lest you continue to think that this aircraft was some fabrication of the History Channel, I suggest you examine a photograph of the aircraft from the Smithsonian Institute’s website. The Smithsonian also provides a longer description of the aircraft here.

      I would also like to address your comment about the German Army’s reliance on horses. The German Army relied heavily on horses because horses don’t require gasoline, and Germany had no extra gas to spare. Using coal-powered trains to ship supplies most of the way toward their intended destinations, and horses for the remaining distance, was logical for a nation rich in coal and utterly lacking in oil.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @Zhukov_2011:

      The kill/loss ratio in the Wiki article is referenced to William Green’s “Warplanes of the Third Reich,” a fantastic and exhaustive compendium on German aircraft of WWII. I have a copy at home but I’ve always been skeptical of many of the figures he quotes in the chapters dealing with Germany’s jets. He hypes up the effectiveness of the Me-262 without going into much detail on whether these figures describe certain Schwalbe units (like JG/7 or JG/44) or the entire Me-262 fleet.

      I did a little digging, and found another source which cites a 4:1 kill ratio for the Me 262. Every source I’ve seen has cited a kill ratio in the 4:1 - 5:1 range.

      You mentioned that the Me 262’s fast closing speed was a disadvantage, in that there was little time to fire at enemy aircraft before the jet overtook them. However, a tactic was designed to counter that problem. The jet would first fly above the bomber formation, then would swoop below, and finally would pull up to the bombers’ level. That last maneuver would reduce the jet’s closing speed to allow more time to fire. Later, the problem of attacking bombers was considerably simplified when the jets were given R4M rockets (which had a much longer attack range than the 30mm cannon).

      Also, I don’t know how much faith I would but in Hans Fey’s quote, considering he was a Luftwaffe instructor and has a bit of a bias.

      That’s possible. On the other hand, an instructor’s primary objective should be to keep his students alive. You don’t achieve that by feeding them false information. In any case, the statements Fey made in that quote are confirmed by the following NASA website. In addition to confirming Fey’s statements about the Me 262’s turning characteristics, the NASA website indicated that, “The Me 262 seems to have been a carefully designed aircraft in which great attention was given to the details of aerodynamic design. Such attention frequently spells the difference between a great aircraft and a mediocre one.”

      Why produce five for six models, as the E series called for, when the U.S.
      and USSR were able to do fine with just one apiece (ok, the Soviets armored
      divisions still relied on KV tanks in many battles, but these were largely
      mothballed when the T34/85 appeared)?

      It is incorrect to assert the U.S. had just one tank model. In 1944, the U.S. produced four light tank designs, three medium tank designs, and one heavy tank design. The plan with the German E-series had been to have one tank design per weight category. For example, the E-5 (the smallest of the E-series vehicles) was to be 5 tons in weight and serve as the basis for things like armored personnel carriers, reconnoissance vehicles, light tanks, and so forth. The vast bulk of Germany’s tank production would likely have been E-50 Standardpanzers and E-75 Standardpanzers.

      I believe you may have explained why Germany (in at least my opinion) receives too much undeserved credit for its “technological superiority”: Germany, in her sheer desperation, researched dozens and dozens of supposedly “war-winning” weapons and in the process created the prototypes for some pretty cool looking hardware.  Allied innovations, which in my opinion were much more superior and effective than anything Germany produced or had near production, are often glossed over because they aren’t as cool looking as Schwalbes, Pzkw. VIIIs or Fritz flying bombs.

      My view of the situation is different. The Axis was generally at a severe (2:1 - 4:1) disadvantage in terms of both military production capacity and manpower available for infantry. That numerical inferiority was why the Axis lost the war.

      But the fact that the Axis war effort had been doomed by the Allies’ sheer quantity doesn’t mean we shouldn’t respect the technological innovations which occurred. One good measure of a technology’s worth is the extent to which it became the basis for postwar weapons or other innovations. Using that as the basis, the Allies made good technological progress during the war.

      You mentioned the Essex class carrier as an Allied innovation. I’ll grant it was better than the German carrier under construction, or the Japanese carriers of the war. But how much of the superiority of the Americans’ design was the result of the fact that the U.S. could afford larger, more expensive, better carriers than could the Axis? In addition to the Essex carrier class, the Allies achieved innovations such as the following:

      Wartime nuclear bomb–> postwar nuclear arms race
      Wartime radar + sonar developments --> further developments postwar
      Wartime computer technology --> postwar computer technology

      It is worth noting here that the Axis, and especially Germany, achieved progress in all three of the above-mentioned areas. In addition, Germany achieved the below list of developments–developments which were significantly ahead of their time.

      Wartime jets + axial flow jet engines --> postwar axial flow jet fighters.
      Wartime advanced jet designs (Me 262 HG III) --> postwar efforts to break the sound barrier
      Wartime stealth bomber design --> 1980s era B2 stealth bomber
      Wartime type XXI U-boats --> postwar nuclear submarines
      Wartime air-to-air missiles --> postwar air-mounted weaponry
      Wartime guided air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles --> postwar guided missiles
      Wartime cruise missile (V1)  --> postwar cruise missiles
      Wartime V2 rocket --> postwar ICBMs
      Wartime assault rifle --> postwar assault rifles
      Wartime infrared vision equipment for tanks --> postwar night vision equipment
      Wartime handheld anti-tank weaponry (Panzerfaust) --> postwar handheld anti-tank weaponry
      Wartime Fritz guided bombs --> postwar smart bombs
      Wartime Wasserfall surface-to-air missiles --> postwar SAMs

      It is true that the Allies had made progress in some of the above areas. For example, the British had developed centrifugal flow jet engines (which are easier to design, but inferior to, the axial flow jet engines the Germans had designed). Nevertheless, the above list represents areas in which the Allies had either made no progress at all, or else were significantly behind the Germans. People are impressed with the late-war German research and weapons development not just because the weapons “looked cool,” but because it was clear that late-war Germany was in the midst of building a solid qualitative advantage over its enemies even as it was in the process of being destroyed. That is an impressive feat on a number of levels, especially considering the Allies’ advantage in population size and available funding.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @Zhukov_2011:

      Could you provide a source for these figures? Almost everything I’ve read states the Schwalbe as having a pretty poor loss/kill ratio. JG44 and some other small, elite units may have reached a ratio of maybe more than 1:2, but on the whole, the jet was too plagued with problems, too short of spare parts, too wasteful in fuel and piloted by too many inexperienced fliers to have had the kind of history you say. Approximately a hundred Allied planes were shot down by Me-262. Compare that figure to the 1,400 or so Me-262s that actually reached an airfield, you’ll see the jet’s history wasn’t so impressive, with a kill/produced ratio of approximately 1:14. Given time, the Me-262 could have had a larger impact, but remember, German military technology wasn’t created in a vacuum. The Allies were taking notes and had their own designs in the work. They had the scientists and the industry to surpass in quality and quantity anything the Germans could put up. Besides, what good are jet aircraft when your soldiers holding the front line are running out of ammunition and food, or when your infrastructureis being bombed day and night?

      And the Horten, well, it would have crashed just as easily as any of Germany’s other rushed, untested and largely ineffective wonder planes, whether at the guns of an Allied pilot or by accident. :wink:

      Thanks for the long posts. It’s always good when someone contributes something well thought-out to the discussion.

      My source for the 5:1 kill ratio of Me 262 jets is here. I’ve read that the ratio increased to 10:1 when the jets were equipped with the latest air-to-air missiles (though that ratio is based on a relatively small number of combat missions).


      Compared with Allied fighters of its day, including the jet-powered Gloster Meteor, [the Me 262] was much faster and better armed.[6] . . . Luftwaffe test pilot and flight instructor Hans Fey stated, “The 262 will turn much better at high than at slow speeds, and due to its clean design, will keep its speed in tight turns much longer than conventional type aircraft.”[34] . . . Allied pilots soon found the only reliable way of dealing with the jets, as with the even faster Me 163 Komet rocket fighters, was to attack them on the ground and during takeoff or landing.


      Several times you mentioned Germany’s oil-related problems. (Its lack of fuel for its jets, the low octane of its fuel, etc.) The small amount of training its pilots received toward the end of the war was likewise a consequence of its lack of fuel. (The fuel shortage prevented them from receiving adequate training time.)

      The fact that Germany lacked the same natural resources as its enemies (or indeed enough natural resources to sustain a first-rate war effort) does not mean that the designs arrived at by its engineers were flawed or second-rate.

      It is true that jets were less maneuverable than most piston-driven aircraft. In general, the slower an aircraft, the smaller its turn radius. That is for the same reason that your car has a smaller turn radius when going 10 MPH than when it’s going 80 MPH. Whenever you manage to increase an aircraft’s speed you’ll generally lose some maneuverability. Despite that trade-off, faster aircraft were generally superior to slower aircraft (all else being equal). Jets were no exception to that rule.

      I agree that Germany’s V2 rockets had little or no military value. (Beyond the effect of distracting Allied bombers from other, more useful targets.) But I disagree with the assertion that the German rocket program wasn’t far ahead of the Americans’ program. During the initial postwar era, the American rocket program faltered, largely because the captured German rocket scientists were viewed with distrust. America tried to make do without allowing the German rocket scientists to contribute much, if anything, to the U.S. rocket program. As the Soviets began making significant progress of their own, and as some of the distrust toward the German scientists began to fade, the German scientists were allowed to do more. Their efforts resulted in the U.S. getting back in the lead. Werner von Braun was in charge of designing the Saturn V rockets that put men on the moon. He based those designs on the Aggregate rocket series he and his team had been working on back in Germany.

      You have correctly pointed out some of the flaws associated with the Tiger tank. But I feel you’ve overstated the case. In any case, Germany was in the process of creating replacement tank designs that were more powerful than its existing tanks, while also being much more easily mass-produced and far more mechanically simple and reliable.

      Germany’s innovations in submarines went far beyond just the schnorkel (which as you point out, was invented by the Dutch). Its type-XXI U-boats had a hydrodynamic design, a sophisticated electronics suite, highly extended battery life, and other advanced innovations. Either those or similar subs had a radar-aborbant rubber coating to make them harder to detect. Germany’s late-war submarines had far more in common with the nuclear subs of the postwar era than with contemporary WWII subs.

      Likewise, the Panzerfaust handheld anti-tank weapon was among the best infantry weapons of the war. Germany had been progressively upgrading its range, with plans in the works to continue the range upgrades.

      You mentioned several Allied inventions. While some of them–such as the nuclear bomb–are indeed impressive, others are not. For example, the idea of ship convoys is hardly a stroke of technological genius. Back in the dinosaur age, brontosaurs had used a similar concept to allow the adults to protect the young from predators. Other Allied innovations–such as radar, sonar, and so on–were also employed by the Germans. (It is also worth noting that the Japanese had contributed extensively to pre-war radar research efforts; but that the Japanese military did not initially believe that research could be converted into militarily useful applications. Therefore, Japanese radar development lagged a few years behind the U.S., Britain, and Germany.)

      The Allies were able to produce weapons in much larger quantities than were the Axis. Partly this was because all three major Allied nations were several years ahead of Germany and (especially!) Japan in implementing mass production techniques. It was also because the Allies had access to far more manpower and raw materials than did the Axis. As a result of this resource differential, anything new or innovative the Allies deployed could be released in very large numbers, and in a way that would have a massive impact on the course of the war. In contrast, the Axis’s limited resources and deteriorating war situation meant that whatever new designs they released would tend to fall into the category of “too little, too late.” But the fact that the Axis lacked the resources to produce large numbers of the weapons its engineers designed does not in any way detract from what those engineers had achieved!

      To give an example of this, Germany invented the first stealth bomber. This aircraft implied a much deeper understanding of aviation than did the Allies’ aircraft designs. (The same could also be said about Germany’s fighter jets.) But the war ended before this aircraft could be mass-produced. Conversely, the construction of large, four-engined planes (such as the ones the Allies created) did not necessarily represent a radical leap forward. Such planes were remarkable mostly because the Allies had the industrial capacity to produce enough of them to matter. The blueprints for the Superfortress would have been useless to the Axis because they lacked the excess industrial capacity required to produce significant numbers of those planes. (It is much, much easier to build a single-engined aircraft than a four-engined Superfortress.) In contrast, the blueprints for the late-war German innovations (type XXI U-boats, Me 262, stealth bomber, assault rifle, Panzerfaust, air-to-air missiles, Wasserfall surface-to-air missiles, infrared vision equipment for tanks, etc.) would not have been useless to the Allies. On the whole, Germany had significantly better and more advanced late-war weapons designs than the Allies. But the Allies were much better-positioned to take advantage of any given weapon design.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Dreadful Axis Mistakes

      @gamerman01:

      I for one would be thrilled if you’d try out ABattlemap and play on the A&A.org forums.  You can play 1940 that way.  On top of that, the map is beautiful.  Go to Global 1940, TMTM’s module thread and go to the first post for download links…  You can watch games, play games…

      Let me propose the following deal. I’ll go to ABattlemap and play Global 1940. In exchange, you’ll go to TripleA and play New World Order. (We can advise each other if we run into technical difficulties.) This way we’ll each get a taste of something new.

      For your first game of New World Order, I’d suggest that you control Italy and Romania, and find an experienced partner to control Germany and Finland. Italy is a major player in New World Order; and can often attain an income of 80 IPCs or higher. Romania is considerably smaller, and seldom gets much higher than 20 IPCs. Germany’s income can get to 100 - 110 IPCs, while Finland’s income is usually in the high teens.

      Your partner’s advice will be especially important during the first couple rounds because of the power of a well thought-out prescripted opening. You want to capture two factories on I1 (in Tunis and Marsailles) and another two factories on I2 (in Algeria and Greece). You should try to capture yet another factory on I3 (in the southwest of Spain) as the first step toward your conquest of neutral Spain and the consequent expansion of your income.

      Also, Britain will likely conquer western Turkey, including its critical industrial complexes. If you can sink the British East Mediterranean fleet and take control of Western Turkey, you’ll then be well-positioned to either move south and east against Britain’s other colonial holdings, or north and east into the Black Sea. An Italian fleet in the Black Sea can create a whole new set of problems for the Soviet Union. There are about six or eight Soviet territories that border the Black Sea, including one with a factory.

      Can you play teams in TripleA?

      Yes. The way it works is this: someone logs into the TripleA website and chooses to host a game. The host decides on the map, and will normally write something along the lines of “1 v 1” or “2 v 2” or something else. If you have a friend you want to partner with, you can sometimes talk a 1 v 1 host into agreeing to a 2 v 1 game.

      If you log into TripleA at a time when none of your friends are logged in, you can often get into a multiplayer game. In cases like that, both your allies and enemies will often be complete strangers. That randomness can make the game more interesting, as long as you don’t get too frustrated by being put in an unwinnable situation (as will sometimes be the case). A lot of other times the teams will be more or less balanced, which can lead to some interesting games!

      Can you watch everyone else’s games on TripleA?

      Yes. You can enter and watch a game even if you don’t control any of the teams. It’s not a bad way to spend 10 minutes here or there. On rare occasions, the host of the game will require people to enter a password to join. That’s not a big deal, because there are plenty of non-password protected games for you to join instead.

      Do they have leagues and tournaments on TripleA?

      Yes. I entered a New World Order tournament, and made it to the second round. At that point the tournament ended prematurely. :( But then another New World Order tournament appeared–one which seemed less likely to end prematurely. However, I didn’t have time to enter this new tournament.

      At least as of a few years ago, there was a league for Revised games on TripleA called the Ladder. I don’t know to what extent that league has transitioned over to Anniversary.

      That being said, TripleA doesn’t seem to place a strong overall emphasis on league play. If you’re there a lot, and if you’re good, you’ll develop a reputation. For example, people know not to mess with Straha, allweneedislove, Hobbes, or other players of that caliber, unless they themselves are feeling very, very competent. Some of the players on TripleA are significantly better than anyone at GenCon (including me). Even if you lose to a top-tier player, you’ll gain respect if you put up a good fight. In any case, there are plenty of mid- and lower level players on TripleA to keep things from getting too top-heavy.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Dreadful Axis Mistakes

      @gamerman01:

      Thanks, Kurt.  A couple of thoughts, from what I’ve read on this site and from my playing experiences:

      Carrier defense has been reduced to 2 for AA50, and carrier attack has been reduced to 0 in the 1940 games.  Also, carriers take 2 hits to sink in 1940.

      Sounds like you need to get your hands on AA50 and/or the 1940 games.

      You noted the big difference in quality of infantry and quantities of manpower.  I’ve seen it explained that the number of units in Axis and Allies roughly approximates some of these factors.  In other words, quantity of units in A&A actually represents quality.  So a stack of 20 German infantry next to a stack of 20 Russian infantry - you might actually imagine 1/3 as many troops in the German army as the Russian army, but 3 times the effectiveness.

      Also, fighter units (and bomber units) can be said to represent not purely fighters or bombers, but a mixture.  So a fighter unit represents your torpedo planes that can sink big ships.  Also, ship units can be thought to represent a mixture of ships.

      Yes, A&A is an abstraction and sometimes (many times) you will see absurd situations (Like a Jap infantry heavy strategy as you said).

      Here’s one of my favorites.  One of the first games I played of AA50 (was actually against myself - to get familiar with the game), UK liberated France by a Normandy invasion.  That same turn, Italy then launched an amphibious assault from the Mediterranean, complete with coastal bombardment.  The Allied troops were all in the North, or in Paris or something.  I guess those Battleship guns could shoot hundreds of miles?  :lol:

      Oh well - A&A is a blast!!  Thanks again, man.

      I agree I need to get my hands on Axis and Allies 1940. My problem is that I live in a small town, and don’t have access to an A&A playing group. That problem isn’t as bad as you think it might be; largely because I can use TripleA to play online. My favorite map on TripleA is New World Order. New World Order is to Anniversary Edition what Anniversary Edition is to Classic. (Except that this may be understating things.)

      I hear what you’re saying about how Axis and Allies abstracts various things. Like you said yourself, it’s a fun game, and I enjoy it a lot.

      Even so, the perfectionist in me is always eager to discover/create the ideal rules set.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Dreadful Axis Mistakes

      You asked whether I find Axis and Allies historically realistic, and if not which parts I feel should be changed. That’s worth a post in itself! Below are the areas I feel the game falls short of historical realism.

      Industrial capacity
      Military aircraft production is a fairly good proxy for overall military production. During 1942, the Soviet Union produced 25,000 military aircraft. Germany produced 15,000 military aircraft that year, and Japan produced 9,000. But in Revised, Germany has an income of 40, Japan of 30, and the U.S.S.R. of 24. It’s also worth noting here that in '42 the Soviet Union produced between 3 - 4 times as many units in every major land category as did Germany. Axis and Allies dramatically understates the Allied industrial advantage–which is probably necessary for game balance.

      Changes in industrial capacity
      Germany produced 15,000 military aircraft in '42, and 41,000 in '44. The U.S. produced 48,000 military aircraft in '42 and 98,000 in '44. Ideally, Axis and Allies should take into account this kind of dramatic expansion of military production capacity.

      Changes in technology
      The Japanese Zero was considered top-of-the-line in early '42, but had become obsolescent by '44. More generally, technology played a very important role in deciding the outcome of the war. This is not to suggest the Allies had a decisive technological edge over the Axis–they did not–but rather that there were a number of technologies which were really, really worth having. I realize most variants of Axis and Allies have some sort of technological system. But that system is far too luck-based, and doesn’t really capture the feel of the ongoing effort by all major participants to both avoid falling behind technologically, and, ideally, to pull ahead.

      Air superiority
      In the real war there was a contest to see which side could gain control over the sky. Fighters were of pivotal importance to that struggle; with their main combat purpose being to shoot down enemy aircraft. Victory in this competition was critical on a number of levels: it meant control over the battlefield skies, control over the surface of the ocean, and gave your side the ability to strategically bomb enemy factories and cities while thwarting bombing raids against your own. Axis and Allies doesn’t capture any of this. Fighters are slightly better on “defense” than “offense.” But beyond that, the only air battles fought typically involve AA guns shooting at enemy aircraft–which is not primarily what the air battles of WWII were about.

      Limitations on manpower
      In August of 1939, Germany’s population was 69 million people, as compared to 160 million for the Soviet Union. More generally, the Allied nations had much larger core populations than did the Axis nations; which meant that the Allies could field much larger numbers of infantry. But in a game like Revised, if Japan decides to go for a heavy infantry strategy, it could easily end up with a much larger stack than the Soviet Union. That situation is completely ahistorical.

      Absence of qualitative unit differences
      According to a study, Soviet infantry were only 33% as combat-effective as their German counterparts. Germany also enjoyed a qualitative advantage over British and American infantry, albeit to a lesser degree. Incorporating qualitative differences could help offset the Allied advantages in military production capacity and manpower.

      The attack/defense combat system
      I can understand giving infantry a higher combat value on defense than on attack. Defending infantry dig a trench, and use the trench as cover while attacking infantry cross some open field. I get that. But why does a defending aircraft carrier have a combat value three times higher than an attacking carrier? Does the defending carrier dig a trench in the ocean water, and somehow hide behind it to defend itself against the attacking carrier?

      The Axis and Allies combat system does a good job of capturing the advantage infantry have on defense; but is not good for capturing a number of other important elements. For example, a fighter is great at shooting down enemy aircraft, but fairly useless if you want to sink a battleship. A dive bomber or torpedo bomber might let you sink the battleship, and is decent at shooting down enemy planes. I would prefer a combat system which allows unit specialization like this, rather than lumping everything into “attack” or “defense.”

      Hitpoints
      Some units were harder to kill than others. Tanks and battleships had thick armor. Fighters were fast and maneuverable. Submarines were stealthy. As a nation provides its tanks with thicker armor, its fighters with better engines and more aerodynamic airframes, and its submarines with increased levels of stealth, those units should become progressively harder to kill. But in Axis and Allies, every unit has only one hitpoint (except for battleships which have two).

      Summation
      There are other ahistorical elements in the Axis and Allies rules set as well. That being said, I understand that Larry Harris’s goal was to build a comparatively simple, straightforward game. The simpler the game, the fewer of the above-described factors can be successfully addressed. I play and enjoy Axis and Allies, but I don’t consider it a realistic depiction of WWII.

      I’ve endeavored to create a more historically realistic rules set. In doing so, I’ve found that each increase in realism increases the game’s complexity. I’ve tried to add as much of the former, and as little of the latter, as possible. Even so, I must admit that if Axis and Allies is a complexity level of 100, Flames and Steel is about a 150. The advanced version of Flames and Steel, which I am working on now, will probably have a complexity of 200. This means my rules set is not for everyone, but only for those who are willing to put up with some added complexity to gain depth and richness. Flames and Steel provides that depth and richness by (among other things) addressing each of the above-described factors.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Dreadful Axis Mistakes

      @gamerman01:

      :lol: Enjoyable read.  I like the part where I was trying to imagine German officers persuading Muslim masses to fight for the Nazis, and Germany and Japan splitting up India.

      It sounds like the German officers would have benefitted from playing A&A.  After playing a lot of A&A it dawns on me that Japan never succeeded at taking Hawaii, Australia, India, much of China, Russia, Alaska, California……  Speaking of Japan, I’m surprised you didn’t mention Midway.  What if Japan was the one who won a(some) huge decisive naval and air battle(s)??

      The European Axis never did really dominate North Africa (for long at all), keep the Allies out of the Med, take Turkey, the middle East, Stalingrad, Leningrad (right?), dominate the Atlantic, or achieve air superiority over Britain or Europe (only for relatively brief stretches of time)

      So I’m wondering, Kurt, what you think about the Axis and Allies games that we have now - AA50 and 1940?  Since you know a lot about WWII history and you think about what-if scenarios, I’m curious as to your thoughts about A&A.  Like what is absurd, what is pretty realistic, etc.  Maybe even what you wish was different (house rule type of things)  I know this will undoubtedly open a can of worms on this site, so if you want to PM me that would be cool too.

      Yes, I understand A&A is just a game and not a historical simulation.  It ignores SO many real-life factors, it’s just an abstraction, and succeeds tremendously in what it was created for - immense fun coming from wonderful combinations of skill (strategy, tactics, and planning) and luck.

      Thanks for the compliments! :)

      I didn’t mention Midway because in my Axis victory scenario I’d envisioned Japan avoiding war with the U.S. in the first place. It’s worth noting that in 1943, the U.S. produced 86,000 military aircraft to just 17,000 for Japan. Had the Japanese won at Midway, it would have prolonged the Pacific war, and would have forced the U.S. to temporarily divert resources from the Pacific theater. But Japan had no long-term prospects for a military victory in that war, and its only real hope was at the negotiating table.

      I think that the German military planners’ biggest problem was a lack of adequate information, particularly about Soviet military strength. If the Red Army had consisted of just 200 divisions (as they believed) and if it had fought as poorly against Germany as it had against Finland, the decision to invade the Soviet Union would have been the best one available. The rewards for conquest would have included oil, grain, industrial capacity, manpower for German factories, and access to vital raw materials. The rewards for conquering the Middle East would likely have been significantly smaller than that.

      The other mistake German military planners made is that they failed to appreciate the kind of qualitative edge their hardware might provide around 1944 - '45. It’s also possible that in 1941, they may not have fully appreciated just what kind of military production capacity Germany could achieve, or how far away from that maximum potential it was. Between those two things, they got into a sort of “now or never” thinking which led to a bid for outright military victory in '41 (the invasion of the Soviet Union), rather than building themselves up and invading later. With a rapid buildup of Germany’s military production + rapid technological advancement, time could have been on Germany’s side. (Even though the opposite appeared to be the case in '41, and for completely logical reasons.)

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Dreadful Axis Mistakes

      As of 1940, Germany had a number of severe disadvantages. The first and foremost is that the U.S. had already committed itself to the Allied war effort. Even though the U.S. was technically at peace with the Axis, it had committed itself to sending large numbers of military aircraft to Britain for use against Germany. In 1941, the U.S. produced 19,000 military aircraft, compared to 12,000 for Germany and 5,000 for Japan. The U.S. outproduced both major Axis nations combined even though it was still (technically) at peace until December of that year. Plans were being implemented to expand American military aircraft production to 70,000 per year, with half the produced planes being sent to Britain for use against Germany.

      Regardless of whether Hitler did or did not declare war on the U.S., he would still have to face America’s industrial might; and would have to find an answer to the U.S.-built aircraft that would be used to attack Germany’s cities and its people. In addition, the British had imposed a food blockade on Germany, which meant that over the long run there would not be enough food to feed the people within Germany’s borders. Some would have to starve or otherwise be exterminated.

      Russia had fought poorly in WWI. It had also fought poorly in the war in 1905 between itself and Japan. Further, the Soviet Union had fought very badly in its invasion of Finland (in 1940). That track record had led German military planners to anticipate it would fight badly if it was invaded. They also believed the Red Army consisted of 200 divisions. (As compared to 150 divisions for the German Army.) This was a severe underestimate: by the fall of '41, the Red Army consisted of 600 divisions. Likewise, German military planners had grossly underestimated the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union.

      Germany’s supply lines were a problem due to its lack of oil. In the long term that problem could be solved by upgrading its rail network and using coal-powered trains to move supplies. The plan was to surround and capture the bulk of the Red Army in the western regions most accessible to the German Army. With the core of the Soviet military strength broken, the German Army could then push eastwards to take the grain, oil, industrial capacity, and manpower it so desperately needed. These resources would allow it to counter the large numbers of British- and American-made aircraft being used against Germany.

      Over the short-term, however, the invasion would make Germany’s food situation worse. Most western Soviet territories ran at a food deficit. Even the Ukraine’s food surplus was not as large as it once had been due to Stalin’s industrialization and collectivization efforts. Because Germany didn’t have the food it required to feed everyone, the solution was to starve or exterminate those it liked the least. Jews received the lowest priority for food allocations, and people in the occupied Soviet territories the second-lowest. Because the British (and later American) food blockade had forced Germany into a situation where it had to starve people in its occupied territories, Hitler felt that getting local populations to cooperate through fear might be more effective than would a more positive approach. It’s difficult to convince a population that you are their friend when you are starving them to death. Germany had no food with which to avert widespread starvation.

      Clearly, the invasion of the Soviet Union failed to solve Germany’s problems. In fact it greatly added to them. Over the short-term at least, Stalin would likely have been content to sit and watch Germany and the Western democracies fight each other. He regarded both sides as equally enemies, and wanted nothing more than a long, bloody war which would bleed both sides white. Once Europe was sufficiently weakened and war-weary, the Red Army would of course move west to pick up the pieces. Stalin’s approach meant that over the short-term at least, Germany could avoid facing the Red Army if it wished to do so. (Though it would have to face that army eventually.) However, the Red Army had experienced a purge several years ago, in order to eliminate the old, gentlemanly officer corps, and to replace it with one more loyal to communism. (I’ve seen it alleged that the new officer corps was intended to be more thuggish–an accusation which seems borne out by the atrocities committed by the Red Army.) Also, in the spring of 1941 the Red Army was in the midst of a doctrine change. With the Red Army still recovering from the purge, and in the midst of a doctrine change, there was an opportunity to attack it when it was unready–an opportunity which would not have existed in '43 or '44.

      In the U.S., some media outlets were isolationist, while others were interventionist. However, the isolationist media outlets were being bought up by those who favored interventionism. The American public had recognized the U.S. had been duped into entering into WWI, and that sentiment made it reluctant to enter another European war. But with American media outlets and the president being strongly pro-war (and generally pro-communist), Hitler felt it was only a matter of time before the U.S. declared war on Germany. (Much like it had during WWI.) He also mistakenly believed that the U.S. would initially be too occupied with its war against Japan to do much against Germany. Declaring war meant that Germany would have to deal with the American Army + its military production, instead of just its military production. Whether that would or wouldn’t have mattered over the long-term depends on how successful FDR and his allies in the media would have been in getting the U.S. into the war had Germany not declared war.

      It is also worth noting that by 1941 the U.S. had broken Japan’s diplomatic code, which meant that the U.S. government knew more about the goings-on in Tokyo than did the Japanese ambassador. Specifically, they knew that if they presented a reasonable offer for lifting the oil embargo Japan would accept. But if the U.S. asked for dramatic concessions on Japan’s part, Japan would go to war within a matter of weeks. The U.S. asked for very dramatic concessions indeed. The war between the U.S. and Japan helped turn the latter nation’s attention away from the Soviet Union; while also giving FDR the chance he needed to fully mobilize America’s resources for war. Also, a leaked U.S. government document persuaded Hitler that the U.S. was temporarily too weak for a two ocean war; and that he could therefore get away with sinking the massive quantities of Lend-Lease Aid flooding into the Soviet Union and Britain. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Stalin shipped 100 divisions west across the Trans-Siberian railway because he knew Japan could no longer seriously attack him. Those 100 divisions arrived in the dead of winter, and proved critical to the Soviets’ success.

      To make a long story short, Germany in 1940 had very few good options. Germany was weaker than either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., and the leaders of both nations were committed to the destruction of the German military. The case could be made that Germany had significantly less long-term strength than did Britain–a nation which was already at war against Germany in 1940. The conquest of North Africa and the Middle East would have helped Germany’s situation somewhat, especially in terms of oil. Had Hitler chosen that path, Germany’s situation would have improved with respect to Britain. Also, the delay would have allowed Germany to build up its own industry. However, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would also have become significantly stronger during the delay.

      The only chance for an Axis victory I can see would have been under the following scenario. In 1941 Germany invades Turkey and North Africa; and secures control over the Middle East. It begins recruiting large numbers of Muslim men for its army, which it sends against the British force in India. Then in the winter of '41, Japan declares war against the U.K., but not the U.S. Germany and Japan would combine to take India, and would divide it between the two of them. Germany would then dedicate 1942 to improving its industrial capacity, developing new, more modern weapons, fending off Allied bombing raids, submarine warfare, and southward conquest along the Nile. It would also attempt to recruit soldiers from India’s Muslim population.

      1943 would likely be similar to '42. The main difference would be that there would be significantly more American-made planes being shipped to Britain every year. Germany would continue to push south in Africa, with the intended goal of taking South Africa. If Africa fell to the Axis, and if Australia and New Zealand negotiated a separate peace treaty with Japan, the British war effort would then be limited to the British Isles and Canada.

      In 1944 Hitler would invade the Soviet Union. The Red Army would have been significantly stronger in '44 than it had been in '41. But several factors could offset that. 1) Germany could invade from the south (Persia), in addition to from the west. 2) Germany would have a much larger initial invasion force because of help from the Muslim men it had recruited. 3) During WWII, Germany massively expanded its military production between '42 and '44. It produced nearly three times as many military aircraft in '44 as in '42; and four times as many tanks. This scenario assumes that a somewhat similar production increase would have taken place. 4) Later in the war, Germany was significantly ahead of its enemies in most major technological areas. Its Me 262 jets achieved a 5:1 kill ratio; and that ratio increased to 10:1 when they were equipped with its best air-to-air missiles. Later in the war it created the assault rifle, it had the best tank designs, it had the best handheld anti-tank weapons, its Type XXI U-boats were the best submarines of the war, etc. Assuming the critical years of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union would have been '44 and '45, many of these technological advances could have appeared in sufficient numbers to make a difference. (Especially if that had been the plan from '40 onward.)

      Under this scenario, the plan would not necessarily have been to conquer the Soviet Union in its entirety. Instead, Germany would conquer whatever it could gain during two years of conquest. After that it would negotiate a peace treaty with Stalin. Conquest of a significant portion of Soviet lands–ideally including Moscow, the Caucasus oil fields, and other strategically important areas–would provide Hitler with the resources he needed to hold his own in the long, grinding air and sea war against Britain. FDR would die in '45. It’s likely that his successor would either have been less pro-communist/committed to Germany’s destruction than FDR had been, or else would lack FDR’s ability to get Congress to do his bidding. Further, Britain would be in dire financial straits by this point, making it difficult to justify further increases in Lend-Lease Aid. (The U.K. was close to bankruptcy even as early as '40.) With its colonies conquered and with Germany victorious over the Soviet Union, and (possibly) with the American commitment to Lend-Lease Aid lessening, there is at least the chance that Churchill might have been replaced with some other leader more willing to negotiate a peace treaty. That peace treaty would have ended the war at last, and would have allowed Germany to escape the horror of postwar Soviet occupation.

      On the other hand, it’s quite possible the British wouldn’t have agreed to peace; and that the Americans would have become increasingly pro-war due to the institutional influences described earlier. If those things were to occur, then in 1946 Germany’s plan would have been to focus on building Type XXI U-boats to sink much of the British Navy, while using its jets to gain control over the skies above Britain and Germany. Naval and air superiority would pave the way for an invasion of the U.K. in late '46 or early '47. At that point, Germany could at last achieve peace, unless of course the U.S. had declared war on it. But by this point, Germany would have the industrial capacity, food supplies, oil, and access to raw materials necessary to hold its own even against the U.S.

      I don’t know whether the above plan would have worked. But, at least with 20/20 hindsight, this seems to have been among the best available plans to ensure an Axis victory.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @CWO:

      Yes indeed.  Patton expressed this idea well in 1944 in a message he sent to his superiors pleading to be given greater priority in the Allied allocation of fuel supplies: “My men can eat their belts, but my tanks need gas!”

      I’m currently reading a book which makes the case Patton was assassinated by the U.S. government. The evidence for assassination is quite compelling, though not 100% conclusive. The book is worthwhile not just for information about the assassination attempt, but also because of the historical background information it presents. The WWII and early postwar administrations of FDR and Truman were pro-Soviet–so much so that if you suspected the Soviets, you became suspect yourself. Patton was strongly anti-Soviet, and therefore a source of friction in the alliance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. that FDR in particular had hoped to build. Patton also protested the Morgenthau Plan and other acts of mass murder perpetrated by the Allied governments in the postwar era.

      FDR also believed that the Soviet Union deserved to control most of postwar Europe because it had done the bulk of the work of defeating Germany. On the one hand Stalin had wanted a second front for Germany–which FDR provided on D-Day–but on the other he didn’t want the Western democracies to get too much of postwar Europe. FDR had no objection to this. The problem was that one of his generals was too good, and threatened to take too much of what both FDR and Stalin felt should be in the Soviet sphere. To prevent this from happening, Wilcox writes, Patton was deliberately and frequently deprived of the gas he needed to advance rapidly eastwards into Germany. That decision drew the war out and cost many lives. But on the bright side–at least from FDR’s and Stalin’s perspective–many, many more people lived under Soviet or Soviet satellite rule in the postwar era than would have been the case had Patton received his gasoline.

      @CWO:

      This ties in with what I was mentioning earlier about the importance of having a coherent plan for winning a war, regardless of the level of technology a country has.  Oil was absolutely crucial to all the major combatant nations in WWII, and as you point out Germany and Japan both had a critical lack of natural supplies in this area.  It was vital for both countries to view the improvement of their oil situation as a top strategic priority – and both countries flubbed it.  Japan correctly decided to seize the Dutch East Indies to obtain oil, but gave completely inadequate attention to the problem of defending its tankers from enemy submarine attack on the long sea voyage to Japan.  As for Germany, a far more sensible option for it in 1941 would have been to invade the Middle East rather than the USSR.  Germany could have secured vast oil resources that way (and by the same token would have deprived Britain of those same supplies).  It could at the same time have caught the British troops in Egypt between its Middle East invasion forces in the east and Rommel’s existing forces in the west.  This could potentially have knocked Britain out of Egypt / North Africa entirely, and deprived Britain of the use of the Suez Canal, its gateway to India, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand.

      You’ve made very strong points. The possibility of an invasion of the Middle East–most likely through Turkey–should have been very strongly considered. (I don’t think that Germany had the extra transports + naval strength necessary for a sea invasion of the Eastern Mediterranean.) Ideally, Turkey could be pressured to become part of the Axis on its own; thereby granting the German Army immediate access to the British lands beyond. But Germany could also have fought its way through the Turkish mountains if necessary. The problem with that option would have been the inherent delay, and the chance for Britain to build up its army’s strength through soldiers from its colonies. If an invasion of Turkey had been necessary, I would think that nearly two years would have been needed between the beginning of the invasion and its conclusion. (Presumably with one German force swinging south from Turkey to meet the other force pushing east from Libya.) Success on this front would have given Germany the oil you mentioned, while facing a much weaker land force than the Red Army.

      There were several reasons why Germany did not do these things. The first is Hitler’s thought that war between Germany and the Soviet Union was inevitable. He was therefore leery of concentrating too much of Germany’s strength in some venture such as the above, leaving it vulnerable closer to home. That fear may or may not have had a basis in reality. Another, highly credible perspective on Soviet diplomacy is that Stalin regarded both fascists and democracies as equally enemies; and therefore wanted the two sides to fight each other in as long and bloody a war as possible while the Soviet Union stayed neutral. Then when both sides had been bled white, the Red Army would move in to pick up the pieces. There is, however, the chance Stalin would have made a move early, especially if Germany looked weak.

      Another reason Hitler launched the war against the Soviet Union was because he didn’t want to give Stalin the time to complete his program of industrialization and militarization. However, that program was much further along than Hitler had realized. It was Germany, not the Soviet Union, that required extra time to catch up. A third factor which led Hitler to choose the Soviets as his next target was the fact the Red Army had seen its performance severely downgraded by purges–a fact which had become evident in the Winter War against Finland.

      But perhaps the main factor which led to the decision to invade was the misperception of the strength of the Red Army. Prior to Barbarossa, German military planners had believed the Red Army consisted of 200 divisions. But by the fall of '41 it consisted of 600 divisions, and the Soviets had attained a recruitment level of 500,000 men a month: a level they would sustain for the bulk of the war. Instead of the relatively rapid, blitz-like conquest of the western Soviet Union–a conquest which would have obtained for Germany the oil and grain it desperately needed–Germany found itself itself in a long, grinding, brutal war against an enemy much larger and stronger than itself; with an army and weapon production capacity several times as large as expected. A plan is only as good as the information it’s based upon; and Germany’s plan for victory was based on very faulty information indeed.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @CWO:

      Getting the right mixture of basic, advanced and super weapons (and other tools of war) is indeed a good recipe for victory (or at least for improving your chances of victory) – and, as you point out, it’s much easier to see the correct ingredients in retrospect.  An example of this type of mixture was given by Eisenhower after the war when he listed what he considered to be the four things which won WWII for the Allies.  One of them, the atom bomb, is clearly in the superweapon category.  Another one, the bazooka, can be regarded as an enhanced conventional weapon: sophisticated and effective, but based on relatively straightforward principles (the Monroe effect) which had been known as far back as 1888, and which did not not require a huge effort like the Manhattan Project to produce a practical weapon.  The other two, the jeep and the C-47 Skytrain / Dakota / Gooney Bird, were multi-purpose transportation devices – unromantic and harmless-looking, but immensely valuable as logistical support systems and as providers of battlefield mobility for ground forces and paratroops.

      Bread-and-butter tools like transport vehicles and cargo planes aren’t as flashy as tanks and fighters, but they are vitally important.  There’s a great scene towards the end of the 1949 movie Battleground which shows just how much these machines meant to the troops.  The American forces surrounded at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge have spent the movie holding the line against the Germans.  Heavy cloud cover has prevented their resupply all through the battle, and the U.S. troops have almost exhausted their resources.  The sky suddenly begins to clear, and moments later the drone of airplanes is heard in the distance.  The soldiers scan the sky suspiciously , then suddenly jump up and shout “C-47s!!!”  The sky fills with parachutes, and crates loaded with ammunition belts and ration packs start landing all around the troops, who rush to open them.  Even if someone watching the movie doesn’t know anything about the course of the Battle of the Bulge, he or she would understand right away that this scene is the great turning point of the battle, and that the guys in Bastogne are going to be saved.

      Solid post, and I can’t find anything in it with which to disagree! :)

      As you pointed out yourself, unglamorous vehicles such as jeeps, military trucks, and cargo transport planes were of critical importance to the war. That was clearly an area in which the Allies had a very powerful advantage over the Axis. During WWII, Canada produced more military trucks than all Axis nations combined.

      There were several reasons for this. One was that Germany and Japan–especially Japan!–were not as far along in their industrialization efforts as were countries like the U.S. and Britain. That meant less military production overall. The other problem the Axis had is that jeeps, military trucks, and cargo transport planes are no more useful than scrap metal except to the extent you can fuel them. Japan, it will be recalled, went to war on the U.S. in the first place because the U.S. had imposed an oil embargo and Japan had little or no oil supply of its own. Germany also had almost no oil. Romania ran at an oil surplus–which helped–but not enough. During the years leading up to the war, Hitler had tried to address the problem of insufficient oil through synthetic oil production. A number of experts told him his goal of major synthetic oil production was economically impossible. But as Adam Tooze notes in The Wages of Destruction, those experts had severely underestimated “Hitler’s sheer bloody-mindedness.” Consequently, Germany received a major amount of oil from synthetic oil production by the start of the war.

      But even adding in the Romanian oil, they barely had enough for their existing motorized vehicles. An Allied-like transportation and supply effort would have been impossible unless Germany could acquire large amounts of new oil. This was exactly why Hitler found it so important to take and hold Stalingrad–he wanted access to the Caucasus oil fields.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @CWO:

      @KurtGodel7:

      As for the cost of the V2 program–my impression is that whatever industrial effort was expended mass producing V2s was almost completely wasted. But the effort invested into research about how to build better rockets should be placed into a different category.

      Research can pay all sorts of unexpected dividends, so it does have value.  That said, however, it can be argued that Germany’s multiple research programs into all kinds of advanced technologies suffered from the “trying to herd cats” syndrome.  It scattered its limited resources on a plethora of projects, including some of debatable practical value, rather than identifying a few that had the most potential to win the war and concentrating all its marbles in those areas.  And it didn’t just do this in the high-tech weapons field.  Just as an example, it developed too many tank types – including the Maus, which was too slow to have much practical value, and too big and heavy to handle bridges or to transport on most railroads.  The Soviets, by contrast, focused on manufacturing just a few basic but effective tank types designed for easy mass production, and as their technology got better they used these improvements mainly to producing upgraded models (as in the switch from the T-34/76 to the T-34/85) rather than developing new machines.

      There’s also the larger point that it’s probably not a good idea to become mesmerized by the theoretical potential of high-tech “wonder weapons” at the expense of using a nation’s economic and industrial resources as efficiently as possible to produce the basic weapons and other tools needed in wartime, or having a coherent strategic plan for fighting and winning the war.  One of John Keegan’s books (I think it’s The Mask of Command) argues that Hitler in many ways never progressed beyond the level of a corporal (which he was in WWI) in his strategic thinking.  Keegan describes Hitler bending over a map of Stalingrad, expressing satisfaction over the news that this particular platoon had captured that particular block, while his generals stood nearby rolling their eyes and wondering what on earth any of this had to do with the overall situation on the Eastern Front.  As the situation deteriorated more and more in 1944 and 1945, Hitler seems to have clung increasingly to the idea that the “Wunderwaffen” under development would save the day for Germany at the last moment, and compensate for the errors which Germany had made up to that point.

      I think I once mentioned it somewhere else on the board, but Arthur C. Clarke’s short story “Superiority” – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superiority_(short_story) – explores the question of whether it’s better to have a vast number of ordinary weapons or a small number of super-weapons.  Clarke wrote in one of his book introductions that the story had been directly inspired by WWII.

      You make a lot of good points, and I agree with about 90% of what you’ve written. (Without having a definitive opinion, one way or the other, about the remaining 10%.)

      I fully agree that Germany should have had fewer weapons designs, and should have concentrated its engineering and development efforts into improving those weapons. Its failure to do so was a major reason why the Soviet Union produced between 3 - 4 times as many land weapons in 1942 as did Germany, and nearly twice as many military aircraft in ‘42. (This, despite many of the Soviets’ factories had been overrun or relocated during '41.)

      It’s harder to say that their research effort should have been concentrated into a few key areas. In hindsight, it’s easy to see which projects could have brought immediate military benefit, which ones would have been associated with more delayed gratification, and which were merely dead ends. (Though as you hinted at, a project which yields no direct military benefit may still significantly contribute to some other, more useful project.)

      Toward the end of the war, Germany had developed the assault rifle, long range Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons, Me 262 jets which attained a 5:1 kill ratio (10:1 when fitted with the latest air-to-air missiles), and advanced type XXI submarines which would have been very difficult for the Allies to detect or sink. These were exactly the kinds of weapons Germany needed to win the war. However, these weapons appeared too late, and in too small quantities, to affect the war’s outcome.

      One problem Germany faced is that its entire war effort had been more or less thrown together in a hurry. In 1933 when Hitler came to power, Germany’s army was a token force with no tanks. Germany as a whole was not allowed to build powered aircraft of any kind. A situation in which the military has few or no weapons means that factories will not be geared up for military production. Given that Germany was in the midst of a depression, and that the major democracies had closed themselves to German exports, German factories were not very well geared up for any kind of production! Going from a situation like that (in 1933) to war with Britain and France (1939) was just too small a time for them to get everything right. The emphasis during those years was on getting new military production running quickly, not necessarily on the disciplined standardization of a few designs which you described, and which was clearly necessary.

      Toward the end of the war, the Germans had become fully aware of the problems you described, and were working to correct them. The E-Series tanks would have had far fewer moving parts, would have been easier to build and maintain, and would have represented far fewer tank designs, than Germany’s previous tank designs. The E-25 would have replaced the Panzer III and Panzer IV, the E-50 was to replace the Tiger I and the Panther, and the E-75 was to replace the Tiger II. Plans were also underway to improve the turrets of the Panthers and, therefore, of the subsequent E-50s and E-75s. The armor of the turrets was to be thicker–three times thicker on the roof–but the turrets would be lighter due to a narrower design.

      Had they had another year or two, the German research and engineering effort would have resulted in tanks that were not only qualitatively superior to anything the Allies had, but which would have been easy to mass produce and maintain. Not only that, the Germans had by far the best handheld anti-tank weapons of the war. The Panzerfaust 150 could penetrate over 200 mm of armor at a range of 150 meters. The bazooka was significantly inferior, and was more useful against pillboxes and so forth than it was against German tanks. With the best tank design, the best aircraft designs, the best infantry weapons, by far the best submarine designs, and a number of other useful designs and innovations, Germany’s research and development effort seems quite impressive! That said, you are correct to say the way it was organized could and should have been better. I especially agree with your assertion that an engineering and production effort should begin with someone at the top having a clear vision of how he intends to achieve victory, who then selects the weapon designs necessary to put that vision into effect.

      I’ve read the short story you mentioned, and it’s overly critical of the German quest for super weapons. Had Germany used exactly the same weapon designs as its enemies, and no other weapon designs, the outcome of the war would have been about the same. Germany’s enemies simply had too much production capacity and too much manpower for Germany to hope for victory. Only a decisive advantage in quality could allow Germany to balance out the Allies’ overwhelming advantage in quantity.

      For most of the war, Germany produced weapons of standard-issue quality, albeit in smaller quantities than should have been the case. Those small quantities were because of various problems you identified (too many designs in production, too many moving parts per weapon, etc.), and not because of Germany’s efforts to obtain super weapons such as jets or air-to-air missiles. Developing the super weapons for the mid- and long-term made sense; and in fact the jet could probably have been finished noticeably sooner had it received a higher research and development priority. But in the meantime, Germany should have been more Soviet Union-like in its production of normal quality weapons. By that I mean it should have focused on a small number of designs, and those designs should have been as simple and as easily mass produced as possible.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @221B:

      CWO Marc,

      Actually, guidance systems were in existence during WWII:

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Beams

      Guidance beams were used for the V-2 though the system was not foolproof:

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-2

      Accuracy increased over the course of the war, particularly on batteries where Leitstrahl-Guide Beam apparatus was installed.

      British intelligence leaked falsified information implying that the rockets were over-shooting their London target by 10 to 20 miles. This tactic worked and for the remainder of the war most landed in Kent due to erroneous recalibration.

      Had the war extended to 1947, I think it is possible that the guidance systems would have improved to a significant accuracy (unless of course the counter-measures also improved).  A moving ship, I doubt could have been hit unless it (or a very near submarine) were transmitting a signal, but certainly a city and probably even a city block could have been targeted.   And, of course, chemical, biological, and especially atomic weapons would not have needed great accuracy as KurtGodel7 stated.

      I think the reason that today the US Navy isn’t overly worried about Chinese missiles sinking one of its carriers is that they have some very potent countermeasures…

      KurtGodel7;

      While reading the article on the V-2, I came across this interesting bit of information:

      The V-2 program was the single most expensive development project of the Third Reich:[citation needed] 6,048 were built, at a cost of approximately 100,000 Reichsmarks each; 3,225 were launched. SS General Hans Kammler, who as an engineer had constructed several concentration camps including Auschwitz, had a reputation for brutality and had originated the idea of using concentration camp prisoners as slave laborers in the rocket program. The V-2 is perhaps the only weapon system to have caused more deaths by its production than its deployment.[39]

      The V-2 consumed a third of Germany’s fuel alcohol production and major portions of other critical technologies:[41] to distil the fuel alcohol for one V-2 launch required 30 tons of potatoes at a time when food was becoming scarce.[42] Due to a lack of explosives, concrete was used and sometimes the warhead contained photographic propaganda of German citizens who had died in allied bombing.[18]

      I find the embedded quote particularly an interesting point of view:

      “… those of us who were seriously engaged in the war were very grateful to Wernher von Braun. We knew that each V-2 cost as much to produce as a high-performance fighter airplane. We knew that German forces on the fighting fronts were in desperate need of airplanes, and that the V-2 rockets were doing us no military damage. From our point of view, the V-2 program was almost as good as if Hitler had adopted a policy of unilateral disarmament.” (Freeman Dyson)[40]

      Perhaps this (and the lack of support given to Goddard by the Americans who certainly could have afforded it) is an indication of better operational research on the part of the allies.  Why spend the money on a rocket inflicting minimal damage to the enemy when the same development money could help fund the manhattan project and the construction money buy a useful fighter instead?

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_research#Second_World_War

      which might be one of the advantages the allies had during the war, though I am not certain it should be called a technological advantage.

      I have heard it stated that the V-2 program cost the same as the manhattan project, which relates directly to the question of operational research.  But I can’t find a good source for this, the best approximation I have is the following: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichsmark

      The Reichsmark was put on the gold standard at the rate previously used by the Goldmark, with the U.S. dollar worth 4.2 ℛℳ.

      ; therefore 100,000RM * 6000 /4.2 = $142M in 1938 dollars…probably not a great method to compare the costs…maybe someone knows (or can find) a better comparison?

      I am really enjoying this discussion, thanks to everyone who is participating!

      Thanks for the good post! It looks like I have some reading to do about the guidance systems the V2s could potentially have used! If they could eventually have become reasonably accurate weapons, then Hitler’s decision to mass produce them seems somewhat less questionable. He may have reasoned that by 1946 or '47 the V2 would become a weapon with actual military value. Once that happened, he’d want to have them in full production. If such indeed was his reasoning, he may have felt that putting them into production a couple years too early would serve two purposes. 1) It would force the Germans to learn how to produce large numbers of V2s quickly, so that they’d be ready to massively deploy the more accurate V2s once they were available. 2) The V2s would distract Allied bombers. One could argue that, had that industrial effort gone into producing fighter aircraft instead, Germany would have lacked the fuel to use all those extra fighters.

      As for the cost of the V2 program–my impression is that whatever industrial effort was expended mass producing V2s was almost completely wasted. But the effort invested into research about how to build better rockets should be placed into a different category.

      Toward the end of the war, Germany had developed some extremely effective air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles. I don’t know how much overlap there was between the rocketry research for those things and the V2 research effort. But often a research application which seems specific to one area can have an application in another. Germany and the U.S. should have provided solid funding for rocket research–which was, after all, the origin of the ICBM–but neither nation should have mass produced V2-like weapons.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @CWO:

      @KurtGodel7:

      This jet bomber was faster than any of the available Allied planes of the time–including their jet fighters–and I agree with your assessment that it would have run circles around them all. The Me 262 achieved a 5:1 kill ratio, and I don’t see why the (very fast) Horten flying wing couldn’t have done the same.

      I was puzzled by the notion of a late-WWII bomber – whatever its propulsion system – “running circles” around a late-WWII fighter, since fighters are supposed to be more agile than bombers, so I had a quick look into this subject.  I was surprised to see that the Horten Ho 229A was actually quite a small 1-man plane, not at all the big lumbering aircraft which the word “bomber” normally suggests.  It had a loaded weight of 15,238 lb – about a ton lighter than the loaded weight of the Lockheed Hudson light bomber (17,500 lb), about half the loaded weight of the B-25J Mitchell medium bomber (33,510 lb), and about three-and-half times less than the loaded weight of the B-17G heavy bomber (54,000 lb).  That would put the Horten roughly in the same weight class as the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik ground-attack aircraft (loaded weight = 13,580 lb), or the Lockheed P-38L Lightning multi-role fighter / ground-attack aircraft (loaded weight = 17,500 lb).  This suggests that the Horten could not have carried a large bomb payload – particularly since its Junkers Jumo 004B turbojets had a very high fuel consumption, which implies a large weight allocation for fuel tanks at the expense of bomb-carrying capacity.

      You are correct about the limited size of the Horten flying wing’s payload. Its normal bomb load was 1000 kg (2200 lbs), as compared to 2000 - 3600 kg (depending on the distance of the target) for a Flying Fortress. The Superfortress carried 9000 kg of bombs. The Horten flying wing’s unique shape allowed it to carry a larger payload a longer distance than it otherwise could have; and did much to offset the inefficiency of the jet engines which you pointed out. But it was clearly not a heavy bomber like the four engined British and American aircraft. This airplane’s purpose was to be fast enough and stealthy enough to radar to allow the Germans to do at least some bombing, despite the Allies’ air supremacy. It was also intended for use as a fighter.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @CWO:

      @KurtGodel7:

      The OP stated that the Germans were working on improving the guidance systems for V2s, such that they could be targeted at specific Allied ships, or at the centers of Allied factories, with near-certainty of getting a direct hit. He added this would have been available in 1947 (IIRC). Had the Germans been able to achieve that, the V2 would have gone from being an expensive distraction whose only real purpose was to soak up far more of the Allied bombing effort than it deserved, to a real weapon with decisive strategic importance. However, I have not yet done the research necessary to either confirm or refute the OP’s statements about this.

      A terminal guidance system allowing a ballistic missile to hit a specific building or ship with near certainty is completely incredible for 1947.  This sort of thing only became possible very recently, with the introduction of laser designation systems (which require a friendly aircraft or ground unit to illuminate the target) and GPS-based targeting systems (such as those used on cruise missiles, which are conceptually closer to the V1 than the V2).  As recently the the First Gulf War, such systems weren’t foolproof: those precision strikes we saw on CNN were the ones that hit, not the ones that missed.

      Another difficulty is that having a precise-enough guidance system is only one-half of what’s required.  The other requirement involves having the exact coordinates of the target, down to an accuracy of a few meters.  In pre-GPS, pre-satellite days, such precise data would have been difficult for Germany to acquire for enemy buildings, and impossible to acquire for non-fixed targets like ships (especially given the degree of air superiority which the Allies had over their own territories, which precludes enemy reconnaissance flights).

      Just a few weeks ago, there were news reports that China was supposedly developing a ballistic missile system capable of targeting individual enemy ships off its coast.  Some analysts issued dire warnings that this spelled the end of U.S. naval supremacy, but others expressed scepticism over the feasibility of such a weapon system – so I find it difficult to believe that something similar would have been achievable by Germany sixty-plus years ago.

      Thanks for the informative response! It sounds like you have a firm grasp of your subject matter. I’ve been doing a lot of research for my rules set, but this sounds like one area that I can safely consider settled. (Unless, of course, someone were to post a link supporting the OP’s statements about highly accurate V2s by 1947.)

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @221B:

      Kurt,

      Excellent points, I appreciate you taking the time to discuss.  It is difficult, however, to assess what might have happened so there are no right or wrong answers.  What if this had happened, what if they had developed that…

      A couple of more points I’d really like your opinion on if you (or others) have time:

      1. How would the German ME262 compare to the UK built (and operational during WWII) Gloster Meteor jet in combat?  What about the Horton HO-229 vs. the Meteor ?  Or the US P-80?

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Me262
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_Meteor
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horten_Ho_229

      My guess is that the Ho-229 would have ran circles around them all…but I cannot definitely say that since we don’t know what would have happened.

      1. The German V-2 was an incredible advance unmatched by the Allies…or was it?  Consider what the American Robert Goddard developed decades before the Germans or the cold war space race between the US and USSR:

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_H._Goddard

      Its a long read (but very well worth it), so I’ll simply quote from Werner Von Braun …

      Don’t you know about your own rocket pioneer? Dr. Goddard was ahead of us all.

      Wernher von Braun, when asked about Goddard’s work following World War II[84]

      What if the US had invested even a small amount of money toward Goddards work (as they certainly would have had the V-2 or proposed V-3 really started affecting the Allied war effort)?

      Excellent post! In response to part 1–not all jets are created equal, as you yourself noted. There were basically two ways engineers could go with jet engines. On the one hand, they could use centrifugal flow jet engines. These were comparatively simple, easily engineered, and well-understood. However, they were associated with severe technical limitations. Their other choice was to use axial flow jet engines. Engines of this type posed a significantly greater engineering challenge than did centrifugal flow jet engines. But the potential reward (in terms of performance) was also greater.

      The British and American jet programs of WWII used centrifugal jet engines. That, in combination with their lack of an advanced, aerodynamic body design, meant that their jet aircraft did not exceed the best available piston aircraft during WWII.

      German jets used the advanced, axial-flow jet engines. (It had taken them several years to iron out the associated difficulties.) Not only that, but they were significantly ahead of the Allies in terms of aerodynamic research.

      The Horten flying wing–otherwise known as the Ho 229–was similar in both shape and concept to the U.S.'s much later, flying wing stealth bomber. (The Horten also had stealthy properties and was difficult to detect on radar.) The flying wing was the result of an effort to meet Goering’s goal of 1000/1000/1000. He’d wanted a bomber that could travel 1000 km/hr, with an operational radius of 1000 km, and which could deliver 1000 kg to its target. The flying wing shape was originally intended to help the plane meet these three goals; but which unexpectedly gave the plane a stealthy profile with respect to radar. This jet bomber was faster than any of the available Allied planes of the time–including their jet fighters–and I agree with your assessment that it would have run circles around them all. The Me 262 achieved a 5:1 kill ratio, and I don’t see why the (very fast) Horten flying wing couldn’t have done the same.

      To address the second part of your post: in itself, the V2 was a fairly useless weapon–at least for delivering a conventional payload. The OP stated that the Germans were working on improving the guidance systems for V2s, such that they could be targeted at specific Allied ships, or at the centers of Allied factories, with near-certainty of getting a direct hit. He added this would have been available in 1947 (IIRC). Had the Germans been able to achieve that, the V2 would have gone from being an expensive distraction whose only real purpose was to soak up far more of the Allied bombing effort than it deserved, to a real weapon with decisive strategic importance. However, I have not yet done the research necessary to either confirm or refute the OP’s statements about this.

      Another potential use for Germany’s rockets would have been to deliver either chemical or nuclear payloads. The Germans were significantly ahead of the Allies in nerve gas-related research; which means that even a small, inaccurately delivered payload would have been devastating. The three- and four-stage rockets under development would have allowed that nerve gas to be delivered to any target in the world. That same technology would also have allowed them to deliver a nuclear payload anywhere in the world, had they been able to build one.

      You made a good point about Robert Goddard. He gave the U.S. an early lead in the rocket race, and the U.S. even had a nascent rocket program during WWI! He began developing a bazooka-like weapon in 1917.

      Thanks to a nozzle invented by Swedish inventor Gustaf Laval, Goddard was able to increase the efficiency of his rockets from 2% to 64%. Goddard’s research was intelligent and forward-thinking, and anticipated a number of later developments in rocketry and space flight. However,


      The publication of Goddard’s document gained him national attention from U.S. newspapers, most of it negative. Although Goddard’s discussion of targeting the moon was only a small part of the work as a whole and was intended as an illustration of the possibilities rather than a declaration of Goddard’s intent, the papers sensationalized his ideas to the point of misrepresentation and ridicule.


      According to an editorial in New York Times, “Of course [Goddard] only seems to lack the knowledge ladled out daily in high schools.”


      As a result of harsh criticism from the media and from other scientists, and understanding better than most the military applications for which foreign powers could use this technology, Goddard became increasingly suspicious of others and often worked alone, which limited the impact of his work. Another limiting factor was the lack of support from the American government, military and academia as to the study of the atmosphere, near space and military applications.


      Irresponsible journalism by the New York Times and other media outlets meant that Goddard’s work was no longer seen as politically acceptable. From then on, the mainstream view was rejection and ridicule. That campaign cost Goddard much of the institutional support he might otherwise have received; and served to prevent the U.S. from developing much of a rocket program until after WWII. The reason for these media attacks was because Goddard had, in the '20s, mentioned the idea of someday flying a rocket to the Moon; and had done some preliminary calculations. All of this goes to show that one ought never to believe any statement any journalist makes about science, ever. (Unless, of course, that statement can be verified by a credible–i.e., non-journalist–source.)


      As an instrument for “reaching extreme altitudes”, Goddard’s rockets were not very successful; they did not achieve an altitude greater than 2.7 km (in 1937), at a time when airplanes could reach up to 15 km and balloons 22 km. By contrast, German rocket scientists had already achieved an altitude of 3.5 km with the A-2 rocket (in 1934), reached 12 km by 1939 with the A-5 and 84 km in 1942 with the A-4 (V-2), reaching the outer limits of the atmosphere.

      Goddard’s pace was slower than the Germans’ because he did not have the resources they did.


      The above situation was the exact opposite of so many other forward-looking research efforts–such as computers and nuclear technology–in which the German scientists did not have the available resources of their Allied counterparts. The U.S. clearly had the spare resources to devote to Goddard’s rocket program, had it chosen to do so.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @221B:

      Still, I think there is too much emphasis on the German achievements and too little recognition of the allied “wonder weapons”; perhaps due to a respect for the Nazi scientists and engineers.  It is important to recognize that the allies had some amazing technological advances during this time as well.

      Yours is a solid post, and a good contribution to this discussion! I came across many of the same things when doing research for my rules set

      The race to build an atomic bomb started as a result of breakthroughs made by German scientists and published in academic journals. A successful atomic bomb effort required a large group of highly talented scientists and engineers, as well as a massive allocation of industrial capacity. Germany had the talented scientists it needed, but it lacked excess industrial capacity to devote to a project which would require years before yielding any benefits at all. Clearly the U.S. achieved something impressive both by having its scientists create a successful bomb design, and because it had been able to enrich the required uranium and plutonium. But Germany deserves credit for a strong nuclear program as well–albeit a nuclear program which lacked the access to industrial capacity to solve the problems the Americans solved.

      You’ve correctly pointed out the proximity fuse’s impact on anti-air fire and artillery fire. It was devastating. Toward the end of the war, the Germans seem to have developed a proximity fuse of their own, which they had apparently intended to include on their surface to air missile. From the link (towards the end):


      Both proximity and self-destruction fuzes were provided. The proximity fuzes were projected on the I.R., Electronic, and acoustic principals; however, the latter had essentially been dropped by the designers as the maximum range at which the actuating impulse was of sufficient magnitude was too small to derive most effective results from the warhead.


      Unfortunately, the article does not indicate how the proximity fuses described above compare to those employed by the British and Americans; or whether the Germans’ proximity fuses were small enough to be practical for normal AA fire. (The referenced surface to air missile weighed 1800 kg / 4000 lbs.) At first glance, proximity fuses seem to be an area similar to radar, in the sense that the Germans had a respectable research effort underway, even if the British and Americans were somewhat ahead.

      I also looked at the R4M–a German air-to-air missile used near the end of the war–on the theory that it might also have had a proximity fuse. From Wikipedia:


      Only a small number of aircraft were fitted with the R4M, mostly Messerschmitt Me 262s and the ground attack version of the Fw 190s . . .

      The weapon had excellent results. . . . in March 1945, six R4M-armed Me 262s flying out of the Oberammergau flight test center and led by Luftwaffe General Gordon Gollob claimed to have shot down fourteen B-17s in a mission.[citation needed] In April 1945, R4M-equipped Me 262s claimed to have shot down thirty B-17s for the loss of three aircraft.[citation needed]


      Unfortunately, the Wikipedia is light on detail, and doesn’t indicate whether the R4M used a proximity fuse.

      You mentioned that the Allies were ahead of the Germans in cryptography. That’s a good point and one worth expanding upon. During the war Britain had several Colossus computational machines. These were digital programmable electronic devices designed for problem-solving. They may or may not be considered full-fledged computers, depending on how broad your definition of a computer is. Regardless, they were critical in Britain’s code-breaking and computational efforts.

      Germany had also made breakthroughs in computational research. From Wikipedia: “[The Zuse Z3 was] the world’s first working programmable, fully automatic computing machine. It was Turing-complete, and by modern standards the Z3 was one of the first machines that could be considered a complete computing machine.” The Z3 was introduced in 1941; several years before the Colossus. However, development on the Zuse machines was considerably slowed due to lack of adequate funding. “Zuse asked the German government for funding to replace the relays with fully electronic switches, but funding was denied.” But by the end of the war, Zuse had built the Z4, which was “the world’s first commercial digital computer.” (Albeit an electro-mechanical computer, instead of fully electronic like the Colossus or the later, far more powerful ENIAC.)

      The war was won by the allies because the Nazi’s failed to defeat the Soviet Union.  The Nazi wonder weapons were too little, too late but even if they had been developed soon enough, I think the Allied wonder weapons could have countered the Nazi’s.

      It’s tempting to point out that the Allied advantage in industrial capacity and manpower was so overwhelming that they did not need to counter Germany’s wonder weapons with wonder weapons of their own. Sheer numbers would have been enough. In 1939, Germany had a population of 69 million people, as compared to 169 million for the Soviet Union. That disparity gave the Soviets an overwhelming advantage in the manpower available for infantry. In the spring of 1941, the German Army consisted of 150 divisions, 100 of which were used to invade the Soviet Union. By the fall of '41, Soviet recruitment efforts had increased the size of their own army to a staggering 600 divisions. Also, if you look at these aircraft production numbers you can see that the Allies had an overwhelming advantage in military aircraft production (a reasonably good proxy for overall military production).

      If those advantages had been taken away–if the Allies had had roughly equal manpower and industrial capacity to that of the Axis–would the new weapons being designed by the Allies have been enough to counter those of the Germans? I don’t think they would have been. German jets, with their air-to-air missiles, would have gained near-total domination of the skies. Their advanced Type XXI U-boats would have been devastating against Allied shipping. Allied artillery and AA guns would have been very significantly enhanced by proximity fuses, but the artillery would have been vulnerable to attacks from the air. (Especially because Germany had developed an air-to-surface missile.) The Germans would have had better tank designs, and night vision for their planned tanks. Not to mention their increasingly long-ranged Panzerfaust hand-held anti-tank weapons. While the Allies would have had their share of advantages as well, I don’t think those advantages would have offset all that.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

      @CWO:

      @KurtGodel7:

      I liked the original article, but I’d like an error-free article even more.

      Me too.  The problem with these kinds of errors is that it only takes a few serious or blatant ones to cast doubt over the credibility of the entire article, even if the rest is accurate.  They create the impression (rightly or wrongly) that an author doesn’t have enough background to evaluate the information he’s found elsewhere, and that he’s just repeating it uncritically.

      As for the supposed weapon mentioned in the BBC link you provided, I agree that the claim is far from being a solid one.  And even assuming that by 1944 or 1945 Germany had developed a radiological dispersion weapon, or even a couple of fully-fledged tactical nuclear bombs, it can be argued that these wouldn’t have changed the outcome of the war.  The Eastern Front was so large, and the Russians had so many divisions along its length, that a couple of localized tactical nuclear blasts wouldn’t have greatly altered the force ratio between Germany and Russia.  Also, by the last third of 1944, Germany wasn’t just fighting on the Eastern Front; it was also fighting the Anglo-Americans in the west.  It would have taken mass-produced tactical nukes to stop the three Allied powers from advancing into Germany…and even in America in 1945, there was nothing “mass” about the number of atomic bombs produced: the U.S. was able to manufacture a grand total of three weapons by war’s end.

      I wonder if we’ve become less accepting of error today than we’d been thirty or forty years ago. Or–maybe I’m not phrasing that correctly–maybe it’s just become easier to do our own research, and therefore to detect errors, than it had been.

      For example, a few years ago I’d come across some articles from The Guardian about Britain’s use of torture on political prisoners around 1945 - '47. Below is a quote:


      Former prisoners [of Bad Nenndorf] told Hayward that they had been whipped as well as beaten. This, the detective said, seemed unbelievable, until “our inquiries of warders and guards produced most unexpected corroboration”. Threats to execute prisoners, or to arrest, torture and murder their wives and children were considered “perfectly proper”, on the grounds that such threats were never carried out.

      Moreover, any prisoner thought to be uncooperative during interrogation was taken to a punishment cell where they would be stripped and repeatedly doused in water. This punishment could continue for weeks, even in sub-zero temperatures.

      Naked prisoners were handcuffed back-to-back and forced to stand before open windows in midwinter. Frostbite became common. One victim of the cold cell punishment was Buttlar, who swallowed the spoon handle to escape. An anti-Nazi, he had spent two years as a prisoner of the Gestapo. “I never in all those two years had undergone such treatments,” he said.


      Britain opened the Bad Nenndorf secret prison in the second half of 1945, and initially used it primarily on key Nazi officials. Its willingness to resort to the above-described methods to obtain confessions casts considerable doubt on any confessions thus extorted! Many people, if subjected to physical torture + threats to their families, will do or say anything they believe will keep their families safe.

      Having been exposed to the article about Bad Nenndorf and a torture center in London, I found that my view of other historical sources had changed. This is particularly true of historical sources which I’d once regarded as credible, but which did not acknowledge the possibility of torture + coercion when reporting the confessions of senior Nazi officials. It is also true of sources which describe the exterminations which occurred in Nazi Germany without bothering to mention the Anglo-American food blockade or the famine/near famine conditions which resulted. (I learned about Germany’s food situation when reading Adam Tooze’s book, The Wages of Destruction.)

      A number of people widely regarded as credible WWII historians have made truly remarkable errors and omissions in their description of WWII history. That does not excuse non-professionals from making errors of a similar or lesser scale. But it does mean that accuracy is perhaps harder to attain in this subject than elsewhere, in part because mainstream WWII historians have traditionally been too uncritical in accepting the claims of Allied governments. This represents something of a double standard; in that the claims made by the LBJ administration about the Vietnam War, or by the Bush administration about the second Iraq War, very often do not receive uncritical acceptance. There is no reason why we should uncritically accept the FDR or Truman administrations’ claims about WWII. But until mainstream historians start doing a better job of separating cold hard facts from Allied propaganda, it will be difficult for non-professionals (who rely on those mainstream historians for most of their information) to create error-free summations of WWII history.

      I realize I have strayed (if only slightly) from the subject at hand. To return to that subject, I agree that by late ‘44, Germany’s military fortunes were bad enough that they could not have been saved by a few tactical nuclear devices. The first few strikes would do the most damage, after which the Soviets and Americans would respond by spreading out their forces. To have significantly altered Germany’s fortunes, the tactical nuclear weapons would have had to destroy the heart of the enemies’ strength arrayed against Germany. IIRC, Germany in '44 had 400,000 men on its western front, as compared to 2 million men in the Anglo-American force. While German infantry had enjoyed a qualitative advantage over their British and American counterparts in 1943, that advantage had slipped away by January of '45. (If not earlier.) This was largely because in late '44/'45, many German soldiers on the Western front were poorly trained, poorly armed old men or young boys, foreign soldiers who had little interest in dying for Germany, or else German men of military age who’d realized the war was lost. Even if half the Anglo-American force had been destroyed with tactical nuclear weapons, they would still have enjoyed a better than 2:1 advantage in manpower, near-complete air supremacy, a commanding advantage in tanks, artillery, and other weaponry, as well as all the other advantages their overwhelming industrial capacity could bring to bear. Likewise, the Soviet force on Germany’s eastern front was much larger, better-armed, and far stronger than the German force it faced.

      posted in World War II History
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
    • RE: Advanced Rules Set

      @onetthome:

      These seem pretty cool, I’ll be sure to print the rules. I’m not seeing any rules for the Pacific though  :|

      I appreciate the compliments from you and from Georgemak!

      I’m currently putting the final touches on another rules set–a more advanced one. As is also the case for the rules set under discussion, this rules set is designed with a global war in mind. But that being said, I wouldn’t object to a custom map designer creating a Pacific scenario.

      Every time I create a rules set like this, I try to build something generic enough that a custom map designer will have a lot of room in which to work. Working within the general framework, a custom map designer could create his own starting map, nations list, national advantages, disadvantages, and available technologies for each nation, starting unit setup, and other adjustments. The rules set is intended to give map designers plenty of room in which to exercise their creativity.

      But my greatest current need is for a software developer. If anyone here is a developer or knows a developer who might be interested in something like this, please PM me.

      posted in Other Axis & Allies Variants
      KurtGodel7K
      KurtGodel7
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