I gave Germany 5 starting tactical bombers with only 4 starting fighters on purpose, because Hitler was obsessed with fighter-bombers, and he probably built too many fighter-bombers at the expense of having enough traditional fighters to guarantee air superiority. The 1941-era Luftwaffe was also famous for its Stuka dive-bombers, which provided close tactical air support, much like a tactical bomber. As the new commander starting in 1941, you’re free to reverse that policy and start building fighters if you want, but I wanted to have a historical start.
Too bad you solved Eastern Canada lack of Infantry issue on one hand and create a similar scratches on my back on the other… :-D
I really want to see paired Fg-TcB when it counts in direct planes vs planes.
Adding more TcBs than Fgs in Germany and elsewhere in Europe doesn’t bother me.
Don’t forget TcB can be useful on front line to add more punch to Tank.
You forced me into reading more deeply about this part of Barbarossa Air war.
I found the numbers:
The strength of the Luftwaffe amounted to 4,389 aircraft, of which 2,598 were combat types and 1,939 were operational. The inventory amounted to 929 bombers, 793 fighters, 376 dive-bombers, 70 destroyers (Messerschmitt Bf 110s), 102 reconnaissance, and 60 ground attack aircraft, plus 200 fighters in reserve and 60 miscellaneous types.[2] Around 68 per cent of the German air strength was operational.
The number of aircraft that would face the Axis in the five (Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev, and Odessa) border districts, out of 13 military districts in the west of the country, was 5,440 (1,688 bombers, 2,736 fighters, 336 close support aircraft, 252 reconnaissance, and 430 army-controlled) aircraft. Around 4,700 were considered to be combat aircraft, but only 2,850 were thought to be modern. Of this total, 1,360 bombers and reconnaissance aircraft and 1,490 fighters were combat-ready. Luftwaffe intelligence suggested that a ground support force of 150,000 ground- and aircrew and 15,000 pilots were available.[53] The actual strength of the VVS in the western Soviet Union was 13,000 to 14,000 aircraft, as opposed to the 2,800 aircraft considered operational by the Luftwaffe.[1]
VVS: Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily Raboche-Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya (Military Aviation of the Workers and Peasants Red Army, or VVS-RKKA, often abbreviated to VVS)
I would say Hitler’s general views on TcB Stukas is not relevant on Fgs vs Bombers ratios when you read the historical facts about Luftwaffe expertise in Barbarossa.
However, it seems there should be no StBombers (one at most to figure for bombing on London I suppose), only TcBs:
Strategic capability
Jeschonnek’s view of air warfare was also flawed. He believed in the quick war. To this end he advocated throwing in all personnel, even training instructors into short but intensive campaigns. He did not believe in retaining reserves of pilots or material. He also, like Ernst Udet, head of the Technical Department, favoured dive bombers. He insisted all aircraft should have the capability, which retarded the development of capable bombers like the Heinkel He 177, by complicating the design, thus delaying development and production.[46] The lack of a heavy bomber denied the Luftwaffe the chance to hit Soviet factories in the far reaches of the Urals and at least disrupt enemy production.[4]
And from game play, I really like to have some kind of planes vs planes in both Archangel (I would get rid of single Infantry there) and Western Russia. Placing many Soviet Fgs and TcBs gives the full impact of how, at start Germany was outnumbered in aircrafts but after initial assault, a tactical victory was achieved.
However, your point about giving some flexibility about not totally scripting the opening is relevant. Giving the choice between Royal Navy or Fg in Archangel is one of them.
Other objectives might be Russian Navy in Black Sea: 1 Cruiser, 1 Sub and 1 TP?
Attrition on Caucasus is also possible if there is less plane in Germany and more on frontline (Poland 1 Fg + 1 TcB Bulgaria Romania 1 Fg + 1 TcB) + 1 TcB in any.
The idea about not placing Soviet Infantry on front is about showing the casualty on war engines. It better depicts the vast quantities of Soviet materials lost. Infantry lost will come in G2-R2, G3-R3 and so forth anyway.
It seems that Soviet were very unprepared and, not only a lot of planes were destroyed in airfield, the lack of tactical skills and understanding too. It takes time before Soviet Air commands give the order to send bombers with escorting Fighters. Many soviet bomber pilots were sacrificed and turkey shot by German’s Fighter pilots:
The Luftwaffe was highly effective at carrying out close support operations,[38] in direct or indirect support of the army and at winning and maintaining air superiority. German doctrine, and experiences in the Spanish Civil War, then Europe, had developed suitable aircraft for the role, such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88 and Junkers Ju 87. Their aircrews were still highly trained, and despite attrition, still had a cadre of experienced personnel. The air-to-ground support was the best in the World at the time. Forward air controllers (Flivos) were attached to every mechanised and panzer division, to allow for accurate air support, free from friendly-fire incidents and in real time.[39][40]
The German air operations staff, at all levels, also practiced the concept of Auftragstaktik (or mission command) doctrine. It encouraged the improvisation of tactics within the framework of set operational goals and advocated by-passing some levels of command under some circumstances. The air units were told what to achieve by high echelons, but not how to do it. This form of command was encouraged at the lowest levels to maintain the initiative and operational tempo.[41] The form of warfare was an ad hoc style, but it allowed field commanders to dis-assemble and re-assemble command structures at Air Corps level, and commit them to a crisis, or urgent operations within a short period of time. This gave the Luftwaffe an unmatched degree of tactical and operational flexibility.[42]
Tactics and technical standards
In the tactical arena the Germans held significant leads against the Soviets. While the Soviets were not as primitive in aircraft design quality as believed, it was in tactical deployment, combat tactics, and training, along with accumulated experience that the Germans held qualitative superiority. In particular, the German Finger-four tactic was better and more flexible than the Vic formation adopted by the Soviets. Moreover, all German fighters possessed radios, so they could communicate with each other. Soviet aircraft lacked this, and pilots had to communicate with hand signals.[50] Despite repeated warnings in the Winter War and Soviet-Japanese Border Wars, little to no investment was made in signals or air-to-air communications. During the later conflict, radios were not used and were thus removed. This was mostly because Soviet radios were too heavy and effected combat performance, while the Germans developed light radios.[51]
On Soviet combat capability
The view of Soviet fighter aircraft, namely the I-16, was positive. But the rest of the VVS’ aircraft were deemed obsolete. However, the view formed of Soviet flying crews and operational personnel was not good. In the German view they lacked General Staff training and operational procedure was cumbersome, though they managed to offset some weaknesses by skilful improvisation. Operations were deemed to be lacking in flexibility in attack and defence and they suffered heavy losses for it. Aircrews were considered brave and eager defending their own territory, but showed a lack of fighting spirit over enemy territory. Outstanding pilots were the exception, rather than the norm. Training of Soviet pilots in formation flying was poor, as it was in bombers. Anti-aircraft units showed increased progress but the Luftwaffe saw serious shortcomings in air-to-air and air-land communication.
While numerically the strongest air force in the world, the VVS was an imbalanced force in comparison to the British, Americans and Germans at the time of Barbarossa. It relied on too few established designers and an over-centralised system which produced aircraft that fell behind the standards of most powers. The VVS was also profoundly influenced by Giulio Douhet, and the theory of air power that was focused on the offensive, and bombing the enemy heartland. It was overloaded with inadequately designed bombers, which were expected to survive in combat. In 1938 production of light and strike aircraft as well as fighters was to be cut in two to allow for more bomber aircraft to be produced.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_Soviet_air_operations_during_Operation_Barbarossa
And this last point just showed that in fact Red Army was so much attack oriented that their own aircrafts ratio was off-balanced in bombers!
Here is my playtest. You should look at G1 and J1 mostly. It goes until G3.
I stubbornly attack Russia, they beat my airforce.
Japan aircraft carriers positions allows an almost complete US Navy obliteration.
Only USS Enterprise CV-6 survived the initial slaughter.
I’m not sure it was intended from your part…
I left unattended China however.
There is also a snapshot of what kind of German and Soviet border I’m thinking of…
I didn’t change German’s ground units, only aircrafts.
Russian border is more a mixed of units, I even left Baltic States with one Infantry.
This represents the Soviet invasion forces needed to puppet these states.
The idea is that you can replace 1 Tank for 1 TcB, it is the same Defense value, but gives a very different TUV and at glance be more impressive.
I scaled the number of planes according to aircrafts casualty ratios in Black_Elk doc. from 1 in Baltic to 2 in Belorussia, to 3 planes in Ukraine.

1941_Alpha02_Argo_3Russia.tsvg