The “just sit and wait for the Phony War to end in April 1940” option is a bit perplexing as an answer to “You are the German High Command! What is your next Combat Movement?” because it seems to imply that the Phony War was operating on a fixed timetable, and that this timetable was in someone else’s hands. The lack of action on land on the Western Front is certainly due in part to inaction by France and Britain (whose strategy was basically to sit around for a couple of years to built up their strength for a showdown, while simultaneously hoping that the Nazi regime would be overthrown by a coup), but it was also very much a deliberate choice by Germany. The Wehrmacht needed to analyze the Polish Campaign, fix the tactical and operational elements that hadn’t worked as well as expected, plan the upcoming campaign against France and the Low Countries, rest and replenish its forces, give them more training, provide them with additional equipment, and redeploy them to the west. Doing this properly took time, but Germany could afford to take the time to do the job right because of the lack of Anglo-French pressure on the western front. ( In other words, by sitting on their collective hindquarters France and Britain surrendered the strategic initiative to Germany, which gave the Wehrmacht the luxury of attacking at the time and place of its own choosing.) Moreover, the time period during which these activities took place were the fall of 1939 and the winter of 1939-1940, which was conveniently timed because this meant that the Wehrmacht wouldn’t have to fight in the fall (manageable, but rainy and muddy) or in the winter (far less harsh in the West than in Russia, but still potentially nasty as veterans of the Battle of the Bulge will recall). The late spring / early summer period chosen for the offensive in the West was much more congenial for military operations.
French divisions mobilized in 1939
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There’s a little “dilemma” that I’ve had for a while:
In the book If the Allies Had Fallen: Sixty Alternate Scenarios of World War 2, in chapter 2 scenario C (scenario was “What if the French launched an all-out attack to help the Poles?”), written by John K Munholland (who died 4 years ago), it is stated that on September 10 the French mobilized 110 divisions of all types. Because it was talking about an offensive against Germany in 1939 and noted some divisions would be required to garrison Africa and the border with Italy, it is safe to assume that it includes forces in these areas. 85 divisions were said to be on the German border, or capable of moving there.
Now here’s the thing. Wikipedia has a list of French divisions in World War 2, listing the mobilization dates of each unit. By counting, I turned up only 70-80 divisions. I bought George F Nafziger’s book French Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 to try to clarify, and I turned up a similar number (71 by September 5, and probably only 5-10 more over the next 5 days).
A 30-40 division gap is definitely odd and quite huge, and I haven’t found a solution in the 1-2 years since I first discovered this.
Do you know anyone or any sources that would help clarify this confusion? Thank you!New developments:
- I found testimony from Alfred Jodl mentioning “110 British and French divisions” facing the Germans. They were talking about the same time period. It’s exactly the same, but it’s something to consider.
- I found a citation for the book “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich”, mentioning a higher number, but I couldn’t find the number in the book (I’m sure it’s the same one).
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@SuperbattleshipYamato I really doubt that the Frencj could field 100 Divisions in 1939.
I would accept the lower figure of 71 as correct.
That said , they really should have pushed into Western Germany, whilst the majority of Germany’s forces were in the East.
Counting and researching Divisions: Great way to spend your free time! -
Thank you so much! I appreciate your input.
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@SuperbattleshipYamato Risking a bit of a Necro to say I am green with envy that you have ‘French Army Order of Battle 1939-1945’, it is not easy to get hold of! It’s a very interesting scenario imo. Niehosters website seems to indicate that Germany had 30 divisions assigned to Heersgruppe C in 1939, with another 11 assigned to OKW reserve for this Heersgruppe so 41 total. Presumably the Germans were fully mobilized unlike the French and were behind the formidable (if incomplete) Aachen-Saar fortifications. Many of the divisions are high numbered or from late Welle divisions but I think many of the French divisions were Light Cavalry/C category reservists anyway. So the figures are 71 French divisions and 41 German.
The French would have been risking alot of their best regular divisions in such an attack and even a wildly successful attack would have ran into the Rhine/Mossel rivers. I imagine the experience of 1914 would have given such an attack a bad taste in the mouth of most French generals, particularly as their plan was to fight the Germans together in 1941 with the British.
I have a low key theory that the French genuinely were attacking pretty much as fast as they were able in September 1939. They started their attack on the 7th day of mobilisation (which is the minimum amount of time to bring their heavy guns forward from the positions behind the Maginot) then stopped after advancing through the German outpost line to the limit of the guns range, fended off a counterattack, then stopped for another 7 days to bring the guns forward (now into actual range of the main line) with French mobilisation scheduled to finish on September 16th. However, on the 14th the news of the Soviet invasion and Polish collapse arrived, rendering their attack near pointless to help the Poles. This pace of attack fits near perfect with French ‘Battle Methodic’ doctrine.
During the time the press (and British High Command) tore into the French for their slowness, and were joined postwar by Wehrmacht generals and Americans and was presented as a great missed opportunity, but the more I look at this the more I am coming to see it as a manufactured myth. The only way the French would have been ready to launch an attack in September 1939 is if they had mobilized with (or before) the Germans, and that was something the British (and much of the public) staunchly opposed, just as they stopped Poland from mobilizing until too late. The fear that mobilisation would trigger a war was too great.
Please feel free to poke holes in my theory!
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@Lancasterlaw1175 fantastic post ; thank you.
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I think your hypothesis is broadly correct.
But I think on a technical and logistical level (not sure about political), it seems to me that it was perfectly possible for the French to mobilize and brings the guns to the front much earlier, before September. This would’ve allowed them to begin attacking almost immediately and shatter the German lines. In retrospect, the French should be at fault for not mobilizing (and preventing the Poles from doing so).
The vast majority of Army Group C divisions were undersized (or even just command headquarters), while only about half of the French ones were deficient in some way (Nafziger’s book also lists the condition of French divisions in September-October 193o).
I got the book online here:
https://www.amazon.com/French-Order-Battle-World-1939-1945/dp/1585450189
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