Responding to the Med Island concerns:
Between Allied and Axis control of the UK Med islands, there’s an 8 PU swing. Eight PUs for three islands in two sea zones may seem slightly more than what they deserve, convoys and supply lines included, but a major reason for those med NOs is to give more importance to the med–in vanilla G40, going north was almost always a better option. Indeed, even in BM with the added NOs, there is still more to gain by going north than by going into the Med as Allies in terms of income differential, not to mention that going north allows easier protection and reinforcements from UK’s capital, and also threatens Germany’s capital.’
Ultimately, the test for any NO configuration is this: What impact does it have on gameplay? And, perhaps secondarily, does it have any foundation in historical fact?
By either or both standards, the current configuration of med island NOs easily passes muster. Is there anyone who seriously argues these NOs do not create more action in the Med? Or that giving Germany and Italy the extra income in the Med creates an imbalance in Axis’s favor (no, to the contrary, the emerging consensus has been that the BM advantage goes to Allies. While it comes down to a matter of opinion, to some extent, I feel that the med Island NOs create naval engagement in the Mediterranean that is more interesting, more varied, and more intense. It expands strategic choices and opportunities for both sides.
To the historical point. even cursory research reveals the huge importance the warring parties placed on these islands. In the context of the war, they could hardly be described as “obscure.”
From the wiki article on the Siege of Malta:
**_The Siege of Malta was a military campaign in the Mediterranean Theatre of the Second World War. From 1940–42, the fight for the control of the strategically important island of Malta pitted the air forces and navies of Italy and Germany against the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.
The opening of a new front in North Africa in mid-1940 increased Malta’s already considerable value. British air and sea forces based on the island could attack Axis ships transporting vital supplies and reinforcements from Europe. General Erwin Rommel, in de facto field command of Axis forces in North Africa, recognised its importance quickly. In May 1941, he warned that “Without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa”.[1]
The Axis resolved to bomb or starve Malta into submission, by attacking its ports, towns, cities, and Allied shipping supplying the island. Malta was one of the most intensively bombed areas during the war._**
From the Wiki article on the Battle of Crete:
**_British forces had initially garrisoned Crete when the Italians attacked Greece on 28 October 1940,[13] enabling the Greek government to employ the Fifth Cretan Division in the mainland campaign.[14] This arrangement suited the British: Crete could provide the Royal Navy with excellent harbours in the eastern Mediterranean, from which it could threaten the Axis south-eastern flank,[15] and the Ploieşti oil fields in Romania would be within range of British bombers based on the island.
The Italians were repulsed, but the subsequent German invasion of April 1941 (Operation Marita), succeeded in overrunning mainland Greece. At the end of the month 57,000 Allied troops were evacuated by the Royal Navy. Some were sent to Crete to bolster its garrison until fresh forces could be organised, although most had lost their heavy equipment.[16] Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, sent a telegram to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), General Sir John Dill: “To lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces there would be a crime.”[17] . . . .
Hitler remained concerned about attacks . . . on his Romanian fuel supply,[14] and Luftwaffe commanders were enthusiastic about the idea of seizing Crete by a daring airborne attack.[19] Hitler was won over by the audacious proposal and in Directive 31 he asserted that “Crete… will be the operational base from which to carry on the air war in the Eastern Mediterranean, in co-ordination with the situation in North Africa.”[21]_**
And, regarding Cyprus, we learn from http://countrystudies.us/cyprus/10.htm:
As it had twenty-five years earlier, [Cyprus] became important as a supply and training base and as a naval station, but this time its use as an air base made it particularly significant to the overall Allied cause.
So the Med Island NO configuration is historically plausible and promotes engagement in a theater that too often was a stagnant pond in vanilla.
