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    Posts made by Coronel Cool

    • RE: Speaking of Religion…

      This dude sounds like a really funny guy!

      The liberals over at Air America The Young Turks found some really great quotes for their Fallwell Eulogy.

      My favourite Fallwell quote must be this: “You should not sleep with prostitutes unless you’re married to them.” ha, ha, ha, ha, ha!!

      Also his vision that all good born-again christians will be sucked up naked on their judgement day is great fun! 
      I would really have loved to see that, but sadly it seems the dude passed away to early.  ;-)

      posted in General Discussion
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: World War Two movie clips

      There are thousand of original film clips from WWII on youtube.

      Here is a french clip from May 28, 1940:

      http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_LVEZjNRYY&mode=related&search=

      From there, just follow “related” to find many other original movie clips

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: Ardennes ( and the battles)

      Military history is full on encounters where one side uses terrain the other side believe to be impassable.

      First rule of combat.
      Impassable terrain is never impassable unless you defend it.

      Baghdaddy couldn’t be more right here.  :-)

      Another famous example that comes to mind occurred on Bataan where the extremely incompetent Gen. MacArthur failed to defend the “impassible Mount Natib”, therefore losing his stronghold on Luzon.

      From Wikipedia:
      “Mount Natib, a 4,222-foot-high mountain that split the peninsula, served as the boundary line between the two corps. The commanders anchored their lines on the mountain, but, since they considered the rugged terrain impassable, they did not extend their forces far up its slopes. The two corps were therefore not in direct contact with each other, leaving a serious gap in the defense line.”

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bataan

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      German infantry division 1939=17,200

      Corps=3-5 divisions
      Army=3-5 Corps

      At Stalingrad germany lost 225,000 KIA plus 90,000 captured

      Thanx for coming around…  :-P

      To avoid any confusion we should also be aware that a field corps and a corps is actually two different things.
      Where the definition of a field corps is (1) that it is a subdivision of a field army, the definition of a corps is (2) that it is NOT a subdivision, but actually a independent force that isn’t really big enough to be called an army (independent geographically (eg. British Free Corps) or according to task (eg. US Marine Corps)). Therefore a corps can pretty much have any size smaller than a field army. A perfect illustrating example of (2) would be The British East African Camel Corps with only 7.000 soldiers. Despite its very small size, this force is surely a corps because it’s not a subdivision of anything: It’s commander was the highest-level commander of British East Africa.

      …and well…the British Free Corps never had more than 27 soldiers!!!  :-D

      I believe DAK was initially a corps according to definition 2 (expeditionary force), - not a field corps. Initially it was only combined of two small divisions (5th Panzer & 5th Light) of less than 30.000 soldiers, but later it grew in size and thus became “Panzer Army Africa”, or even later “Army Group Africa”, allthough these organisations never reach a size comparable to a field army or an army group of the eastern front. This is why “Army Group Africa” was dubbed a “paper tiger” by the allies.

      Cheers  :wink:

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      Cyan:

      the poulation of the us in 1940 was 132,164,569. .2(132,164,569) = 26,432,914.

      Yeah, I think we can agree that the US fought the war much like they had both of their hands on their back (busy with lots of other stuff). With your calculations the great US effort seems merely like spitting.  8-)

      As for Germany it has been estimated that around 3-4 million soldiers were still in uniforms in may 1945 just before Germany surrendered.

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      Imperious leader:

      an army would be made up of 15 divisions ( with 10,000 men each so thats 150,000 but its still to high and some units are just not gonna fit really any consistent system because the game was not designed that way. It was a balanced idea on deployment rather than historical.

      I’m quite sure a full German infantry division at WW2 was much more than 10.000 men, rather 16.000-18.000 men, and consequently I believe the average German field army (at least before combat) was very much bigger than 150.000 soldiers. The average German Army corps was about 60.000- 120.000, more or less the size of a russian army.  The Russian equivalent to a German army was called a “front” and could number as much as 350.000 men. I also believe The German 6th army at Stalingrad initially numbered 200.000-300.000 men. Tell me if I am wrong.

      Baghdaddy:

      We should not assume that a “destroyed” army is actually representing 100,000’s of men dead.  It more accurately is the destruction of war materials and disruption of the organization that is what most quickly removed combat units from the front line.  2% to 3% causualties were enough to get most combat units looking for R&R.  10% casualties would be enough to make most units static and unable to do much more than hold ground.  Casualty rates higher than that would generally be the end of the unit but the “elements” of the unit would still be individually functioning and could often be pulled back together in R&R to rebuild the unit.

      I think this sounds very reasonable to me, which is why I suggested that the visible inf-unit may be interpreted as the elite front-division of the corps it represents. Losing this front-division the corps would eigther be pulled back for reinforcement (symbolized by a newly purchased inf) or pinned down, unable to make offensive action (thus symbolized  only by the territory colour).

      AJGundam:

      Well that’s why it’s called a game

      He,he, yes A&A is a game alright, but unlike e.g. RISK it is nevertheless designed to follow WW2-history more or less accurately.

      Have you guys ever tried playing the CD-rom game? In this game the odds are very much manipulated to make the game even closer to WW2 history. Example: Even though the odds should be exactly equal, it sure seems UK will almost NEVER lose the bomber in the first SBR on Germany, where as Germany will almost ALWAYS lose the bomber in a first SBR on UK. So to win in the cd-r game one could say that knowledge of WW2 history seems more helpful than actual skills in calculating the odds.

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      ncscswitch:

      Since a “turn” refers to 3-4 months of time, crossign your own territory would allow for refueling along the way, and actual “combat” movement would begin when you moved into enemy territory, or over water.

      Yeah, if we agree to Harris’ “syncronized” theory, that’s an acceptable point of view, I think.

      Imperious Leader:

      Each Infantry has to be a army. Germany had about 15 armies in 1942.

      It does not sound very realistic to me that Germany can put up 10 new armies every turn (every four months?) Also, this would mean that Germany could attack egypt with 4 armies + pz corps (1.0- 1.5 million soldiers?) in spring 1942.

      ….and there should be 250.000 - 300.000 soldiers on Midway island? - nah…  :-)

      Then I would rather count the total ipc value on German units and then divide with 15.
      A German field army= 258/15 = 17 ipc

      Germany’s initially only got 11 ipc of units in Africa, (Africa corps - not entirely a field army) so this makes more sense to me.

      Since Germany in first turn can attack Russia with 139 ipc of units, this would still be a strong offensive with more than 8 field armies.

      Example: A possible attack on Caucasus on G1 with 3 tanks, 3inf, 3fig (60 ipc) could thus represent an army group (Army Group South) consisting of 3 field armies + smaller panzer armies, (The 4th Army, the 6th Army, 17th Army + 1st Panzer Army and 4th Panzer Army)

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      But I think maybe the range of fighters should be changed from 6 to 5 movements, as the typical range of fighters was max. 500 miles (max 800 miles with droptanks). At the Battle of England German fighters could cross the channel but not the North Sea (except Me-110).

      Ha, ha ha, Did I really say that? I meant of course “from 4 to 3 movements”!  allow me to re-edit that, :-D

      yeah but i think planes shouldn’t have to spend movement points when they cross into thier own terrtories.

      How so? would they turn off the engines and glide?

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      “Col Cool”, how long have you been on this site?

      Did you have a previous alias?

      If so, why have you chosen to start a new name?

      Ive played A&A for many years with a large group of friends. Therefore I have also been aware of this website for a few years, and once in a while I have frequenced this webpage reading threads and articles. But I have always done this as a guest only. I have never before been a member with alias.  :-)

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      If we start going into historical accuracy, we would have to make disparate units (e.g. German tanks hit at 4, Russian at 3, Japanese at 2).

      Sure, I agree that changes like these would be necessary (allthough i disagre that German tanks was better than the Russian tanks. The russian tanks (like KV-2 and T-34) was the best in the world in 1942 IMHO).

      But I think maybe the range of fighters should be changed from 4 to 3 movements, as the typical range of fighters was max. 500 miles (max 800 miles with droptanks). At the Battle of England German fighters could cross the channel but not the North Sea (except Me-110).

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      Imperious leader:
      1 inf = 3-5 corps or 1 army
      1 tank = 1 tank corps
      1 AA gun = built in gun emplacements and batterys built around industrial complex and cities
      1 transport = 100 merchant ships only no combat ships
      1 submarine = 40 subs
      1 fighter = 2,000 planes
      1 bomber = 1,000 bombers
      1 carrier = 4 carriers
      1 battleship = 4 Battleships
      1 destroyer= 20 destroyers
      1 artillery= light armor/ mechanized infantry  1 corps
      1 factory = lots of heavy industry
      Neutral country (3 ipc) = garrison (up to 20.000 active elite troops)

      This is obviously for A&A revised (indicated by the destroyers) But, wow. 1 inf = 1 army? This may be true for the German east front, but I personally don’t think it would be as much realistic when you look at other war fronts and theatres.

      Well, It’s great to find agreement that the 3 ipc price for neutral countries, could be viewed as representing a rather small defence force.  :-D

      dezrtfish:

      An infantry has to be at least corp level.  Look at the number of divisions in Germany in 1942.

      Yeah, but maybe the actual inf could then be understood as the front division of a corp (still representing a corps)? This would also mean that the the loss of 1 inf wouldn’t be the loss of an entire corps. Anyway I believe it’s fair to say it all depends on where on the map we base our calculations. Take for example the Islands of the pacific: A full army corps (80.000-140.000 soldiers?) on the tiny Midway Island does not sound very realistic to me.  :-D

      However: Your 1inf=1corps suggestion sounds very realistic concerning for example the british forces in North Africa (2 inf), that at spring 1942 was not yet army sized (later became the eight army). But looking at the German Afrika Corps, it seems to consist of 1 tank & 2inf. But yes, maybe the 2 inf represents the italians and the Vichy french.  :-)

      But, thanx guys for sharing your thougts on this matter.

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      Hey balungaloaf, what about my suggestions regarding unit strength, rounds etc. in A&A classic. what do you think about this - is it unrealistic?

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      Here is my suggestions regarding unit strength, rounds etc. in A&A classic.

      A&A Rounds:

      1 round  = 4 month (calculated on how fast you can take Germany (9-10 rounds?) if they loose the battle in Egypt and are locked in a stalemate in Russia right from the start.

      A&A Units:

      1 inf = 1 division (18000 soldiers?) + maybe non compat troops like signals, logistics, a.o. (Indicated symbolicly by the territory colour?)
      1 tank = 1 tank division (250 tanks? - 14000 soldiers?) + non combat (calculated comparing with the size of real life Afrika Korps)
      1 AA gun = 500 real life AAguns.
      1 transport = 100-300 larger and smaller vessels (including armed merchant cruisers)
      1 submarine = 80 submarines (based on comparing with German/Italian active submarine forces early 1942 (160?)
      1 fighter = 1200 fighter planes (compared with british fighter strenth 1942 (2400?)
      1 bomber = 1000 heavy bombers (uk strength early 1942)
      1 carrier = 7-9 fleet carriers + support (approx. Japan=8, US=7, UK=7, - early 1942)
      1 battleship = 6-10 battleships + approx. 20 cruisers ?
      1 factory = lots of heavy industry
      Neutral country (3 ipc) = garrison (up to 20.000 active elite troops)
      Occupied but empty territory = garrison (?soldiers)

      Ipc value of German sized army units:

      Division = 3-5 ipc
      Army Corps = 18-23 ipc
      Field army = 30-60 ipc (can include a fighter)

      Now, what do you guys think, does this sound realistic and reasonable ?  :-)

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • How A&A corresponds to WWII history

      Wikipedia writes:

      Axis & Allies is not a strict historical wargame, due to its streamlining for ease of play and balancing so that both sides have a chance. For instance, the economic model is simplistic, with each territory producing a number of “IPCs” (Industrial Production Certificates) good toward the purchase of any unit. Moreover, the game is supposed to start in the spring of 1942, but Japan is immediately in position to attack Hawaii again, while Germany is pressed well into the USSR with an initially superior force. Another significant difference is that the Soviet Union and Japan are opponents at the start of the game; historically, they did not go to war with each other until 1945.

      Well, actually I do not agree entirely to wikipedia’s conclusions. I would not call a time span of three months “immediately”, concerning Japan’s ability to strike at Pearl Harbour. I firmly believe they could actually have made a new strike at Pearl Harbour instead of moving the Imperial Fleet from Java Sea to the Bengal which they did March 1942.

      I must also point out that the Soviet union and Japan actually went to war (undeclared - but who cares) against each other already in 1939. The Japanese were however so heavily defeated in the great battle of Khalkhin Gol, that they would never again have the guts to
      attack the Russians.Â

      I would like to hear what A&A players have to say on this topic. How A&A Classic or A&A Revised corresponds to WWII history or how it does not.

      I believe Mr.Harris once stated - in a thread he started on this website, as I remember  - that all moves in a round should be understood as synchronized. But he didn’t mention how much time in history each A&A round represents. What do the players think of this?

      I would also like to discuss how much force the different units represents. Furthermore any other comments related to this topic will be very welcome. Let us hear your suggestions, thanx.

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: Belief-o-matic: What is your religion (or non-religion)

      Since constructivism was not considered a constructive option in the poll construction, I believe that I have no constructive reasons to find any reasons for my participation in the poll construction particularly constructive. :roll:

      posted in General Discussion
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: 65th Anniversary

      balungaloaf also had some comments:

      most of their army in the beginning of the war was in china anyways.  we didnt make more japs go to china.  just made the troops their do more action to get rid of bomber bases.  which they could never do.

      Let’s take a serious look at this detail. US high command was very much aware of the rivalry between the Japanese fleet and army, and of the Japanese armys reluctance to spread their forces all around the South East Asia. But the Japanese army were under heavy pressure from the navy and Tojo to do just that. All the army needed to follow their own goals was a good excuse to stay in China. Soon after the Doolittle raid the Japanese Army informed Tojo and the Navy that there was no army forces available for large operations in the south (fx. for an invasion of Australia).

      The allies must presumably have been aware of all this, since to this very day UK and US insist that there was never a genuine threat to Australia (any sort of possible invasion). This is however a much controversial claim, highly disputed by many Australians who believe this claim in fact is a thin pretext for Mr. Churchill’s “Germany First Strategy”, and his explicit refusal to support Australia.

      why would you want the pilots to risk their lives in a very dangerous landing on a carrier.  it might not be impossible, but near impossible. like a 1% chance of actually belly crashing onto the deck and keeping it on there.

      Please read my posts more accurately, I pointed out that  “……If they could make bellylanding in China they could just as well have made bellylanding close to CV-8.” (USS Hornet)

      its way easier to go to china.

      As I believe to have demonstrated in my reply to dezrtfish: This is really not true. At least Russia would have been a much easier and very much safer destination.

      i’m gonna have to say guys, once again, some people just try to blame america for everything.  its infused in their brain, its how their synapses work.  you know what i call these people, the L word, which i wont take out of the political forum.  but seriously, its fun to watch their brains in action.  so what else is our fault in WWII.

      Right…here we go…   :-P

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: 65th Anniversary

      Dezrtfish argued:

      Of your strategic goals I see 2 and 3 being viable, but I believe that Number 1 was an unforeseeable circumstance.

      I believe all these strategic goals, must have been considered very important. You know all this: At the time of the planning of the Doolittle Raid, the war situation was already immensely grave. The Japanese had made landings and assaults practically everywhere in South East Asia, and the ABDA forces in Dutch East India was severely threatened. Anything that could possibly divert the attention of the Japanese commanders was much needed. The Doolittle raid was a perfect such diversion. At the time of the raid, the Japanese was in firm control of mostly all South East Asia, the Imperial Fleet had already completely destroyed the entire combined fleet of ABDA, and had since moved to the bengal and destroyed a good part of the british fleet in the indian ocean. On April 12 The Imperial Fleet, having lost not a single surface warship, was ready to be moved south towards Australia.

      I also think blaming Japanese barbarism on a mission like this is unreasonable.

      Yes definitely, and that was of course not my point. My hypothesis addressed the increased Japanese pressure on the chinese front (to destroy airfields useful for long range bombing missions).

      I think that most Americans were shocked by the inhumanity that the Japanese considered culturally acceptable.

      That is words of wisdom from a fine soldier!  :-)

      I also don’t believe that they were necessarily “risking” 33% of the Carrier force.  If that was the case they could have done the job with naval bombers.  I’m sure your aware of the contingency plan to dump the bombers overboard if the carrier was detected.

      Yes thanx, I know of the decision to overthrow the planes, but I don’t see how this approach in any way eliminates the risk of losing the carrier. I believe Japanese submarines represented a huge threat to the entire mission. A submarine could very well have detected the action force, and there is a considerable risk that the taskforce could have been completely unaware of such detection.

      I don’t think you are taking into account the logistics involved in flying the bombers back to the carrier.  The entire task force was on radio silence.  Not to mention the original plan was to land the B24s in china and not crash them.

      Well, I believe they could, with not too big a risk, had broken radio silence at the expected time of return of the bombers. At that time USS Hornet would be protected by CAP - the fighter planes that was originally stored below the flightdeck.

      But dezrtfish, what really puzzles me is the question: Why exactly China? Why not Russia? (I know of “Guests at the Kremlin” but that plane headed to Russia on emergency only because of lack of fuel). It is a fact that the distance from Japan to Russia is HALF AS LONG as the distance to national China. This means that USS Hornet could have released the planes much earlier if Russia had been the destination. Also the choice of China as destination, severely endangered the life of many crew members (several was killed by the Japanese). Thus China is in no way the logical choice, considering the threat to the carrier and the safety of the crew. So why exactly China? I have never found any acceptable answer to this question.

      To gain some better insight try Col. Doolittle’s after action report, it’s a bit lengthy, but it’s strait from the horse’s mouth so to speak.
      http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/rep/Doolittle/Report.html

      Ctrl + c !!!
      Yes ! I found and studied this Doolittle action report some years ago on the Internet, but for some reason I failed to save it and had even forgot all about it. Thanx Dezrtfish, you are god damn serious!

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: Barbarossa

      In the case of Greece Hitler had no choice. Italy invaded w/o consultation of her partner and was soundly defeated and proven not ready for a general war in 1940.

      Of course Hitler had a choice concerning Greece, and consequently he initially decided not to intervene at the time the italians was pushed back through Albania. Instead he decided to invade Greece as late as april 1941. If he had invaded greece much earlier (fx. by overseas landings from Italian territory), it can be argued that the invation of Yugoslavia could have been avoided since the political situation on the Balkans then probably would have been much different by march 1941.

      Yugoslavia was becoming a minor axis ally untill her pro german gov. got thrown out of power.

      That’s my point. It’s very thinkable that the Yugoslavian change in power would not have appeared in circumstances were the Germans and the Italians would already control Creece (practically surrounding Yugoslavia).

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: Barbarossa

      I pretty much think you had all the most important issues in you post. Also the way you list it.

      But for the debate, let me, address point 2)

      Hitler could If he had prepered for it, have moved into balkan, soon after taking France. If Hitler had concentrated  on Balkan, instead of planning the invation of Britain, then Yugoslavia and Greece, could have been seized maybe as early as oktober/november 1940, Thus these operations would’nt have been in the way of preparation for Barbarossa, and a cancelling of yogoslavia/Greece wouldn’t have been on this list.

      Well, I don’t really think Yugoslavia was worth taking. Greece, however, could be considered more important.

      Well, The Islands of dodecanese Rhodos, Kos & Kharpathos etc. were already Italian (booty from ital/Turk war of 1912).

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
    • RE: Battle of the Bulge History article

      “for now yes. If you play fair it will open to other things after a few months.”

      LOL!!!

      posted in World War II History
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      Coronel Cool
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