Topics created by aardvarkpepper

Some time ago, I wrote a thread addressing a situation where another player was upselling their G1 6 tank line, arguing G1 Ukr was this great cool thing. Which, let’s face it, on some level I agree that 1942 Online meta Axis players are way too timid and uncoordinated. I think advocacy of aggression is good for the meta.

But I stated that playing G1 Ukr hold blind, ignoring dice outcomes and R1 action, was questionable, and further that I thought the proponent of the line had ignored R2 Ukr strafe (attack with intent to retreat).

One thing I remember from Discord is, after I said G1 6 tank buy does not necessarily require G1 Ukr hold, that I was ridiculed.

So I thought, you know, though I’ve spoken to various timings before, I’ve never really chained together what I’ve written into addressing the G3 W Rus line.

So here we go, it’s popcorn time!

THE BACKGROUND

Some months later, I was having a civil discussion with some other players on Discord about US1 bomber use; there were a few different participants, some points were made that I disagreed with, but nevertheless.

I wrote that I thought US1 bombers were not “correct” in any circumstance I would expect, that US1 transports reach Finland/France on US3, those transports threatening Karelia/Berlin/France on US4, and that US2 bombers (at the earliest) made for a pseudotiming - which is not to say, a specific line of play, but a confluence of factors that can be combined with other conditions to possibly arrive at something useful.

This was civilly questioned by another Discord poster. I thought they were civil and brought up coherent points, so I proposed a game - not as any sort of competitive match, or to prove or disprove any points with finality, but to possibly serve as illustrative context which, over repeated games, might form the basis for further analysis and discussion. Which maybe I didn’t say so much at the time, but at any rate we agreed to play.

I decided to take the G3 W Rus line, as I hadn’t used it in a while, and I thought fast pressure would highlight what I saw as questionable in the US1 bomber x 1 purchase line. My purpose, not to say that a US1 bomber is useless (it is not), but to more sharply define the terms; to show that a claim an entirely other player made that the US1 bombers should not be expected to bomb might not apply in practice - you get the idea.

THE POINT INTENDED TO BE ILLUSTRATED

US1 purchased bomber threatens France, Berlin, Karelia on US3. If the US1 East US fleet is left alone, it can drop to those territories on US3. But in practice, I think the Axis can counterpressure, discouraging the Allies from advancing their fleet.

HOW THIS WAS INTENDED TO BE DONE

Again, the framework was G3 W Rus line, specifically off G1 tank purchase, G2 air purchase, combining to pressure W Rus on G3.

Shifting G’s main stack to W Rus leaves Karelia vulnerable. However, G’s air force combined with J’s airforce moved to Ukraine on J2, counterpressure any fast Allied landings on Karelia. It is not desired that G bleed its stack, as G is the major Axis stack controller that is best suited to hitting a combined Allied defensive stack on Moscow. However, with both G and J in position, with the Allies still building their Atlantic fleet up, with G having some G2 air purchase to effectively take fewer casualties against possible attack against Atlantic fleet, the position is considered to work out all right.

THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

What’s big, gray, weighs forty thousand pounds, and sits in the middle of a room where nobody’s talking about it? That’s right, a Panzer IV tank, or maybe three African bush elephants, take your pick.

Let’s talk about the Panzer first.

WHEN GERMANY ATTACKS

The fastest way for G to advance against USSR is typically the Ukr / W Rus / Cauc line. If the Allies cannot get a good attack against an Axis Ukraine stack, then the Allies are pressured at both West Russia and Caucasus. Whichever the Allies don’t defend, the Axis can hit and very possibly hold; then the Allies retreat to Moscow.

Exactly when and how this plays out is more complicated than I lay out here, with various strategic variations.

But what it comes to is, whatever pressure the Allies exert against Japan is pressure not exerted against Germany.

If a player thinks that UK1 to sz37 defines the game, then the simple fact is they haven’t played against competent Axis that press appropriately, nor have they likely played against Axis that even counterpressure appropriately.

Yes, lucksacking UK1 to sz37 off a blind buy can be very tough and fast, and set the tone for an Allied win on strength of the position. But that’s where we get back to the elephants.

OPPORTUNITY COST

Characteristic of meta discussion “explanations” is explanations that are, well, bad!

A fighter can be used to attack sea or land, therefore it is good.

Yes, thank you, we are familiar with the basic properties of units, the real question is why is a fighter purchased and not, say, two infantry and an artillery?

I understand a desire to simplify discussion, but current meta discussion goes so far in that direction that it’s typically not discussion at all.

I think it’s something like, UK1 to sz37 wins a bit more than 60% of the time, about half of that expecting to lose 1-2 fighters. Where defender “wins”, I think they get wiped like 69% or something, but an additional 10% to retain only a fighter or battleship. Something like that.

At any rate, aggregate that’s risky, it should be seen.

Consider alternatives like UK1 to sz61 (J destroyer/transport) with 3 sub buy at India. (I’m not saying to do this, just giving an example). If the J destroyer is destroyed (94.8% at least, with fighter/cruiser is it?), then J has no counter to the US1 build. As to UK development, parking the UK carrier south of Persia, if G air is not in range, leaves J with risking fighters, committing J btl and/or carrier to where UK has a big counter, and if J doesn’t hit then the UK carrier gives UK fighters on India range to hit sz61 (Yunnan sea zone) along with the subs.

The real question is not whether UK1 sz37 has any good points or is worth the risk, because “good” and “risk” are relative terms that really require comparison. Instead, it’s a question of what the risks really are, how the development plays out, compared to other lines.

Personally I think UK1 to sz37 in 1942 Online, currently with no bid, currently without ability to use allied carriers or transports, is needlessly risky compared to other lines. I think it’s a potentially useful line to play against players that aren’t familiar with fighting it, I think when it gets lucky it can be quite strong, but on balance I think it not worth pursuing against competent opponents, considering what I consider to be lines with less risk.

I think even UK1 3 subs at India is not great; currently I’m trying to figure out a way to defend Moscow as long as possible while not giving up too much in Pacific pseudotimings. No surprise there I’m sure, nor will be my comment that I don’t want the Moscow stack to be cut off from reinforcing India.

At any rate, I think this thread sums up some thoughts I have on UK1 to sz37, cheers.

Very well explained, but I see that if there are criticisms, it is because we are in the year 2025, before X books of different subjects were written and in the end the essence was found in 40 pages, today those 40 pages are written, apparently the ternological development in general that should give us more time to know things in themselves and in relation to their context, has not been like that, we must work more and we have less time every day, learning things as absolute lines when they are not could be a real problem and it would always be good to look for the why or causes of what is presented to us, thanks for the clarifications, but I have played more Classic both on the board and in Programs and I am preparing in this version of 1942 2e online, I will return several times for this work because it is really very deep, thank you.

Today I spoke with someone on Discord and mentioned ROI in context of trades in some situations in KJF. They didn’t know what I meant. Shocking.

Well, the nature of the internet is such that sometimes subjects will have to be revisited, people forget what used to be known, and so on.

Here I’m going to try something new. Instead of putting everything on display, I’m just going to hit a few sharp notes, and maybe readers that are really paying attention will be “hey but what about -”

Figure it out yourselves. Or wait until I maybe finish up a series of articles, I don’t know sometime.

Okay, anyways minimal trades and ROI.

The basic idea is, you trade minimally, why? Because of ROI.

Say you have 1 fighter 1 infantry attacking 1 infantry for control of a 2 IPC territory.

What happens when you add 1 infantry to attackers?

You get slightly higher probabilities of destroying the enemy infantry without sustaining a loss, slightly higher probability of capture. But the next expectation is, I forget, say +0.3 IPC. Because the attacking 1 infantry 1 fighter already had pretty good chances; padding the attack a little more doesn’t make that much of a difference.

Now let’s say you have a battle of over 200 IPC counting units on both sides. What happens when you add one artillery to attacker?

Depends on compositions, but you can get something like +20 IPC. Not looking at my notes at the moment. Something stupid anyways.

So you contrast 10% ROI (return on investment) and 500% ROI. You can see how 500% ROI is much better.

Why? The first round, the artillery can inflict a casualty on a defender. Not for sure, but there’s a chance. That defender won’t be around for the second round of fire. So that defender can’t destroy another attacker, and that attacker in turn could destroy more defenders. The whole thing snowballs.

And battles last, I forget, something like a bit more than 6 turns on average even for major stack battles, depending on composition of course but still. What with dice bunching up here or there, and only needing so-much-value to hit, that’s about what it works out to.

So what you see is a cumulative effect; even though we’re only talking about percentages instead of a sure thing, the aggregate probability over time and cumulative effect results in much higher ROI.

And if you send more units to the front for trades (as opposed to stacking something that isn’t intended to be attacked at all), then often that just means your opponent gets more opportunity to pull a favorable ROI attack on the units that were made vulnerable.

Yes there’s exceptions and such. But be very wary of writers that post stuff like “because top platinum says so”. There are mathematical reasons that can be explained and demonstrated that show exactly when and how the above does not apply, and understanding how to make that distinction is what separates weak players from strong players.

Oh, and to add my usual disclaimer, this isn’t meant to be some comprehensive address, it’s just a few random not terribly well organized thoughts. There’s much much more to everything, numbers, strategies, tactics, timings, opportunity costs, and so on.

Just picking one - the strategic use of small UK and US forces in Europe

Let’s say Axis want to cut UK/US reinforcements off at Karelia. This is pretty essential if the Allies are not to send cheap UK/US ground reinforcement to Moscow. There’s some timing issues where Axis are trying to shift off Karelia but I won’t get into how Axis handle that and Allied counters here.

The rules for land retreat are, all units retreat to a ground territory that at least one unit came from. This can be used to set up “teleports” where, say, Allies use UK ground units on Finland and West Russia to attack German-controlled Karelia, and all UK units “retreat” to West Russia. The same is true for US.

But thinking on it, UK and US won’t typically have units just sitting around in West Russia. (A related issue, one of the problems with 1942 Online is inability of defender to select the controlling power of a unit taken as a casualty, which definitely is problematic for this sort of tactic). Typically UK units have to deliberately be sent in from India in advance, and US ground unit(s) from China must be preserved.

But having a small number of ground forces has loads more applications.

For example, I mentioned above using German infantry to keep Japanese fighters safe. If UK only has air units in range, UK would end up trading expensive air units for cheap German ground - though that bleeds the German stack, it’s really often not worth the trade (as UK fighters can be used in a combined Allied stack defense as well).

But if UK ground units are in range, suddenly Germany has to use a lot more units to defend, which bleeds its major stack, or Japan’s air becomes unsafe, or any number of unpleasant scenarios.

Or, I mentioned if USSR attempts to move its Moscow stack into Kazakh, that Germany can smash it. If US has ground forces to recapture Kazakh from Axis, though, USSR fighters can land on Kazakh, which can make a difference, especially if a good portion of Germany’s attack units are at West Russia and/or Archangel instead of just a simple stack on Caucasus, which is what’s going to happen in the game described above.

When players attempt to “optimize”, often they may ignore these small but important things, instead doing things like “I must defend India with everything possible, because defending India is important”. True. But other things are also important. Depending on dice outcomes and player decisions, both the player’s own decisions and the opponent’s decisions, games change a lot.

But I don’t understand? India is important? Look at the screenshots. UK is holding India, but I don’t think any player would seriously claim Allies are in a winning position.

Or I don’t understand? Japan needs to be the major Axis stack controller against KGF? Look at the screenshots. It’s a KGF. Japan is far from the major Axis stack controller. Again, seems it’s working out for Axis.

And for those that say “well it’s not that simple, there’s other factors” - exactly. Which is why I detail and open for discussion what I think those factors are, and how different factors need to be weighed in the balance.

1942 Online’s lack of communications is on some level understandable. There are costs to implementing features. Simply removing communications options reduces options for toxicity. Sure.

But after a couple years of play, the 1942 Online meta is pretty awful by and large.

Maybe the thought was, players are going to be so casual, they won’t actually want to develop or learn. Communication? Who needs all that? Make 'em jump through hoops!

But for the same reason, I don’t find 1942 Online particularly compelling, particularly ranked with stale meta and compulsory 24 hour checkins.

What was the desired experience, really? What is 1942 Online’s “ideal player”?

On the one hand, a casual player that isn’t going to care if they can’t see unit movements and deal with an obfuscating UI, because “it’s just a game.” No need to chat, “it’s just a game.” But on the other hand, 24 hour checkins are pretty demanding, and where with other “free to play” games missing a day usually means losing some virtual currency or negligible opportunity cost, here a single missed checkin means losing potentially hours of investment made in multiple ranked games.

On the other hand, noncasual players that don’t need chat because they’re already synched outside the game. But then, all the limiting rules changes, lack of bid, and obfuscating AI make the program a bother to use. (Just use TripleA!)

So if the product fundamentally does not appeal to casuals or to noncasuals, the playerbase ends up being only players with very particular preferences, or one might say tolerances. Is that “just my opinion” or isn’t that just how things are?

Sometimes people protest that complaints don’t understand the realities of the situation (yet typically such arguments never provide such “realities” or leave anything open to discussion). For my part, I think the programming team was given limited time and limited budget to accomplish certain tasks that were designated by the design team; I think the design team was probably constrained by orders from up the chain which in turn were likely influenced by licensing and investor considerations. So where I would say the design was not good enough, or there are demonstrably bugs, well, I think that’s understandable, to some point.

But at some point someone needed to step in and take responsibility. Someone had to be in charge. It’s two years on, and I’m playing ranked games in a weak meta, with the altered rules, the no-bid, no balance, 24 hour checkin, and no-comms.

Look, I’ll tell you how I know it’s a weak meta.

Some might argue “not everyone wants to have a discussion, aardvark!” So true. But you don’t need a discussion if you understand fundamentals. If you understand the fundamentals, it takes ten seconds to respond in an intelligent way to basic questions.

. . . like?

Let’s take the basic topic of Axis vs Allies balance. The so-called conversation around that was, Axis win 55%, Allies win 45% at one point. And the narrative was, that’s balanced. That’s defined as balanced, you understand, that was the nature of the so-called “conversation”.

But the problem is, over large sample sets, 55% versus 45% indicates imbalance. And further, as I pointed out at the time, the data collection itself was suspect, because if weak players tend to play Axis, then reports would naturally skew against the “true balance” of the game when played by skilled players. (Similar things happen with fighting games and Starcraft, but I digress.)

The developers put in separate ratings for Axis and for Allies, which I disagree with, but all right, at least that addresses some concerns over imbalance. But the discussion I mentioned above was not about ratings validity, but game balance in general; Axis versus Allies. And again, the argument was made using facts that was presented as having one meaning when the actual meaning was literally the opposite.

Well, mistakes can be made. But back to player skill in the meta.

When you have players of a certain ability, they’re going to naturally draw up probability distributions, as was done in some articles for 1942 Revised edition. Seems most of what I remember has been lost to time, but I remember reading and writing such articles, so I know very well it happened.

And what is the nature of these probability distribution writeups? Well, what happens is one takes different proposed moves, writes up the probability distributions and sequential decisions based on information available, and creates probable outcomes. Over multiple turns, different opponent and player responses are each explored, each action having its own probability distribution. By understanding the probability distributions and their consequences, “balance” is proved or disproved for a skilled player set.

And that’s really all there is to it. If that sounds stupidly complicated, literally that was what I did this entire thread (without so much numbers) but one can very much see the numbers and the thinking behind everything if one looks. Would help if had TripleA’s .tsvg system but eh.

So how do you know when it’s a weak meta? When players keep asking about balance regularly, and they keep getting the same stock answers using statistics with no context with suspect data. Okay it’s pretty funny for some people, but come on. At some point you’ve just got to be like really now.

But nobody wants to do some sort of complicated writeup or analysis just to answer a question that doesn’t even apply?

Well, no. When a decent player creates strategies, they must understand their tactical tools, they must understand how to evaluate board state, how to optimally distribute forces and plan purchases not just for the current turn but subsequent turn. I hope that just makes sense. So naturally if they’re thinking through such things and trying to identify key timings, then they are going to do a certain amount of necessary work.

Which is why it was simple for me to understand quite early how Japan could use submarines to counter the KJF, and why and how Japan should pressure India, the timing of the German advance to cut off units at India, and various contingencies. Sure, a lot of the lessons in how to evaluate numbers and distributions came from reading up on Revised. But Revised allowed transports to be used as cannon fodder, had different setup at India and East Canada; anti-KJF in 1942 Online is a different animal.

And as a side note it’s nuts for me when I read players write about “shucking” East Canada like it’s Revised. In Revised, you needed one transport per transport drop from East Canada to northeastern Africa, there were fewer territories in Revised making it faster to march through, transports acted as ablative armor protecting Allied fleet cores. In 1942 Second Edition, you need two transports per transport drop, Japan capture of Alaska threatens the Eastern Canada sea zones, etc. etc.

The real key identifier for lack of thought in a meta is a lack of discussion about pros and cons and real consequences.

Oh, G1 can build Berlin tanks to help secure Karelia on G2? Well I suppose that might not have been incredibly obvious to some players so was worth mentioning. But what about the loss of infantry on the G4 push towards Ukraine? What, nothing? Somehow Germany magically makes up the difference? But look at the numbers on the income, these different branches - no? Just take your word for it because you’re “top platinum”? What about where you say this and this happens, but it doesn’t happen if an opponent reasonably does this and this? Doesn’t the whole supposition just break apart?

Players don’t want to have involved discussions? Sure. But when there’s authoritarian commands like “build 2 tanks on round 1”, well, there’s an old joke I think about George Washington and the Continental Congress, something like that. Someone proposed that the army be limited to whatever number of soldiers, and Washington said “Let’s also pass a motion that we’ll never be invaded by armies above a certain size too” or some such thing. Ha ha. No, it’s really funny, you know?

But when such hilarity is said in all solemnity and expected to be taken seriously, well, you know.

@Panther

Thanks for the reply.

Thanks again to @Krieghund too. :)

@aardvarkpepper

I love the concept… Haven’t lost to an effective 2 ocean strategy in a while if ever. Any top tier play I see involves a focused target.

What about the USSR? How do they fare in this? A smart Axis player will ignore/allow the pestering of the western allies for a chance to knock out USSR early (by early I mean turn 6-8).

At that point, if the Allies have east indies, Africa, Scandinavia, trading western Europe… Who cares, you have knocked out Russia. Just keep your eye on the prize.

Thanks for the very well laid out vision of this type of play. I’d like to try it.

The reason I think this is a good time to add one destroyer is because Germany will know that their window of opportunity to attack with the sub fodder will be closing quickly. So they may choose to attack at even less favorable odds instead of allowing Allies with that extra destroyer to split off and take out those subs the next turn, or if destroyer already in range why not do that now and have the replacement destroyer take its place?

Germanys options with those subs are very limited if US fleet is in sea zone 8.

Either way you are likely reducing Germanys odds to successfully airstrike the fleet.

I am guessing the counterpoint to this is that the Allied player WANTs Germany to attack their fleet to kill aircraft and if they build an additional escorts maybe Germany won’t do that.

To me this would be fine if they don’t. Its still likely wasted IPC for the sub buy that does not end up doing anything then.

The extra escort puts Allies ahead in the number count (which is close if they have 50% odds) should Germany decide to answer with additional air buy or the extra destroyer after dealing with the German subs can split off to help support another fleet in another sea zone.

Based on the Allied players comment they were already conceding some tempo by not bringing transports forward.

Then final comments of concern about not being able to land in Finland after losing their fleet.

Ships are expensive and take time to rebuild securely and so landings are now further being delayed at a pivotal point of the game. Pressure is off Germany in the meantime. They have a window now to focus ground forces east again.

Allied player says they had follow up, however based on what I see they only have follow up to sea zone 13 not sea zone 3 which their transports are in position to move to but now cannot do so safely.

To me this is following a decision tree too rigidly. The 50% attack offer rather than adjusting that pattern to the board state.

I get what you are saying as far as unit count for G4 or G5 timing.

However the bomber can help break Russian lines on G3 sometimes before the reinforcements from the East arrive.

Also can cause Allies to build more escorts or fewer transports and delay landings a round which means fewer units used for trades so more can move east.

There is a gap in follow up reinforcements that occurs as a result of this as you point out, but this is the trade off for higher speed.

The bomber threatens sea zones 3 and 13 that could otherwise be safe moves for Allies without it. It also helps threaten Egypt or Trans Jordan attack without needing to have fighters in range of those territories which puts them out of position in other areas if they are.

I just read over your post again and it’s funny how with a different point of view other things stand out.

You said that US fighters to India does not synergize well with US Med Shuck plan. In some ways this is true. The fighters go to India and are not protecting US fleet in sea zone 15 or sea zone 13 on that round. That means 3 starting fighters out of circulation on this round.

However what US can do is round one build of carrier destroyer fighter transport infantry round one for 42 IPC.

UK positions Egypt forces in Trans Jordan round one US fighter from China lands there to support it. US waits in sea zone 11 for its build. Possibly moving starting destroyer and transports to sea zone 10 with 4 ground units moving north to east Canada for additional flexibility if that is safe from German ships in Atlantic.

Then round 2 US moves in to sea zone 13 with 2 destroyers cruiser carrier 2 fighters landing in Morocco. The carrier that went to sea zone 45 round one comes back around south America from there. It will arrive in sea zone 13 on round 4 filling that part of the escort chain at the same time as the Battleship and destroyer from the west coast arrives as well. It should be noted that if the PH carrier did not take this side route to sea zone 45 on round one and makes a bee line for sea zone 13 immediately through the canal it could arrive there on round 3 instead, but because of US needing to buy escorts, transports and ground to fill transports it doesn’t really have the resources to do all of that anyways. Other builds are higher priority and getting fighters to the center higher priority as well instead of having them idle around waiting for that carrier to arrive round 3. The one round detour does not take much away from that in terms of timing.

The US fighters in India have done their job of shoring up defense there vs J3 timing. This may cause Japan to not make the attack because it is unfavorable. Importantly this gives UK one more round to do another build round 4 and shore up its defense there. This may include UK fighters going to West Russia which can transition to India from there and take their place.

US fighters in India can be freed up from India round 3 to go to West Russia, possibly providing air support to attack on Kazakh along the way. Maybe they go to Caucus instead.

Then round 4 they can land on carrier in sea zone 15 and fighters from that carrier go to the carrier now arriving in sea zone 13.

It’s an option and how the transition lines up and actually does work together.

Those fighters may be needed in India or Russia still in which case US builds more fighters round 3 to land on the carrier reaching sea zone 13 round 4 instead. Depending on the board state and what the Allied needs are.

The focus here is to get US support to the center as quickly as possible and then once there to have the flexibility to shift them to where they are most needed afterwards in response to what Axis has done.

The key to all of this is getting units to where they can most help when they are needed. US and UK can do a form of fighter swapping between West Russia and India so that they are always present in the numbers required on Germanys turn, then transitioned to India as required on Japans turn.

UK fighters to India from WR and US fighters from India to WR. Somewhat doubling their defense capabilities by using the turn order against Axis in this way. While also making attacks of opportunity while transitioning.

Or let’s say Russia wants to attack the Ukraine stack on Round 2. They are looking at 16% chance to capture. 21% with sacrificing fighters.

But if Germany does not drop the extra infantry and AA gun via Med transport then its odds are 43%

I will let you think about if there is a better course of action here.

8 infantry build round one with Russia? 4 infantry 3 Artillery? UK does not drop fleet and sends fighters? US sends its fighters to West Russia?

These things could reduce Germanys odds on West Russia enough perhaps that Germany does not attack, but I do not think they can be reduced enough for Russia to capture Karelia without giving too strong of odds on West Russia.

The 3 tank build is a contingency against Russia Karelia stack somewhat.

I have seen players stack Karelia and Belarus thus blocking the tanks in Ukraine from counter attack, but 7 tanks from Poland and Berlin makes such a move risky as well, although Germany will lose higher TUV in this battle due to not much infantry shield. Usually 2 infantry from Finland and one from Baltic is all that is available for that counter, and maybe this is the way for Russia.

But such a move then opens up G2 Caucus stack with Japans fighters landing on.

Thanks for posting this here. Discord is miserable for actually maintaining/archiving information to the point where I have no idea how it’s become top dog over the years.

Some posters on Discord are saying how the Allies player counters Japan’s invasion of Alaska is dependent on “player level”. Sure.

But magical abilities are being ascribed, and it should be understood there is no magic.

For example, I read a “top level” player will supposedly “defend” Alaska. How, exactly? When, exactly? Is it magic?

The first post is to players that already have a very good grasp of what’s going on, telling them this is the timing, the timing shift, the opportunity cost, and so on.

This post is more basic.

Assuming Germany doesn’t have early advantageous dice against USSR (or other disasters), assuming Germany is not in a position to dash forwards and crush Moscow before the Allies can really do anything, the game takes a slower pace. Germany and Japan build up and move towards Moscow; UK and US carry out their own development.

But let’s give some concrete numbers. Suppose Japan decides to attack Alaska early. Why would Japan do this? If the US player was very silly, and only then. Generally at the end of J1, Japan should have made whatever opportunistic attacks to start choking USSR’s income. Every unit sent to Alaska is a unit not sent to Asia, and any units Japan dumps to Asia next turn from the Alaska transports will have to be to Buryatia or Manchuria, which is far from India; India has an existing industrial complex that UK uses to disrupt the Axis, and controlling that industrial complex is a big boost to Japan. For reasons I shall not get into at this time.

So the only reason why Japan should hit Alaska J1 or J2 (or generally early), considering it detracts from the basic Axis strategy, considering it detracts from what is normally one of the Axis’ stronger tactical focuses - is if Japan does better to hit Alaska somehow. Which amounts to US overextension. Which shouldn’t happen.

So Japan should not invade Alaska early, unless Allies are super unlucky or super bad. Or unless the Japan player just wants to have fun; games don’t have to be about “winning” or “losing”.

==

What about late in the game? Supposing the Allies go KGF?

We must first talk about tanks and opportunity costs. Suppose US buys tanks. A single transport can transport, say, two infantry, or an infantry and a tank. Though tanks are expensive, they can blitz (probably useless if dropped on France but whatever), and they are more efficient defenders than infantry. So should we expect that the US has lots of tanks? Probably not. Because infantry are much cheaper than tanks, and we may expect that the US will use IPCs to buy more transports and infantry.

But there are other reasons to buy tanks, specifically, tanks on Western US defend Western US and threaten Alaska. Tanks on Eastern Canada are ready for US’s usual KGF transport routes and also threaten Alaska.

Then there’s also certain things about timings at Finland. But suffice to say that building a heavy tank force is quite expensive, and though I expect US to build a few tanks, I don’t expect heavy investment.

Yes, three paragraphs to go over things that veteran players already know very well. I did mention this post is more basic.

Those things said, what can we reasonably expect of a Japan to Alaska invasion? Let’s say reasonable worst case.

REASONABLE WORST CASE, JAPAN TO ALASKA

In KGF (if KJF, then Japan hitting Alaska is opportunistic / “best chance”. After Japan takes India (before capturing India, Japan needs its transports to speed attacks on India. Even afterwards, one or two transports may be used for Africa and/or Australia.) US has a few tanks East Canada.

All makes sense? This is as bad as it gets for Japan hitting Alaska. But let’s throw in a few more things that we also know, if we think about it.

Japan isn’t making good progress supporting Germany in Europe. (If Japan were doing great with Germany, who cares about Alaska, just smash Moscow and win). Germany’s position isn’t hopeless, or near hopeless. It just needs a “little more”.

Okay. Now let’s say Japan dumps 2 units to Alaska, 4 units, basically a distraction. This is not the supposed “hard counter” that a lot of players are talking about on Discord. It’s just Japan saying “hi”, now Japan is +2, US is -2.

Now what is the magical defense?

Obviously if US has a pile of infantry on West Canada, then US smashes Japan in Alaska and sits there, and Japan can’t really do much about it. (Remember, we expect Japan to have 8-12 ground on the followup, plus up to six fighters, a bomber, two battleship and a cruiser support shots, plus maybe some more air power, who knows.)

Well, if US was sitting on a huge chunk of infantry on West Canada, then let’s really think on it. Somehow, the Axis are not doing particularly well, despite the US holding back a huge chunk of income on a threat that Japan never even needed to commit to? Then why are the Axis generally doing not so hot in Europe?

You see the magic? Where did this perfect defense materialize from? It comes from the assumption that somehow the Allies are basically already winning.

But let’s make it a little less magical, you say? Let’s say there is a small infantry reserve on West Canada? Well, that infantry reserve will get blown up by Japan’s counter. So really, US needs a lot on West Canada. That’s just how it is.

But US can use fighters against Alaska? Most of US fighters are in or near Europe. They simply haven’t the range.

Bombers? Again, out of range.

But the US fighters and bombers are NOT out of range, one claims, if they are held back? True, but then we again have the situation where US is pre-emptively holding back counter forces, and considerable forces at that, against a potential Japanese invasion.

We need more magic!

Then let’s say US responds late to Japan’s attack. That is, Japan secures Alaska on the initial or the followup.

Then everything I wrote in the initial post is true; Japan threatens multiple locations with a single stack of units; US must pull multiple defenses or come out the loser, Axis units that would not be really relevant until a few turns in suddenly become immediately relevant.

This is just the numbers. The situation. The timing. The logistics. No magic involved.

Japan to Alaska isn’t about some poorly considered premature invasion that pulls away from Axis strategic and tactical goals.

Nor is Japan to Alaska about some late game Hail Mary, trying to brute-force some solution. This is what some posters are saying on Discord, but it’s not about that at all. It’s about pulling a US response, where US wants to invest more in the defense than Japan needs to on the offense, because US wants local superiority of force, Japan gains income from invasion while US is merely reclaiming, and US cannot really afford to lose, given the multiple threat development of Japan.

If US does not respond to the threat with sufficient force (including taking reasonable chances and getting unlucky), then Japan captures Western US. That shouldn’t happen, but Japan may still fuel its invasion with traded territory income. But those are both actually silly scenarios. What probably happens is, US responds “late” (if not, then US was paying an opportunity cost for a threat that never needed to materialize), then US has to keep shoveling resources into repelling the threat, then after Japan switches back to Asia, US’s logistics chains are inefficient for some time while US readjusts, and the majority Allied stack holder may be severely disrupted at least.

About contingencies:

I mentioned contingencies a few times in passing. If Germany can’t break USSR from Karelia into West Russia with raw power, Germany can go in through Ukraine to push USSR / Allies combined stack back. If Allies can’t break Axis defense at Karelia with one power, it can do followup attacks with another.

Or when contingencies are absent; if Allies commit to France but can’t do much off the position, if Axis pressure Russia then the Allies may not have any outs. If Allies are committed to France, a partial pullout means Dunkirk except Germany doesn’t hold back, and anything sent to try to help Russia may not arrive in time anyways. If Germany tries a stack defense of Karelia and it fails, well, probably all Axis air is dead, most German tanks are dead and Germany can’t recover.

So you’re looking at this and maybe thinking “well, if Axis are in danger at Karelia why don’t they just pull back? isn’t aardvark always saying not to assume players are brain-dead?”

Right. But that gets to what I want to lead off with when talking about contingencies.

Some other players say things like “there are always things you can do”, or “if you’re smart you can always figure a way out.”

Usually, yes. Always, no.

If players want to play accurately, they need to think about things mathematically. Not romantically, not movie hero defying the odds, but coldly, mathematically, objectively.

So the problem with going right into how to use “contingencies” is when players build up a little confidence in their abilities they think maybe they can fudge things, get a little lucky, maybe small things won’t make a difference. Then it’s all about the romance and movie hero escapades, except now there’s a Scientist (fancy) that says Dramatic Things and is a Genius that Figures A Way Out. There’s always a Contingency Plan.

But really? What if your opponent is just better at running the numbers? And/or what if your opponent just got lucky?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFRCTeQtNdU

So the first thing to remember about contingencies is you won’t always have them.

The second to remember about contingencies is sometimes you SHOULD NOT have them.

Wait, what? How can NOT having a backup plan be a good idea?

“Put all your eggs in one basket, and then watch that basket” - Andrew Carnegie

If the Axis stack Karelia, what does that really mean? The strength is, UK/US ground reinforcements are cut off at Finland (there’s some Allied outs but they’re not great), Japan and Germany both have air that “locks down” UK and US fleets. (If UK and US fleets are together, maybe Axis don’t want to take the combined defense down. But the moment UK moves off, Japan can hit UK and/or US before US can move to reinforce UK. If US moves off first, Germany can hit UK and/or US before UK can move to reinforce. Even if Germany doesn’t have a huge air force, if Germany kept just five fighters that can be pretty nice if there’s a big transport payoff.)

Say the plan is Germany tries to force an Axis-favored battle against the USSR/Allied combined stack near Russia, while Japan pressures trades and grabs Africa income.

Suppose Japan tries to have a “backup plan” of pushing mass units through Asia to challenge Russia.

Then what happens? Probably Japan still doesn’t have the unit count to challenge USSR head-on. It’s still absolutely necessary that Germany get an Axis-favored battle against the USSR / Allied combined stack.

But how will Germany do that, when Japan has less units at Karelia, so Germany needs to commit more units there to defend? Japan also has less air near Atlantic, so UK/US don’t need as much naval escorts and can just keep building then dumping ground which in turn pressures Germany.

That doesn’t mean Japan building mass units is categorically wrong. Maybe dice and player action make it clear it’s unlikely Germany will ever be able to get any sort of decent battle against the USSR/Allied combined stack near Russia. Then the Axis need to try something else, if the current plan is unlikely to have any success.

But for this example the point is building a backup plan can cut the chances on the primary plan.

Watch out for whenever a “backup plan” requires significantly different buys and/or moves to a “primary plan”. When that happens, only switch plans if the primary plan has already succeeded or if the primary plan is unlikely to succeed. (If the primary plan already succeeded, mission accomplished and time to set new objectives and means of accomplishing those objectives. If the primary plan will probably fail, better not throw good money after bad and adapt a new plan.)

Do contingencies exist, are they of practical use? Sure. If Germany wants to choke off USSR income at Ukraine, if USSR has a bit too much at West Russia and Caucasus (which could hit any German push to Ukraine), USSR can deny income to USSR at Belorussia instead. The USSR infantry/artillery at Caucasus can’t reach, probably anything Germany could have pushed to Ukraine can reach Belorussia instead.

Yes, if Germany can’t capture and hold Ukraine that won’t push USSR into having to decide between defending West Russia and Caucasus. But Germany can still try to force a major stack battle favoring Axis at West Russia, perhaps by building air. In turn that could mean Germany’s defense of France collapses, but if the Axis can still get a tolerable position out of it, that may be what has to be done. (Though there’s no guarantee even allowing France’s defense to collapse would give the Axis a decent position, depending on the position.)

Third thing to remember about contingencies is you can’t do them if you don’t have what you need. When you leave a resource where it can be destroyed, whether it’s an expensive bomber or an inexpensive infantry, that means you won’t have it later.

Consider if the Allies try to pressure Japan. If Japan tries to pressure Asia and Africa (which I’d say usually it should despite the oncoming USA navy), US can advance in the Pacific, threaten any new builds in Japan sea zones, and push Japan’s navy away. Then US can start grabbing high value islands and set up industrial complexes and the Axis game can get pretty awkward.

But there’s a difference between “awkward” and “deadly”. If Japan loses control of the entire Pacific coast, if US is taking high value islands and setting up ICs, that’s tough for Axis. But if simultaneously Germany is about to crush Russia and UK has nothing happening in Europe, then Japan can wait for Germany.

But then what happens? Suppose Germany has a small fleet, moves it into position, then Japan uses its fleet to reinforce. The further US pushes into Pacific / Indian Oceans, the harder it is for US to protect its lines of reinforcement. So it’s possible that even if US had good odds against a Japanese fleet, just a few German naval units could tip the scales. And it’s very easy for Germany to, say, produce two carriers and a destroyer at Italy, then move through the Suez if Axis have control. Then Germany can land four fighters on, and that’s pretty hefty defense, especially if Japan still has a good-sized fleet.

But if Japan has no fleet left to reinforce, if Japan tried some (unnecessary) losing-odds battle for nonessential territory that it couldn’t hope to hole for long anyways, then Germany has no backup. And if Japan took a bad-odds battle then US won’t even have been severely weakened.

That doesn’t mean Japan shouldn’t try to fight in the Pacific even without German reinforcements, it doesn’t even mean Japan shouldn’t try some bad-odds desperation moves. It depends on the position. But if Japan loses a chunk of navy and air force for no good reason, that navy and air force won’t be around later to make a difference.

So to recap, for this section on contingencies. Rather than trying to have some complicated clever plan with a lot of parts moving in different conflicting directions, stick to the basics. Consider the numbers, consider your strategy, know when something’s not working as well as it needs to so you know to switch to something else. If you must spend units don’t hold back, but think about whether you really need to spend resources. You may, but you may not. Also remember even if your opponent plays completely correctly mathematically (they may not, I don’t), there is still dice variance so there may be an opening.

@bob-loblaw

Re: “ussr will have 2 aa guns, 3 tanks, 2 art, 5 inf normally in west russia (sometimes 6 or 4 inf)”, “attack Baltic states, belorussia, and West Russia”, “ussr Baltic opener . . . two of them have >90% chance of victory (3 inf, 1 tank, 1 fighter vs 3 inf) and (8 inf, 3 tanks, 2 artillery vs 3 inf 1 art 1 tank).”

. . . and 1 inf 1 art 1 fig vs 1 inf 1 tank at Baltic States, I assume.

Superficially, the numbers seem to check out. But take a good hard look at the numbers, and not just the net IPC changes, but the resulting positions, counters, and followups remembering dice variance.

Saying you’ll have 5 infantry at West Russia? Reasonable, but not something to depend on. Sometimes 6? If you get lucky. Sometimes 4? Perhaps, but also you might see 3, 2, or less.

And what happens in case of cascade failure? Suppose you do a bit badly at West Russia. You’re prepared for that? But suppose you also do badly at Belorussia. Now Germany has more to counter with, and there’s nothing USSR can do about it once the triple has been committed to.

Nothing can counter super bad dice, but a Ukr/W Rus open is slightly less vulnerable.

"I doubt a smart player would . . . "

You really think Germany would hesitate to destroy both USSR’s AA guns, three tanks, and two artillery, and cut off UK fighters flying from London to West Russia, along with a possible G1 tank build for quick early pressure and possibly even a J1 Manchuria IC to pump tanks on the timing - along with G2 starting with control of Karelia?

“a retreat after round 1”

Instead of assuming Germany stupidly overcommits tanks and loses them to an easy counter that can’t be punished, or assuming Germany needlessly exposes air to AA guns, how about assuming Germany correctly calculates the balance of ground and air that has about a 85%+ probability to capture West Russia and destroy all USSR’s valuable ground units? Not overkill, not underkill, but just about right, and if the attack on West Russia isn’t favorable then of course Germany doesn’t hit that and goes to Caucasus - but again, Germany doesn’t overcommit.

You’re assuming Germany does a 1-turn attack into West Russia then retreats after exposing German air to AA fire, without Germany even attempting to blow up USSR’s valuable tanks. What was it you were just saying about smart players? So it won’t just be a 1-turn attack, right?

“so you prefer Germany can put 5 tanks and 9 inf in Karelia”

Let’s not get sidetracked. There’s a lot that could be said about R1, G1, builds, attacks, counters, contingencies, percentages - but suffice to say I don’t say Ukr/W Rus is SAFE (in fact, I don’t think it IS, and that’s one of the reasons I push for preplaced bid which the developers won’t do but eh whatever).

But I do think Ukr / W Rus open has better outcomes than a triple open.

As to “you prefer Germany can put 5 tanks and 9 inf in Karelia”, do you think there’s a perfect answer? What would that be?

You do R1 tank build and retreat tanks from Ukraine for a heavy R1 counter to Karelia? Even then, how do you answer G1 tanks mobilized on Berlin? I don’t say G1 super heavy tank build, but just say Germany sticks two tanks on Berlin. Pretty good odds that means G2 captures and secures Karelia, especially if Japanese fighters are in range, which they may well be. But then you do an attack/retreat into Karelia to strain German logistics? Very well, then on G1 Germany sees USSR lined up with that mighty counter and instead just doesn’t do a heavy push to Karelia, then Germany captures and holds Karelia on G2.

Plainly, I’m saying if the Axis player is competent, Allies won’t have easy answers. Won’t matter if it’s USSR triple open or Ukr/West Russia, it won’t be easy. If it were, wouldn’t be much of a game.

If you want to go into R1 W Rus/Ukr open and the Karelia game, let’s have that discussion, but that’s a thread of itself.

“med fleet . . . allows uk fleet in India to . . . nearly impossible to take Egypt in (g2)”

I believe this is another topic better covered in another thread.

But I will say, before starting another thread, think on it a moment. If Germany’s about to smash the **** out of Europe, it doesn’t need to push in Africa, and there’s a decent chance something like that gets lined up after a USSR triple open. Also, you’re not considering what happens if Germany lands a chunk of air in Africa, and of course why would you because you probably don’t see it much. And maybe you’ll pull the ‘UK builds an Atlantic fleet if Germany puts fighters in Africa’ and I’ll shrug and say I don’t care because if UK dropped a carrier and a fighter I’ll reposition air on G2 (even better if I have the bomber) and blow up UK’s fleet at low cost to German air if they dare to drop, and if they stand off then I’ll just continue shenanigans in Europe. Then you can come back and say something else and I’ll say something else and that’s how it goes. But on balance, the question is what is gained and what is lost?

“not destroying the fighter in egypt . . . sz 37”

You want to roll the dice on UK1 vs Japan’s East Indies fleet, go for it. I think it’s a bad deal. Which is another thread.

Yes yes, you have ideas and you won’t be dissuaded, and that’s fine. Either you’ll try it over and over and fail when you come up against decent competition and you’ll change your mind, or you’ll try it against decent competition and win and maybe do a writeup and I’ll change my mind. But either way we’re not there right now.

But before you get into future writeups:

I don’t worry too much about IPC swings. I tend to think about things in terms of unit counts, positions opening up, and other less-tangibles. Yes, keeping an eye on IPC changes is important, but it’s definitely not the only thing to keep an eye on by far.

Don’t just think about 95% or whatever. Think about the resulting position. Think about the opportunity costs. Think about dice swings. Cascade failure. Concentration of force versus spreading out.

It is not safe to assume an opponent will not attack because of negative IPC expectation. No, really.

http://calc.axisandallies.org/?mustland=0&abortratio=0&saveunits=0&strafeunits=0&aInf=3&aArt=&aArm=1&aFig=1&aBom=&aTra=&aSub=&aDes=&aCru=&aCar=&aBat=&adBat=&dInf=3&dArt=&dArm=&dFig=&dBom=&dTra=&dSub=&dDes=&dCru=&dCar=&dBat=&ddBat=&ool_att=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Sub-SSub-Des-Fig-JFig-Cru-Bom-HBom-Car-dBat-Tra&ool_def=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Bom-HBom-Sub-SSub-Des-Car-Cru-Fig-JFig-dBat-Tra&battle=Run&rounds=&reps=10000&luck=pure&ruleset=AA1942&territory=&round=1&pbem=

At Belorussia you look at 3 inf 1 tank 1 fighter vs 3 inf, see 95% win, looks super good, right? But actually it’s not that hot, as the above link and some thinking shows.

4.58% no attackers survive (disaster)
5.56% attacking fighter survives (lost 15 IPCs of units for 9 IPCs of units and didn’t gain any income from capturing territory. Unless you want to lose the fighter, which is amazesauce for Germany so I assume you don’t do that.)

(Calculation aids state 5% loss. But there are different degrees of loss; here there’s at least a 10% of a strictly unfavorable outcome. That’s one thing players using aids often may miss.)

15.1% attacking tank and fighter survive. Which is where the situation becomes barely tolerable; at least you capture the territory and trade off 9 IPCs of attackers for 9 IPCs of defenders. But the tank is lost on the counter.

But what happens after the German counter? Pretty good chance that 6 IPC tank dies in exchange for perhaps a German infantry. Let’s say the tank has 2/3 chance to destroy a 3 IPC infantry (I know tanks hit 1/2 the time, but let’s just use 2/3 for Reasons), so USSR expects to gain 2 IPC from possibly destroying a German infantry, 2 IPC from the territory, meaning net gain 4 IPC in exchange for a 6 IPC tank.

Yes, USSR does have positional considerations that offset the 2 IPC difference, but the positional pressure isn’t all that great. Germany has much better options when USSR is spread thin, and if as already mentioned there’s some level of cascade failure then USSR will be in big trouble.

Now let’s look at West Russia.

http://calc.axisandallies.org/?mustland=0&abortratio=0&saveunits=0&strafeunits=0&aInf=8&aArt=2&aArm=3&aFig=&aBom=&aTra=&aSub=&aDes=&aCru=&aCar=&aBat=&adBat=&dInf=3&dArt=1&dArm=1&dFig=&dBom=&dTra=&dSub=&dDes=&dCru=&dCar=&dBat=&ddBat=&ool_att=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Sub-SSub-Des-Fig-JFig-Cru-Bom-HBom-Car-dBat-Tra&ool_def=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Bom-HBom-Sub-SSub-Des-Car-Cru-Fig-JFig-dBat-Tra&battle=Run&rounds=&reps=10000&luck=pure&ruleset=AA1942&territory=&round=1&pbem=

Let’s say 20.22% for 4 inf 2 art 3 tank 2 AA or less. Reasonably likely, and I’ll use 4 inf 2 art 3 tank 2 AA as the baseline. Germany’s counter is up to 3 inf 1 art 3 tank 4 fighter 1 bomber, without giving up attacking the UK battleship/destroyer.

https://aacalc.freezingblue.com/?rules=1942&battleType=land&roundCount=all&attInfantry=3&attArtillery=1&attTank=3&attFighter=4&attBomber=1&defInfantry=4&defArtillery=2&defTank=3&defAAGun=2

But also G1 capture of West Russia prevents Allied fighters from landing on, keeping it in play.

If you’re thinking “nah, Germany needs to maintain its air force to threaten Atlantic shipping” - as I’ve written in other threads, I use Japanese air for that when going anti-KGF. Germany still does well to have some air, the more the better, but smashing all USSR’s tanks and preventing fortification of West Russia? Maybe that’s only 20% to have favorable odds of all that following a USSR triple open as was described, but that’s still more than the odds Germany has against a Ukr/W Rus open.

@kakarrot1138

btw

UK carrier submarine 2 cruiser 2 fighter vs Japan 1 carrier 2 fighters 1 battleship

https://aacalc.freezingblue.com/b/s5nnfm

comes in around 63%

Forming 1942 Second Edition and 1942 Online research/testing group for strategy/tactics. Writeups to be published as guides in time. Games will be played on TripleA v5 and 1942 Online and TripleA v5 (Larry Harris Tournament Setup) without bids.

Applicants must be comfortable with discussion of mathematics and exact details and are expected to contribute meaningfully. This is not a group for casual players, nor is it a group for players that want to develop “secret” lines of play.

Forming 1942 Second Edition and 1942 Online research/testing group for strategy/tactics. Writeups to be published as guides in time. Games will be played on TripleA v5 and 1942 Online and TripleA v5 (Larry Harris Tournament Setup) without bids.

Applicants must be comfortable with discussion of mathematics and exact details and are expected to contribute meaningfully. This is not a group for casual players, nor is it a group for players that want to develop “secret” lines of play.

Well written stuff.
Cheers

@Krieghund Thanks. I’ll cite the “Defenseless Transports” on page 17 (for me), when making the case to the 1942 Online developers. Appreciate your taking the time to input, and especially the specific reference - most helpful.

I’m just as pleased that the AAA can shoot down the fighter before the fighter can get any automatic destruction effect. Simultaneous shoot-downs is weird.

Also thanks @Witt of course.