Russian winter realisticly unrealistic

One problem with 1914 is warfare on the western front. It usually just dissolves into two giant stacks going at it in one territory, and the allies win that battle 90% of the time because they can get units there faster. One reason this happens is because people aren’t aggressive enough. Also, its too easy for people to combine their forces because flanking maneuvers aren’t very deadly in Axis and Allies. So I would make on slight adjustment to the moving out of contested territories rules:
When a unit moves out of a contested territory they may not battle. They may still move into contested territories containing units belonging to their power, but they may only reinforce not battle there. Also, I was really intrigued by @Arreghas idea about contested territories. You can see his forum here: https://www.axisandallies.org/forums/topic/34163/1914-contested-territories-an-interesting-tweak

Here’s another example of how determined ordinary Soviet infantrymen could be, especially in engagements with high symbolic value.  In a book that he wrote, Marshal Chuikov describes an incident that allegedly occured during the Red Army’s assault on Berlin.  A Soviet tank somehow got isolated during the street fighting for the city and was damaged by a German anti-tank round.  All but one of its crew were killed.  The surviving (though wounded) crewman kept working the main gun, loading and aiming and firing it by himself.  When the main gun ran out of ammunition, or was wrecked by another enemy hit (I can’t remember which; I read the book a long time ago), the Russian soldier proceeded to fire the tank’s machine gun at the nearby Germans.  When that ran out of ammunition, he started lobbing grenades out of the tank to drive off the Germans who were pounding on the hull and demanding that he surrender.  A fresh Soviet unit finally arrived and forced the Germans to retreat.  The Russian reinforcements got into the wrecked tank and found the last crewman inside.  He was dying of his wounds, but he was holding a knife in his hand, ready to use it to make a final stand against any German soldier who had tried to enter the tank.  After telling the other soldiers what had happened, his final words were supposedly, “Thank you, comrades, for not leaving my body in the hands of the Fascists.”

The whole problem lies on Japan’s absurd overpowerness. No matter what house rules are present, Japan will always take Soviet far east and China. Allies have nothing to prevent it.

Why Japan’s role is always trying to rescue Germany via marching to Moscow? Why Japan always outproduce Germany and USA? It is neither fun, nor historical plus it totally deprives Pacific front and two ocean going approaches for USA.

Typically USA esablish a pipelines in North Africa while abandons Pacific, Britain in N.Russia, Germany turning into surviving mod waiting Japan to recue. I’m really sick of to see the same thing.

The solution is make Germany 2 times stronger than Japan considering 1942 borders, make Soviet far eastern and Chinese territories less valuable (Making two territory worth 1 with Nos), Hawaii factory with 2ipc value, then rebalancing.

Did some real brief digging around on the wiki and found this…

The last part seems to confirm those speculations in Reason 2 Marc mentioned aboved. Though I think there might still be enough in here to justify a starting Strat B for the Russians.

The fact that the Russians are unlikely to ever be able to afford another one would put a ceiling on it, and give a nod to the fact that the Soviet strategic bombing campaigns in WW2 were dwarfed by those of the Western Allies. The logic there I guess would be that Britain and America can readily expand their bomber arsenal through purchasing, whereas the Soviets are basically stuck using what they start out with, or risk just getting crushed in the land war haha.

Anyhow, here’s quick copy paster…

"Soviet strategic bombing
See also: Shuttle bombing and Operation Frantic
The first Soviet offensive bomber campaign was directed against the Romanian oilfields in the summer of 1941.[185] In response to a German raid on Moscow on the night of 21�22 July 1941, Soviet Naval Aviation launched a series of seven raids against Germany, primarily Berlin, between the night of 7�8 August and 3�4 September. These attacks were undertaken by between four and fifteen aircraft�beginning on 11 August the new Tupolev TB-7�from the island of Saaremaa, base of the 1st Torpedo Air Regiment.[185] (At least one raid of the 81st Air Division took off from Pushkin.) Besides thirty tonnes of bombs, they also dropped leaflets with Joseph Stalin’s defiant speech of 3 July. The Soviets sent a total of 549 long-range bombers over German territory in all of 1941.[185]

In March 1942 the strategic bombing arm of the Soviet Union was reorganized as the Long Range Air Force (ADD). It raided Berlin from 26�29 August and again on the night of 9�10 September with 212 planes.[185] It raided Helsinki for the first time on 24 August, Budapest on 4�5 and 9�10 September and Bucharest on 13�14 September. The German-occupied Polish cities of Krakow and Warsaw were not exempt, but the bombers concentrated primarily on military targets.[185] There were 1,114 sorties over Germany in 1942. In March 1943 there was a strategic shift: in preparation for the Kursk Offensive, the bombers were directed against the German railroads behind the front.[185] In April the Long Range Air Force expanded to eight air corps and eleven independent divisions containing 700 planes. After the Kursk preparations, the Soviets turned their attention to administrative and industrial targets in East Prussia in April. With 920 aircraft taking part, they dropped 700 tonnes of bombs there. The largest Soviet bomb of the war, an 11,000-pound weapon, was dropped on Konigsberg during one of these raids.[185]

Throughout 1943, the Soviets attempted to give the impression of cooperation between their bombers and those of the West.[185] In February 1944 they again shifted priority, this time towards terror bombing, with the goal of knocking Finland and Hungary out of the war.[185] Helsinki was struck by 733 bombers on the night of 6�7 February, by 367 on the 15�16th and 850 on the 25�26th. A total of 2,386 tonnes of bombs were dropped.[185] Budapest was hit four straight nights from 13�20 September with a total of 8,000 tonnes by 1,129 bombers. The Soviets flew 4,466 sorties into enemy territory in the year 1944. In December the Long Range Air Force was reorganized as the 18th Air Army.[185]

The main task of the 18th Air Army was to support the final offensive against Germany, but it also undertook raids against Berlin, Breslau, Danzig and Konigsberg.[185] In total, 7,158 Soviet aircraft dropped 6,700 tonnes of bombs on Germany during the war, a modest 3.1% of Soviet bomber sorties, a mere 0.5% of all Allied “strategic” sorties against German-occupied territory and a measly 0.2% of all bombs dropped on it.[185]

After the war, Marxist historians in the Soviet Union and East Germany claimed that the Soviet strategic bombing campaign was limited by moral qualms over bombing civilian centres.[185] One early bombing theorist, Vasili Chripin, whose theories influenced the Soviet Union’s first strategic bombing guidelines (1936) and the service regulations of 26 January 1940, drew back from terror bombing as advocated by Western theorists.[185] The Spanish Civil War also convinced Soviet war planners that the air force was most effective when used in close cooperation with ground forces. Nonetheless, after the war, Marshal Vasili Sokolovsky admitted that the Soviets would have gladly launched a strategic bombing offensive had they the capability.[185] In reality, the Soviets never geared aircraft production towards long-range bombers, and so never had enough to mount an effective campaign. The land-based nature of warfare on the Eastern Front also required closer cooperation between the air forces and ground troops than did, for example, the defence of Great Britain.[185]"

That note 185 heavily referenced above shows the following as its main/only source… so there’s that too I guess. Little lackluster, but you know what they say about beggers lol

Horst Boog; Derry Cook-Radmore, trans., “Part I: The Strategic Air War in Europe and Air Defence of the Reich, 1943�44”, in Germany and the Second World War, Volume VII: The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia, 1943�44/5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 [Stuttgart: Deutsche Veralgs-Anstalt GmbH, 2005]), 153�58.

I wonder what the difference is in :
Battles fought in Winter / Casualties    - VS -    Battles fought in Summer / Casualties

Cheers,
Starlight Sniper

Amazing, thanks a lot CWO!

And instead of giving the US an extra $10 for having the Philipines and Hawaii, they should start off with $10 extra and lose $10 due to a massive loss of morale when they lose them. A penalty as suppose to a reward. The loss of morale can truly result in a loss of production. That would make it more realistic.

I am probably going to post this topic in another section. I would like to build more support for this for any future revisions to the rules.

They’re here.  We’re also experimenting with allowing the Central Powers to turn down the armistice, but that’s not entirely official yet.