REAL MEN, WOMEN, AND FUZZY CREATURES FROM ALPHA CENTAURI
(and people of other genders who are also real, particularly those that have read Douglas Adams)
Not much point in spending time on straw men, so what’s really going on?
COUNTERPRESSURE - LOSING A BATTLESHIP IS OK
Games between competent opponents are not a matter of force this, force that, or whatever silly things some like to write to pretend they are in total unrealistic command over a situation.
Your opponent has choices. Choices that have consequences.
I’ve written elsewhere some general notes about KJF defense, probably to the effect that J can build subs, then later fighters when the Allies apply too much pressure to the sea zones around Japan so Japan doesn’t want to build new navy, that J should try to capture India.
Roughly, subs are cheap attackers, an opponent must move their navy into range before they themselves can attack, and when they do, Japan can use those subs to fuel a vicious counter, before the opponent can get an attack off. Though Japan “defends”, it does so by attacking, that is, counterpressure.
Think about how this applies to the aftermath of UK1 to sz37. Japan loses a battleship and a carrier. The carrier frankly was not great on attack. The battleship was useful and could soak a hit, but actually couldn’t be used in many counterpressure situations, as hitting an opponent fleet would likely leave that battleship vulnerable to being destroyed by an opponent counter.
Only if an opponent moved a fleet into range where it could be completely destroyed, and the opponent had no counter, would a battleship really be useful. Make sense?
But competent opponents are not likely to do that.
So you can see where J has another destroyer, which can usefully hunt subs, which is yet considered expendable, and is cheap insofar as naval battles go, considering it can defend against air while subs can’t - at any rate, you can see how it can be more useful to counterpressure than a battleship. It doesn’t seem to make sense, but when it’s understood the destroyer may be considered fully expendable where the battleship is not, there it is.
If the battleship were fully expendable, then of course it’s more useful than a destroyer - but nobody likes to throw away battleships, they’re pretty useful and too costly to replace. So there it is.
COUNTERPRESSURE - LOSING FIGHTERS IS OKAY - BECAUSE -
If Japan defends with counterpressure and the battleship wasn’t such a big loss, then what about the loss of fighters? Fighters are obviously great at counterpressure.
Except not so much. That seems ridiculous; fighters seem to be the essence of counterpressure; they hit, they retreat, they are not vulnerable to attack (mostly).
But counterpressure is a matter of application as well as abstraction.
Suppose UK1 does not hit sz37 and Japan has six fighters two carriers to apply counterpressure. Besides cleaning up UK assets in Indian and Pacific Oceans, exactly where does J want to have counterpressure?
J wants to threaten the India sea zone to prevent any UK naval buys from getting going. J wants to threaten the east Australia sea zone if not hitting Hawaiian Islands fleet to prevent US from moving a fleet there with two fighters and a third fighter to West Canada, then on US2 moving those fighters to India. (Though this US action is too late against an Axis pressure line threatening G3 West Russia. A bit more on that later, and I expect I’ll do a writeup on the G3 W Rus line itself in another thread). J also wants to threaten the Iwo Jima sea zone and the zone north of it; if the US unites fleet there, it can threaten both J’s sea zones which pressures against J building any new naval units unless bringing its entire fleet back to defend the sea zone, which in turn restricts J’s freedom to move ground units where it wants (typically Yunnan).
J can counterpressure with navy at the Philippines sea zone, but fighters are a problem. Placing J1 fighters at Kwangtung allows J2 to support a G2 Ukraine push and hold attempt, but most of those fighters do not have range to some of those critical zones. Four fighters only can typically be used for counterpressure; those fighters that can land on carriers.
If UK1 hits sz37, I’ve argued elsewhere that J1 buys a carrier - not because I like it. I very much do not like it; I typically argue against tactically inflexible units, and I’ve commented that after a J1 buy, the Allies can go KGF, leaving any dedicated naval investment useless.
But a J1 carrier is immensely useful. It is a powerful defender, joined by sub, two destroyers, and cruiser along with two already existing fighters for defense against air threats. It also extends effective fighter range for counterpressure.
If carriers and fighters are great, why not buy more? The answer is, after UK1 to sz37, Japan already has fighters to fill a second carrier. Japan does not have any more fighters to fill a third and would have to buy them - quite expensive, and very possibly not the best use of resources.
As to if the Allies do not hit sz37, two carriers is adequate to a range of early air threats and additional counterpressure and control should mostly come through subs, destroyers, or tactically flexible fighters that don’t tie defense down.
In practice, a J1 carrier may not help to counterpressure the aforementioned sea zones, for J2 at least. In theory, fighters landed on the new carrier could reach the various sea zones, but there’s often reason to put fighters elsewhere (like Kwangtung).
At any rate, remember anti-KJF is not strictly about stacking defense, but about counterpressure, and loss of 2 J fighters is not necessarily critical.