@crockett36
I take issue with U.S. not scrambling at Hawaii. Its a losing defense, but killing the destroyer and maybe extra plane is the priority. This is because the U.S. fleet at San Diego can reach and assuming Japan keeps 2 fighters to land on the carriers, you can take out much or 100% of Japan’s fleet at Wake and Japan losing carriers and planes is a big win.
The issue for Japan becomes that you can take 3 hits (destroyer and 1 carrier) before you have to choose between wounding a carrier (and automatically losing 2 planes) or losing planes and risking the battle.
You can use a transport to take Wake on J1, but now we’re talking about missed opportunities down the road… that transport usually brings troops south and will be out of use for 3 turns (J1-J3) if it survives at all. But that would allow your fighters to survive.
So… is that worth it for the U.S.? Maybe. Japan loses 2 carriers, 4 planes, 2 destroyers, and a sub. (88ipcs, depending on if you take Wake Island with a transport) vs U.S. (78 ipcs after losing 54 ipcs from Japan’s attack). That may sound unbalanced but the U.S. makes 30+ ipcs more than Japan for 3+ rounds this way. Focusing your attack south closing that gap noticeably quicker and you can still keep the U.S. back from interfering for a while.
Japan will also lose a transport at Borneo to the UKPac. Now Japan can’t take the Money Islands on J2. You let China keep Yunnan, so they’re buying artillery.
So slowing down the U.S. cost Japan 1-2 ipcs on J1, 10ipcs on J2, 5+ipcs on J3 and UKPac gets +8 or more ipcs… its hard to know what happens after that but China and UKPac can be relatively aggressive with no real threat of Calcutta falling to transports. ANZAC’s fleet becomes a threat quickly since Japan only has 1 carrier to help defend its fleet.