Real reason the allies won the war

@martin-of-tours

Based on how the Japanese command and the decisions they would have likely made, there would have been almost no impact on the war. The Iowa class battleships, which were awesome, but arguably had little impact strategically would have had their resources shifted to speed up the building of the Essex class carriers, with little expense on the Soviet Union or the British. The US would not need to defend California or even shift resources for it-the US can easily just activate their militia (remember the Second Amendment). Japan would not have invaded (or even thought of) invading the continental US, and capturing Midway or Hawaii (a formidable task in itself) would still have made it hard, if not impossible, to win in an invasion. Japan would have needed more ships and men than planned for Operation Downfall, which would be impossible, considering only the US could muster that large of a force. Japan would also have to deal with China, the threat of the Soviet Union, and the British. It would have been a waste of a victory, as Japanese troops would probably have been slaughtered on the beaches of Midway.

Now if the Japanese political and military leadership was headed by people who know what they’re doing, then absolutely! This would have set the US back quite a lot. The Japanese then should have adopted a strong dug in defence, operating the capital ships only in range of powerful land based aircraft and submarines, coming up with an effective convoy system, and working with the army to coordinate operations. This could have taken up so many US resources to beat that the Soviets would have had a lesser victory at Stalingrad, and Rommel could have held out longer in Tunisia if there were less forces in Operation Torch.

The best thing for the Japanese to do, of course, is to attack the Soviet Union. The Far Eastern troops were grossly exaggerated by the Soviets (which the Japanese willingly believed after Kahlkin Gol), and replacements for the ones that have been siphoned off west were generally worse, with little training. The Japanese air force was less outnumbered by the Soviets than the Germans were, and had even more of a quality advantage. The Japanese could have easily destroyed most of the Soviet Pacific fleet in days, destroyed the Red air force in an even more total fashion than the Germans did, and captured Vladivostok. Japan’s decisions are kind of stupid when they basically thought that they had a greater chance of defeating the US, a nation that has had their resources not yet tapped in any way (except Lend Lease) than the Soviet Union, whose cream of forces were destroyed in 1941, their replacements almost always understrength (most Soviet cavalry divisions were less than a third of a real division, rifle and tank brigades were only a quarter of even a small World War 2 division, and rifle divisions were only half as effective as a German infantry division), suffered enormous equipment and officer shortages, and had horrible logistics. In addition, many Soviet units had little training, and were expected to get that on the job fighting, leading to huge casualties. And that’s the west! The Far East forces were infinitely more inferior. As for oil, Japan could have reduced American unhappiness by doing withdrawing partially from French Indochina and reducing operation in China, both of which are necessary anyway for mustering forces. Diplomatic decisions are much easier to reverse than military ones, and the US would have saw the invasion as a removal of a threat to American interests in the Pacific (both Japan and the Soviet Union would have their hands tied up). Coupled with a better German strategy, the war in the East could have been won in 1941.

I strongly recommend you read Nigel Askley’s books, who give the most detailed account of Operation Barbarossa, detailing German and Soviet mobilisations, production values, and reinforcements, all used for a war simulation. I haven’t bought them all and don’t read them entirely (only the parts I’m interested in), but they are very good books, and more are being written. The part about Soviet Far East forces (Volume 3B) is very well done, and they also cover the Soviet and German air forces and navies.

@barnee

An incident would not have been needed-Pearl Harbour still would have happened, just without Hitler declaring war on the US. The Battle Of The Atlantic would still have been won by the Allies, it just would have taken longer without the US fully committing to it. US participation would still have increased though, and if Germany did not declare war (which they should not, to make this scenario more likely), the US would have declared war on Germany in 1943. It might have been a different situation with a truce though.

@Narvik:

Now, that is pure speculation, man.

How could a great power like USA 1940 not take part in a world wide conflict about world domination and survival ?
Even with Alf Landan as president.
Would there be no war against terror if Obama was President during 911 and not Bush ?

In the 1930s the War Department of the US had the notorious color plans.
Green for a war against Mexico.
Black for a war against Germany
Orange for a war against Japan.
Red for a war against Britain.

Since may 1939, the Rainbow plans had been prepared by the Joint Army and Navy Board. This would have happened no matter if Roosevelt or Landan or somebody else was President.

I guess the only thing that could have delayed a US entry, was if Japan ignored the Pacific and attacked Russia only, and Germany ignored Britain and attacked Russia only. But of course the Great Powers USA, Britain and France could never accept this kind of new world order, so sooner or later USA would have to enter the war, at least for survival as a nation.

How could a great power like USA 1940 not take part in a world wide conflict about world domination and survival ?
Even with Alf Landan as president.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared war on the U.S. His thought was that a state of war would allow Germany a better opportunity to sink the large numbers of American transports ferrying weapons to the Soviet Union and Britain. He thought those weapons might have made the difference between victory and defeat in the planned anti-Soviet summer offensive of '42. He also believed, probably correctly, that FDR would eventually get his wish of going to war against Germany.

I can hardly claim to be an expert on Alf Landon. But for the sake of argument, let’s suppose he was a sort of “go with the flow” politician. By that I mean a politician who isn’t afraid to hit back against an attacker, but who has no ambition to initiate aggression against any foreign nation. If he was like that, war between Germany and the U.S. wouldn’t have been inevitable; and Hitler wouldn’t have had any reason for believing it was inevitable. The U.S. would most likely have provided help to the Allies; but restraint on the part of both Hitler and Landon would have prevented that aid from degenerating into outright war.

Japan’s situation is different. Prior to Pearl Harbor, there were two schools of thought within the Japanese government. One school held that Japan should expand south, to places like the Dutch East Indies and Borneo. The other school felt Japan should expand to the north, at the expense of the Soviet Union.

The FDR administration wanted the former school to win the debate. It also wanted to promote the belief that, if Japan went to war against the colonial Dutch, it would also have to go to war against the U.S. (It was a little unclear why the U.S. would go to war to protect the Dutch colonial possessions, when it didn’t go to war to oppose the conquest of the Netherlands itself. But that’s neither here nor there.)

In order to encourage the Japanese to head south (and thereby to protect the Soviet Union from a second front), the FDR administration initiated eight separate provocations against Japan. One of them was the well-known oil embargo. Another was “pop up cruises.” These involved American warships repeatedly and deliberately violating Japanese territorial waters. The emotional effect was about the same as would have been the case, had hostile foreign ships shown up off the coast of Los Angeles or New York City. Collectively, these eight provocations caused Japanese leaders to make a decision which was part rational, part emotional. A decision to focus on the south rather than the north. And a decision to attack the United States immediately; as opposed to conquering British and Dutch colonies without declaring war on the U.S. (One of the effects of the eight provocations was to convince many Japanese leaders that a state of war between the U.S. and Japan was inevitable.)

The reason I mention all this is because the eight provocations are a fairly FDR-specific thing. They’re not the sort of thing that (for example) Calvin Coolidge or Herbert Hoover would have done. I very much doubt they’re the sort of thing Alf Landon would have done; though again I can hardly claim to be an expert on Landon. In the absence of these provocations, the Japanese would likely either have turned north against the Soviet Union, or else would have gone south without attacking the United States.

In the postwar world FDR and Churchill created, the Soviet empire stretched from the Bering Sea in the east all the way to the very heart of Germany in the west. By the late '40s, the democracies could not hope to defend Western Europe in any kind of conventional war; and would have had to immediately resort to nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet invasion. This situation was not optimal from the American point of view, especially given the fact that the stated long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy was world conquest.

Suppose instead that the Axis nations had achieved their objectives. Hitler would have conquered all the Soviet Union west of the Urals. Germany would be at peace with the remainder of the Soviet Union and with Britain. Japan would have seized the islands of the South Pacific, as well as the eastern portion of China. In this scenario, the Old World would have four major powers: Germany, Japan, Britain, and (to a lesser degree) the Soviet Union. In a world like that, America could play these powers off against each other, as best served American interests. This scenario would give America far more opportunities to exert influence, than would a world dominated mostly by the Soviet superpower and by communist China.

Far from being helpful to American interests, the Soviet victory in WWII was very damaging. FDR was driven to take the actions he did because of ideology, not because he was working to promote the nation’s best interests. If we assume that Landon would have placed American interests above the dictates of a radical Left ideology, it becomes highly unlikely that he would have pursued a Soviet victory in WWII with the same enthusiasm that FDR did. Or even at all, for that matter.

@rjpeters70:

Germany got a bastion of anti-communism in Spain who gave 40,000 “volunteers” in Barbarossa.  What more you want?

Taking Gibraltar from the British.

I can certianly see why Canada would be at the tops of this list, the Canadian assault on Vimy ridge is one that has certianly deserves mention, Epic, simply epic. Of course, their counter attack in Belgium at Ypres in the face of a German gas attack, cant go unmentioned, full credit to them.

I think the German Sturmabteillung, and their descendants the Stormtroopers, were some of the best formations not only in the German amry, but in the world. However, I would be remiss if I did not mention Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck and his determined group of east african (Tanzanian) Askari schutztruppen, who waged a very spirited and determined guerilla campagin against the Allies, and is the only German commander who was never defeated in battle.

Another very impressive allies was the American 93rd division and their black troopers, the Harlem Hellfighters of 369 regiment.

And this really only scratches the surface.

Read “world war 2 behind closed doors” by laurence rees

There was a secret part in the treaty between the french, british and poles which the brits and the french promised military assistance against a German attack not a Soviet attack and remember they did not help in the war between the poles in the soviets in late 1910’s and early 1920’s but instead suggested the curzon line (which the Molotov-Ribbentrop line basicly followed)

Also the soviets at Tehran were more interested in soviet post war borders than they were in actually winning the war and remember in 1943 this was not a certainty. They wanted to keep there pre 1941 gains.

This is just a brief overview of some othe parts of the book I suggest you read it. It is very good.

The brits and the french could have attacked the siegfried line before the germans finished it and probably would have been succesful and because they did not co-operate with the Belgium people (I don’t know the correct word) and the dutch because the later two did not want to appear co-operating with the allies because at that time they were neutral. The Germans had a brilliant strategy in attacking (the aaa territory North West Europe) and then following nit up with the tank drive through the ardennes they cut of the Elite French and British troops from the rest of the army. They shouldn’t have allowed Dunkirk and should have forced the British and French into the sea and this would come back to haunt them.

The Panzer IV is getting a lot of love in this poll. The Panzer III in the early years of the war was the German’s tank killer tank with it’s long 50mm gun. The early versions of the Panzer IV had a short 75mm gun.

I’ll be posting the mid war years 41-43 tanks soon.

A year since the last post