Defining terms (pseudotiming, counterpressure), taking through defining a strategic line properly, UK1 to sz37 comments

So there I was on Discord, writing about problems with UK1 to sz37 - and I realized, I was writing a lot of core things I’d figured on putting in an article sometime but didn’t get to.

Eh, busy.

First, terms.

TIMING: A strategy built off calculations from a specific actual board state to accomplish a particular objective in a particular time frame.

Example: Before purchasing on G1, G calculates maximum expected Allied defense of W Rus. If it is expected Allies cannot hold against maximum Axis pressure, G1 builds tanks, G2 builds air, for G3 pressure against West Russia, which hits before (if J does not hit US fleet at Hawaiian Islands) US1 to East Australia, US2 3 x fighters to India, US3 3 x fighters to West Russia.

(If it is expected Allies can hold without making significant sacrifice elsewhere, then Axis don’t do that, of course.)

Non-Example: G pushes to Ukraine, pressuring Allies at both West Russia and Caucasus. This is not a timing, this is a tactic based on board properties.

PSEUDOTIMING: Not a full strategy, but a combination of factors that meshes together nicely to create or relieve pressure, typically with some concept of the passage of time.

Example: As above example, but G2 air and J2 air moves to Ukraine. Typically this comes before the Allies have really built up much fleet in Atlantic, so any Allied drops to Karelia are disrupted. (If the Allies push fleet, both G3 and J3 air can hit, so UK cannot move then US simply reinforce as J could hit before reinforcement, nor can US drop then UK reinforce as G could hit.

Unlike G3 W Rus pressure, here the Axis are not trying to pressure a position through brute force. The Axis do not “force” anything; they simply offer Allies a choice; send underdefended fleet and offer Axis an advantaged battle, in exchange relieving some pressure against Moscow, or hold off for safety, in exchange allowing Axis to proceed unhindered. The Allies could even do something else entirely. The Axis are simply shoving units into the area, at a time Allied responses are still pretty limited, in the hope that Axis counterpressure may be useful.

PRESSURE

People are not “forced,” it is not “they had no choice”. People have a choice, but may be pressured to do things they would otherwise be not inclined to do.

COUNTERPRESSURE

Merely focusing on stack battles or even net IPC expectations misses the point.

Suppose the Allies have weak fleet in range of G air. If G does not attack, Allies can land, which then denies G income unless G deals with the landing. If G deals with the landing, that bleeds G resources away from eastern Europe.

But if G attacks to prevent Allied landing, G bleeds its air against UK/US, which also bleeds G resources.

Stacking is a brute force deterrent, but “bleeding” the strength of a stack is usually about applying and using counterpressure in calculated ways.

UK1 TO SZ37, BASE CHARACTERISTICS

First, the base calculations for the outcome. For any battle with no good contingencies in case of failure, where a variable outcome can sharply define the position for following turns, mere IPC calculation is insufficient. Rather, the exact expectation of units should be used.

Note the order of loss, which is not a safe assumption. Attacker pips combine to 15; defense pips combine to 14; if attacker gets few hits and defender gets two hits, what is the attacker to do? It’s a high-stakes battle with bad outcomes in case of failure, and the attacking carrier is weakest on attack. So the carrier may be lost.

On the other hand, if the attacker gets 4 hits and the defender gets 1 hit, the attacker may try to preserve the attacking carrier, as it can be a real bother for Axis to deal with.

So we really can’t safely say the attacker loses a carrier first, no no. But I leave out the rest for simplicity.

https://axis-and-allies-calculator.com/?rules=1942&battleType=sea&roundCount=all&attSubmarine=1&attCruiser=2&attFighter=2&attAircraftCarrier=1&defAircraftCarrier=1&defBattleship=1&defFighter=2&attOOL=escf&defOOL=efp

https://axis-and-allies-calculator.com/graph.php?cmd=piechart&rules=1942&battleType=sea&roundCount=all&attOOL=escf&defOOL=efp&attSubmarine=1&attFighter=2&defFighter=2&attCruiser=2&attAircraftCarrier=1&defAircraftCarrier=1&defBattleship=1

Skelly’s tool only runs perhaps a thousand calculations I think, so has some variance. But accepting the figures I’m looking at, which look roughly correct to me, the attackers win 62.9%, of that losing all units 32.8%, retaining one fighter 12.7%, one fighter one sub 1%, two fighters 16.6%.

Defenders are characterized as winning 31.1%, but of that losing all units 68.6%. It is characterized as a “win” because the attackers do not “capture” the sea zone, I imagine.

62.9% + (31.1% * 68.6%) = 84.2%. That is, 84.2% the J fleet gets wiped. There are some disturbing possibilities outside that, like J battleship and fighters surviving, and again, UK options after UK1 to sz37 failure are often not good. But I leave that aside.

When attacking, UK can expect to lose everything or retain just one fighter about half of the time. A bit of luck, or a lot of luck, changes the effective outcome a lot.

I’ve mentioned elsewhere the baseline an attacker wants is 85%, with good contingencies in case of bad dice. Players often cite 62.9% (or thereabouts) which is what calculators report as the failure percentage for UK1 to sz37. But actually, we see if the tactical objective is to destroy J’s fleet, UK’s success rate is much higher.

OPPORTUNITY COST

If UK is sending all that to hit sz37, it is not sending that elsewhere - particularly, the G Med fleet is not accounted for.

Core Axis strategy is typically to overwhelm Moscow, whether through raw aggression, aggression/control, or some balance of slow pushing and fending off Allied counterpressure.

Especially for fast Axis, a G Med fleet can be a problem, especially if the Axis did certain things.

G1 POSSIBILITIES

G1 Tank Dash

Following bad R1 dice off 12 W Rus / 9 Ukr, G strafed W Rus, stacked Ukraine, captured Karelia. Now if R recaptures Karelia to disrupt production, it loses most or all of its remaining ground attack units (artillery and tank). Stacking W Rus deals with some issues, but W Rus is not necessarily safe, particularly if R1 purchased 4 inf 2 tanks, as unit count will be low.

G1 Ukr Stack

Contrary to some descriptions of G1 Ukr hold attempt executed regardless of board state, I say it’s best done only where R2 Ukr strafe is not favored considering not net IPC change, but the strategic and tactical situation.

Mostly I hear this involves moving G transport to Ukraine and G btl to UK destroyer. If R2 plans to strafe all-out against Ukraine, then UK can still hit the G trn with a bomber, which leaves it vulnerable to G’s counterattack into Caucasus as G retains control of Ukraine and R is pressured into stacking all defense on W Rus to preserve logistics from London to W Rus to India.

Depending on the situation, R may choose to stack Caucasus, but I cannot completely recommend this. The intent of stacking R2 W Rus if possible is to render G’s infantry on Karelia less relevant, unable to move to develop pressure. Meanwhile, with G’s forward reserves of infantry at Ukr depleted, any R counters against G aggression will be costly to Axis, as they pay with expensive tanks and J fighters, or perhaps a few remaining G infantry. Stacking Caucasus allows G to press into W Rus with fodder infantry, possibly backed by J fighters, making the G pressure more relevant - and though a R counter may be favored, abandoning W Rus should not be the default considering the disruption to Allied London-W Rus-India fighters.

G1 Mass Tanks into Probably G2 Ukr Stack

G1 should really try to stack Ukraine, but sometimes the numbers just aren’t there. It is very difficult to stop G2 Ukr stack off G1 mass tank buy though.

I use this with G2 air build in some games, particularly with a G bomber.

G1 Mass Infantry

I think this is played enough that I shall not detail it here.

G MED FLEET REVISITED

Only G1 Ukr stack (which, again, I say should only be used after weak R1 dice, unless a player wants to try a switchup for funsies) - leaves the G fleet where its transport can be stripped, and even then a G2 transport build threatens to accelerate matters in the Med - though I’d say the Allies can handle that, so I’m not particularly concerned and will not detail that further here.

The rest of the lines are free to do G1 to Trans-Jordan, which pulls units away from Persia, Africa, and India.

G may choose to stack remaining Africa ground units on Libya. If the Allies destroy the G Med fleet with UK 2 fighters and bomber, they have little to deal with Trans-Jordan; not dealing with Trans-Jordan leaves G with more pressure into Egypt.

The Allies may stack Egypt depending on outcomes after destroying G’s Med fleet, or abandon - but all of that is if UK1 hits the G Med fleet.

Since we’re looking at UK1 to sz37, why is this relevant? Because of the development into later board states.

I’ll often see G1 abandon Libya, perhaps reasoning UK can hit Libya (which they can) with good outcomes. But if UK hits Libya with enough to get good odds, then the G Med fleet survives. Even if G has no units at Italy ready for pickup, the G Med fleet quickly becomes a problem - especially if G units pushed towards Egypt pressure the Allies, preventing fighters from landing there, leaving Allies with few good options to take out the G Med fleet on later turns. If UK1 doesn’t destroy the G Med fleet, it might be at least a couple turns, by which time G might have gotten some good usage out of the situation.

Imagine, then, that G1 has hit Trans-Jordan and left Libya with 2 inf 1 art 1 tank. Even without G air threatening Africa (remember the possibility of G1 bomber buy or fighters being sent to Africa, each of which has drawbacks but nevertheless) - that’s the situation UK1 may be looking at.

UK1 TO SZ37 REVISITED - OPPORTUNITY COSTS

UK1 will not send a fighter to Szechwan, typically meaning 2-3 ground and 1 US fighter are at risk.

UK1 will not hit the G Med fleet, which may mean leaving the G transport alone.

UK1 will not land fighters on Egypt, on many boards meaning G2 can advance into Egypt often without any Allied counterpressure.

UK1 will not hit the Kwangtung destroyer/transport, making J1’s open faster on the ground, opening up “Turbo Burma” lines.

Explicitly, J1 drop to Burma leaves up to 7 ground on Burma, while Malaya infantry and East Indies ground filling 3 spots on those same transports next turn, along with potentially J1 bombers buy, for 17 dice attack on India (10 ground,4 fighter, 3 bomber, never mind bombards) - this is especially the case if UK1 committed to building sea units on India and/or did not fly London fighters to W Rus. An alternate line uses J1 dump to Burma with J1 transport build; the J1 mobilized transports dump to Burma on J2 along with either the original transports pulling 3 infantry off, or picking up and dumping from the coast which didn’t necessarily advance inwards towards China, to Buryatia / etc to stabilize the coast as needed.

I’ve written elsewhere that J1 response to UK1 builds a carrier, but that is the passive simply explained line that players can naturally use for defense and offense. Turbo Burma is flatly preferred, as if J secures India, J can just build a carrier there if need be. The usual problem with anti-KJF is J cannot capture India quickly; when India can be captured quickly, the entire nature of anti-KJF changes too.

I’m not saying Turbo Burma is infallible, there’s a lot of breaking points - for example, J1 to Burma sea zone is not necessarily safe. It’s an opportunistic attack, but the possibility should not be ignored.

Strategically, UK1 to sz37 opens up a lot of options for Allies to bleed out to J, which leaves G less opposition to deal with in Europe. This is hardly fatal, but it’s not something the Allies can afford to ignore either.

UK1 TO SZ37, CONDITIONAL

So you see where instead of saying UK1 to sz37 is generally a good move, I push towards defining what exactly is good about it, when the good is maximized, what is bad, what exactly is bad, which in turn pushes towards instead of executing UK1 to sz37 on all boards, only executing in certain positions.

Particularly, if G1 built all infantry so will not progress quickly; if G1 lost its battleship to bad dice against UK destroyer, if G sent its Med fleet west where UK couldn’t use its Africa / Indian Ocean fighters against it anyways, if G was a bit timid and did not stack Libya, that sort of thing.

Any proper strategy should not only account not only for a plan to win, but also a plan to stop an opponent’s plan.

MORE TERMINOLOGY

Copying my own writing from Discord earlier today -

ATTACKING UP THE TIMELINE; R2 UKRAINE VS G STACK

Suppose G1 stacks Ukraine.

Suppose the Allies calculate that R2 attacking Ukraine is not a “great attack”, they have higher net IPC expectations elsewhere in terms of units destroyed. Say in this calculation, they at least figure on an opponent’s immediate counters, which should be the minimum as “overextension” is a mistake.

However, Axis and Allies is not about simple immediate-consequence IPC maximization calculations.

Suppose if R2 does not hit Ukraine, that G2 can further stack, from there developing unstoppable pressure against both West Russia and Caucasus - “unstoppable” a strong term, but accurate as Allies cannot realistically hope to defend both territories.

Then, for simplicity, say G gets a winning position.

A competent Allies player, knowing how the position will develop, attacks up the timeline; before the Axis can develop that pressure, R2 takes the Ukr attack even if the IPC expectation is not as high as another tactical action.

Exactly how does that work out? How is that possible? I see posters writing about how apparently I don’t understand the importance of IPCs.

Think on this, then. When a German infantry unit is destroyed, that influences how the position develops, both in terms of Germany’s further defending actions, as well as Germany’s attacking actions. Oversimplifying for a moment, once all Germany’s infantry are destroyed, G loses tanks, losing 6 IPC per casualty, not 3.

Now consider that G1-mobilized Berlin infantry do not reach West Russsia or Caucasus until G4. G1-G3’s infantry pressure against eastern Europe is largely a matter of moving infantry that existed on the board at the start of the game.

So when R2 hits a G stack at Ukr, that leaves G weak on infantry count.

Some might say G pushes infantry to Karelia if G1 stacks Ukraine, to overload R’s counterpressure options, and to maintain pressure against W Rus.

But the key to the G Ukr/W Rus/Cauc line is the simultaneous threat against W Rus and Cauc. Stripping out G’s Ukr infantry neutralizes that specific threat. That means Allies can stack defense on W Rus - because what happens?

Suppose after a R2 Ukr strafe, that G pushes to capture Caucasus on G2. I mentioned elsewhere, G1 mobilized tanks only reach W Rus/Cauc on G3. They are not in range to reach Cauc on G2. Typically I think in terms of timing (when I bother to think, which is far less than some might think 🤔 ).

Pushing G2 to Cauc also puts G’s forward stack in range of probably up to 6-7 additional units that mobilized on Moscow. Even with J fighters, the Axis are paying 6-10 IPC per casualty.

So then I see players talk about how I don’t understand the importance of IPC where they’re talking about 2-3 IPC net expectation here or there - while I’m looking at the 20-30 IPC outcome, or at the least timing disruption that directly attacks Axis strategic goals.

You don’t spend dollars to save pennies. You spend pennies to save dollars. Accumulating wealth isn’t only about not spending, it’s also about investing.

ATTACKING UP THE TIMELINE

The Allies, knowing the Axis position develops favorably to Axis if R2 does not hit Ukraine, thus hit Ukraine if that’s what the calculations indicate is best (moves should never be executed ignoring board state; it could be on some boards that R2 should not hit Ukraine).

It is not that R2 hits Ukraine because of the immediate board situation, in terms of immediate changes in net IPC valuation. R2 hits Ukraine because it sees a problem in a later position, and attacks where the Axis are weak on the timeline - now - which is attacking up the timeline.

RETURNING TO UK1 SZ37

Competent players don’t distinguish between current board state and “attacking up the timeline”, because in their minds the two cannot be separated. I use the phrase as I think it may be useful to players developing conceptual understanding.

Players applying this thinking correctly to sz37 understand, it’s not a question of executing sz37 in isolation of other factors. It’s also a question of other actions taken, any of which may be relevant to attacking up the timeline.

Let’s apply this to UK1 to sz37. Ignoring a lot of things for simplicity, the questions are, under what conditions should UK1 to sz37 be executed, and what other moves should go alongside it?

COUNTERPRESSURE TO UK1 SZ37

Examining a line and its immediate tactical consequence is not how a line is built out. No. Instead, the strategic aims of each power should be examined.

A lot of players write about what the Allies do with UK1 sz37, but they should also be writing about what the Axis do.

Players should be thinking about the opportunity costs.

I think it’s clear that the Axis timing against Moscow is a concern. The Allies want to slow Axis timing against Moscow.

How does UK1 to sz37 affect that - apart from what I already wrote about opening Szechwan to attack, risking UK air that could stabilize W Rus / India, leaving J the Kwangtung destroyer and transport alive?

UK1 to sz37 also comes at opportunity cost against the G Med fleet.

That’s a problem.

So the question is, how do the Allies face that?

The response is, it really depends on what the Axis do.

Eh, I suppose I should put this on the forum instead of Discord.

There was a lot more on Discord, where I was writing about development of KJF and anti-KJF, but possibly more on that later.

WHAT HAS COME BEFORE - UK1 TO SZ37, SUMMARY SO FAR

UK1 to sz37 is especially dangerous to Allies, as it opens the door to a lot of fast Axis pressure options. Despite a nominal percentage of approx 84.2% for the tactical objective of removing J’s East Indies battleship, carrier, and two fighters, in practice the fact UK has few good contingencies against failure means the line should be regarded as considerably risky unless some way to mitigate the risk, in terms of achieving Allied objectives, on a desired timeline, is found.

THE TIMELINE

The core problem with KJF is G is left to go wild in Europe, able to tweak and customize its full output towards a timing to pressure the Allies off Moscow - or fight a losing-stack battle, which is often even worse. Explicitly, on a G3 W Rus timeline with G1 tanks and G2 air splash, G4 captures Caucasus, then either G5 hits Moscow with tanks mobilized on Moscow up through G3, tanks mobilized on Karelia through G4, and bombers built on Berlin through G4.

Leaving aside discussion of a high-pressure G line that uses Caucasus production with expectation of quick capture of Moscow, transposition into alternate game, including variants with light Allied fleet presence, maintains G stack on W Rus, not Caucasus, preventing Allies from moving any combined UK/US ground units through Karelia into Moscow. The UK India stack is rendered irrelevant, as any major shift to Persia is followed by G stack shift to Caucasus, preventing India stack from uniting. If Allies respond with Finland stack shift to Karelia, G can shift back to W Rus, disrupting Allied reinforcements before they can march to Archangel then Moscow. Alternately, G can attack Persia stack with intent to retreat, weakening it so reducing UK’s defense options for India; collapse of India springboards J’s development against Africa.

G2 air splash leaves G with expected 7+ air units, along with J2 air to Ukraine, deterring any early threats to Karelia, even after G3 moves stack to W Rus. The Allies can still capture Karelia, then Axis can wipe transports and escorts, delaying UK/US counterpressure, meanwhile R is still cut off from reinforcement and choked for income.

UK1 to sz37 removes 1-2 fighters and Szechwan’s ground against a coordinated fast Axis offense, as well as opening up Africa options for faster G income which feeds their fast advance, so is quite dangerous.

AXIS POST-MOSCOW, AND THE R MOSCOW STACK

A key issue Allies have with Axis advance along the Ukr/W Rus/Cauc line, besides cutting off the India stack (or drawing it in, leaving J with less to deal with when pressuring India, either’s fine for Axis) - is the Moscow stack being rendered irrelevant.

Suppose G3 moves to West Russia, R4 stacks Moscow, G4 stacks Caucasus. Now what does the R stack do? If the R stack runs to China, G pushes to main stack to Persia and captures Moscow lightly, successfully disrupting R production to the tune of 5-6 units and preventing at least some Allied fighters from landing on Moscow assuming even light R recapture (as at least one Allied power will be unable to land fighters, having just recaptured Moscow). If the R stack runs to Persia, the G stack smashes or strafes while still capturing Moscow.

Specifically, the R stack has a lot of issues being significant to the defense of India, which is where the G stack heads after hitting Moscow - again, not necessarily to hold Moscow, but merely to disrupt production. Once G disrupts India production, J can clean up while G heads back to Moscow - in sum, the Axis win.

The base timeline we’re looking at off aggro G is G5 Moscow. The Axis can change that timeline to hit later if necessary to build more force, as they build up more units and continue to isolate Allies, but at any rate it can happen quite quickly.

In KJF by the time Moscow falls, the Allies do not only want to control the money islands (or whatever other strategic objective). They also want to have ICs running to the point that enough of a stack can be built to resist any oncoming G stack.

In KGF it’s really the same in a lot of ways, except Allies have to be a bit more careful where Axis victory by VC is concerned, and the Allies aren’t building new ICs or such, rather they’re often either concerned with making sure Moscow never falls while also trying to prevent Axis economic dominance then Axis trying to win on attrition - or the Axis are trying to smash Berlin as Moscow falls, then Allies try to consolidate before Axis can recover.

Regardless, there’s a sense, however vague, that this happens on a specific timeline. It is not enough that UK1 hits sz37. The question is, what effect is expected? What are the most likely scenarios that happen, and how do the Allies handle each of those possibilities? What is the timing of the key Allied pressure, how does that interact with key Axis pressure timing, and so forth.

UK1 TO SZ37 BRANCHES: KGF, KJF, SPLIT; TIMINGS UNDER PRESSURE

Fast pressure is always preferred, as fast pressure requires response that bleeds an opponent’s front.

But if an opponent has cost-efficient counters, expressed not simply in net IPC calculations, but also tactical and strategic importance, then the advantage of fast pressure is more than cancelled.

Both Axis powers start with a lot of units that the Allies must deal with to effectively apply pressure; this is made more difficult if the Axis make purchases that play to their strengths.

For KGF, the Allies want to prevent Axis win by VC, and either defend Moscow until the Allies can push outwards, or give up on Moscow and try to capture Berlin then consolidate to gain advantage before Japan can consolidate and advance after capturing Moscow. The Axis have to watch India and Africa; once those collapse, the Allies can lose the game over time on attrition.

For KJF, the Allies want to either relieve Moscow with fast tanks or fighters, pressure the Japanese navy into retreating so the Allies can operate with minimal hindrance, and capture valuable islands to set up industrial complexes to speed the Allied advance. After the Axis capture Moscow, the Allies may have a serious issue dealing with surviving G units moving towards India to disrupt production and reclaim territory, as well as G potentially building carriers to help defend J’s fleet. If possible, Allies want to capture the money islands well before Moscow falls, which typically means using UK and US together effectively.

For split, the Allies want to try to get the Axis to try to maintain local superiority of force in both theaters, slowing Axis advance. However, the Axis can coordinate and ignore one or both counterpressures, capture Moscow, then consolidate to press back outwards.

The less fast pressure the Axis apply, the more time the Allies have to develop.