Good link for understanding Japans war plans before 1941

@abworsham4

I read that, and is one of my sources. Funny enough, KaLeu put a link to Quora asking the same question, and one of the answers just copied and pasted the article you sent me.

HERE

Notice the machine gun on top and the men posted

Zeppelins

In 1939 the Soviet Union seized the eastern half of Poland. In 1940 it followed that up by annexing Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and part of Romania. In addition it launched a war of aggression against Finland, seizing about 10% of Finland’s total land area. Inhabitants in conquered territories were treated brutally. For example in the east half of Poland 10% of the population was lost due to deportation or outright liquidation.

FDR did not meaningfully pressure the Soviets to renounce their strategy of territorial aggression. Moreover, he did not put serious pressure on Japan to abandon its policy of expansion in China–at least not in 1937 when the wave of expansion in question had been released. FDR’s hard line stance against Japanese expansion did not manifest itself until 1941.

FDR’s warlike opposition to Japanese aggression in China was not the result of a universalist policy of opposing aggressive territorial expansion in general. If it had been, he would have been equally assertive in opposing Soviet expansion. Nor was his opposition driven by a particularist concern for the Chinese: he waited four years between the start of the Japanese offensive in China before initiating his efforts to provoke war with Japan. Those efforts started in 1941, shortly after Germany had invaded the Soviet Union.

Prior to Barbarossa, German military planners had anticipated having to deal with 200 Soviet divisions. By the mid to late fall of '41 they had already encountered nearly double that number. During the winter of '41 - '42, the Soviets shipped an additional 100 divisions west across the Trans-Siberian railway. Prior to Pearl Harbor, Stalin had held those divisions in reserve on his eastern front, to defend against possible Japanese aggression. With Japan going to war against the United States, Stalin knew that Japan would be too preoccupied elsewhere to launch much of an attack against the U.S.S.R. The hundred divisions in question could therefore be used on the German front.

None of the above could have been accomplished, had the U.S. and Japan signed a mutually acceptable peace agreement. That is why FDR’s administration ignored Japan’s various peace proposals, while pursuing a policy of deliberately provoking Japan into doing what it ultimately did.

The Siege of Tobruk lasted for 241 days in 1941, after Axis forces advanced through Cyrenaica from El Agheila in Operation Sonnenblume against the British Western Desert Force (WDF) in Libya, during the Western Desert Campaign (1940–1943) of the Second World War. In late 1940, the British had defeated the Italian 10th Army during Operation Compass (9 December 1940 – 9 February 1941) and trapped the remnants at Beda Fomm. German troops and Italian reinforcements reached Libya, while much of the WDF was sent to Greece and replaced by a skeleton force, short of equipment and supplies.

Operation Sonnenblume (6 February – 25 May 1941), forced the British into a retreat to the Egyptian border. A garrison was left behind at Tobruk, to deny the port to the Axis, while the WDF reorganised and prepared a counter-offensive. The Axis siege of Tobruk began on 10 April, when the port was attacked by a force under Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel and continued during three relief attempts, Operation Brevity (15–16 May), Operation Battleaxe (15–17 June) and Operation Crusader (18 November – 30 December). The occupation of Tobruk deprived the Axis of a supply port closer to the Egypt-Libya border than Benghazi, 900 miles (1,400 km) west of the Egyptian frontier, which was within the range of RAF bombers; Tripoli was 1,500 kilometres (930 mi) to the west in Tripolitania.

The siege diverted Axis troops from the frontier and the Tobruk garrison repulsed several attacks. The port was frequently bombarded by artillery, dive-bombers and medium bombers, as the RAF flew defensive sorties from airfields far away in Egypt. British Mediterranean Fleet and Inshore Squadron ships ran the blockade, to carry reinforcements and supplies in and wounded and prisoners out. On 27 November, Tobruk was relieved by the 8th Army (the name of British, Commonwealth, Imperial and Allied forces in the Western Desert since September 1941), during Operation Crusader.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Tobruk

I have decided to no longer post polls, but instead post questions for discussion instead.
Might make your answers to my questions easier to give an opinion on.

The Siege of Tobruk began in April 75 years ago.
Rommel was tenacious, and the British certainly did not want to give up this important port to the Axis powers.
History says that this was one of Rommel’s greatest victories when Tobruk finally fell.
History also says that this one of Britain’s finest hours, holding out as long as they did.
Tell me your impressions as we now enter the heart of the Western Desert Campaign in North Africa.

@CWO:

@Narvik:

I spent some of my military service up there in the 80ties, and cant belive how Churchill in 1940 would think it was even remotely possible to walk 50 000 Brits over the mountain with no skies and no supply and no winter gear.

Churchill had a track record of cooking up grandiose flanking operations that looked impressive on maps but which were of dubious practical value, and a bad habit of giving a completely inadequate amount of thought to their operational and logistical details.  Gallipoli in WWI is the most notorious example, and the 1940 British invasion of Norway had many of the same problems: it was planned too quickly and too superficially, and like Gallipoli it was based on the premise that an amphibious invasion can be improvised by basically just loading a bunch of troops onto standard Royal Navy warships and throwing them at an enemy coastline.  As the Americans eventually learned in the Pacific, successful amphibious operations require months of careful planning and training, lots of specialized equipment, and close inter-service cooperation.  So it doesn’t surprise me that Churchill wouldn’t have bothered considering the practicality of marching several divisions of British troops through Norway’s mountains, in winter, with no special training or equipment.  Another place where he made this mistake was Italy, which was another of his pet flanking operation concepts.  His argument that Italy was the “soft underbelly of the crocodile” falls apart when you look at a topographical map of the Italian peninsula: it’s ideal country for a defender because it basically consists of narrow coastal plains (defilades in military parlance) flanking a rugged mountainous interior.  And to (literally) top it all off: where would the invading Allies have ended up if they had managed to fight all the way up to the top of the Italian boot?  In the Alps.

I think you make some very good points.

But the invasion of Africa was to secure Britains fuel links to the middle east.
Also I believe his intention was to invade Greece.

I do believe that in some ways the invasion of Greece would make some sense
as it could help with the Russians more readily once the fronts meet up.
Also a third of Germany’s oil comes from the Romanian town (or city) of Polesti

@Razor:

I think Stalin sabotaged the Republicans cause since he was afraid of disturbing UK, they sure did not want a commy state as neighbour. Imagine UK joining up with Germany against communism in Europe.

I think that over-zealous Comintern agents and an NKVD infiltrated PCE (the communist part of Spain) are what really caused the most damage to the Spanish Republic. The wasting of men and material on useless “prestige” offensives in places like Brunete and Teruel, the lack of initiative shown the Soviet advisors and their communist promoted officers, and the persecution of Republic supporting groups like the CNT, UGT (anarchists) and the POUMS (Spain’s Marxist/trotskiest party) did the most damage.

Also, the other single biggest enemy of the Republic and the country that did the most to help the Nationalists and hurt the Republic was the United Kingdom. Their policy of “non-intervention” and the stupid committee they set up that did absolutely nothing. Even when given proof that both Germany AND Italy were blatantly ignoring their roles in this non-intervention committee, and actively helping Franco with troops and equipment, the UK did nothing. Also Britain keep France from helping the Republic by suggesting that they would not back France against the Germans if they did. It was part of the UK’s stupid policy of appeasement that did the most damage to the Republic and thrust them into the arms of the Soviets, and all the damage that caused.

Well of course, but its more than just those wars.  One can say the Greek/Persian Wars had ramifications on WW1 and WW2.  Cause its ramifications were alot bigger and grander thna just WW1 and WW2 while still including them.  My point earlier was with all this talk about keeping things in relavent forums, one can simply put this stuff in the general forum or ask some one to create a forum titled Military History.