this emphasis on history
is to me a mystery
for things to be fun in a game
things should not turn out the same

if you want divergent play
throw those history books away!
“but the game is world war two”
real tanks roll dice? I never knew

if you want to start a list
of all the thing the gameplay’s missed
terrain, morale, food, intel, weather
oil, iron, and shoe leather

Not enough? Look at the board
No doubt but that things were ignored
Europe, Asia, take your pick
Differences are laid on thick

There’s much more that could be said
Of game design but cheese and bread
Are what I crave so off to kitchen
To make a sandwich that is *****in

Wrote a document a while ago regarding changes between 1942 Online and board game. 41 pages long, though I ended up cutting it short.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/17F3TotY7HEKeiLv3ewlfYotQv_hWXqh5PDo7B0exXpY/edit?usp=sharing

The development team needs to go in and test rulebook implementation line by line. There are just loads and loads of little things all over the place that I didn’t even get to in that document.

My impression is there’s a real possibility 1942 Online is only ever going to be a compromised version of the board game.

==

On another note, I started writing an AI for Axis and Allies. Which is fun for me, so there’s that at least. :relaxed:

Speculation, you say? :thinking_face:

I’m guessing Renegade researched the license and the market before acquiring the license, and that we may see India and China. I don’t expect either to be selected, but a poll would introduce the idea of having games about events in those theaters.

I predict we will not see the First Soviet-Finnish War. It’s an important part of history, not just of itself, but how action and thought around it shaped how things unfolded in Europe. But I think it’s too political in the current climate.

My guess is Renegade may not have the licenses to the particular versions of some Axis and Allies games, like D-Day, and they may try to publish new editions with entirely new rules, to capture whatever proceeds, while capitalizing on name value of the theater.

But for various reasons, I’m guessing Operation Barbarossa / Battle of Stalingrad.

@djensen said in Getting your IPCs back if you don't deploy:

It definitely speeds up the game. I feel like timed tournaments should move to this as well.

Can’t agree - whether this is regarding getting IPCs back if you don’t deploy, or whether this is regarding buying and deploying at end of round.

The speeding up, sure. Personally I’d favor allowing purchase phase after combat movement.

But purchasing after combat means a player knows outcomes of battles. The game then becomes less about risk management and more a simple optimization exercise.

As to getting IPCs back if you don’t deploy - I can’t really favor it. Had a game in which UK player ideally would wipe out a German fleet by buying a carrier to create a legal landing zone for additional fighters. By board game rules, the UK player would have to have placed the carrier, then the carrier could easily be wiped on the German player’s turn (they had plenty of air force). But by 1942 Online rules, the UK player didn’t even have to place the carrier; they could buy the carrier to create a potential landing zone, then not place the carrier, never giving Germany an odds-on attack against a poorly defended 14 IPC unit.

1942 Online has a load of changes to the board game - non-use of allied transports and carriers, floating fighters when defending carriers destroyed, submarines can’t be ignored, blitzes are automated and can’t be opted out from, sea unit movement, just this big list. I wish I could say I thought the changes improvements, but I confess to being disappointed.

Discussing moderation of Steam forums is against Steam forum guidelines. But I do want to point out when I wrote recently that the 1942 Online developers need to read up on certain issues, that’s not a “personal attack”. If a teacher tells a student they haven’t done the homework when the student hasn’t done the homework it’s not a personal attack.

Especially when it’s been a few months and the student still doesn’t know what the assignment is.

Literally, how can the developers address an issue if they don’t understand the issue, if they don’t acknowledge the issue, and if they give every sign they don’t even know the issue exists, despite it being written out time and again in short and long versions by different posters over and over again for months at a time?

I’m just saying right? I’m sure some people feel they’re trying very hard, but it’s at the point they need to either acknowledge they’re in over their heads on some matters (which happens, it’s not their fault if they don’t have a huge budget) OR they need to seriously get some work done.

I mean hey. I’ve always said on Steam forums things happen, limited budgets, sure. But the developers never acknowledge there’s even any possibility of there being limited functionality or limited budget or anything. They just ignore issues or play them off as being non-issues or whatever.

Like lack of simultaneous defender decisions, casualty assignation after like-valued dice instead of end of subphase - these are changes to the game.

And even for use of allied carriers, it was played off as a total non-issue “it’s the same for both sides” until I wrote this

https://docs.google.com/document/d/17F3TotY7HEKeiLv3ewlfYotQv_hWXqh5PDo7B0exXpY/edit?usp=sharing

It’s NOT the same for both sides. But I don’t expect that I need to write fifty pages of documentation to back up each and EVERY point I make (though God knows, I’ve written a LOT on Steam forums)

Anyways players should know - if you don’t care about a load of gameplay compromises and the developers trying to play things off with total denial games, then yeah, go ahead and get 1942 Online.

But otherwise? TripleA has a game state editor, chat, undo, and better UI in terms of presenting information to the user in terms of how many of what are on the board. AND TripleA doesn’t have developers characterizing LEGITIMATE CRITICISMS as “personal attacks”.

Thought I’d responded to some points in this thread but maybe not.

Anyways seeing how the thread is necro and there’s a lot of stuff floating around - going to write some for some of the more “advanced” players I suppose, though I don’t like that term.

1. UK is for the most skilled player.
2. In a decent game without aberrant dice, UK abandons India to help hold Russia. If the Allies position stabilizes, UK can reclaim India in time.

So I read some stuff through the thread like players saying this happens or that happens. But this is just the same oversimplified hash that I’m always saying new players shouldn’t fall for.

Examples?

Suppose Germany blew up UK’s East Canada destroyer and had two submarines and all its air surviving against the UK battleship battle northeast of London, losing the cruiser. The combination is not super likely, but as each action individually has decent expectations of success, there is good reason for Germany to undertake both, and Germany can get lucky.

(As to WHY Germany does those actions, I won’t get into that here as this is a UK thread but anyone can start a Germany thread or whatever.)

Then let’s also say Germany lands its air in range of the UK sea zones, which is also not necessarily the case but can reasonably happen (if Germany doesn’t try to hold Ukraine using German fighters, if Germany doesn’t land fighters on a new Mediterranean carrier).

So then Germany has two submarines five fighters against UK destroyer, cruiser, carrier, and two fighters. It’s not a fantastic battle for Germany, but Germany does have the advantage that it doesn’t really care what happens to its submarines, but every UK fleet loss has to be replaced. (Well, not the cruiser so much, but still). And there’s some complications, like UK potentially losing a very expensive carrier early, or losing its cheaper fighters and thus losing defense power early.

Then there’s also the question of what UK’s transport fleet looks like and its planned usage.

Yes, this is all a bit involved, I know. But I did say UK is for the most skilled player. The stuff I’m talking about so far isn’t even the complicated stuff, it’s not even the basic level, it’s the stuff you know before you even get to basic level.

So let’s say you drop destroyer and carrier and Germany can’t punish. Somehow. But there’s no guarantee of that either. Because Germany air purchases and moves may have left USSR-controlled West Russia in danger of being broken on G2, so UK may not want to keep its London fighters back to land on a carrier, they might want to land on West Russia instead.

And inevitably some silly person speaks up saying “but if Germany breaks West Russia then Germany loses all its tanks”. But first, we don’t know that happens, second we don’t know what happens even if that does happen, third that doesn’t consider the possibility of Germany attacking then retreating, fourth that doesn’t consider the two-peak model plus the aforementioned uncertainties which mean Germany may attack with intent to retreat but keep its options open to simply crack West Russia like an egg, withstand any USSR counter, then crush Russia and Axis go on to win handily.

And when I say that Japan lands two fighters on a carrier south of Persia so they have range to reinforce any G2 push to West Russia or Karelia, and/or Japan pushes a bomber to Europe as early as J1, maybe you start getting an idea of what I mean by UK basic level. UK basic means you’re watching the USSR stacks, the German stacks, USSR ability to defend against Germany, Japan’s reinforcements, you know all of that, you know all their little tricks for both sides, and you know how to use UK to thread that needle. And even then you’re not advanced, you’re just basic.

So how do you know when you’re a little advanced? Well, when you start to understand the applications, and by that point you’re no longer following dogmatic simple advice like “always buy two fighters two infantry one artillery”, but instead you’re looking at the board and in your head it’s like the Matrix. Except of course by the time you’re actually there you don’t think of it as being complicated.

So let’s say Germany lost all its subs on G1, then you’re considering a UK1 buy of carrier and transport because you’re trying to threaten against 1) any German fortification of Norway and/or Finland, 2) threatening capture of BOTH Norway AND Finland if Germany does NOT defend both (which it can’t comfortably do), 3) thinking about what you do if Germany and Japan land mass air at Karelia threatening any UK2 landing, 4) how German fighters at Karelia have limited range opening up a possible UK/US landing at France and NW Europe, 5) US’s builds and fleet timings and how Germany and Japan actions and UK actions may or may not make landings possible as part of an overall strategic plan. Then there’s some other stuff I won’t get into, but even all this stuff doesn’t mean “master” level thinking. That’s just barely the basics level.

All I’m doing there is making the point that playing UK involves more complicated decisions and a better understanding of each other power in the game, and a better understanding of the game itself, than any other single power.

If someone wants to oversimplify for newer players, okay. But even newer players should understand when it is being oversimplified.

To answer the OP, what do I do?

Roughly, it goes like this:

1. I think about the opposing team, any play experience I have of them in the past, any guesses I have as to how they’ll play based on what they’ve said or what they’ve done. I try to figure out their risk preferences, their play preferences, and their familiarity with different lines.

Then it’s important that one remember one’s own risk preferences, familiarities with lines, and weaknesses.

For example? I’m risk averse; when I carry out an action I want to have a good backup plan in case the dice don’t work out. So I try to use superior calculation and long-term planning, wait for an opponent to drop the ball and/or screw up, then I just grind them to death.

But when I play against Craig, I can’t afford to do that, because Craig uses what I call threat multiplication (an unfortunate personal term that bears only passing resemblance to the term as it’s used properly in current military parlance). In fact Craig’s the one that TAUGHT me that. So when I play against Craig, I have to remember I just can’t afford to play it “safe” because that play style doesn’t work, and he’s strong enough that he probably won’t just fall into a grind-to-death trap. He WILL have his chances at reversals, and I have to let him take them, because trying to beat him easy raw power and raw calculations just doesn’t work against his play style.

2. UK1 you have to look at West Russia, Szechuan, the UK East Canada sea zone, the UK/German position in the Atlantic, including whether the UK cruiser survived, Germany’s actions in the Mediterranean. You also have to look at USSR’s actions, USSR1 dice outcomes, Germany’s actions, Germany1’s dice outcomes, Germany’s buys, Germany’s air placement, and you should also have asked US what its plans were.

Why? Roughly it’s something like this. If Germany has a good attack on West Russia there’s a good chance it takes it. And why? Not because Germany intends to capture West Russia, but simply because Germany is trying to kill a load of USSR units to weaken USSR’s threats. Why does trading make any sense to Germany? Because USSR can use a SINGLE W Rus stack to threaten BOTH Karelia AND Ukraine, both of which are points Germany wants to push to. But Germany does not have to worry so much about its ability to press and hold against USSR, because a German push can be followed by Japanese fighter reinforcements, and Germany’s advancing has less to do with raw power single stack offense against raw power multiple power stack defense, and more about Germany simultaneously threatening multiple territories which the Allies can’t both defend so Allies give way at one so Germany presses. OK?

What I’m getting at is it’s not enough that USSR defend West Russia against a German capture action. USSR’s defense at West Russia should be strong enough that Germany can’t even get good results off a planned attack then retreat action. Often that means UK wants to land its London fighters on West Russia, NOT on a newly built carrier in Atlantic. (But it’s a little complicated so read on).

So then you start thinking about G2 attacks into West Russia. Besides UK fighter reinforcement what else can reach? The US fighter on Szechwan. Even without any USSR reinforcements on Szechwan, Japan attacking Szechwan is still risky. USSR can move in an infantry, UK can maybe land a fighter from its Indian Ocean fleet (more on that later). But if UK doesn’t do that, if USSR doesn’t do that, then the Allies have to think about the possibility that Japan makes even a bad attack against Szechwan, just to kill the US fighter, just so it can’t reinforce West Russia, just so Germany has better odds against West Russia on G2. OK? When I say UK needs to look at West Russia, I don’t mean UK can just take for granted that US has can fly in a fighter from Szechwan, UK needs to be aware that Japan has options that may prevent that.

I mentioned that UK may not land a fighter on Szechwan and there’s complications regarding UK fighters on a new UK carrier in Atlantic.

First, suppose Germany gets territory in Africa. In some ways that’s nice because it pulls German units out of Europe, but quick German tanks running through Africa cuts UK income quick and increases German income quick. Germany leverages that income into superior unit count in its Europe factories, then that becomes a problem for the Allies down the line, whether they’re trying to break down Berlin/Europe, or whether Germany’s trying to beat down USSR’s door. More money gives Germany more options, and though there IS that tradeoff of Germany committing resources to Africa, a skilled Axis player leverages that advantage in the midgame to the Axis advantage. So to prevent exactly that, UK may (it also may not) have the opportunity to destroy Germany’s Mediterranean fleet, then use its Union of South Africa infantry along with UK air to destroy any quick German incursion into Africa.

UK will almost certainly lose Africa after Japan captures India for various reasons, but the point is to keep the income out of German hands. But if UK uses its air in the area (and the London bomber) to hit Germany’s Med fleet then there isn’t a UK fighter available to land on Szechwan.

See? It’s all connected.

As to early Allied landing in Finland/Norway, it’s not so simple. Yes, in some scenarios the Axis can beat up any premature UK fleet. But in other scenarios the Axis can’t beat up any UK fleet, for example suppose Germany landed all its fighters in Ukraine and/or Africa (to choke off early USSR income and push UK out of Africa, so there’s reason for Germany to do this, I’m not just saying it just randomly happens). But if that happens then maybe UK can try for some early greedy grabs of territory because it can’t be punished - and UK will WANT to be a bit greedy, because UK is going to take losses elsewhere that it can’t reasonably prevent because of Axis actions. OK?

Then there’s all the other things I mentioned earlier too.

So you have to think about all those things. Sometimes you’ll go three infantry for India and two fighters for London, sometimes you’ll go two infantry one artillery for India and two fighters for London, sometimes you’ll go two infantry one tank for India and save the rest, sometimes you’ll pop in a UK1 bomber to help out in Africa and/or pressure Mediterranean early.

Even off the same board position, what you choose can and probably should be different based on what you think your opponent will do.

@william-macphereson said in How to play UK:

I have a somewhat different approach to Great Britain.

I’m going to make a distinction. Some posters say that I just don’t like anything different to what I write, which is the same I say of certain other posters. But you’ll notice I don’t hesitate to break down the numbers and the details (which others don’t do, not really), and even when I do disagree with something “different” to how I would play, I make a distinction between “different wrong” and “just different”.

Recent example, I think it was “1baddude” on Steam, said he split a German Atlantic sub off to hit the UK cruiser. And this is NOT something I would do, it IS different. But I do not say it is WRONG; I can build out a mathematical line that shows that there are solid reasons to do that exact play. It isn’t something I would normally do, it’s “different”, but I don’t say it’s “wrong”.

But for the unquoted parts, building UK1 3 fighters and the planned usage, mmm . . . well, I hesitate to say “wrong”, but I’m certainly going to say it all is described completely different to what I’d think reasonable to expect.

“3 fighters which get dropped into India. Ideally, by the end of round 2, you’ve consolidated the other two fighters with those 3 in India, creating a hornet’s nest to warn off the Japanese fleet.”

. . . except that doesn’t happen, I think.

First, Allied defense of West Russia is by no means a certain situation. Can you really afford to have a “hornet’s nest” at India? Considering even German attack and withdraw actions could be profitable, considering Japan could kill the US fighter on Szechwan even if USSR reinforced with an infantry. Second, why do you need five fighters on India? Even if Japan’s Kwangtung transport survives, even if you transported units out of India (which you said you did to attack Borneo), you still won’t need five fighters on India, Japan simply shouldn’t leave anything in range for UK to get a good battle - why would Japan do otherwise?

If you are playing out-of-the-box setup instead of the LHTR setup then you could maybe make a case, but I assume the LHTR setup is used as that’s what’s standard for ladder. Which, by the way, if you DO assume out-of-the-box setup, that’s perfectly valid, but I think it would be good to make that clear, yes? Makes a lot of difference.

But either way, let’s think about what really happens.

1. My assertion is India is NOT immediately threatened by Japan. I say UK1 build of 2 fighters on London 3 infantry on India means, if West Russia isn’t broken, that UK2 can land those UK1 London fighters on West Russia then by UK3 they make it to India. More specifically I’m saying UK overcomes its local production limits of 3 units on India by building on London and shifting those to India.

If you claim UK1 3 fighter build on India has a use, I could go with that. But you’ll need something better than a vague “hornet’s nest”, got to have some very specific usage that makes the unit count loss at India worth it (compared to UK1 2 fighter 2 infantry 1 artillery or some other combination of 3 UK ground on India).

2. My assertion is UK does NOT have a hornet’s nest to warn off the Japan fleet. J1-J2 consolidate control of the Asian coast, then J3 Japan starts dropping to Yunnan. This is what happens even if the Allies push KJF (Kill Japan First). UK fighters on India simply don’t have the range to hit any important Japanese fleet elements at any sort of favorable odds for those first few turns, and probably UK will never be able to use its air effectively against Japan, barring possibly threat on Burma, but there again, compare UK1 3 fighters on India to UK1 3 ground on India and 2 fighters on London. The application for UK fighters at India is very specific. It’s not all bad, but I don’t know that I’d say it’s worth the opportunity cost.

Remember, 1942 Online (unlike in 1942 Second Edition) you can’t land UK fighters on US carriers. If you COULD then mass UK air is a whole other story (and how), but you CAN’T. Supposedly it’s been about a year and a half and no official announcements as to their intending to put it in, so I figure it’s probably not in. Anyways.

“After R1, it’s 3 infantry every round to India until Japan has fully committed in Central Asia, then maybe build some armor”.

Disagree. If you said infantry or artillery and maybe a tank somewhere, then I’d be like yeah. But pure infantry cuts your options.

Theoretically you build infantry because you don’t want to spend on artillery which you’ll lose to a counter. Theoretically you have a glut of UK air. But in practical terms that isn’t the case. If you must use your air to get favorable odds to hit a target, then you must use that air for that attack, which means you can’t use your air for other actions. Your opponent knows your options are limited, so then they can hit you with multiple threat options and force you to choose. Whatever you don’t hit they then have the advantage at, and why? Because you went pure infantry and limited your options. And remember, you specified UK is fighter-heavy, not bombers. UK fighters aren’t bad at all, but what do UK fighters on India really have range to do? Sitting on India all they can do is defend. Yes, UK1 mass India air does threaten off J1 battleship/carrier/2 fighters south of Persia, but on the flip side those UK fighters aren’t on West Russia defending there either so Germany has better options. From India, UK fighters can fly to West Russia but there’s not really room for any other action; UK fighters can also help stave off German incursion into Africa etc. etc. but again and again the issue is UK fighters don’t really have a load of flexibility for a long time. And when you do have openings, I assert that often you’ll want cheap UK artillery so you have better options.

Maybe in the back of your mind you’re thinking those UK fighters threaten the Borneo sea zone. But if Japan recaptures Borneo, which it has excellent chances at (unless UK lucksacks on the capture and again on the defense) - but at the outset of the UK action, UK can’t know it will lucksack. So the expected outcome is Japan recaptures Borneo then UK fighters on India don’t have range to hit the sea zone.

But moving on, suppose Japan tries to capture and hold Burma. There’s going to be a turn where it’s awkward for Japan; all UK units on India can hit Burma then retreat, potentially killing a load of Japanese units for a few UK units, and Japan won’t be able to land fighters if it just captured Burma. But in that scenario, if you want to inflict a chunk of casualties, cheap artillery is going to boost UK’s options. But you can just use a UK fighter to make up for the lack of UK artillery? Not really; that’s why I made the point that UK fighters aren’t terribly flexible. If you want to use a UK fighter to help defend West Russia, you can’t have that UK fighter hit Burma, it won’t make it. So if you want to make up the difference, you will want something else. Make sense? And 1 IPC for changing an infantry for an artillery buys two attack pips; 10 IPCs for three attack pips on a fighter you can see isn’t as efficient. (The mathematics works out a bit differently to what I’m implying but in effect 1 IPC for 2 pips or 10 IPCs for 3 pips, it’s just a lot.)

As to late tanks, I sort of disagree. UK can get some very interesting and nice things off early tanks between Africa and even later in Europe, just opens up a lot of options. But is that really worth trading off sheer early unit count? Maybe not. So maybe you don’t build early tanks. But late tanks? Assuming the Axis are competent, probably late UK tanks are way too late to do anything useful. So if you do want gains off tanks, early can make a big difference. Late tanks, it’s sort of too late and UK’s economy gets tied up with units at London anyways.

The rationale on UK tanks early/late? Okay, obviously if you have a UK tank at India then you can blitz towards Africa, and maybe depending you can capture Morocco, Algeria, Libya, or at least deny German income in the south and at Egypt. Or if you have a UK tank at Europe, maybe you can use it (there’s a lot of complicated shenanigans UK can pull) against probably Germany, sure. But it must be early. If UK delays too much at northwest Africa, then Germany is sitting on uncontested income, probably US wants to step in, then US gets the income and UK never does. So it’s early or never there. Or if Germany somehow managed to sneak a tank into undefended south Africa and for whatever reason UK’s South Africa infantry and air can’t do anything and US didn’t do anything, then again, IF all that happens, then if UK builds a tank late it’s going to be too late; Japan can drop to Africa to secure German income even if that means bypassing India, then Germany is just impossible to dislodge. If you have a lone tank racing west, maybe it doesn’t get cut off by Germany from Caucasus because Germany didn’t capture Caucasus yet, maybe Japan doesn’t blow it up because Japan’s still developing at Yunnan and the Asian coast - but late? Late, Japan will be in the area or even if Japan’s dealing with KJF, Germany will have secured the early income. Late is too late.

" transport goes to Borneo with 2 infantry. It’s a suicide mission for all concerned, but it succeeds about 75% of the time"

4. Less than 68%.

http://calc.axisandallies.org/?mustland=0&abortratio=0&saveunits=0&strafeunits=0&aInf=2&aArt=&aArm=&aFig=&aBom=&aTra=&aSub=&aDes=&aCru=0&aCar=&aBat=&adBat=&dInf=1&dArt=&dArm=&dFig=&dBom=&dTra=&dSub=&dDes=&dCru=&dCar=&dBat=&ddBat=&ool_att=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Sub-SSub-Des-Fig-JFig-Cru-Bom-HBom-Car-dBat-Tra&ool_def=Bat-Inf-Art-AArt-Arm-Bom-HBom-Sub-SSub-Des-Car-Cru-Fig-JFig-dBat-Tra&battle=Run&rounds=&reps=10000&luck=pure&ruleset=AA1942&territory=&round=1&pbem=

Also there’s other considerations. You drain two infantry out of India which seems to be compensated for because Japan has to use its Japan transport to recapture Borneo. If you get super lucksack with UK1’s attack maybe you have two defenders on Borneo and it can get awkward for Japan, but there’s no guarantee at all that you can use those planned 5 UK fighters on India to hit Japan at Borneo, and regardless J2 recaptures.

Maybe you’re thinking that the load of UK power has got to mean something, but it doesn’t work out that way against decent Axis. Think about the pie-in-the-sky projection, you capture Borneo, mass UK fighters on India, Japan doesn’t hit the US fleet at Hawaiian Islands, US captures Solomons. Even off a stock J1 opening that ends its turn with 4 transports, Japan has a counter of 8 ground 4 air and bombards easily against Borneo against perhaps 8 defenders, UK and US trade their whole air for cheap Japanese ground. But that doesn’t happen, and UK doesn’t buy an IC on Borneo as it can’t defend it? All right, Japan recaptures Borneo with little trouble, defending with two battleships, two carriers, four fighters, destroyer, and cruiser; US can ramp up pretty fast but hitting Borneo sea zone on US2 is still too fast, so that doesn’t happen, right? And if US doesn’t press a hard response to Borneo, then Japan can commit less fleet, J2 can still start building 2 subs a turn against KJF, etc.

What I’m getting at is, Allies can have a load of power in the area but it’s very hard to leverage against competent Axis. Especially with 1942 Online’s rules changes. Remember also, if US1 builds Pacific fleet, Germany probably has a load of freedom at Europe and Africa, and that’s going to be trouble.

Anyways you start looking at the pros and the cons and it comes down to UK has less at India, UK’s India stack makes less impact when it pushes into Europe as it retreats from Japan, the loss of UK flexibility contrasted to ease of Japan’s response - my opinion is Borneo shouldn’t be the “stock” UK move. Even if UK1 capturing Borneo without using a cruiser bombard was 75%, even 80%, I would question it.

Don’t get me wrong. I like playing greedy, even when it’s mathematically wrong. So would I hit Borneo? Sure, yeah, I’ve been known to do it. Yay UK income. But that’s not the same as recommending it.

But if someone says to park the UK transport east of Africa I’m not going to say that’s wrong either. There’s reasons for that too.

“Whatever you do, though, don’t camp your India/Egypt fighter on the Indian Carrier,”

Considering you said to send UK’s Indian Ocean carrier and cruiser against Japan’s destroyer and transport off Kwangtung, sure.

But players - especially UK players - need to THINK, not just accept, but to think, run the numbers, etc.

Such as? Say Germany parked its battleship and transport south of Italy and built a Mediterranean carrier. Depending on other Germany moves, maybe UK doesn’t have any good options to hit the German Mediterranean fleet. So then what does UK do? Probably UK still wants to destroy Japan’s Kwantgung destroyer / transport, but now UK can use air to do it, as UK doesn’t have any other good targets for its air near India anyways.

So then what happens with UK’s India carrier and transport? If Germany didn’t hit Egypt or Trans-Jordan then you can potentially have east of Africa UK destroyer, carrier, and fighter. Japan can only hit that with two fighters. But does Japan do that? Probably not. So there’s a decent chance that UK can preserve some fleet to head around South Africa to join up in Atlantic.

Which doesn’t seem like such a big deal maybe but as I’ve written elsewhere, I think Japan should push big air to Europe against KGF, then believe me the Allies are scrambling through the couch for pocket change. A destroyer and a carrier even late is pretty nice.

“The Aussie fleet has a choice in round 1- grab an aussie and a kiwi infantry and head for Africa, or try and sink the Japanese sub”

Or hit New Guinea. Usually I would say UK Aus fleet heading towards Atlantic and eventually Europe (not Africa) is the way to go. Specifically, if UK can capture Morocco UK3 and push east, that’s ideal; UK wants all the income it can get. But normally I expect UK to make a play for Morocco on UK2 anyways. As to dropping to southwest Africa, I think US is better for that. Yes, UK air in the India region means UK ground in India has better options, but UK fleet in Atlantic is so much better I don’t know that I would want to delay. But anyways though UK Aus to Africa is something to keep in mind, I think UK Aus often ends up northeast Atlantic.

“Meanwhile, in England, other than the 3 infantry going to India, it’s Destroyers and a Carrier in round 2 if it’s safe enough, otherwise a bomber and a few infantry/arty for the eventual attack on Europe”

That sounds pretty optimistic to me.

A lot of players say “yeah you can just buy whatever!” but if you’re really looking to squeeze the last bit of efficiency out of every IPC, think on this.

UK is starving for income, always. London can place 8 units, India 3, combined 11 units, pure infantry buy requires 33 IPCs. Yes, UK transports in Atlantic can drop to any number of territories but still, infantry aren’t terribly flexible. You want some artillery in there to free up your air to hit other targets of opportunity, you want air, you want transports, you want naval escorts. 33 IPC will not be enough, and if you’re looking at UK income after India falls, you’re still looking at 24 IPC just for infantry. If UK wants any sort of tactical flexibility at all, it needs more than just infantry, so UK is absolutely starving for income, always.

You do UK1 3 fighter buy, then follow up with excess navy and bomber buys, and UK’s going to be low on unit count. You really have to think about the tradeoffs. If you go a bomber (just one) I’d say probably you could make something of that between Asia, Africa, and Europe, but you throw in a bunch of fighters and destroyers too? UK fighters and destroyers don’t have much tactical flexibility, throw in low unit count and I expect it to be an issue. Well, against decent players.

“By round 5, the Germans should be knocking on Moscow’s door and the Japanese will probably be poised for an all out assault on India (which England won’t win in all likelihood)”

That doesn’t happen with competent Axis players.

See what you think.

G1 infantry/artillery buy, G2 infantry on Berlin, then depending either G3 infantry to start building stack defense against Allies (Germany doesn’t want to endlessly trade) or G3 tanks to push the timing on USSR. The G2 Berlin infantry/artillery build push into Ukraine on G4, if Japan is running late it grabs India right around then (it isn’t “poised” to start threatening India on J5, that’s just way late), and Japanese fighters reinforce German stack pressing in towards USSR and/or Karelia.

From G4 capture and hold of Ukraine, both West Russia and Caucasus are threatened; probably the Allies can’t defend both so fall back from West Russia, Germany moves into West Russia in force on G5, then USSR has to defend Russia or Caucasus so defends Russia, then Germany presses into Caucasus on G6, and only on G7 does Germany seriously threaten Russia. And in that there’s some threats and timings I didn’t detail, like Germany moving its Western Europe stack into Berlin to defend it while moving its Berlin stack into Baltic States, freeing Germany to build bombers to hit Russia with, German tanks on Karelia threatening to hit Russia immediately provided certain things, any UK/US pressure into Karelia possibly being crushed by Germany’s stack on West Russia.

OK? Everything makes sense so far?

So the question is if the Axis player is competent, then why is Japan screwing around with India? First, why is Japan so late with its pressure against India? Second, if Germany is developing pressure against Russia, that should be obvious to Japan, so Japan should be trying to bleed off USSR units and income in the east. If UK has a stack at India that gets cut off after Germany grabs Caucasus, too bad for UK, it can’t unite with Russia. Then after Russia falls, Russia has 8 local production and Caucasus 4, plus Japan’s 8, 20 units against about 3 units a turn on India, India falls for sure.

What I’m saying is the Axis know all this, so if Germany is SERIOUSLY threatening Russia, then Japan is NOT seriously threatening India, because that’s like Japan being off picking flowers and watching the pretty birds while the war is lost or won in Europe. And Japan should not do that.

If it’s a G5 threat against Moscow, probably that came off a G1 West Russia break, which was all calculated before Germany’s first turn purchase phase. So Germany is racing to choke Russia out, and if Japan is on its back foot screwing around with India - you see?

So I’m saying with competent Axis, either you probably see G7 pressure against Russia at earliest and Japan capturing India J5 (if not earlier), but J5 is kinda late. But if you have G5 pressure against Russia, Japan is trying to choke out Russia ASAP instead of sitting uselessly near India. And real talk, if G5 pressure against Russia was all calculated and projected, then probably UK lost India anyways early because UK had to abandon it early to send reinforcemetns ASAP to Russia. That’s why I’m saying that scenario where G5 is going to hit Russia but ends up failing while Japan is screwing around against India, none of that remotely should be happening.

==

Don’t get me wrong, if the Axis aren’t competent then it all plays out as was described; UK air is a hornet’s nest against Japanese navy because Japan plays completely incompetently, Germany overcommits to early tanks and air and runs out of steam against Russia, Japan makes a late and bad attack against India. Sure.

Or even if the Axis are competent, considering different player decisions and dice outcomes, some of that could happen. Kind of.

But if making the case for usage, you can see where I’m saying it’s appropriate additional details be provided. Instead of simple and dogmatic “always do this”, it ends up being more “under specific conditions XYZ and ABC, THEN you do this”

But even if you attach conditions to the actions, UK1 3 fighters on India followed by UK pure infantry on India is, I think, going to be tough. Like yeah you can get away with it against the meta, maybe, but I don’t know that I would say it’s “solid”.

Board gaming and miniature wargaming aren’t really two distinct categories. You could have a board game with loads of expansions, added rules, and supplementary miniatures. Or you could have a miniature game with collectible factory-painted miniatures with one simple ruleset.

Cost and equipment vary per game, as does ease of finding players. It’s not like if it’s generally popular nationwide you’ll be able to find a game. It tends to work in clusters - in one area one particular game will be all over the place and in the surrounding towns too, but you drive a few hours in any direction and that particular game’s nowhere to be seen.

I don’t know that I would say there’s really differences. You get together, you do the thing, players tend not to be really strategic or tactical, it’s a casual thing. Maybe ordering takeout or watching a sports game on TV or talking or whatever.

I’m interested in the full records. Particularly the W Rus strafe reasoning and aftermath. Was it a retreat into Karelia? If yes, no need for further explanation on that count, though I’m still curious about the exact distributions, attack roll results, and defender decisions, esp. as 42.3 is Larry Harris setup right? and Germany took the bomber as an early casualty at Ukraine it seems?

@DoManMacgee said in Game 203 Report: What happens when you do everything right?:

I’d hardly call Russia buying INF all game and turtling in Moscow “correct play” in 1942.3, but to each his own. I have no tournament experience in this version but I imagine a marginally more aggressive Russia build (at least 1 Tank bought every few rounds) would yield better results.

Well I mean three Russian fighters seems like a super luxury to me, but as far as 8 infantry goes at least on the first turn, I’m not sure I’d really say that’s passive. The way I figure it, Russia needs casualty count and infantry are what you put out. Germany has this big logistics problem getting stuff to the front. So you build more infantry, you trade with fighters and artillery, you keep building infantry, you do strafes and stuff, more infantry keeps your unit count healthy while Germany feeds into it.

But infantry ALL game, I don’t know. Like, I think I would stick some artillery in there if I had infantry stacks, maybe not R1 or R2 or even R3 but . . . all game, all infantry? I mean, I could see it in some games but I’d want to see a game record to see how that all played out.

Isn’t that an exaggeration after all? I mean if you had three Russian fighters, didn’t you have to buy one? Or does patch 42.3 change that up or something? I don’t know.

“The UK traded a stack of tanks to fend off the german ones coming out of africa” - really, German had a stack of tanks in Africa? Is that normal? I don’t think I would expect it.

@DoManMacgee said in Game 203 Report: What happens when you do everything right?:

I’m interested in seeing one of your replay files if Germany is killing your USSR by only building Tanks and Strat Bombers in 42.3. Doesn’t seem like very cost-efficient trading to me.

Well German tanks repositioning can be really nasty. But still.

Also I’m thinking about the effects of tournament rules, what with timers and things. So if the Axis just contain 7 VCs then they win? How do games usually go on time? To the end with 9 Axis or 10 Allied VCs?

Because the tournament thing is pretty big imo. It’s like okay if Moscow is threatened normally maybe you pull out of India but if it’s a battle for 7 VCs before time’s called that’s less an option.

(edit - After having played more and read some old posts by Hobbes, I agree 8 inf is not the way to go in the now-implemented LHTR setup. If you have a good successful Ukraine strafe and retreat to Caucasus and everything goes right, then 8 inf can work. But if Ukraine doesn’t go well or if Russia captures Ukraine, then Russia loses a chunk of its attack power on R1 or G1 respectively. Then Russia can’t really punish German incursion especially with Japanese fighter reinforcement.)

@Panther: That’s very interesting. I’d been using the FAQ dated September 3, 2014 at

http://www.wizards.com/AvalonHill/rules/AA1942_2ndEdition_FAQ.pdf

but apparently there’s a more recent version dated November 24, 2014 at

https://media.wizards.com/2015/downloads/ah/AA_1942_2nd_Edition_FAQ.pdf

You are, of course, quite correct. The software should prevent overbuying, and players should have to mobilize all units purchased.

My statement, based on the old FAQ, was incorrect.

@JuliusBorisovBeamdog Players are not supposed to be able to voluntarily not place units then get a refund for any non-placed units.

Some time ago, I wrote a thread addressing a situation where another player was upselling their G1 6 tank line, arguing G1 Ukr was this great cool thing. Which, let’s face it, on some level I agree that 1942 Online meta Axis players are way too timid and uncoordinated. I think advocacy of aggression is good for the meta.

But I stated that playing G1 Ukr hold blind, ignoring dice outcomes and R1 action, was questionable, and further that I thought the proponent of the line had ignored R2 Ukr strafe (attack with intent to retreat).

One thing I remember from Discord is, after I said G1 6 tank buy does not necessarily require G1 Ukr hold, that I was ridiculed.

So I thought, you know, though I’ve spoken to various timings before, I’ve never really chained together what I’ve written into addressing the G3 W Rus line.

So here we go, it’s popcorn time!

THE BACKGROUND

Some months later, I was having a civil discussion with some other players on Discord about US1 bomber use; there were a few different participants, some points were made that I disagreed with, but nevertheless.

I wrote that I thought US1 bombers were not “correct” in any circumstance I would expect, that US1 transports reach Finland/France on US3, those transports threatening Karelia/Berlin/France on US4, and that US2 bombers (at the earliest) made for a pseudotiming - which is not to say, a specific line of play, but a confluence of factors that can be combined with other conditions to possibly arrive at something useful.

This was civilly questioned by another Discord poster. I thought they were civil and brought up coherent points, so I proposed a game - not as any sort of competitive match, or to prove or disprove any points with finality, but to possibly serve as illustrative context which, over repeated games, might form the basis for further analysis and discussion. Which maybe I didn’t say so much at the time, but at any rate we agreed to play.

I decided to take the G3 W Rus line, as I hadn’t used it in a while, and I thought fast pressure would highlight what I saw as questionable in the US1 bomber x 1 purchase line. My purpose, not to say that a US1 bomber is useless (it is not), but to more sharply define the terms; to show that a claim an entirely other player made that the US1 bombers should not be expected to bomb might not apply in practice - you get the idea.

THE POINT INTENDED TO BE ILLUSTRATED

US1 purchased bomber threatens France, Berlin, Karelia on US3. If the US1 East US fleet is left alone, it can drop to those territories on US3. But in practice, I think the Axis can counterpressure, discouraging the Allies from advancing their fleet.

HOW THIS WAS INTENDED TO BE DONE

Again, the framework was G3 W Rus line, specifically off G1 tank purchase, G2 air purchase, combining to pressure W Rus on G3.

Shifting G’s main stack to W Rus leaves Karelia vulnerable. However, G’s air force combined with J’s airforce moved to Ukraine on J2, counterpressure any fast Allied landings on Karelia. It is not desired that G bleed its stack, as G is the major Axis stack controller that is best suited to hitting a combined Allied defensive stack on Moscow. However, with both G and J in position, with the Allies still building their Atlantic fleet up, with G having some G2 air purchase to effectively take fewer casualties against possible attack against Atlantic fleet, the position is considered to work out all right.

THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

What’s big, gray, weighs forty thousand pounds, and sits in the middle of a room where nobody’s talking about it? That’s right, a Panzer IV tank, or maybe three African bush elephants, take your pick.

Let’s talk about the Panzer first.

WHEN GERMANY ATTACKS

The fastest way for G to advance against USSR is typically the Ukr / W Rus / Cauc line. If the Allies cannot get a good attack against an Axis Ukraine stack, then the Allies are pressured at both West Russia and Caucasus. Whichever the Allies don’t defend, the Axis can hit and very possibly hold; then the Allies retreat to Moscow.

Exactly when and how this plays out is more complicated than I lay out here, with various strategic variations.

But what it comes to is, whatever pressure the Allies exert against Japan is pressure not exerted against Germany.

If a player thinks that UK1 to sz37 defines the game, then the simple fact is they haven’t played against competent Axis that press appropriately, nor have they likely played against Axis that even counterpressure appropriately.

Yes, lucksacking UK1 to sz37 off a blind buy can be very tough and fast, and set the tone for an Allied win on strength of the position. But that’s where we get back to the elephants.

OPPORTUNITY COST

Characteristic of meta discussion “explanations” is explanations that are, well, bad!

A fighter can be used to attack sea or land, therefore it is good.

Yes, thank you, we are familiar with the basic properties of units, the real question is why is a fighter purchased and not, say, two infantry and an artillery?

I understand a desire to simplify discussion, but current meta discussion goes so far in that direction that it’s typically not discussion at all.

I think it’s something like, UK1 to sz37 wins a bit more than 60% of the time, about half of that expecting to lose 1-2 fighters. Where defender “wins”, I think they get wiped like 69% or something, but an additional 10% to retain only a fighter or battleship. Something like that.

At any rate, aggregate that’s risky, it should be seen.

Consider alternatives like UK1 to sz61 (J destroyer/transport) with 3 sub buy at India. (I’m not saying to do this, just giving an example). If the J destroyer is destroyed (94.8% at least, with fighter/cruiser is it?), then J has no counter to the US1 build. As to UK development, parking the UK carrier south of Persia, if G air is not in range, leaves J with risking fighters, committing J btl and/or carrier to where UK has a big counter, and if J doesn’t hit then the UK carrier gives UK fighters on India range to hit sz61 (Yunnan sea zone) along with the subs.

The real question is not whether UK1 sz37 has any good points or is worth the risk, because “good” and “risk” are relative terms that really require comparison. Instead, it’s a question of what the risks really are, how the development plays out, compared to other lines.

Personally I think UK1 to sz37 in 1942 Online, currently with no bid, currently without ability to use allied carriers or transports, is needlessly risky compared to other lines. I think it’s a potentially useful line to play against players that aren’t familiar with fighting it, I think when it gets lucky it can be quite strong, but on balance I think it not worth pursuing against competent opponents, considering what I consider to be lines with less risk.

I think even UK1 3 subs at India is not great; currently I’m trying to figure out a way to defend Moscow as long as possible while not giving up too much in Pacific pseudotimings. No surprise there I’m sure, nor will be my comment that I don’t want the Moscow stack to be cut off from reinforcing India.

At any rate, I think this thread sums up some thoughts I have on UK1 to sz37, cheers.

REAL MEN, WOMEN, AND FUZZY CREATURES FROM ALPHA CENTAURI

(and people of other genders who are also real, particularly those that have read Douglas Adams)

Not much point in spending time on straw men, so what’s really going on?

COUNTERPRESSURE - LOSING A BATTLESHIP IS OK

Games between competent opponents are not a matter of force this, force that, or whatever silly things some like to write to pretend they are in total unrealistic command over a situation.

Your opponent has choices. Choices that have consequences.

I’ve written elsewhere some general notes about KJF defense, probably to the effect that J can build subs, then later fighters when the Allies apply too much pressure to the sea zones around Japan so Japan doesn’t want to build new navy, that J should try to capture India.

Roughly, subs are cheap attackers, an opponent must move their navy into range before they themselves can attack, and when they do, Japan can use those subs to fuel a vicious counter, before the opponent can get an attack off. Though Japan “defends”, it does so by attacking, that is, counterpressure.

Think about how this applies to the aftermath of UK1 to sz37. Japan loses a battleship and a carrier. The carrier frankly was not great on attack. The battleship was useful and could soak a hit, but actually couldn’t be used in many counterpressure situations, as hitting an opponent fleet would likely leave that battleship vulnerable to being destroyed by an opponent counter.

Only if an opponent moved a fleet into range where it could be completely destroyed, and the opponent had no counter, would a battleship really be useful. Make sense?

But competent opponents are not likely to do that.

So you can see where J has another destroyer, which can usefully hunt subs, which is yet considered expendable, and is cheap insofar as naval battles go, considering it can defend against air while subs can’t - at any rate, you can see how it can be more useful to counterpressure than a battleship. It doesn’t seem to make sense, but when it’s understood the destroyer may be considered fully expendable where the battleship is not, there it is.

If the battleship were fully expendable, then of course it’s more useful than a destroyer - but nobody likes to throw away battleships, they’re pretty useful and too costly to replace. So there it is.

COUNTERPRESSURE - LOSING FIGHTERS IS OKAY - BECAUSE -

If Japan defends with counterpressure and the battleship wasn’t such a big loss, then what about the loss of fighters? Fighters are obviously great at counterpressure.

Except not so much. That seems ridiculous; fighters seem to be the essence of counterpressure; they hit, they retreat, they are not vulnerable to attack (mostly).

But counterpressure is a matter of application as well as abstraction.

Suppose UK1 does not hit sz37 and Japan has six fighters two carriers to apply counterpressure. Besides cleaning up UK assets in Indian and Pacific Oceans, exactly where does J want to have counterpressure?

J wants to threaten the India sea zone to prevent any UK naval buys from getting going. J wants to threaten the east Australia sea zone if not hitting Hawaiian Islands fleet to prevent US from moving a fleet there with two fighters and a third fighter to West Canada, then on US2 moving those fighters to India. (Though this US action is too late against an Axis pressure line threatening G3 West Russia. A bit more on that later, and I expect I’ll do a writeup on the G3 W Rus line itself in another thread). J also wants to threaten the Iwo Jima sea zone and the zone north of it; if the US unites fleet there, it can threaten both J’s sea zones which pressures against J building any new naval units unless bringing its entire fleet back to defend the sea zone, which in turn restricts J’s freedom to move ground units where it wants (typically Yunnan).

J can counterpressure with navy at the Philippines sea zone, but fighters are a problem. Placing J1 fighters at Kwangtung allows J2 to support a G2 Ukraine push and hold attempt, but most of those fighters do not have range to some of those critical zones. Four fighters only can typically be used for counterpressure; those fighters that can land on carriers.

If UK1 hits sz37, I’ve argued elsewhere that J1 buys a carrier - not because I like it. I very much do not like it; I typically argue against tactically inflexible units, and I’ve commented that after a J1 buy, the Allies can go KGF, leaving any dedicated naval investment useless.

But a J1 carrier is immensely useful. It is a powerful defender, joined by sub, two destroyers, and cruiser along with two already existing fighters for defense against air threats. It also extends effective fighter range for counterpressure.

If carriers and fighters are great, why not buy more? The answer is, after UK1 to sz37, Japan already has fighters to fill a second carrier. Japan does not have any more fighters to fill a third and would have to buy them - quite expensive, and very possibly not the best use of resources.

As to if the Allies do not hit sz37, two carriers is adequate to a range of early air threats and additional counterpressure and control should mostly come through subs, destroyers, or tactically flexible fighters that don’t tie defense down.

In practice, a J1 carrier may not help to counterpressure the aforementioned sea zones, for J2 at least. In theory, fighters landed on the new carrier could reach the various sea zones, but there’s often reason to put fighters elsewhere (like Kwangtung).

At any rate, remember anti-KJF is not strictly about stacking defense, but about counterpressure, and loss of 2 J fighters is not necessarily critical.

2025 Apr 28

So there I was on Discord, reading a post from a player. Long story short, get the popcorn, it’s time to look at UK1 to sz37 (Japanese battleship, carrier, two fighters off East Indies).

I say it’s not good. It only needs one good counterexample to change my mind, but I haven’t seen that counterexample yet.

Addressing some topics players bring up:

STRAW MEN SECTION

GenCon

Yes, KJF UK1 to sz37 is popular at GenCon - where there’s a preplaced bid typically used to add a UK sub to the battle reducing the risk by I think it’s something like 20%. Further, I believe as GenCon games are adjudicated by victory city count before ending normally, that Allied KGF results in the Axis winning by victory city. Only with KJF do the Allies stand a chance to contest VCs - or so I believe.

At any rate, UK1 to sz37 may be standard with good reason at GenCon, but I say not for 1942 Online.

UK1 India/Aus Fleet Are Useless

UK1 India/Aus fleet take forever to be relevant, and J can lose critical things.

My reply is, no, the J assets are not critical. Useful, yes. But no more.

If it’s KGF, J can afford the loss of battleship and carrier. UK1 to sz37 means not landing a UK fighter on Szechwan, meaning J can attack there to destroy the US fighter. The Allies have something in the region of 60% to win at sz37, half of which involve losing one or both fighters.

So where India and W Rus defense are concerned, the Allies open up the possibility of losing three fighters at 4 on defense. Meanwhile, Japan loses two fighters at 3 on offense, and Japan’s Kwangtung destroyer and transport mean earlier drops to Asia’s mainland.

That’s not to say J comes out far ahead on the exchange in terms of pressure against India; personally I think after UK1 to sz37 that J1 should purchase a replacement carrier if it’s lost, and that slows J’s development. But you can see where it’s less “this is fantastic” and more “oh, well, maybe this isn’t bad.”

Particularly, if G is applying fast pressure, it works out to UK1 making an unforced error. Ideally the Allies want to build a combined stack to defend against G’s pressure. That the UK “bleed” out to J means there’s less for G to deal with.

US Builds Less Fleet

No. More on that later.

Straw Men Cast Aside

Well, the above are just some of the popular things that players claim about UK1 to sz37. Personally, I view UK1 to sz37 as a meta switch, that is, playing a line and hoping an opponent doesn’t react well to it - though in fairness that might be overstating things. More on that later.

But in sum, it comes down to some players believe - with reason - that there’s various reasons to use UK1 to sz37. But the problems with the line come up in critical examination - specifically, when the specifics are closely examined, the timing and development carefully considered, when opportunity cost and specific comparisons made.

@ManuC23
Maybe hop on the Discord (not officially supported but eh)

https://discord.gg/UYUpgeQW

ask around, find players you like to play with.

INDIA REVISITED

So what if Axis adjust their plan? What if Axis push India?

Remember, even though this is a mostly abstract discussion where we don’t have defined lines to work with, in practice the Axis must make real commitments. It’s not that Japan’s entire airforce just got blown up then Japan flies in another six fighters - or if it does, then Japan’s ground pressure will be very late and/or weak.

If the Axis push India, they have a lot less flexibility in terms of applying pressure against R since their whole air force is blown up. UK likely still has fighters even after losing some in the UK2 attack on G2’s Caucasus. Not for sure! But probably.

So UK is 6 infantry down (edit: and a couple fighters), having bled India to counterpressure Caucasus. Isn’t that a problem?

Well, J is down 6 fighters and a bomber. I’m not saying problem solved, but you can see where some of the heat is taken off.

Which makes me wonder about why J should commit fighters in the first place, but then again, how else do you explain G2 committing to Caucasus, and do Axis really want to fight an even more understrength major stack battle?

YOUR TAKEAWAY (THE THIRD PART)

Things are not going to be smooth. Something is going to go wrong. If nothing goes wrong then congratulations you won.

The numbers are important, vital, in assessing states and together with turn order knowing how to transition between states.

But at some point, a player will have to shift to gestalt thinking, where they are looking not merely at immediate tactical applications, but counts and compositions, consciously thinking about what the major points of the opponent strategy are and how to counter them - and how to counter the counters and so forth.

This gestalt thinking is not the same as the vague references that lack detail that plague most meta discussion. Understand, you are not flailing about mouthing empty platitudes. You use calculation tools to assess state by looking at how particular battles may play out, you can use the same tools to predict how future actions may play out, you move on from using these calculation tools to look at specific battles and potential specific battles to looking for repeating patterns of counts and compositions, and apply that understanding to your prediction of how board states develop over time rather than simply using calculation tools. Which does not mean you stop using calculation tools, in fact maybe you deliberately study and memorize common battles and try to develop formulae to predict outcomes.

UNIT TYPE AND COUNT

At some point, a player’s intuition for any particular version of Axis and Allies may recognize how a position is likely to develop, based on the map (what territories connect to what, how “big” the board is), income, production (how many units can be produced where), combined with looking at what’s on the board at the moment.

I think that intuition is absent in the currently addressed proponent of the G1 Ukr hold / G1 6 + tank build, not because the line contains risks, but because the risks are not acknowledged, because important things are not addressed, much less small details that don’t make sense on first examination so should be explained especially to newer players but aren’t - perhaps because there is no real plan, only action and observation of consequences.

LET’S TAKE A MOMENT TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO BE WRONG

So I say “don’t be smug!” and of course, nobody thinks they are, not really. If they are maybe just a little bit, then it’s with good reason! They put a lot of time and work in, and people should recognize that!

When I say not to stop at empirical data, but to apply discipline and the scientific methods to build accurate predictive models that not only encompass empirical data but allow a player to develop entirely new lines of play, that’s a specific criticism where people start to perhaps take a step back and think.

But now I say - think on it really. If the scientific method is about cycles of hypothesis, testing, and observation, there is not necessarily an endpoint. As to intuition, of course it’s informed by experience, but a player won’t know what’s outside their experience, never having experienced it! So really, everything could be wrong. Everything I write. Isn’t that just massively reassuring?

To which I reply, yes, you will be wrong, I will be wrong, and none of that excuses failure to try to progress, none of that means the scientific method, flawed as it may be in practice, should not be applied. After all, what else have we got? Tanks + magic = win?

So much for theory, and warnings, and so on. Now to return to the whole G1 Ukr hold / G 6 tank + buy line.

WHAT HAS COME BEFORE (THIS BEING THE THIRD PART)

Well, it really doesn’t look good in general, what with a lot of suppositions by the opposition having been demonstrated to be flat wrong, or at least suspicious, and in Discord there’s an ongoing refusal to answer specific questions not just from myself but posters in general, so there may be some inclination by readers just to dismiss the whole thing.

But actually - not so much. No matter how disagreeable someone may be, or how bad they may appear, the legitimacy of their points should be considered separate from the person trying to argue those points.

We did see, at least, that R2 might have some reason not to hit G1 Ukr hold (mostly timidity and aversion to risk to R air to the AA gun), along with probably neglecting any G1 stack on Karelia. We saw G2 had a strong attack into WR that could not be taken lightly. Even with some Allied coordination, the Axis advance could not be taken too lightly. We saw that even a single AA changed win/loss outcomes by 14% at a key timing, how a couple more infantry lost impacted expected defense, which should give readers the idea that if the dice came out a little differently there would be a legitimately strong attack that would be difficult to deal with, and that if a player didn’t coordinate carefully the G move could indeed be overwhelming.

Of course, I set the bar of player competency pretty high, so I don’t feel a competent player should necessarily be losing it over the line, but that’s as it goes.

There are some key counterpressure timings I mentioned to disrupt the Axis timings. But there’s a lot left unsaid.

THINGS TO COME, OR NOT

I mentioned some "odd’ bits earlier, like G1 6 units to sz7. It’s not that I was concerned particularly at the time; I thought there were major basic issues that needed addressing. But properly, every action taken should be part of a plan. The tricky part is, a player that does an action may be wrong in performing that action because it’s not part of a plan; a player that does the same action may be right in performing that action because it’s part of a plan.

So how can you tell the difference? Naturally, you ask. I asked on Discord, and got some replies like “it doesn’t matter”, “you know everything anyways”, I explained people reading a board wouldn’t necessarily assess the board state the same as the active player, but all the same. No reply. And you know, that’s okay. There’s a lot going on. Imagine, top player, lots of respect from others, been working on something for two years in collaboration with another player, people listening intently, then suddenly a horrible disrespectful aardvark appears and starts asking awkward questions. (I don’t think of myself as disrespectful, but I feel sometimes others treat me that way, so I infer.) Well, we shall move on bravely in any event.

So, who really knows, vaguely defined line, repeatedly no specifics, and at some point I can’t even address the line, because I don’t know what it really is, I don’t know what it’s supposed to be about, both despite my inquiries into the matter and superficial replies - and I’m not interested in building out a supposed line as I can’t be bothered. Yet, I suppose I’m doing enough writing on the matter and providing enough specifics that perhaps - quite horribly to me - my name shall forever be linked with the line of play, if I go much further. Ugh, fame.

I won’t try to address everything, no. Just not convenient. But a few things, perhaps.

WHEN THINGS GO WRONG

I wrote essentially R can postpone a major stack battle until R3, though I don’t say it’s right to do so. If players find that doesn’t work out, again, I’ll say look at R2 vs Ukr. Think about it. The numbers indicate that’s one of the weakest points in the Axis line - at least, as far as I make it out to be.

If things are going terribly, then probably - not for sure, but probably - there was a point earlier in the game where a wrong decision was made.

It’s said chess goes to the player that made the second to last mistake. So too with Axis and Allies, perhaps.

But also, sometimes you legitimately won’t have done anything wrong. Or sometimes you’re consistently losing but you can’t figure out why. For those times, analysis, and trying to get insight from other players, may help.

So moving forward - why only address the losing scenarios? Because if you’re not losing you’re winning and you can figure it out from there, I’d say. Even if you were losing you would have to figure it out from there, come to think on it.

G1 UKR HOLD WITH G1 6 TANK + BUY - THE FUTURE

Okay so let’s say the Allies did a bunch of fun things but the Axis managed to push on.

The problem is, this is where the proponent of the line totally craps out. They have literally nothing on key end game states, transitions between current and later states, or generally anything except “Tanks + magic = win!” which seems rather derisive, but is, in application, really pretty much the case when it comes to actionable information. They won’t put anything in an analytic framework so have no basis for comparison to recognize where something might be overkill, or where something else might be underkill, and so have no idea of how to reallocate resources to deal with burgeoning threats.

That doesn’t mean they play badly. It does mean they’re terrible at explaining, when it comes to identifying reasoning, when it comes to giving actionable information, and so on. Which is not to be uncharitable, it’s just to recognize the fact so progress can be made.

My intuition tells me one way or another, things aren’t over. (Unless they’re over.) But let’s assume the Allies didn’t quite get the dice they wanted.

FOUR PROBLEM SCENARIOS

Before getting into it - I’ve been here before. I don’t need to hear anyone boasting “that’s what I meant in the first place”. Typically someone has vague low-effort authoritarian appeals in place of anything approaching a reasoned argument, they wrote nothing of the kind, it’s I that am writing out the details. That’s just the reality. When someone doesn’t even allude to anything until after someone else says it, they’re not the originator, they’re the copier. Weak arguments are weak, don’t try to dress it up any other way because I will call people on it.

As I said, I let that sort of thing go for years and only saw things get worse. What I do now is what I think of as minimally corrective action. No, things aren’t going to get better on their own, they haven’t done to this point and I see no reason to think that will change. What I do see is some people that don’t want to be bothered making up excuses so they don’t have to think about much less deal with any issues. Of course, squashing the person making noise about what’s happening seems like a solution, but that just ends up with them being inundated and accepting bad reasoning, bad arguments, and things in general devolving.

Which will probably make a lot more sense to people in about four years if it doesn’t already, and even more sense ten or twenty years after that. Eh.

I’m not saying I’m original. I always say I’m copying, more or less, methodology used in Revised days, and some applications found in various other disciplines. If I have some original points, well whatever, I’m not here to build a cult of personality. If anything, I find fame a bother.

Anyways back to Axis and Allies; there’s more than four problem scenarios, but whatever. Figure it out, heh.

1. If G2 captures the Caucasus and J2 reinforces then they get wiped, but R gets badly depleted.
2. If G2 captures the Caucasus and J2 does not reinforce then G gets wiped and R depleted.
3. If G2 does not capture the Caucasus, instead continuing to build pressure at Ukr
4. The Allies fail some significant action

There’s some variations, like G tries to smash the combined Allied stack on WR, but the lines transpose. It’s not simply about who controls what and where, precisely. It’s more that map characteristics and logistics push players naturally into certain repetitive lines, so a position develops of those mechanics. That was supposed to be what was illustrated in my game as Allies against TTG, but sadly the audio commentary didn’t reflect that at all, but eh.

So what’s actually going on in actionable terms is, the UK1 player should be looking at the board and thinking at least about those three possibilities, and what action they should take. Depending on what the Axis do, any or none of the above may happen.

Why are there four categories listed above? Why may there be more? (There are). Why did I make that comment about transposition?

It’s to get players thinking about lines, not in terms of rote moves to follow, which is dangerous, but transitional states characterized by force compositions - unit counts and types. It’s a bit of an oversimplification, but a useful one for now.

In the first line, G loses a large chunk of infantry and its starting tanks, and J loses its starting fighters. That will not change, and those units are not “replaceable” in the sense buying more tanks or fighters comes at opportunity cost of infantry. Probably R is quite depleted, though perhaps not.

In the second line again G loses a lot of tanks, J does not lose fighters, R is less depleted.

In the third line nobody’s depleted.

The fourth line is really just there to increase awareness that there are, in fact, practically irrecoverable game states. It’s not that a player can think their way out of every situation. In practice, actually players should try for the “best chance”, similarly to previously described, understanding what future danger points may exist, and taking moderate or possibly even extreme chances so even worse scenarios with worse probabilities may be avoided. It is important to understand this is not simply refusal to capitulate, it is a matter of training against adverse conditions, so a player gets used to operating while playing a “losing” game. It’s also a matter of playing through a game to gain firsthand experience with scenarios that might not otherwise be easily explored.

Regardless, under all lines, the characteristics of the game will take on aspects reflective of the forces available to each power.

ADVANCED LOGISTICS, AND LIMITS - WHY THERE ARE NOT, IN FACT, INFINITELY MANY STATES

When I see what I call an uninspiring game where players are on round 38 pushing massive blocks of infantry around, I wonder just how and where the community failed those players that they would play in such an uninspired joyless manner.

Germany starts with a certain number of tanks. Buying any more comes at the expense of infantry, but Germany starts with those tanks.

Each power only has a certain amount of income, and can only mobilize that income at particular locations in limited numbers. Sometimes the numbers are quite high as on Berlin, sometimes quite low as on Karelia, but there is a limit.

Players need to understand effective play considers these starting units, their usage, stack sizes, stack compositions, stack movement, production, development, as part of one big gestalt.

Let’s say for example that Japan wants to pressure India. How does it do that?

Japan can build up to four transports and use them to move units from Tokyo to Yunnan each turn, from where units can move to Burma then India, or be transported via transport directly to India.

Tokyo’s production limit of 8 means no more than 4 transports can be used, and to fill transports to capacity, 4 of those units must be infantry. That’s just how the game rules, map, and starting setup interact.

But Japan may build up to six or even eight transports to pull units off isolated islands, or Philippines o East Indies and so forth. So Japan can use more than just 4 transports against India. Again, that’s just the board and starting setup, it’s just thinking outside the limits of production on Tokyo alone.

But if Japan buys transports that’s less spent on actual units to ferry to India. That’s economics. If Japan moves transports east/southeast to pick up units from isolated islands, those transports are moving away from India, and will have to return. That’s timing, opportunity cost, and logistics.

Sometimes you see players complain or boast that there are supposedly any number of possibilities that are impossible to analyze. Clearly that is not true. Even those players don’t really believe it, none of them buys USSR1 battleships (at least not that I know of). It’s not true when it comes to development of board states either.

Japan cannot just throw whatever at India. Whether Japan builds bombers, tanks, transports, or industrial complexes, there is a cost paid, and an opportunity cost as well. Whatever action Japan takes, Japan will be better at something but worse at others, depending on what that action was.

MY INTUITION, WHAT “THEY” SAID, AND WHAT FOLLOWS

My intuition is a lot of what little was said by the proponent of the line lacked any distinguishing characteristics, probably because they don’t have a plan that they can really enunciate. I think a lot of small things aren’t talked about, even now, and that as rounds pass, this lack of detail will become more obvious and important, as important things are wholly undefined.

I don’t think the Axis should push to Caucasus on G2, or stack Ukraine on G1, but I don’t have absolute mathematical proof, even if what I did look at leans that way. The proponent of the line did not answer a specific question from another poster about the disposition of the J air force, but did support G2 Caucasus. For the sake of limiting discussion, then, I will assume that J did land its air force, for the sake of simplicity.

https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1333148559218049024

“You can write the main ideas now and more detail later. I promise not to criticize your level of detail or something else on how you describe it.”

(In response, eventually, to my statement detail was absolutely necessary yet not provided).

ASSUMPTION OF COMPETENCE

Sometimes it’s very easy to be dismissive of someone because they say or do things that one doesn’t think makes sense, or perhaps there are personal disagreements. In the history of recent Discord discussion around this topic, there was a lot of back and forth, and I’m sure assumptions were made all around.

I will say again, it’s about clarity, communication, and reproducible results. Things are not really “strategies” if players end up feeling lost, if they lack actionable information. I say again, I think key details were left vague, and assertions made that were not supported. I say again, I think there was poor communication and bad intention.

However, all that very naughty behavior does not answer the question - what validity is there in the line? What happens as the line is played out?

Yes, I disagree with the nominal proponent of the G1 Ukr hold with G1 6 tank 1 inf buy. But even if I disagree, do I in fact find zero credibility in the line, do I say its success is all due to bad meta play?

It’s easy to say “yes”. It’s easy to say “no”. But actually, the answer is I identified some specific points of counterpressure, which though in simple application seem to counter some arguments, in practical terms have not been fully analyzed. I left the story at demonstrating Allied counterpressure points do really exist against G3 Moscow, which is nice for a short fairy tale, but in real life, real characters have to deal with real problems that aren’t wrapped up nicely at the end of a forty-five minute episode.

It’s not that I assume the nominal proponent of the line is competent. But for the sake of discussion, instead of picking apart bad choices and bad communication, one must assume that there is, indeed, some competence. We must assume, for the sake of discussion, that even if the nominal proponent is really just terrible at writing about what happens, that there is, in fact, some real strategy that works, perhaps that would even work if the meta were not weak. Personally I’d say really look at that R2 Ukraine but eh. We proceed.

I say G2 should not push the Caucasus, that J2 should not reinforce with air. The nominal proponent of the line advocated G2 Caucasus and remained silent on J2 air.

I think actually the nominal proponent advocates G2 Caucasus to push their point about G3 Moscow. Like, they don’t want to back down. Especially since early talk by other posters in the thread discussed G3 Caucasus and were not addressed. Though come to think on it a lack of specific response was characteristic to the discussion at that point. So who knows. Eh.

So here we have an assertion by nominal proponent that G2 pushes to Caucasus. It should be understood, being on the losing end of a major stack battle means losing dozens of IPCs or more relative to an opponent. It’s true that positions should not be assessed merely by value of units or units destroyed. But tanks have very high value for Germany, they certainly aren’t easily replaced, the losses are real in a real sense. So how to rationalize that decision?

Well, it’s not even very hard. One only need look at the proposed UK2 attack on G2 Caucasus. It’s not an IPC-positive battle, it’s only performed as part of the overall strategic Allied counterplay. Similarly, G losing a major stack battle could be put in that light.

If there is a strategic end served, it is in weakening USSR’s central stack. It makes sense that if that is the simple goal, that J’s fighters may be served up as well. In practical terms, maybe J could do more with the fighters but we just won’t worry about that.

WHY RESTRICT SCOPE - KEEP IT SIMPLE

As it is, there’s a lot of context and theoretical methods and models to get into, then there’s also a practical matter of time. If I say “if this happens” then write a dozen pages, then “but if this happened instead” then wrote another dozen pages, then “but in this scenario neither of those happens and these three scenarios happen instead”, well, people just won’t follow. So, keeping it simple. Again, I requested information, it was not forthcoming, I don’t care to get into boundless speculation, and I don’t particularly regard this entire venture as a great use of my time, except that possibly commentary on how to build and use an analytic construct may make the meta discussion community less boring. Ah well.

INDIA

Where Moscow is central to the conversation, so is India. Japan will go after India as a gateway to Africa IPC and to help address Japan’s horrible logistics and production limits - or Japan won’t do that and will go after Moscow.

For purposes of this discussion, I will say Japan presses Moscow. It’s consistent with a very simple plan, and though it has the issue that UK retains Africa IPC and bleeds the Axis through Persia, we shall say the Axis are working on a self-imposed timer; they are determined to take Moscow in short order and regard all else as a distraction. An assumption, but one consistent with an Axis decision to commit to a bad-odds major stack defense.

ATLANTIC

Earlier I mentioned something like UK1 purchase 2 fighters London 3 inf India, which goes into UK2 fighters to WR, then possibly UK3 India defense. But also I mentioned UK1 extant London fighters to WR, meaning they could not hit G’s sz7 survivors, which I thought ought to raise a stink, but nobody made a peep. Well, it’s a problem.

If UK1 does not have a destroyer that can hit the Baltic sea zone, then G2 can build submarines unopposed. This, together with air, can deter Allied landings, especially as submarines are quite expensive, and transports, destroyers, and such, rather more expensive.

This problem is compounded if the sz7 survivors are not wiped out. The problem is simplified as the line, at least as I understand it, leaves the G Baltic transport where it may easily be picked off, but I digress.

I don’t think I read one word about G sub counterpressure on Discord. Ah well. There’s also G subs at Italy counterpressure, which needs thinking about. After all, it should make sense. If G1 is near-pure tank build then Axis is soft on unit count; one way for Allies to challenge Axis low on unit count early is to push to Africa.

At any rate, that’s the problem in broad theory. Now some practical comments.

ALLIED NAVAL DEVELOPMENT IN ATLANTIC

At end of G1, G threatens any landings at Morocco with 4 fighters and any sz7 survivors, preserving Axis income assuming US will not land there - not an entirely safe assumption as the Allies have two destroyers and a cruiser entirely unaccounted for, but especially if G has survivors of sz7, then G won’t risk its precious air. We say UK1 builds London fighters and India infantry, leaving G comfortably in control of the north Atlantic. UK and US may dump to French West Africa, or possibly move to sz10 East Canada; the former sets up for control of Africa and possibly setting up to bleed the Med, the latter sets up for a dump to sz3 Norway/Finland, G has a lot of ways to respond, including Baltic sub(s) even if no sz7 survivors, but sz10 can move to sz13 on round 2.

It’s not that an Allied move to sz10 is a “fake” and it doesn’t “force” anything either. (Meta discussion is filled with grandiose inaccurate terms). G has a choice, it can invest in subs for a low-cost counter in case Allies follow up with pressure to Norway/Finland, G can stick to air or build more air, G will have to think about where its fighters are landing considering G NW Europe fighters can’t hit Moscow or Caucasus, and the Allies threaten to land on NW Europe as well - remember, under the proponent’s line, 1 AA moved to Ukraine, 1 AA moved to Baltic States, it’s not that Axis have a load of AA to throw around on defense, and infantry are in short supply as well, remember the proponent’s line places an infantry on Italy?

Pepperidge Farms remembers.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gXUxLqqmhNs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2QVjp4KEjU"

So why wouldn’t Allies move to sz10? Control of Africa. If the Allies dump to Africa immediately, Allied forces are in place about the time Axis start nosing about.

So you see where I’m going, perhaps. I say moves should be done responding to board state. Instead of simply asserting that Axis will ignore India and push Moscow, I would say if Allies dumped to Africa then Axis push Moscow while Allies ground is bumbling about useless in Africa. If Allies went to East Canada, then the Axis push India/Africa, as the Allies will be late with any counterpressure there.

Doesn’t that just make sense?

So what do the Allies do? The answer is, the Allies move to sz10. It is not a matter of a pre-emptive counter. UK and US and the USSR sub, if surviving, all act after G1; they see the G1 move and purchase. They know the Allies may not have time to be slogging through Africa while the Axis beeline for Moscow.

G2 in turn knows the Allies do this, as those moves are completed before G2. So G can responsively purchase submarines at Baltic.

AFRICA

It’s important for income, and Italy for production. Normally I would not ignore Africa, but here we are.

ITALY

The Allies want to bleed the Axis out in the Mediterranean. There really is an issue where possibly G has no sz7 naval survivors, then Allies just dump a transport to Morocco to start the bleed. If G commits fighters to the counter that’s less pressure on R. If G reactively buys units to counter, that’s less pressure on R. It’s a real problem that should be addressed, as should the transposition where sz10 pushes to Morocco on round 2 to start the bleed.

Earlier I mentioned J’s air may or may not be present. You can see where it makes a difference. If Axis have almost no air then the Allies can simultaneously bleed Axis out in northern and southern Europe, needing relatively few escorts and taking advantage of early existing Allied units (e.g. fighters) to bolster defensive stacks. Which is not to say we assume the Axis messed up by sacrificing Japan’s entire air force. There are tradeoffs to every move, and that Axis decision is perhaps not the worst.

KARELIA

The Allies dump to Finland/Norway then push through to Karelia towards Moscow, trying to establish a logistics reinforcement line that moves cheap UK and US ground units to join a unified Allied stack on Moscow. From Karelia, the Allies can also trade G territories.

It’s not as simple as G simply stacking Karelia. G is very soft on unit count after G1 6 tank 1 inf buy. If the Allies set up a bleed against Med, G must deal with that bleed else G is denied income and the Allies just keep pushing pressure there.

WHAT REMAINS TO BE SAID?

Sometimes I hear people say “It’s common sense”. That’s just . . . lame. It’s gaslighting and a character attack and a lazy disclaimer all rolled into one.

So-called “common sense” is really just a product of training and expectation. I think some toxic people have an idea of what “common sense” is based on their experience, and so act in toxic ways that seem right and natural to them. Their training doesn’t let them see, or perhaps admit, to their part in things.

For my part, I’m not trained to deal with that sort of thing productively. For much of my life, my training was to think some people just can’t move ahead, not as a matter of judging or feeling superior, but just accepting what the facts of the moment. I was trained to think it’s not a matter of trying to get into productive relationships with such people, as they simply aren’t capable of anything really productive in the first place.

But over time, thought and discipline prevailed over such “common sense”. Yes, some people behave in ways that I consider unproductive, and especially where it comes to communications, I understand there’s nothing I personally can do, not because nothing can be done, but because I don’t have a background and training where I can communicate the issue in ways that make sense to such people. In turn, I myself have bad habits in my own ways, as do others. It’s really not about the proverbial washing of hands and wiping the dust off the feet, and more about realizing everyone has their faults, and moving forward.

Which is not to get caught up in moral relativism. Wrong is wrong, and if someone has issues acknowledging issues and is a poor communicator, it is what it is.

Some might say what are these little vignettes, they came here for Axis and Allies! Sure. But communication is an issue that affects everyone, and I think learning to get along with people that we don’t like is a more practical and useful thing than learning about specialist applications in a board game.

. . . but at the same time, I don’t see anyone else writing about these specialist applications so back to it, I suppose.

What about “common sense” applied to Axis and Allies? Again, there is no such thing as “common sense”, not really. What there is, is a product of training. I played various versions for over thirty years is it, applied mathematical models for over twenty, then I had the good fortune of meeting some very extraordinary people, and the further good fortune that my training enabled me to recognize their unique abilities and apply some of what I learned, in some small ways, to my own process.

Part 1 was about demonstrating players should not play blind into board state. Part 2 was about explaining and demonstrating a methodical framework as applied to Axis and Allies. Both parts challenged the unthinking hierarchies present in current meta discussion. It’s true that I have strong disagreements with what I’d characterize as authoritarian non-thinking in meta discussion. But what I’m going on about really has a larger goal in mind. At some point, I think players should acknowledge they cannot and should not surrender their judgment in pursuit of some supposed goal - here, getting better at Axis and Allies. Players must realize that they often don’t have the experience of their opponents, that the fastest way to improve is through disciplined methods, and most importantly, in the end players must be independent. They must be, as it were, adults, capable of exercising their own discretion and judgment, no longer dependent children always looking to others for advice - those others often being children themselves.

Yes, one day even what I write should be left behind as players go on to more advanced things.

But until that day I have you, bwa ha ha ha, cough cough.

NOT FOR KIDS

(which assures that the kids will be the first ones to read this)

Previous parts have been about fundamental premises and the process of reason. However, those familiar with applied science, or some Axis and Allies veterans, will be looking at bits of text and saying “isn’t this important, shouldn’t something more be said” or “what does aardvark mean by these cryptic references to what isn’t being said”. Other players might think “how do I know when I’m getting good?”

Well here’s a very Adult Thing to think about. Life is a journey, not a destination. It is not about when you think you are good. It is not when you receive the adulation of others. It is when you realize how little you know, how far there is to go, and you realize that will always be the case. When you are no longer complacent and smug, no longer self-satisfied, always looking both inwards and outwards, then you will have begun your journey of enlightenment. Or maybe not, what do I know, I’m just an aardvark.

INTUITION

At one point in my development as a player, I was constantly predicting win outcome percentages, which was not just a matter of using an odds calculator a lot. Especially with smaller battles such as small trades for territory, the same unit counts are involved over and over, so especially someone trying to memorize such things will remember them.

But I’d gone rather further than that, I’d typically estimate large stack battles outcomes with less than 3% error, sometimes predicting the overall outcome within 0.1%. Which is pretty funny if you think on it because my favorite tool, David Skelly’s often has variances larger than that thanks to running fewer PRNG iterations. Well it’s sort of funny anyways.)

I could predict future board states, not looking at current board states, but simply by reading move lists and dice outcomes.

I had enough practical knowledge to look at a board state and the turn number then state what was “odd”, which is a lot more impressive when players learn to do it themselves. In meta discussions that’s why where other posters often react to what they see on the board, I also react to what I don’t see, I’ll ask why part of the board is how it is, what the opponent did, what the player did, and how there’s no way the current board state is normally correct because someone missed the counter or didn’t develop their position properly.

The problem with that sort of “common sense”, though, is other players simply don’t have it. Some don’t even know to look for any of it. There’s also a lot of small sub-disciplines, like wave interference, binomial applications, practical stack building versus bleeding, understanding tank applications, fighters, bombers, the whole naval rigamarole, what key timings are, how to predict key timings based on initial setup, ruleset, territory value, IC locations, logistics, and so on.

Most of that won’t make sense, I’m sure, and that’s all right. It’s just things you can look forward to, or maybe you’ll have your own specialties.

INTUITION AS APPLIED IN THIS SERIES

When I read posts saying players should play ignoring board state, I “knew” that was wrong, not because I already had the specific calculations at hand. No. I knew that Revised edition veterans spoke against tank rush except under certain conditions, I knew I had heard nothing from 1942 Second Edition players (which doesn’t mean that much, the analytic community pretty much retired but still), and something like a decade later even with all the rules changes, 1942 Online wasn’t so different that I thought unsupported tank rushes would be good.

Besides that, I’d already done my own research some years ago into “R1 dice break into G1 WR strafe with Kar/Ukr stacks.” I don’t know, maybe I should call it something like “the aardvark tank rush” like follow subscribe, then discover years later some player in Indonesia wrote it all up and better years earlier - which is typically the case, remember how long the board game has been around, how long different versions have been around, remember current versions are often only adaptations of earlier versions, and if you also know specifically how different versions were “broken” - that is, how players played optimally yet repetitively to win highest percentages in those versions - and you knew how specifically later versions changed to remove those “broken” lines of play - well, let’s just say you get some ideas of what’s going on.

So I was like “yeah no way that’s true” and I started typing, and to my not-too-surprise, I was able to find without much trouble a case that could be mathematically demonstrated that supported my case. That’s intuition at work.

As to claims that G3 pressured Moscow and Allies could fend J3 India, well, that’s not really intuition, that’s more “common sense”. (Oof, there’s that phrase again.) Well, I suppose it’s not really common sense. But think on it. If Axis are seriously pressuring Moscow, then why are the Allies allocating resources to protect India? It’s not like infantry can move from India to Moscow in one turn, it takes a while.

Again, I had some practical experience, writing up the whole Ukr/WR/Cauc Axis line, with J fighter reinforcements, and how India could be “cut off”, Moscow isolated. But . . . I didn’t really need that much.

Anyways! Intuition.

INTUITION GOING FORWARD - WAVE INTERFERENCE, UNIT TYPE AND COUNT, AND BAD VAGUE ARGUMENTS

So far specific cases have been very straightforward. It may not have seemed that way when I started addressing the question of G3 Moscow and Allied defense against J3 India by addressing Szechwan, then I probably at least addressed Mediterranean, north Atlantic, some brief timing, and so forth. But there are sharp limits to what can be achieved using such a limited predictive model…

Before getting into the particulars, a word about bad vague arguments. I’ve spoken to authoritarian arguments that attempt to use reference to authority in place of reasoned arguments (“top rank player” or “my day job is” or “you don’t know who you’re talking to.”) That is different to when I write “that is not relevant, but here is what is specifically relevant” or “that is a question that I will not address at this time”.

The difference is one tries to avoid addressing specifics altogether and goes on and on about things that have nothing to do with the nominal topic, another is simply limited on time so chooses to talk about something that is perhaps not what a querent wants to talk about or even what a querent thinks is related, but which does have some relevance.

People use bad vague arguments catch on and start copying phrases or references, hoping to lend weight to what they write. I read, for example, an argument that units are not about their IPC value, and I thought “very good, they have enunciated what any player that doesn’t purchase battleships already knows”, but perhaps that was uncharitable on my part. Then they said a whopper which amounted to ignoring addressing a major stack battle, and downplaying losing a major stack battle, and I thought “oh no”, but also “it would be really funny to take a screenshot of this to pass around at office parties”. I know, I’m awful, but I also didn’t take the screenshot . . . to pass around at office parties.

While one tries to form an intuition around bad vague arguments, one is bound to have bad intuition.

So what forms good intuition? I can’t say what will work best for others, but I know predictive models I build account for wave interference and unit type and count.

WAVE INTERFERENCE

I expect I shall have to use something than that “wave interference”, as it doesn’t convey well what’s going on to most. Well, I’ll think on it.

Sometimes players of Axis and Allies say it’s about “strategy” or “tactics” or vague grandiose things, which makes sense. It’s a game about conquering the world (or liberating it, whatever). It attracts a certain crowd. When I say “risk management” or “binomial distributions” or even “logistics”, people just sort of grunt and sidle away. They don’t want to get caught up in that nonsense.

“Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics” - Napoleon.

I mean, don’t listen to me, listen to the guy that’s been dead for over two hundred years and has never played the game. Got quotes from Sun Tzu too for what it’s worth.

So what is this “wave interference”? What are “rogue waves”? What does any of that have to do with Axis and Allies?

Sometimes I see players talk about “fair dice”. Some even want dice altered to be more “fair”. Or I’ll read how a player said everything was going great then the dice wrecked their great plan. I’m like hey. Don’t they know what game they’re playing? (Well, no, they don’t, but that’s okay, it’s a marketing thing, they want to play this strategic tactical thing but they end up with a time-consuming game that’s about risk management. Eh.)

I’ve seen a lot of Youtube videos where someone complains about bad dice, not recognizing that they owe their position to a lot of small favorable dice results over the course of the game. I think “they have no right to complain, haven’t they been paying attention? they were literally winning on luck!”

Dice happen. Sometimes a player gets a lot of small good luck, sometimes a lot of small bad luck andd it adds up. Or there’s an unusual result in the first round of a major stack battle, which can turn out to be very costly to someone. It must be understood, it is not just about accepting that dice happen, or believing superstitious nonsense that the dice will turn, or getting caught up in Monte Carlo fallacies. It is entirely expected that there will be a range of results in any combat, and how a player forms plans and contingencies to deal with both bad and good luck influences who is the winner.

(And again, where it comes to ranked play, remember some players have better control over schedule, some have more patience with UI, some - well let’s just say there’s things other than board game skill that influence ranked outcomes).

I’ve written elsewhere about multipeak models and how binomial distributions are “jagged edged”, how Axis and Allies risk models are different to everyday perceptions. I’ll mention a bit of that here. Most people think of risk as something analogous to everyday life; if they throw a dart at a dartboard maybe they don’t hit the center, but near the center. They think dice work like that.

But actually combat in Axis and Allies is a result of interfering waves, reinforced by multiple rounds over time. If a player has a 85% predicted win rate on a battle, they often think it’s like they’re tossing darts at a board and they’ll hit 85% of the time, and 15% of the time it won’t be great maybe but close.

But actually in application it’s like having dartboards on opposite walls. 85% of the time a player hits the dartboard in front of them, and 15% of the time the darts fly out of their hand backwards and hit the target behind them. It’s very weird for players not used to thinking like that. Then if the dart hits near the center of the dartboard behind them, players get really really weird about it, because nothing about what’s happening even seems to make sense.

But a player used to how things work isn’t surprised at all.

So, wave interference. Knowing the probabilities, knowing anomalous results, knowing anomalous results in early rounds reinforce over repeated rounds, players know that odd dice outcomes will happen. They don’t depend on it, they don’t fear it, but they do try to account for it as best they can. The ocean’s surface is not like glass, but a lot of small ripples, then sometimes there’s a giant rogue wave that comes along.

In warfare, commanders deal with these sorts of things by keeping reserves to deal with situations as they come up. Rather than simply committing everyone to battle “if you’re not fighting you’re not doing your job”, they understand that situations sometimes come up that require a fresh and ready force able to respond. Or, with firepower, commanders can shift fire to deal with particularly troublesome targets, instead of everyone just firing ahead no matter what is happening elsewhere. That is, commanders in real life have various abilities to respond, and need to act intelligently.

What does that look like in Axis and Allies? There’s a lot of applications, small and large, but for the time being, I’ll say - a good plan shouldn’t need everything to go right, a good plan ideally has some flexibility to respond to conditions, and sometimes small chances need to be taken early to prevent big things later. Those are only general thoughts, not specific applications, so you can imagine what the final and most important thing to remember is. Don’t get smug and think because you lack a plan, that you’re a master of innovation and response. You will get wrecked by a player that’s prepare, and you’re not smarter than the numbers. Know your position, understand the board stat, and always remember there’s probably something you haven’t considered that’s going to come back and bite you.

YOUR ACTIONABLE TAKEAWAY

It wasn’t my purpose to advocate the line of play, so there is no actionable takeaway in terms of execution or counter. (edit: Come to think on it, I suppose there is an actionable takeaway in terms of counter. But actually a lot of board states may not suit, you have seen the numbers are pretty tight, so there may be cases R3 doesn’t have a good counter to G2 Cauc even after setups. So properly there should really be an address of the transition where Allies press Berlin, and how the Karelia / West Russia / etc. game should play out. Ah well. Returning to what I was saying -) There are some actionable takeaways though.

1. Competent play requires considering board state. Players do not properly play canned lines into any board, though that is characteristic of meta discussion where some players downplay and dismiss the importance of detail. However, you have seen for yourself the sharp difference single units can make, and the difference in execution between a planned counter, and an unplanned counter. Consider, for example, if R2 attempted to hold with 3 less UK fighters because UK sent air against the G survivors of G1’s attack on sz7, or used the Egypt fighter again in some autopilot variation. That would be a problem. Players that neglect such details are asking to lose.

I read a poster on Discord claim they always went for positive IPC battles. Well, you know UK1 to sz7 and actions with the Egypt fighter could be IPC positive. But that’s not the issue, and never was. The question was, what was the opportunity cost? What was the cohesive strategy? Again, not simply my words. There’s enough in this thread to demonstrate the reality of what is not simple “theory”, but very much what players will see in practice.

2. Single units make a difference. The closer the battle, the bigger the difference. (edit - 14% swing for just removing a single Axis AA gun at R3 into G/J Caucasus.)

3, Just because someone’s a top meta player does not mean they execute competently, and it certainly doesn’t mean they can explain things well, or even accurately. Here, we see some assertions that did not stand up to examination, that board state need not be considered, timing dismissed, that unfounded assertions should be accepted as “basic” knowledge, that G3 can hit Moscow under the line, and also Allies hold India against J3 India. None of those is necessarily true, especially in combination. (edit: Well, the Allies can certainly hold India. The question is, what does that cost Moscow?)

4. That said, that does not mean experienced players should be dismissed out of hand. Even a wrong answer can be useful to a new player, as at least such answers may be clear and brief, so lend purpose to the player, and hopefully get that player thinking - rather than trying to follow rote instructions.

5. That a player is inarticulate or outright wrong should not be held against them. Typically such players are making an honest effort to be helpful. If they are passionate, or angry, or even abusive, often that comes from their sincere belief. (edit - I’m referencing other players in Discord, as I found conduct to be egregious. For myself, I feel calling people on what they do is not “abuse”. It may be received negatively, and I expect I may give some thought as to what I say (edit: that is, to how what I say is received, and thus reconsider how I make my points), but in the end, I cannot be held responsible for how other people choose to receive a message. Where some complain and complain about how I have all the time I want to write bits, but no time to waste in a game that I find a pointless clash of egos, well, I just see that as manipulative with negative aspersions thrown in. It really is rather off-putting, but I’m used to it by now. At any rate -)

6. Understanding (edit: in the sense of getting along with others) is all well and good, but that is not the same as moral relativism, accepting all positions as equal. Some actions result in advancing the progress of an argument, whether for or against, other actions distract from it.

===

(edit: reproduced below)

AXIS AND ALLIES ANALYSIS (more or less)

1.  Define what is to be examined.
2.  Based on past experience, identify then test possible short-term failure states. Typically requires working through many variations of action and response even so.
3.  Note and write up all lines studied. If failure state(s) found, concludes here.
4.  If no failure state is found, progress to more complicated projections of the predictive model, particularly accounting for anticipated board states as they develop over time.
5.  If no particular point of failure identified, proceed to comparative tests of entirely different lines of play, identify key metrics that distinguish when one line should be used over another.
6.  Write and edit, including key metrics. The final writeup should ideally have the reader always knowing what to do, and why to do it, in any situation.

===

That, and the previous comments about methodology as applied to Axis and Allies. I think the example here was a little too simple, but eh.

G2 CAUCASUS HOLD

This is where it finally starts to get a little interesting. I mentioned earlier a player needs to look at potential fail states; this is one. The interesting thing is not the fail state, but how reading into the methodology should show consideration of current board state is essential, board state varies based on dice rolls as well as player decisions, and how adding assumptions to a bundle can in the end invalidate the lot - or not, as the case may be.

G2 can see what R2 purchased, so need not commit to G2 Caucasus hold. However, considering the proponent of the line stated G3 Moscow, and G2 may not safely break W Rus, G2 Caucasus is now a must for this line. Remember, I didn’t say G3 Moscow, the proponent of the line did. I merely examine the line (lightly, at that).

By the time G1 finishes, UK knows what Axis is up to so counters, US the same, and of course R2. Everyone is going to line up to prevent G2 Caucasus hold, because control of that territory and industrial complex accelerates the timeline on G’s attack. It’s a real problem.

The prospective Axis defense includes J’s fighters. So you can see why I made a point of Szechwan in the first place. It was important to establish whether or not the US fighter lived, and provision was made for G2 WR being coinflippy even without the US fighter. The upshot is, if the US fighter is destroyed, then we think Allies may still hold WR, but also that there may be less J fighters.

There’s more, but I’ll leave off.

I mentioned the simplified scenario has R at 12 inf 2 art 3 tanks 2 fighters at W Rus at end of R2; the R2 build is unaccounted for (as we only looked at WR defense which R doesn’t mobilize into). G’s pressure into Caucasus is 7 inf 9 tank, which eats R’s WR stack plus R2’s Moscow mobilization; the G AA joins the defense on noncom.

J has up to six fighters and a bomber that can reinforce. J could have another two bombers as reinforcement if buying on J1 and flying in on J2 against R3 counterpressure. However, I will ignore that as doing so would negatively impact J’s development. (Actually, a key timing should never be ignored!)

At end of R1, USSR collected 28 IPC, remember the base scenario included capture of WR and Ukraine, and R had not lost income in Asia yet. The added R inf is the Kazakh infantry that moved to Szechwan on R1, back to Kazakh on R2, otherwise R adds 7 artillery.

https://axis-and-allies-calculator.com/?rules=1942&battleType=land&roundCount=all&attInfantry=13&attArtillery=9&attTank=3&attFighter=2&defTank=9&defFighter=6&defBomber=1&defInfantry=7&defAAGun=1

Favors Axis, clearly. But this is where the bundle of assumptions I mentioned starts getting too big.

You see, this is a failure state for the Allies. It’s not good that G2 holds Caucasus, it’s not fatal, but it’s very inconvenient. The Allies, however, know this, being competent. So now we have to re-examine all previous assumptions that were previously dismissed, including the question of player competency.

Now also comes a practical application of something I’ve often mentioned elsewhere, that single units make a difference at key timings. Then players just sort of dismissively grunt, because they don’t think things like that matter. But look.

Simply, the proposed R3 against G2 Ukraine with J2 reinforcement has about 31% attacker win. That’s not good. But a competent Allies player will know it’s not good, so should take steps to prevent that from happening. Doesn’t that just make sense?

Suppose just the G AA is removed from the picture. How much do you think that impacts the defense?

https://axis-and-allies-calculator.com/?rules=1942&battleType=land&roundCount=all&attInfantry=13&attArtillery=9&attTank=3&attFighter=2&defTank=9&defFighter=6&defBomber=1&defInfantry=7

The attacker’s percentage jumps to 45.3%. Don’t you think that’s interesting?

Chop a G inf off as well. The attacker percentage increases to 58.6%. Removing another G inf increases to 71.6%.

PLANNING THE ALLIED COUNTER AGAINST G2 CAUCASUS HOLD ATTEMPT

This is all a very simplified treatment, but a reader should understand the methodology. It hasn’t been conclusively demonstrated here that G2 Caucasus hold aftermath is actually an issue, but let’s just accept that as a premise.

We then use 31% as our baseline for comparison, which is the win percentage on the proposed R3 counter. We want to chop up to 1 AA 2 infantry from the G stack.

Remember how the UK bomber survived, whether used at Africa or not, thanks to G fighter placement?

Remember how UK was assumed to hit the sz61 destroyer/transport fleet off Yunnan?

Remember there’s three UK fighters on W Rus?

Remember how G has no good line against Africa?

Now these pieces come together; UK can have 6 inf 4 fighter 1 bomber that can hit G’s 1 AA 7 inf 9 tank.

https://axis-and-allies-calculator.com/?rules=1942&battleType=land&roundCount=1&attInfantry=6&attFighter=4&attBomber=1&defAAGun=1&defInfantry=7&defTank=9

It’s not a great attack on the face of it, no. But think about what happens when. We know the real danger point for Axis, when the R3 counter is less a simple coinflip, happens when the Axis are stripped of 1 AA 2 inf. It’s not that R3 counter is safe then, no no. But it’s a real potential problem for Axis.

You see also where J may really not want to lose J fighters. Chop even a single J fighter off the defense and things get really dicey. But with the percentages being tossed around, J1 against Szechwan again looks to be a possible viable contender. Actually I’d say one risky battle to enable another is sequential failure potential in practice, but eh. Regardless, everything gets a second look.

Also a second look is R2 into Ukraine. Before it was handwaved off, but you did see there was real reason R2 might go ahead and strafe, if plot armor were not a consideration. Then consider how that works together with a potential UK2 into Caucasus. Any numbers the R2 strafe chops, chops off both defenders against the R3 counter and the UK2 counter.

BILL AND TED’S EXCELLENT ADVENTURE

Well, if R looks into the future and takes preventative action, G can take preventative action too! But think on it. Supposedly G3 Moscow was a key component of the line. That just got deconstructed, not fully, no, but you can see where there’s reasonable suspicion that the transition state through G2 Caucasus hold is questionable.

Also, we could say G sees the counter coming so avoids all that happening. But the question is when and how that happens exactly. It’s not that G2 can capture Caucasus then run away before UK2. If G2 captures then J2 reinforces, if UK2 hits it with a disruption attack, Axis choose between having G’s forward infantry and tanks wiped out at relatively low cost to Allies, or probably losing J’s fighters as well.

Suppose we just assume G2 Caucasus is indeed questionable, and G3 thrown out. But if the purpose of the line is not G3 Moscow, then what is it?

To be clearer, if G1 mobilized tanks are not pushing for G2 Ukraine into G3 Moscow behind a G2 Caucasus hold attempt, then why were G1 tanks even built in the first place?

Well, I have a different use for G1 tanks, but this thread isn’t about lines I’m proposing.

https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1332988936116502528

“I can promise you that G1 tanks buy with the intention of a G2 Ukraine stack is a bad Axis strategy. I dont want to discuss it at all, because it is basics.”

https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1332987598779711499

“To buy tanks for a G2 Ukraine hold is not necessary. Can be done without tanks buy, and if you have missed that and written pages of arguments, it is just a bit funny.”

https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1332804684733218958

“I dont think R1 result matter much if tank opening is good or not.”

https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1332862097662414901

“G1 or G2 Ukraine stack tank rush is a big difference. If G2 Ukraine it will be no G3 Moscow threat, and instead G4 with one more turn of Russian production, and it would be no real threat unless another turn of full tanks buy. This can not Germany afford against a good player. In my games the big improvement came when I started to stack Ukraine and mini stack in Karelia G1”

https://discord.com/channels/606254910438375434/1300603351636906106/1332987887473397772

“That is just how basics is”

I recall a post that sold the G3 Moscow attack harder, but either it was edited out or I just didn’t find it, anyways it was a bother going through all that junk on Discord - because most of it had nothing to do with the nominal topic but was character attacks introduced into the conversation at any excuse.

To any that object to that little slice of life observance, realize. There’s writings meant for posterity that are all clean and edited, this thread is really off the cuff.

PLAYER COMPETENCE

A competent player knows the percentages of different failure points through a timeline, and attacks, not where they are weakest, but where they are strongest. There is something to be said for playing against blind spots in a meta, but a good meta would have already thoroughly addressed this topic anyways. Think on it; the Axis do not roll dice against AA in this line, the Axis do nothing more than the simplest attack with the loosest coordination, were outcomes to be otherwise that would be a serious game balance issue - and that is why the topic would have been addressed.

Using only the simplest of details and logic, I demonstrated step by step how the assertion that G3 hits Moscow is questionable at best, simply because the Allies have an “interrupt” to the otherwise safest Axis line, and Axis advance at that speed demonstrably requires coinflippy odds.

It doesn’t end there, of course. Were the line to fully be examined, Axis variations of timings against Moscow would be examined, transitions to Japan being the major Axis stack power looked at, speed and strategy of Allied pressure against Germany detailed, both for and against, all with different variations. I haven’t addressed KJF variants either, or, anyways, I won’t get into it. Suffice to say that the serious examination would be much more lengthy.

Here, though, I only wanted to demonstrate that G3 Moscow was questionable. That, as part of narrowing down the definition of the line, though it turned out that helpful poster on Discord cleared that up. Eh.

ALLIED DEFENSE AGAINST J3 INDIA

Well, you saw the numbers on R2 hold of West Russia.

Yes, UK fighters can land on West Russia then later move to India to defend against J3 India. But simplifying, the turn after UK does that, G can hit a combined Allied stack. It gets a little complicated and I’ll leave a lot out. But it comes down to, if the Allies really defended India, it would be at the cost of W Rus defense, which I showed was coinflippy for Allies as it was (unless adding the US fighter, in which case it’s a little good for Allies.)

So under what conditions would Allies no longer need to defend W Rus? If G was largely neutralized. But if G3 threatened Moscow, then G wouldn’t have been neutralized.

AND SO WE DRAW TO THE END OF THIS ADDRESS

It’s not that I knew for sure G3 to Moscow wouldn’t work out. I had my suspicions of course. Years ago I did a writeup on, as I called it at the time, something like R1 dice break into G1 W Rus strafe with G1 Kar and Ukr stacks, with Caucasus capture variation. That was part of my examination of the J1 Manchuria IC line; my conclusion at the time was Manchuria IC got one more tank in on the critical timing but that sacrifices elsewhere made it generally not worth it for Axis. But I digress.

But in that line, I knew that a “soft” G1 tank build had issues. That’s why even tank rushes executed by players that don’t habitually ovecommit can run out of steam. So substantively, in a line where G is not pulling out of Africa, where G also does not make an early play for Africa, where G splits its Med fleet, oh, a lot of things I won’t get into, I figured some of the old stuff I wrote would apply, and it did.

An analogy for the situation - if someone tosses a baseball underhanded, you can catch it despite variations in arc, speed, and precise end point. If someone tosses a bowling ball that’s a different matter. Without examining board state, G1 Ukr hold attempt is just another unsupported G tank dash variation, and suffers the same essential issues. R1 dice break into G1 W Rus strafe with Kar and Ukr strafes is a different animal, there the dice results and actions probably mean the rush hits more like a bowling ball.

Returning to the topics at hand, what I really thought would be an issue was the claim that Allies hold against J3 pressure concurrent with G3 having a real threat on Moscow. Claiming Allied defense against J3 India of itself, sure, no problem. But I’ve written elsewhere, on many occasions, one of the issues of Allied India hold is it has to be measured against G advance in the Ukr/WR/Cauc line. If the Allies sit on India too long, the India stack gets cut off, Moscow gets isolated. So it should make sense that if G3 Moscow was being claimed, it would not stand to reason that Allies should hold J3 India in the KGF line, as India falls soon after Moscow if Moscow does fall, so may as well give up India if things are close.

What if Allies hadn’t had interrupts against G2 Caucasus or couldn’t hold R2 W Rus? Then the line would have looked at the actual G3 against Moscow, modifying previous lines to potentially have that as the failure point if it were, and adjusting optimal Allied action to whatever other “interrupts” may be anticipated.

Properly, the development of the Allied Atlantic would also be in question, and - well, I’ll leave off. Good enough

In the end, remember. It’s not that there are infinitely many things that need to be accounted for. In practice, one only needs to be disciplined, and run the numbers on different points in time of different reasonably expected variations of the line, A player uses experience to inform their understanding of failure state, but experience is not strictly necessary if good discipline is used in considering outcomes of lines of play. A key failure state is identified that has the lowest expected win rate for the player; instead of allowing that state to occur, the player should look at other lines, possibly even lines that were dismissed earlier, in a comparative sense. What looked like a not-so-great battle can on reflection look pretty good given the alternative.

Also mentioned is the importance of responding to board state, the importance of being specific in what questions are asked, and what details given. The difference of a single unit was shown to have, I think it was a 14% swing in a key timing? Where players just dismiss the importance of even single units, of detail, of play, it should make sense that naturally their “strategies” are not reproducible, and hence of questionable value to study.

Finally, note it is quite possible to truncate writeups to relatively short lists of instructions. However, it should be understood given even the minimal depth of topics mentioned in this writeup, that inevitably means sacrificing something important. I think that’s fine for players that only want a superficial guide, but players looking for deeper development will have to know the details so they can understand the tradeoffs of different actions.