G40 Redesign (currently taking suggestions)

@Argothair:

That could work nicely for an alternate set of VCs! Collect $1 per “point” per turn of each Victory City in flexdollars, and if you collect $25 or more, then you double your flexdollar take.

Black Elk, maybe you’re right that the 8 VC threshold for doubling would work for an otherwise OOB 1942.2. It’s easy for Germany to hold Leningrad and for Japan to grab Honolulu, but harder for them to hold it against even one USA attack, and the cash doesn’t get distributed until after the USA’s turn. If Japan manages to take and hold Honolulu for one full turn, but then loses it again, I guess it’s not the end of the world if the Axis get an extra one-time bonus of $8 in flexdollars. That seems proportionate!

Likewise, if the Allies have lost Calcutta but are still trading all three of Paris, Rome, and Leningrad (so they hold those cities at the end of America’s turn, but not necessarily at the end of Germany’s turn), then they deserve an $8 boost, because they’re trampling over the Atlantik Wall and turning into the Atlantic Rubble. Same thing if the Allies hold Calcutta and trade both Paris and Rome in the same turn – they deserve a boost. That’s not cheap; that’s proportionate; it’s part of Germany’s job to make sure that the Allies don’t penetrate into the European heartland. The Allies can land in Norway or Northwest Europe and Germany doesn’t lose major income, but if the Allies actually make it into both France and Rome, even if they can’t quite stay there, then that ought to signal the endgame and trigger a bonus.

Instead of a given number to double up, suppose each conquered VC worth double.
Using 4 VCs vs 4 VCs, excluding Capital City, suppose each worth 2 IPCs.
Each side gets 8 IPCs for Warchest. But, if Axis gets another VC by the end of US turn, it worth 4 IPCs.
This would rise Axis to 12 IPCs while Allies would get 6 IPCs. Anothe VCs, 16 IPCs vs 4 IPCs.
Retrieved VC worth only 2 IPCs but other enemy VC still 4 IPCs.

One problem is Karelia, Soviet cannot fight back before end of round and sharing money.
Same issue for Germany, loosing Paris or Rome, cannot be taken by the end of round.
If all VCs considered 2 IPCs, it makes Axis 12 and Allies 14.
With Karelia taken, Axis 16 vs Allies 12.

That way, the 8th VC makes an Axis 20 vs 10 IPCs a pretty high differential.
If Allies keep leads, 8 to 5, then Axis 10 and Allies 18.

Probably 1 IPC per VC can work, with 2 IPCs per additional.
For each VC taken it makes 3 IPCs swing. By itself, 8 VCs give 4 or 5 more IPCs to one side.
You get this kind of IPCs progression:
VCs    Axis    Alllies
3vs10  3        13
4vs9    4        11
5vs8    5        9
6vs7    6        7
7vs6    8        6
8vs5    10      5
9vs4    12      4
10vs3  14      3
So, 1 VC makes 2 or 4 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 5 or 7 IPCs differential.

You get this kind of IPCs progression if 2 IPCs per TTy + 4 per VC conquered:
VCs    Axis    Alllies
3vs10  6        26
4vs9    8        22
5vs8    10      18
6vs7    12      14
7vs6    16      12
8vs5    20      10
9vs4    24      8
10vs3  28      6
So, 1 VC makes 4 or 8 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 10 or 14 IPCs differential.

If capital VCs are excluded, 4 vs 4 VCs.
You get this kind of IPCs progression if 2 IPCs per TTy + 4 per VC conquered:
VCs    Axis    Alllies
1vs7    2        20
2vs6    4        16
3vs5    6        12
4vs4    8        8
5vs3    12      6
6vs2    16      4
7vs1    20      2
8vs0    24      0
So, 1 VC makes 6 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 12 IPCs differential.
So, the more VCs you get the more you have money to share amongst friendly powers.

@Baron:

@Argothair:

That could work nicely for an alternate set of VCs! Collect $1 per “point” per turn of each Victory City in flexdollars, and if you collect $25 or more, then you double your flexdollar take.

Black Elk, maybe you’re right that the 8 VC threshold for doubling would work for an otherwise OOB 1942.2. It’s easy for Germany to hold Leningrad and for Japan to grab Honolulu, but harder for them to hold it against even one USA attack, and the cash doesn’t get distributed until after the USA’s turn. If Japan manages to take and hold Honolulu for one full turn, but then loses it again, I guess it’s not the end of the world if the Axis get an extra one-time bonus of $8 in flexdollars. That seems proportionate!

Likewise, if the Allies have lost Calcutta but are still trading all three of Paris, Rome, and Leningrad (so they hold those cities at the end of America’s turn, but not necessarily at the end of Germany’s turn), then they deserve an $8 boost, because they’re trampling over the Atlantik Wall and turning into the Atlantic Rubble. Same thing if the Allies hold Calcutta and trade both Paris and Rome in the same turn – they deserve a boost. That’s not cheap; that’s proportionate; it’s part of Germany’s job to make sure that the Allies don’t penetrate into the European heartland. The Allies can land in Norway or Northwest Europe and Germany doesn’t lose major income, but if the Allies actually make it into both France and Rome, even if they can’t quite stay there, then that ought to signal the endgame and trigger a bonus.

Instead of a given number to double up, suppose each conquered VC worth double.
Using 4 VCs vs 4 VCs, excluding Capital City, suppose each worth 2 IPCs.
Each side gets 8 IPCs for Warchest. But, if Axis gets another VC by the end of US turn, it worth 4 IPCs.
This would rise Axis to 12 IPCs while Allies would get 6 IPCs. Anothe VCs, 16 IPCs vs 4 IPCs.
Retrieved VC worth only 2 IPCs but other enemy VC still 4 IPCs.

One problem is Karelia, Soviet cannot fight back before end of round and sharing money.
Same issue for Germany, loosing Paris or Rome, cannot be taken by the end of round.
If all VCs considered 2 IPCs, it makes Axis 12 and Allies 14.
With Karelia taken, Axis 16 vs Allies 12.

That way, the 8th VC makes an Axis 20 vs 10 IPCs a pretty high differential.
If Allies keep leads, 8 to 5, then Axis 10 and Allies 18.

Probably 1 IPC per VC can work, with 2 IPCs per additional.
For each VC taken it makes 3 IPCs swing. By itself, 8 VCs give 4 or 5 more IPCs to one side.
You get this kind of IPCs progression:
VCs    Axis    Alllies
3vs10  3        13
4vs9    4        11
5vs8    5         9
6vs7    6         7
7vs6    8         6
8vs5    10       5
9vs4    12       4
10vs3  14      3
So, 1 VC makes 2 or 4 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 5 or 7 IPCs differential.

You get this kind of IPCs progression if 2 IPCs per TTy + 4 per VC conquered:
VCs    Axis    Alllies
3vs10  6        26
4vs9    8         22
5vs8    10       18
6vs7    12       14
7vs6    16       12
8vs5    20       10
9vs4    24       8
10vs3  28      6
So, 1 VC makes 4 or 8 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 10 or 14 IPCs differential.

If capital VCs are excluded, 4 vs 4 VCs.
You get this kind of IPCs progression if 2 IPCs per TTy + 4 per VC conquered:
VCs    Axis    Alllies
1vs7    2         20
2vs6    4         16
3vs5    6         12
4vs4    8         8
5vs3    12       6
6vs2    16       4
7vs1    20       2
8vs0    24       0
So, 1 VC makes 6 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 12 IPCs differential.
So, the more VCs you get the more you have money to share amongst friendly powers.

Keeping 4 vs 4 non-capital VCs, it makes sense because you get a different IPCs swing reward compared to Capital conquest.
VCs gives money in the Warchest while Capital taken gives looting enemy 's power cash in hand.
Both creates a swing to help finish the game.

CWO Marc provides some reasons to explained how one action can make a swing on balance.
The link lead to an interesting thread on our actual topic:
@CWO:

@Argothair:

The problem is that the capital rules incentivize players to engage in boring, ahistorical, one-sided offensives where the players take turns steamrolling each other in opposite theaters. So how can we eliminate that incentive while still capturing a sense of drama and purpose in our victory conditions?

Maybe by introducing some sort of political-impact element to the game.  I don’t know what precise form it could take (a current approximate equivalent are the national objectives) or what kind of bonus it would translate into (perhaps cash, perhaps victory points, perhaps forward or backward movement along a political “progress towards victory” chart of some sort), but the idea would be for some territories (and some player actions, about which I’ll say more in a moment) to have higher political/symbolic value than others.

To give just one rough example: the Hawaiian Islands territory (which includes Honololu) and the Philippines territory (which includes Manila) both start out as US island territories in the Pacific, and purely on paper the Philippines territory is worth more than Hawaii (at 2 IPCs versus 1), but from a historical point of view they didn’t at all have the same political value.  If Hawaii had been occupied by Japan, the political symbolism would have been very large and very bad for the US and very large and very good for Japan; sort of a Pearl Harbor on steroids.  Fortunately it never happened.  By contrast, the Philippines were actually occupied by Japan; in the US, this event provoked a mixture of anger and embarrassment, but at a level that was quite manageable.

Some sort of political-impact factor relating to player actions in general could also, perhaps, help with problems such as the two-theatre issue you’ve mentioned.  Players could be rewarded not just for holding specific territories with high symbolic value; they could also be rewarded for taking political considerations into account when planning their overall strategy.  I won’t go into the details here (though I can provide them if you want), but there were a number of reasons why historically the US fought a two-theatre war in WWII, and some of those reasons were political in nature.  Those kinds of considerations aren’t currently reflected in the A&A rules (which don’t use politics as a hard-wired element of the victory conditions), so naturally the players can ignore these factors and follow strategies that (as you mention) are both inaccurate from a historical viewpoint and unsatisfactory from a gaming viewpoint.

@CWO:

To pick up on Argothair’s reference to momentous turning points of the war being something that could perhaps be reflected in a revised system of victory conditions, here’s a concrete example of a territory (and of events associated with it) which turned out to have major political and strategic implications for both the Allies and the Axis in WWII, even though in Global 1940 this territory has no IPC value, contains no victory city, and has no OOB national objectives associated with it.  That territory is Sicily.

For the Allies, the planned invasion of Sicily was (among other things) designed to benefit the overall Allied war effort by helping to keep the Soviet/Anglo-American alliance glued together.  Churchill and Roosevelt were under pressure from Stalin to open a second front against Germany in continental Europe, to help relieve the pressure on the Soviets, who felt – with some justification – that they were bearing the brunt of the land war with Germany.  The Anglo-American argument that their strategic bombing offensive against Germany was a kind of “second front” wasn’t satisfactory from Stalin’s point of view, but at the same time the British and the Americans weren’t yet ready in 1943 to launch a cross-Channel invasion against occupied France.  An invasion of Italy (via Sicily) from North Africa thus offered a kind of compromise between what Stalin wanted and what the Anglo-Americans were unable to do.  (It also helped that Churchill had the same fondness in both WWI and WWII for strategic outflanking schemes of debatable value.  He believed that Italy was “the soft underbelly of the Axis crocodile,” an assertion which ought to have sounded absurd to anyone who could read a topographical map of Italy.)

The Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in early July 1943 advanced the cause of the three main Allied powers by helping to maintain their cohesion, but it was also the start of a chain of events which ultimately had the opposite effect on the two main European Axis powers.  Mussolini was removed from power within a couple of weeks of the invasion of Sicily.  When the Allies invaded mainland Italy at the beginning of September, the new Italian government negotiated an armistice with the Allied powers, and eventually switched sides from the Axis to the Allies.  The Italian armistice led both to an Italian civil war and to the German invasion of Italy, whereby the German Army (taking advantage of the fact that Italy’s topography is well suited for defense) reduced the Allied advance to a slow grind that would last until 1945.  The German invasion of Italy (and its takeover of the Italian zones of occupation in France and the Balkans) involved about 40 divisions if I’m not mistaken, which necessarily meant reducing the number of German forces serving elsewhere.

The specifics of the above anecdote are, of course, too detailed for a simplified military-themed game like A&A, and I’m not suggesting that they (and similar ones for other territories) be modeled in detail into a new set of victory conditions.  The more general point to take away is that a particular territory (or a particular set of actions by a player) could potentially be considered to affect the course of the war in ways that aren’t reflected in a victory system which is based either on economics or on victory cities.  I’m not sure, though, if that’s what Argothair was driving at.

@Baron:

CWO Marc provides some reasons to explained how one action can make a swing on balance.
The link lead to an interesting thread on our actual topic:
@CWO:

@Argothair:

The problem is that the capital rules incentivize players to engage in boring, ahistorical, one-sided offensives where the players take turns steamrolling each other in opposite theaters. So how can we eliminate that incentive while still capturing a sense of drama and purpose in our victory conditions?

Maybe by introducing some sort of political-impact element to the game.  I don’t know what precise form it could take (a current approximate equivalent are the national objectives) or what kind of bonus it would translate into (perhaps cash, perhaps victory points, perhaps forward or backward movement along a political “progress towards victory” chart of some sort), but the idea would be for some territories (and some player actions, about which I’ll say more in a moment) to have higher political/symbolic value than others.

To give just one rough example: the Hawaiian Islands territory (which includes Honololu) and the Philippines territory (which includes Manila) both start out as US island territories in the Pacific, and purely on paper the Philippines territory is worth more than Hawaii (at 2 IPCs versus 1), but from a historical point of view they didn’t at all have the same political value.  If Hawaii had been occupied by Japan, the political symbolism would have been very large and very bad for the US and very large and very good for Japan; sort of a Pearl Harbor on steroids.  Fortunately it never happened.  By contrast, the Philippines were actually occupied by Japan; in the US, this event provoked a mixture of anger and embarrassment, but at a level that was quite manageable.

Some sort of political-impact factor relating to player actions in general could also, perhaps, help with problems such as the two-theatre issue you’ve mentioned.  Players could be rewarded not just for holding specific territories with high symbolic value; they could also be rewarded for taking political considerations into account when planning their overall strategy.  I won’t go into the details here (though I can provide them if you want), but there were a number of reasons why historically the US fought a two-theatre war in WWII, and some of those reasons were political in nature.  Those kinds of considerations aren’t currently reflected in the A&A rules (which don’t use politics as a hard-wired element of the victory conditions), so naturally the players can ignore these factors and follow strategies that (as you mention) are both inaccurate from a historical viewpoint and unsatisfactory from a gaming viewpoint.

This looks interestingly like what I proposed earlier that didn’t get much attention:

@LHoffman:

However, building on a point I made above about Japan taking Hawaii… If you really wanted to make the Pacific more of a battle ground (forget Japan invading the US), the best bet would probably be to alter victory conditions as they relate to Hawaii. Make Hawaii far more important politically. Such that if Japan takes Hawaii and holds it for a turn, the US automatically quits the war against Japan. Or something similar to that.

This would reflect history in a much more realistic fashion and brings a Pacific battleground into consideration every single game. US public and political opinion during the war would have seriously reconsidered war against Japan if Japan was to have taken such a close and important territory as Hawaii. Japan initially hoped that the attack on Pearl Harbor would be enough to dissuade the US, but that didn’t work. Physically taking Hawaii may have pushed that over the top and caused the US to sign a treaty. We will never know and I would research it more to see if that is plausible, but from what I do know that may be a darn good compromise. It makes holding Hawaii critically important to the United States and to the Allies overall. Japan could still ignore Hawaii and continue on as usual, but why wouldn’t they want to at least threaten it if it can knock a major player out of the war against them? It could even be made that if Japan takes Hawaii, they suffer an economic penalty such that they cannot spend all 80 IPCs against Germany either. Hawaii probably should probably be made harder for Japan to take in this case, or at least prevent them from doing so on their first attack.

Granted CWOMarc suggested it first sometime last year. I don’t care who gets credit for the idea, just that its merits are discussed. It seems like one of the more reasonable and non-intrusive proposals that I have seen to try and get the US to fight Japan in the Pacific.

@Baron:

@Baron:

@Argothair:

That could work nicely for an alternate set of VCs! Collect $1 per “point” per turn of each Victory City in flexdollars, and if you collect $25 or more, then you double your flexdollar take.

Black Elk, maybe you’re right that the 8 VC threshold for doubling would work for an otherwise OOB 1942.2. It’s easy for Germany to hold Leningrad and for Japan to grab Honolulu, but harder for them to hold it against even one USA attack, and the cash doesn’t get distributed until after the USA’s turn. If Japan manages to take and hold Honolulu for one full turn, but then loses it again, I guess it’s not the end of the world if the Axis get an extra one-time bonus of $8 in flexdollars. That seems proportionate!

Likewise, if the Allies have lost Calcutta but are still trading all three of Paris, Rome, and Leningrad (so they hold those cities at the end of America’s turn, but not necessarily at the end of Germany’s turn), then they deserve an $8 boost, because they’re trampling over the Atlantik Wall and turning into the Atlantic Rubble. Same thing if the Allies hold Calcutta and trade both Paris and Rome in the same turn – they deserve a boost. That’s not cheap; that’s proportionate; it’s part of Germany’s job to make sure that the Allies don’t penetrate into the European heartland. The Allies can land in Norway or Northwest Europe and Germany doesn’t lose major income, but if the Allies actually make it into both France and Rome, even if they can’t quite stay there, then that ought to signal the endgame and trigger a bonus.

Instead of a given number to double up, suppose each conquered VC worth double.
Using 4 VCs vs 4 VCs, excluding Capital City, suppose each worth 2 IPCs.
Each side gets 8 IPCs for Warchest. But, if Axis gets another VC by the end of US turn, it worth 4 IPCs.
This would rise Axis to 12 IPCs while Allies would get 6 IPCs. Anothe VCs, 16 IPCs vs 4 IPCs.
Retrieved VC worth only 2 IPCs but other enemy VC still 4 IPCs.

One problem is Karelia, Soviet cannot fight back before end of round and sharing money.
Same issue for Germany, loosing Paris or Rome, cannot be taken by the end of round.
If all VCs considered 2 IPCs, it makes Axis 12 and Allies 14.
With Karelia taken, Axis 16 vs Allies 12.

That way, the 8th VC makes an Axis 20 vs 10 IPCs a pretty high differential.
If Allies keep leads, 8 to 5, then Axis 10 and Allies 18.

Probably 1 IPC per VC can work, with 2 IPCs per additional.
For each VC taken it makes 3 IPCs swing. By itself, 8 VCs give 4 or 5 more IPCs to one side.
You get this kind of IPCs progression:
VCs� � Axis� � Alllies
3vs10� 3� � � � 13
4vs9� � 4� � � � 11
5vs8� � 5� � � � �9
6vs7� � 6� � � � �7
7vs6� � 8� � � � �6
8vs5� � 10� � � �5
9vs4� � 12� � � �4
10vs3� 14� � � 3
So, 1 VC makes 2 or 4 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 5 or 7 IPCs differential.

You get this kind of IPCs progression if 2 IPCs per TTy + 4 per VC conquered:
VCs    Axis  Alllies
3vs10   6  26
4vs9� � 8� � � � �22
5vs8� � 10� � � �18
6vs7� � 12� � � �14
7vs6� � 16� � � �12
8vs5� � 20� � � �10
9vs4� � 24� � � �8
10vs3  28 6
So, 1 VC makes 4 or 8 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 10 or 14 IPCs differential.

If capital VCs are excluded, 4 vs 4 VCs.
You get this kind of IPCs progression if 2 IPCs per TTy + 4 per VC conquered:
VCs� � Axis� � Alllies
1vs7� � 2� � � � �20
2vs6� � 4� � � � �16
3vs5� � 6� � � � �12
4vs4� � 8� � � � �8
5vs3� � 12� � � �6
6vs2� � 16� � � �4
7vs1� � 20� � � �2
8vs0� � 24� � � �0
So, 1 VC makes 6 IPCs diff, 2 VCs make 12 IPCs differential.
So, the more VCs you get the more you have money to share amongst friendly powers.

Keeping 4 vs 4 non-capital VCs, it makes sense because you get a different IPCs swing reward compared to Capital conquest.
VCs gives money in the Warchest while Capital taken gives looting enemy 's power cash in hand.
Both creates a swing to help finish the game.

I’m just willing to expand this idea by giving more starting IPCs to Allies in 1942.2, to help increase this Warchest.
I would add Stalingrad, Cairo and Sydney as VCs.
That way, excluding Capital Cities, Allies start with 7 VCs while Axis gets 4 VCs.
You get this kind of IPCs progression if 1 IPC per TTy + 2 per VC conquered:
VCs      Axis    Alllies
0vs11    0      15
1vs10    1      13
2vs9      2      11
3vs8      3      9
4vs7      4      7
5vs6      6      6
6vs5      8      5
7vs4    10      4
8vs3    12      3
9vs2    14      2
10vs1  16      1
11vs0  18      0
So, 1 VC taken by Axis (Leningrad, we may suppose) makes 0 IPC differential, but 3 IPCs if Allies takes the first VCs.
Each VC makes a 3 IPCs swing.
It can be easily given to each VC’s owner or shared according to needs.
Each side deciding what they do with this additional money.

To increase PTO action, I would consider to give New Zealand a VC: Wellington as part of ANZAC.

Hawaii, San Francisco, Sydney, Wellington and Calcutta being within grasp of Japan.
USA couldn’t let Japan do anything in PTO.

Axis winning 4 allied VCs, it gives 9 IPCs differential.

Including Wellington,
That way, excluding Capital Cities, Allies start with 8 VCs while Axis gets 4 VCs.
You get this kind of IPCs progression if 1 IPC per TTy + 2 per VC conquered:
VCs     Axis  Alllies
0vs12  0        16
1vs11  1       14
2vs10  2       12
3vs9    3       10
4vs8    4        8
5vs7    6        7
6vs6    8        6
7vs5    10      5
8vs4    12      4
9vs3    14      3
10vs2  16      2
11vs1  18      1
12vs0  20      0

Still making a 4 VCs victory conditions for Axis per side (ATO or PTO) or Allies whole map.

@LHoffman:

@CWO:

Here are a couple of thoughts about the Hawaii thing (in terms of the historical context, not in terms of the potential game angle).

A Japanese invasion and conquest of Midway was theoretically quite achievable (though in practice the Japanese operation aiming to do so failed disastrously) because the Midway island group is small and because in 1942 was essentially uninhabited except for the US military garrison there.  A Japanese invasion and conquest of Hawaii would have been in an entirely different league, in view of the fact that the Hawaiian Islands are a much larger island group (both in terms of square footage and in terms of the number of islands), had a large population, and had a considerable military infrastructure.

Conquering and occupying Hawaii, would only have been half the problem because Japan – assuming it conquered and occupied the Hawaiian Islands, something that would have required large invasion and occupation forces – would then have had to hold Hawaii over the medium to long term in order for the invasion to have been worthwhile in the first place.  In practice, this would have meant three things: keeping the occupation forces supplied, fortifying the islands in anticipation of an American counter-invasion, and fighting off the counter-invasion when it occured.  This would have been, to put it mildly, awkward.  For starters, Hawaii is roughly twice as far from Japan as it is from the continental United States, which gives the US the same advantage on the eastern side of the Pacific that Japan had when it invaded the territories (like the Philippines) that are on the western side of the Pacific.  Japan, moreover, was (relative to the United States) less industrialized, oil-poor, and superficial in its attitude towards (and its capacity for) naval logistics.  Just look at how much trouble Japan had hauling home the oil it took from the Dutch East Indies, or how badly it kept some of its island garrisons supplied during WWII, even when they were much closer to home than Hawaii.

As for the notion that losing Hawaii would have caused the US to hoist a white flag and sit down at the table with Japan to negotiate a peace treaty, I tend to think that the opposite would have happened.  The US was collectively outraged when Pearl Harbor was attacked and responded by throwing itself and all of its national resources into WWII; losing the Hawaiian Islands – assuming Japan could pull off such a feat – would probably have outraged the US a lot more, and increased the American resolve to fight rather than deflating it.  The biggest factor playing in favour of the US was time: the US mainland was never at risk of conquest, so the US could take whatever time it needed to build up its forces in order to defeat Japan.  And given the magnitude of America’s industrial resources, it was able in just a few short years to out-build and “out-logistic” Japan on a colossal scale.  (There’s a scene in the movie Midway in which one of Yamamoto’s officers says that if Japan can destroy the American carrier fleet at Midway, the US will be “compelled to sue for peace.”  The critical question that should have been asked by another officer at that meeting should have been: “Compelled by what?”)

I actually agree with this, but I have read in multiple accounts that had Japan taken Hawaii either very early in the war or after a protracted conflict, then US public opinion could have swayed a decision to stop fighting Japan and focus on Germany. I can’t support that right now, but it is nagging in the back of my mind.

It is worth noting that both the US military and the American public significantly overestimated Japanese ability to actually conduct such an operation, at least at the start of the war. I think in large part that could just be attributed to paranoia stimulated by fear and shock, but there were multiple contingencies  brought up about Japanese invasion of Hawaii or even attacks on the West Coast. You mentioned Midway… in it there is a scene where Nimitz is debating with his staff about where to deploy the carriers for the battle: either aggressively to counter-attack the believed assault or conservatively in between Hawaii and California in case the Japanese didn’t do what was expected (it was stated by James Coburn’s character that Washington advised this as the “smart play”). I am not entirely sure how much of that was ginned up for dramatic effect, but I do think it is representative of the concerns at the time, when Japan was still powerful. In hindsight, it is easy to see that the threat to both Hawaii and the US was overblown, but at the time there were many unknowns and the threat was perceived as very real. I think that should factor into a house rule of this nature.

Hoffmann,
It seems to me that San Francisco VC makes for a better peace treaty condition, Hawaii was important but from a game POV, it is more difficult to seize it than Hawaii. Playing the whole game on a gambit VC, I would rise the challenge.
I’m trying to rise up interesting targets for Japan and giving them Victory conditions which they can get only by fighting in PTO seems a way to incente USA doing something.
If San Francisco, Hawaii, Wellington, Sydney and Calcutta are 5 VCs, and it requires Japan to take 4 of them, it seems an interesting Challenge.

And if we do the same on Europe: Leningrad, Stalingrad, Moscow, London and Cairo makes 5 VCs, also Germany must take 4 of them makes for a hard challenge.

So what do you think of European and Asian Axis 1942.2 victory conditions?
Each (non-capital) VC taken providing 3 IPCs swing into a Warchest which can be shared by each side could help each Axis power but on start these VCs provide more incomes for Allies.

@Baron:

Hoffmann,
It seems to me that San Francisco VC makes for a better peace treaty condition, Hawaii was important but from a game POV, it is more difficult to seize it than Hawaii. Playing the whole game on a gambit VC, I would rise the challenge.
I’m trying to rise up interesting targets for Japan and giving them Victory conditions which they can get only by fighting in PTO seems a way to incente USA doing something.
If San Francisco, Hawaii, Wellington, Sydney and Calcutta are 5 VCs, and it requires Japan to take 4 of them, it seems an interesting Challenge.

And if we do the same on Europe: Leningrad, Stalingrad, Moscow, London and Cairo makes 5 VCs, also Germany must take 4 of them makes for a hard challenge.

So what do you think of European and Asian Axis 1942.2 victory conditions?
Each (non-capital) VC taken providing 3 IPCs swing into a Warchest which can be shared by each side could help each Axis power but on start these VCs provide more incomes for Allies.

@Black_Elk:

I think it’s worth exploring an alternative to sudden death for the VC win. Even if Hawaii is the main focus for the Pacific (rather than North America), the trick is making the capture of the Honolulu VC significant enough that it drives the game towards conclusion (using a clear economic incentive) without just forcing it to end abruptly right then and there.

Sudden death or capping the game by rounds, is only really satisfying under tournament conditions, where time is the main consideration for resolution. In a more casual home game, people seem to prefer concession, with large economic swings to reinforce resolution.

Right now OOB the US at war gets a ton of objective money for controlling the continental US. If you put it all on Hawaii instead, maybe that’s enough to reorient both sides on Honolulu as a principle objective? Probably simpler in this instance to just use the regular objective scheme since Hawaii is kind of special case in Global.

I agree with you both. Perhaps making Hawaii stand on its own as a major objective is too much. If you included it in the USA’s continental bonus it would be almost as important but not give the sudden death punch you mentioned.

All that said, I don’t think that a Hawaii based objective alone will give either the US or Japan enough reason to have an outright PTO war of their own. It could, but it’s hard to tell because the focus is completely around one island on the eastern side of the Pacific. You’d have to playtest it. The US cannot stand to lose it, I just wonder if Japan would exert the effort to try to take it once the US fortifies it. It would be denial of US resources (taking Hawaii) vs using potential money and equipment spent taking Hawaii to bring in more resources for Japan elsewhere (Asia). Does that help Japan force a quicker victory than a JCC? Hard to tell. (None of this takes into account whatever revised VC/warchest rules you plan to use in addition).

Haven’t considered this rule for 42.2. While I think 42.2 could be revised in this way, to achieve better play results, I think we all realize that we won’t be able to just use G40 rule revisions and sub them into 42.2 at face value. The smaller scale and complexity of 42.2 will require a great deal of simplification or outright change from whatever rules are proposed for G40… at least as it pertains to political rules and VCs, IMO. But you guys have already mentioned that.

@Black_Elk:

**Right now OOB the US at war gets a ton of objective money for controlling the continental US. If you put it all on Hawaii instead, maybe that’s enough to reorient both sides on Honolulu as a principle objective? Probably simpler in this instance to just use the regular objective scheme since Hawaii is kind of special case in Global.

1942.2 on the other hand, there is no broader objective scheme in opperation, so that’s where a more robust but generic VC = Cash mechanic might be easier to work with. But my thought there is that if a VC economic driver is put in place for 1942.2, the same should carry over into 1940, just for consistency. But then you could use the more standard objective bonuses to further push the gameplay in the desired direction**. Basically make Hawaii a lot more challenging for Japan to take than it is OOB (but not impossible as the SF VC is OOB), and considerably more influential than it is OOB for the American economy. In gameplay terms it would be ideal if, after they have secured themselves economically in Asia and the South Pacific, Japan looks to Honolulu as a serious contender for the prime objective for Axis victory, on par with Calcutta/Cairo or even Moscow. I also agree it would be nice if Anzac was similarly boosted as a main objective. Perhaps connecting directly to a large American or UK (Europe) bonus.

In general, I like the idea of fewer objectives in G40, but with more weight to each. I think the standard bonus should be on the order of 10 ipcs or more, rather than 5 ipcs or less. Fewer objectives to track in total, but with each being a major economic driver, at least relative to capital capture.

I believe both 1942.2 and G40 should have similar victory conditions per theatre.
That way, in 1942.2, Japan will not have to Center Crush systematically.
VCs owned and conquered VCs should help to constitute a warchest which can be use to help the weakest member of the alliance. This does not forbid friendly Axis power to help other for example, helping taking Cairo or Stalingrad but capturing VC in his own Asian theatre might be easier.

Probably Hawaii can still be a turning point with an higher IPCs value and VC swing for 1942.2 while, as you said Black Elk, G40 USA might have a 10 IPCs NO on that advance US base, and more if as 1942.2 have an higher IPCs value.

Wellington and Sydney can be considered VCs in both games and get IC and higher value in 1942.2.
All zero Islands should be 1 IPC to still gives incentive to fight around them.

Western China should be impassable so it keeps G40 China entanglement similarities.

Why not use a NAP between Japan and Russia in both?

The idea would be to allow Japan both directions viable, East as well as West.
After all, Germany would have been more than happy that Russia fight on two fronts, (usual JCC) but historically, Japan had enough on his hands with China, UK and USA and never fight Russia.
This is what we hope somehow, let us give a few IPCs to Japan under NAP so it can hope to give a real fight in PTO. (So, instead of an hopeless scenario, can it be a working scenario if USA spend too much in ATO.)

Do you agree on this principle about 1942.2 Redesign being a mirror-like of G40?

Wellington and Sydney can be considered VCs in both games and get IC and higher value in 1942.2.

I just want to check in with you guys for a moment to see what the intended scope of this project is, i.e., to see how deeply people are willing to change the game.

Are we…

1. Adding Victory Cities to the 1942.2 map? To the G40 map?
2. Changing IPC values on the 1942.2 map? On the G40 map?
3. Redrawing the territories (beyond just making Western China impassible) on the 1942.2 map? On the G40 map?
4. Adding new sculpts (e.g. tactical bomber) to the 1942.2 game? To the G40 game (e.g. paratroopers)?

I am happy to help design, write up, and playtest any and all of the changes above, and then some, but I know there was some resistance earlier in the thread to making “radical” changes to the map.

I volunteer to try to put all of the house rules we’ve been discussing on one sheet of A4 printer paper in MS Word / PDF format, but before I do that, I want to know which rules are fair game!

I’m happy to see your enthusiasm and open mind Argothair.
I cannot say for sure that we are doing 1 to 3 actions of your list.
We are talking to expand Japan viable options on both 1942.2 and G40 outside Center Crush and Tank Drive to Moscow. Trying to get a better feel of WWII theme in combat unit interactions, tactics and strategies.
General guidelines are: simpler as possible, historically accurate as possible, less radical change as possible, which means to use as most as possible what is already in A&A universe.

Once this said, I know for sure that TcB will be tried in 1942.2 Redesign, it totally increase the overall experience and reach our general goals in conjunction with Fighter unit.
And many more units can also be tried in Triple A engine; what will pass the cut to tabletop game IDK.
Some changes are easier to put on Triple A, like adding units, than in real material world, which need sculpts to convey the idea on board. But others are easier to implement, like Impassable Western China because it only requires to enforced it the way some people enforced Dardanelle’s Straight : No warship in Black Sea due to Turkey being Neutral.

Black Elk is the Mastermind of all Redesign project and will certainly add is perspective to answer your question.

For now, I would just add that your worries are totally legitimate and I don’t feel these HRs on G40 and 1942.2 Japan Redesign options are ready to roll. More POVs exchange might help get a better start for playtests.

@Argothair:

I am happy to help design, write up, and playtest any and all of the changes above, and then some, but I know there was some resistance earlier in the thread to making “radical” changes to the map.

I volunteer to try to put all of the house rules we’ve been discussing on one sheet of A4 printer paper in MS Word / PDF format, but before I do that, I want to know which rules are fair game!

That would greatly help, if we could get a Word and/or PDF version of the changes.

All changes and new units will be in Triple A notes  too.

Maybe give a 5 icp NO to any country controlling up to so many sea zones next to kami token or symbol ? Or they attack or blow up the symbol and get some kind of bonus.

Treat it like an island or a Kami base. You can damage it. Can’t launch any Kami’s in those sea zones until repaired.

It sounds like changing territory values would require marking up the map in a way that’s more permanent / radical than people might want.

Is everyone OK with introducing a “minor factory” into the 1942.2 overhaul? By combining minor factories and national objectives, we can make fringe territories like New Zealand more important without the need to change their actual IPC value

As a Plan B, I guess you could say that either all factories get +2 to their production capacity or that all VCs get +2 to their production caps, but I don’t think those solutions are nearly as elegant. Giving all territories +2 to production takes too much pressure off of Caucasus, London, India, etc., and giving only VCs +2 to production introduces a new mental step that players have to think about when figuring out how many units they can produce.

Minor factories could be represented with a factory token over a green chip in face to face games (or if you have the older 3-D style factory sculpts left over from Revised, you can use those for major factories and save the 2D chits for minors).

On TTy IPCs values, I think about it and it is quite easy to adjust by using a few dedicated control marker with the new number inside. For instance, I may use my UK NatConMark and write a 3 in center and put it on TTy like Eastern Australia.
I can do 1IPC  NCM for zero IPC island.
You need one per TTy and use blank NCM as usual when capturing such TTy.

Vote up this comment if you want to increase production caps by directly increasing territory values (e.g., using Baron Munchhausen’s national control marker idea).