@Quintin
I’ve often seen players make the point they’re #1 rank or #2 rank or top ranked platinum, citing lopsided records like 19-0, 50-0, 48-3. I’m not saying experience should be discounted. But I think lopsided records are indicative of a weak meta, and I think basing projections on personal experience against a weak meta misses the best lines of play.
@Quintin said in kjf no good in 1942 online:
The J approach you mentioned though I think is among the weaker choices for J in KJF. Back in april when I made #2 allies doing only KJF the my main strategy was to trade Russia for the money islands and the coast of asia, then grind axis out in an endgame with a 10-20 income lead. Also important was denying J any IC’s on the mainland, so their income could not be spent efficiently.
The 2 sub / ground hybrid plays into this plan, as US will get naval superiority and get the money islands. You suggest a push on india, and you’re right that this can only be held by giving ground to germany. But giving ground to germany to hold india is fine for the goal of tranding J’s important land for Russia. Germany will inevitably make progress no matter what you do as allies in KJF. The games I’ve played where J went for this they ended up bottled up in burma and lost china income. G gets russia around G8, US gets borneo IC US6 or US7 if you’re only doing 2 subs a turn and then the endgame is favorable for allies.
I’m perfectly willing to believe in your experience that’s exactly what happens. But I think that is not what should happen. I’d originally written a lot more detail on how I saw KJF / anti-KJF developing, but didn’t post those details as I only wanted to make some general points. But as you want to take a closer look, I think it’s reasonable enough to go off topic a bit and develop the discussion. Though I expect you probably won’t answer on most of these points.
You wrote US will get naval superiority and get the money islands, that Allies giving ground to Germany in Europe to hold India is fine, that US gets Borneo US6 or US7, then endgame favorable to Allies.
That US gets naval superiority is not in dispute. The question is when it gets it, and what, specifically, it does with it. The question is not whether the Allies give ground to Germany in Europe to hold India, but the consequences - which I think perhaps are not “fine”. That US gets Borneo US6/US7 or even earlier, why not. But the question again is how the position develops from there, and I think it by no means a sure thing that US even holds those islands.
If I remember your previous posts elsewhere correctly @Quintin, you advise J1 attacking US’s Hawaiian Islands fleet. But I will assume this does not happen - why? Because I’m arguing the weakest-case scenario for the anti-KJF line I’m describing. Also, I assume UK does not try the coinflippy attack against Japan’s East Indies fleet, for reasons already mentioned in previous posts in this thread.
So let’s also say that Japan’s Kwangtung destroyer and transport are destroyed, and the German Mediterranean battleship and transport are destroyed, and that by the end of Japan’s first turn, Japan has destroyed whatever remained of UK’s India fleet, and though UK has options with its Australia fleet, those options aren’t great. And pretty much all of those assumptions I think are reasonable and also go against the anti-KJF line that I’m arguing.
. . . no? Those assumptions are unreasonable and/or wrong? Perhaps. But if German’s Mediterranean battleship and transport survive until Germany’s second turn, then Germany has a line on Africa income. There’s drawbacks - Germany bleeds out Europe to feed Africa - but when Germany sees KJF develop, Germany knows it has time to play the longer game.
So we assume Germany’s battleship and transport were destroyed. But how? If UK1 attack of one fighter one bomber, that’s rather coinflippy, and if UK loses its air, then UK doesn’t have a good followthrough. Then Germany can do what it wants in the Mediterranean for quite a while. The numbers -
http://calc.axisandallies.org/?mustland=0&abortratio=0&saveunits=0&strafeunits=0&aInf=&aArt=&aArm=&aFig=1&aBom=1&aTra=&aSub=&aDes=&aCru=&aCar=&aBat=&adBat=&dInf=&dArt=&dArm=&dFig=&dBom=&dTra=1&dSub=&dDes=&dCru=&dCar=&dBat=1&ddBat=&ool_att=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Sub-SSub-Des-Fig-JFig-Cru-Bom-HBom-Car-dBat-Tra&ool_def=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Bom-HBom-Sub-SSub-Des-Car-Cru-Fig-JFig-dBat-Tra&battle=Run&rounds=&reps=10000&luck=pure&ruleset=AA1942&territory=&round=1&pbem=
61.4% attacker, 38.6% defender doesn’t sound bad. But if attackers win, it’s not GREAT for the defenders but it’s not awful either - Germany simply pushes Europe and uses tanks for its timings, and that’s no picnic scenario for Allies either. But if attackers lose, I don’t see any good attacker recovery. True, it’s not as bad as it might sound. 38.6% defender includes if only the German transport survives, but USSR can clean up an undefended transport before it becomes a problem if USSR starts R2 with a fighter on Caucasus (otherwise in range), not fantastic as it does have opportunity costs but at least brings it to 18.3% defender instead of 38.6%.
So I assume that UK hits with two fighters and a bomber (which can still fail, but the odds are better). Which in turn assumes that the UK fighter on Egypt was alive at the start of UK’s turn.
So if UK is attacking with two fighters and a bomber, that leaves carrier and cruiser to hit Kwangtung’s destroyer/transport. It’s not as great as cruiser/fighter, but it’s all UK has left.
But UK can attack with cruiser only? Sure. But that’s yet another coinflippy attack.
http://calc.axisandallies.org/?mustland=0&abortratio=0&saveunits=0&strafeunits=0&aInf=&aArt=&aArm=&aFig=&aBom=&aTra=&aSub=&aDes=&aCru=1&aCar=&aBat=&adBat=&dInf=&dArt=&dArm=&dFig=&dBom=&dTra=1&dSub=&dDes=1&dCru=&dCar=&dBat=&ddBat=&ool_att=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Sub-SSub-Des-Fig-JFig-Cru-Bom-HBom-Car-dBat-Tra&ool_def=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Bom-HBom-Sub-SSub-Des-Car-Cru-Fig-JFig-dBat-Tra&battle=Run&rounds=&reps=10000&luck=pure&ruleset=AA1942&territory=&round=1&pbem=
I’m not saying any of the things I’m saying happen do necessarily happen. I’m simply saying there’s reasons they may happen, and again, it’s not that I’m assuming these hypotheticals to make my case - I’m assuming the hypotheticals as they work against my case.
Do those assumptions work against the case I’m making? KJF with Germany-fueled income in Africa, or KJF with Japan’s Kwangtung transport surviving, those don’t look like great scenarios for Allies to me.
Then there’s the scenarios I’m not discussing but that bear mentioning. UK could mess with its odds against the German battleship/transport or the Japanese destroyer/transport to be greedy and try to preserve the UK carrier. Or US1 pushes its combined fleet to Iwo Jima’s sea zone to immediately interdict the waters around Japan, meaning Japan either has to not buy submarines on J2, or needs to move its fleet off what’s likely to be ideal placement at Yunnan. (But note Japan can get scenarios that have Japan leaving undefended transports at Yunnan, which leaves the main Japan fleet free to go wherever it likes, it’s a very real possibility).
But neither of those are likely to be issues. If the UK player has a preference for high risk high stakes battles, eventually they will likely blow themselves up on a fail, then Axis just walk in. Further, even if UK only tried preserving its UK India carrier as a one-time-let’s-try-this bet, it’s very difficult for the UK player to move that carrier in position to support US pushing Pacific especially as Japan knows exactly what the UK player is trying to do. As to US pushing to Iwo Jima, that can be an issue - but if the Japan player is competent, the Japan player knows US1 to Iwo Jima restricts their options so they take preventative measures by leaving their air in range. US1 to Iwo Jima can still happen as a gamble or after bad J1 opening dice, but it’s not normal.
. . . and so far I haven’t written why 2 subs a turn (transposing into air) is good or why Japanese ICs against the KJF are bad. But understand, I’m not trying to drown the reader in unnecessary detail. It’s simply that we need a minimal level of detail to even have any sort of reasonable discussion. Otherwise everyone’s pulling phantom armies out of nowhere, opponents are retreating for no good reason, and so on. And if I’m correct that the meta is weak, then readers can see the issue where a player that argues how a game develops based on their experience against a weak meta won’t necessarily find the right moves and countermoves against a strong meta.
So now that the stage has been set, I write how I expect the game to develop. Yes, things might be different here or there, and players can be clever here or there, and dice are going to turn out one way or another. But some general points hold true and need be considered.
Using the projection I describe, Japan loses its Kwangtung destroyer/transport, the German Med fleet is destroyed, Japan cleans up UK’s navy in the Indian Ocean, and though UK can have units off Australia, well, that’s another level of detail I won’t get into. But I’ll say Japan buys 3 transports and ground for its first turn. Then if Japan sees US1 drop a Pacific fleet, then if US hasn’t posted off Iwo Jima in strength (which it probably didn’t especially if Japan was competent), only then does Japan start building 2 submarines a turn.
Under Quintin’s projection, Japan does some sort of all-out naval battle with US using mass subs, or does some sort of all-out ground on Asia. Then he characterizes “normal G8 russia timing” though I say Germany’s normal development is G7, not G8 if not earlier than G7. But is that what we should expect? G1 infantry build, G2 sees no UK Atlantic fleet and goes infantry at Berlin / Karelia (if held) and excess tanks on Italy if any excess income. G3 tanks (with infantry/art at Karelia), G4 tanks (again with slow units at Karelia), by G4 the G1-2 infantry build pushes and holds Ukraine, forcing USSR to choose between defending West Russia and Caucasus. USSR chooses to hold Caucasus (as if it surrenders it then Germany just holds it and gets a wonderful logistics advantage). G5 Germany pushes West Russia, then USSR must choose between Moscow and Caucasus. USSR chooses Caucasus. G6 Germany pushes Caucasus and holds, builds tanks at Karelia and bombers at Berlin. So you have G1 and G2 infantry-heavy builds, G3-G5 tank-heavy builds, then G6 tank/bomber, all in range to hit Moscow on G7.
“The pure ground you pressure Russia as much as possible as J with the aim to accelerate the G timing on russia to G6 or G7.”
Which makes no sense to me at all. If USSR is bleeding out its Europe stack to fight for 1 IPC territories with Japan, I can’t even. Sure, once Japan gets up close, then maybe USSR finds it to its advantage to trade Kazakh or whatever. But accelerating Germany’s timing? How? That shouldn’t remotely be the case with ground. If you use AIR power to reinforce Germany’s pushes, THEN USSR can’t counter Germany’s fast pushes. But Japan GROUND power won’t be in position to reinforce Germany’s pushes.
In a weak meta, I can totally see some players bleeding out USSR’s Europe stacks and engaging in all sort of self-destructive play, sure. It DOES happen. But it should not happen.
Then, Quintin’s recommendations are pure subs or pure ground. And why? My opinion is he gets away with it (though he shouldn’t). So if it works for him, why not? I’m saying it shouldn’t work though.
Think about what happens if Japan builds mass subs. Say Germany wants some help against USSR. Why? Because if Germany just sits on its butt all day against USSR, then US builds and builds then eventually steamrolls Japan. Speed is an issue. (And as I mentioned, I don’t think the timetable is necessarily as Quintin describes). Well then, are those Japanese subs going to just roll up on land and start fighting for ground? No. And again, I’m sure Quintin’s getting away with it, but you really have to think about it. J1-2 aren’t really worse as most of Japan’s planned ground presence units in Asia depends on what already existed at the start of the game between Tokyo, Philippines, and East Indies. But once Japan’s early reserves are bled out, Russia and UK can push. And it is really very bad if UK and USSR have income, plus if Japan’s being starved out.
But what if Japan goes mass ground? Then when US pushes its navy, Japan gets pushed off position early - and why? Because Japan has no teeth to threaten US with. So US just walks right up to Japan and starts grabbing stuff. Then Japan’s pure ground build gets choked off.
But the lines transpose; Japan can go mass ground early then build subs late? But the lines don’t transpose. If Japan doesn’t have submarines in position to punish a US advance, then it’s down to Japan needing to commit capital ships - and whether it’s an all-out attack or a strafe, Japan then needs to worry a lot about the US counter. But if Japan has subs then US’s options get cut pretty badly. Cheap Japanese subs absorb hits and lend attacking power, then Japan consolidates with almost no real losses to its defensive power, then US doesn’t have a leg to stand on. If Japan tries to put off building mass subs until late, they just won’t be in good position.
@Quintin said in kjf no good in 1942 online:
Get a J IC on kazakh or in manchuria or both and try to win the income grind in the endgame. I call this an accelerated KJF.
Well it would be the accelerated “anti-KJF” really?
I wrote part of the reason effective KJF is so hard is the Allies need to find an effective timing. And part of the problem is Japan has retreat options. So long as Japan’s hasn’t gotten crazy bad dice or made a major screwup, Japan can retreat then come back. If Japan drops 15 IPCs on an industrial complex, that’s 15 IPCs that can’t fight, that ties Japan down to defending that location, and if the Allies do capture it then the Allies get a free IC that can immediately produce if the Allies hold for just one turn. Japan-built ICs are a gift to the Allies if the Allies are going KJF.
Again, I expect Quintin gets away with Japan ICs against KJF in what I say is a weak meta. But again, that’s different to what I expect is the strongest play / counter-play.
Every time I post details, Quintin never answers on specifics. Well, people are busy. But I am saying a lot of times, I think the timings he gives are quite optimistic. Which is entirely in line if he’s speaking experientially and if I’m correct that the meta in general is weak.
I went from specifics to generalities, and I know the argument’s hard to track. But take my word on it that the various other KJF lines that develop off other assumptions are not, as far as I’ve seen, superior unless one of those assumptions is lucky dice and/or a bad opponent. More on that later.
But if you DO accept the assumptions I started with, then look at the projection. Japan starts with two battleships, cruiser, destroyer, submarine, two carriers, six fighters, and a bomber. US starts with battleship, cruiser, 2 destroyer, submarine, carrier, four fighters, bomber. (We’ll leave off US’s East US destroyer/transports and China fighter for now). We say Japan builds no real fleet (transports don’t count) on J1. So by end of US1 we have Japan with 166 IPCs worth of naval/air, and US with 162 (assuming US spends on nothing but fleet - and that means no transports, no nothing, JUST fleet). Something like that. Make sense? And again, we could accept another set of assumptions, I have no objection to that, but I’m making the assumptions I think worst against KJF as if I can establish the anti-KJF works despite negative assumptions, well, there you go.
So you look at it and maybe you think things like “well battleships aren’t really great for cost, cost doesn’t equate to utility, looks like US is going to have more IPCs worth of fleet really quick if Japan’s only adding 12 and US 38-40” . . . all true. Especially the cost and utility bit. But think about how it actually develops.
The US “trick”, as it were, to improving its KJF timings, is to keep a carrier off Western US to mobilize fighters on. Then those newly mobilized fighters have range to both Japan’s sea zones, Philippines’ sea zone, Borneo’s sea zone - it’s really nice. But you have to realize that costs 14 IPCs. Look at the map, think about different builds and timings. No matter what you build, you have to think about when US gets where it wants to be.
Okay, so let’s say US has a big fleet. Where does it put it? I mentioned US1 off Iwo Jima, so let’s start with that. If Japan was SMART about its move, then Japan KNEW US1 off Iwo Jima was a possibility so Japan can have just about its entire navy and air in range. US just produced 42 IPCs of units, but that’s not at Iwo Jima, it’s on West Coast / West Coast sea zone (and the US cruiser that I counted isn’t even there. Nor does US have a second carrier to land its fighters on, nor does the US bomber participate). So it’s 166 IPC of Japan units flattening 76 IPC of US units or whatever.
. . . so? The timings, you see? The US1 build is on the West Coast at the end of the US turn. And/or off Solomon Islands, but whatever. On paper US catches up, but in practice, US may need four turns to get any naval builds to relevancy - one turn to build, next turn to Solomons, third turn to moving into position (because US won’t have the brute strength to just walk up for a while), fourth turn push. So US progress is very slow. On the other hand, Japan’s builds come into play very quickly. One turn to build, the next turn immediately subs are relevant against the surrounding waters, and though that’s probably not great, on the turn after that, Japanese subs can definitely be in position.
Then throw in that Japan doesn’t have to push. Japan can just sit there loading units onto Asia all day while Germany builds up against Russia. It’s US that has to come in range, Japan that can decide whether or not Japan wants to fight, if Japan does want to fight then Japan has a load of cheap 6-IPC subs that are wonderfully efficient on attack. Then if Japan doesn’t want to fight, if US wants to push, US needs not only to have the defensive naval power to have pushed Japan off in the first place, US needs attacking naval power if it wants to drive Japan’s navy off position. And in all this, you notice how nothing was said about US’s investment on transports and ground. Yes, US can certainly take territory, but it can’t necessarily hold it.
. . . and? Let’s say US 6 to Borneo or whatever, which I say is way too late and perhaps a bit optimistic in terms of timing, but whatever. Look at the assumptions, look at Japan’s options.
If Japan captured India, then we can take it as a given that Japan was forced off position to defend Borneo and East Indies. Oh, all right, India’s sea zone is in striking distance and Germany can blow up any US destroyer block and UK probably won’t even have blockers considering 1942 Online’s changed mechanics, but let’s just hand-wave all that - and again, as I’ve been doing, I’m saying we make assumptions that don’t work for the case I’m arguing but against the case. (Like, if you want to say Japan can crush India AND defend Borneo and East Indies, fantastic, I don’t have a problem with that, and in fact I expect something like that - though I wouldn’t say a “hard defense”, more like if US tries to get all grabby then Japan whacks 'em on the nose). Since Japan hit India, we know what? That Japan built bombers on Japan last turn to help with the India invasion, at least that’s what I say should be expected as Japan ought to have held Burma particularly with German fighter help and I’d say Germany wants to have something around to blow up blockers anyways.
What does Japan’s fleet look like by then? Say it’s been dropping two subs a turn on J2, 3, and 4, have them in position (and why not) as it’s J6 (before US6), two turns of movement off Japan, is that unreasonable? Then let’s say that Japan transitioned to fighters, then bombers, which is exactly as I described they ought. Then with Japan’s fleet at India, with 36 IPC (which Japan should have available as it’s been fighting ground battles and increasing its income if anything - and again, I’m fine with assuming that doesn’t happen because if you say USSR bled off a big stack to fight Japan, great, then Germany’s timeline against USSR really moved up) - anyways, at that point Japan’s navy is two battleships, four carriers, eight fighters, cruiser, two destroyers, eight submarines, plus it has three bombers though those won’t defend at sea. That’s what Japan has at India’s sea zone; US’s newly produced units at West Coast US won’t reach. Nor will US naval units that were produced prevoius to the last three turns. So if US is going to threaten that, it’s the US starting forces plus its US1-3 builds, something like 240 IPCs? Against Japan’s 250? Japan has loads of fodder and high-defense fighters?
But even that’s not the end of the story. What exactly did US bring? If US cheaped out on transports and ground, then US doesn’t have any robust answer to Japan simply taking back anything Japan lost unless US defends the sea zone. If US defends the sea zone, though, that sharply limits US’s options, and Japan has two turns to respond - the first turn while a US IC is built, the second turn to capture the territory before the US IC can produce. Even if Japan misses the capture on both turns, US IC isn’t the end of the world - it’s an improvement in US logistics for sure, but it did cost US time.
But Japan doesn’t capture India? Why and how, exactly, does that not happen?
Let’s say you pile USSR and UK units onto India. Okay, then India holds. But then how is Germany deterred from pressing early and hard into Europe? There’s just no way. Units on India don’t threaten most points in Europe, and if you want to say it’s Allied tanks threatening Caucasus then that’s fine for Axis too, though Allied tanks certainly have their uses, that’s going to cut into unit count one way or another. I don’t say it’ll be easy for Axis, but I don’t see a good way for the Allies to stop Germany from capturing Caucasus then Japan reinforcing (if even necessary considering how much was bled off to split). And where does Japan’s position break down? Germany even has the option of pushing hard to Persia, it’s not great for Europe, but if Germany just wants to crack India, well, there it is.
And if Japan can’t capture India, why would Japan just sit around? Japan has options. Leapfrog to Africa, push to Szechwan. So what is really accomplished by late Allied defense of India? The Allies have split stacks, one on Moscow, another on India, they’re cut off by Germany’s stack on Caucasus. So then what does UK do? Pull out to Persia and get its stack flattened? That’s if Germany doesn’t just capture Moscow and Japan reinforces. Push towards southeast Asia and get some income but then the stack really becomes irrelevant to Russia, then Germany captures Russia and pushes its stack to Persia, preparatory to capturing India?
Which leads me back to my point about logistics. If you assume US does NOTHING but build fighting fleet, you could say US progresses in Pacific. But if US didn’t build transports and ground, how can it expect to fight off Germany’s stack? UK’s producing how many units a turn, where, and advancing or retreating how, exactly? Mysteriously, US has a powerful navy and a powerful ground force in position - but how does that happen?
It makes sense if Axis botch the response - Japan gets blown up by the US navy, Germany doesn’t pressure Europe properly, then Allies just stomp all over Axis while laughing heartily. But if Axis don’t botch the response, I don’t know that I would call it a winning game for Allies.
As to “once allied carriers get implemented” - eh. If it happens, there’s still all the other gameplay changes, and it’s not just a matter of shaving 10-15% here and there because the defender can’t respond appropriately (though that’s bad enough). I expect if it happens the meta will switch up so that’s something, but it’s still not going to change that you just can’t play KJF properly in 1942 Online.
(edit - fixed some bad phrasing)