G40 Redesign (currently taking suggestions)

@LHoffman:

This actually has a lot of merit. The Atlantic Wall was a big deal to Hitler. Ended up being more hollow than advertised, but prior to D-Day there was a lot of focus on building it (by the Germans) and fear at having to face it (from the Allies).

Here are a couple of sections from Cornelius Ryan’s book The Longest Day which illustrate Hitler’s obsession with the Atlantic Wall, and the scepticism of his generals about it.  What’s interesting about the positions of Von Rundstedt and Rommel is that they were both partly right and both partly wrong, a problem compounded by the fact that Hitler decided on a compromise which used the worst rather than the best of the two options.  Rommel was right that Allied air superiority would hinder the deployment of German reserves from the rear to the front, and Von Rundstedt was right that the wall would spread out the German forces too much and nail them in fixed positions, thus allowing the Allies to punch through at a point of their choosing without being bothered by the German forces elsewhere along the wall.

By the fall of 1941 he began talking to his generals about making Europe an “impregnable fortress.” And in December, after the U.S. had entered the war, the Führer ranted to the world that “a belt of strongpoints and gigantic fortifications runs from Kirkenes [on the Norwegian-Finnish frontier]…to the Pyrenees [on the Franco-Spanish border]…and it is my unshakable decision to make this front impregnable against every enemy.”  It was a wild, impossible boast. Discounting the indentations, this coastline running from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Bay of Biscay in the south stretched almost three thousand miles. […] Hitler had become obsessed with the fortress concept. […] Hitler dashed across the room to a table on which there was a large map and for a full five minutes threw an unforgettable tantrum. Pounding the map with his clenched fist he screamed, “Bombs and shells will fall here…here…here…and here…in front of the wall, behind it and on it…but the troops will be safe in the wall! Then they’ll come out and fight!” […]  Thousands of slave laborers worked night and day to build the fortifications. Millions of tons of concrete were poured; so much was used that all over Hitler’s Europe it became impossible to get concrete for anything else. Staggering quantities of steel were ordered, but this commodity was in such short supply that the engineers were forced to do without it. As a result few of the bunkers or blockhouses had swiveling cupolas, which required steel for the turrets, and the arc of fire from the guns was thereby restricted. So great was the demand for materials and equipment that parts of the old French Maginot Line and Germany’s frontier fortifications (the Siegfried Line) were cannibalized for the Atlantic Wall. By the end of 1943, although the wall was far from finished, over half a million men were working on it and the fortifications had become a menacing reality.

[…]

The wise old Von Rundstedt had never believed in fixed defenses. He had masterminded the successful outflanking of the Maginot Line in 1940 that had led to the collapse of France. To him Hitler’s Atlantic Wall was nothing more than an “enormous bluff…more for the German people than for the enemy…and the enemy, through his agents, knows more about it than we do.” It would “temporarily obstruct” the Allied attack, but it would not stop it. Nothing, Von Rundstedt was convinced, could prevent the initial landings from being successful. His plan to defeat the invasion was to hold the great mass of his troops back from the coast and to attack after the Allied troops had landed. That would be the moment to strike, he believed – when the enemy was still weak, without adequate supply lines and struggling to organize in isolated bridgeheads. With this theory Rommel disagreed completely. He was positive that there was only one way to smash the attack: meet it head on. There would be no time to bring up reinforcements from the rear; he was certain that they would be destroyed by incessant air attacks or the massive weight of naval or artillery bombardment. Everything, in his view, from troops to panzer divisions, had to be held ready at the coast or just behind it.

Thanks for this transcript CWO Marc,
I never thought it drags so much resources.

From a game POV, what can recreate this somehow seems Allies need to get a big NOs for the first time they land in Europe mainland.

Instead of Germany NOs, breaking Atlantic Wall NOs / opening Western Front:
it can be like +10 IPCs for the first Allies to conquer a land TTy in Europe.
This bonus will apply to this allied power, even after all its units been destroyed in TTy.

So, this will happen sooner or later but in Germany’s interest the later the better.
That way, Axis will need to keep many Infantry along Atlantic Coast to deter invasion.
This will drag resources in similar way.

+5 if at War and for each Allied control territory: New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Britain
And why not add Malaya to this package?

I believe ANZAC need more bonus to have some significance it PTO.

Why not write it the same for UK both ETO and PTO?
UK PAC
+5 if at War with Japan and for each Allied control territory: Burma, Malaya and Kwangtung.

UK Europe
+5 if at War with Axis and for each Allied control territory: Malta, Normandy and Greece

Is it needed to be zero IPC?

+1 for each zero IPC Axis island under US control (Med/Pac).

@Black_Elk:

Yeah I think you’re right, but when the Objectives are multifaceted, it makes them harder to achieve.

Is the goal is to give Anzac some easy cash to fight more independently? The idea below would make them more powerful than OOB. OOB they are only effective once the US has rocked the money islands away from Japan  (and the fight in the Pacific is already more or less determined.)

ANZAC
+5 each, if at War with Japan and Allies control: Solomons or New Guinea/New Britain

That would give Anzac a relatively easy 10, if Japan does nothing to put a wedge between them and the Americans. New Guinea is easier for Japan to disrupt, Solomons a bit harder.

Hence, it explained why these Islands were important to capture for Japan. To disrupt shipping between USA and ANZAC.
This somehow explained how it can radically affect ANZAC. Just a +1 for Japan but a big -5 for ANZAC for each Island

Also, if written like this, money Islands will be included (as it was supposed OOB):
+1 for each zero ipc Allied Pacific island under Japanese control

I may goes that far as :
+5 if at War and for each Allied control territory: New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Britain, Malaya

UK ETO:
Why not add Gibraltar (giving another reason for Italy/Germany to conquer:
+5 if at War with Axis and for each Allied control territory: Gibraltar, Malta, Normandy, and Greece

UK Europe
+5 each if Allies control Malta, Greece or Normandy

Written that way, it means you only get +5 IPCs if you control any amongst these three.

In my mind, it will be +5 for each TTy.

Also, ANZAC may be lower like:

+3 if at War and for each Allied control territory: New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Britain, Malaya

+5 for each Allied control territory: Gibraltar, Malta, Normandy, and Greece

@Black_Elk:

Ok edited the above.

Does that feel cool?

Yep, far better.
What about:
ITALY
+1 for each Allied territory in the Med or Middle-East controlled by Axis.

This depict how all oil field resources were needed.

Is it more historical if Middle-east was included in spreading communism?
+2 for Axis territories under Soviet control (only in Europe or Middle-East proper)

This one need to be defined, what is an open route?
+3 if at War, for each open supply route: Persia, Far East, Arctic.

That one means +10 if both TTys in Axis hands?
+5 for Normandy/Holland if at War with US

For these two I would add: uninterrupted possession
+5 each for uninterrupted possession of Normandy and Holland, if at War with US

Why do you need that Germany be at war with US to give Normandy NO?

For the Mid East I think that is pretty much coveted already by the German NO. Keeping it focused on the Med suggest more the dream of a new Roman Empire.

+1 for each Allied territory in the Med controlled by Axis.
Does it include all North African TTs like Egypt and, bordering Med TT like Syria?

Do you think adding Gibraltar is too much here?

+5 for each Allied controlled territory: Gibraltar, Malta, Greece, Normandy.
We talked about it when discussing VCs. (Free Town for a Gibraltar NO)

I would add this one:
+5 for each Axis controlled territory: England , Volgograd, Novgorod, Russia, Caucasus, Egypt, Iraq, Persia.
(Sea Lion is so a pyrrhic victory as it seems.)

I found it far much simpler to follow.
I hope G40 pros will comment.
Maybe ask a revision on G40 Forum once ready.

I threw a line there:
Re: G40 Balance Mod - Feedback Thread
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=37553.msg1642276#msg1642276

I am not interested in giving the USSR consistent free cash, but what do you think about giving Russia more money for the “no Western Allies in USSR territories” NO?

I think the incentive to keep the other Allies out needs to be significant. It may be possible to do this through means other than NOs, but there is one specifically geared for it.

@LHoffman:

I am not interested in giving the USSR consistent free cash, but what do you think about giving Russia more money for the “no Western Allies in USSR territories” NO?

I think the incentive to keep the other Allies out needs to be significant. It may be possible to do this through means other than NOs, but there is one specifically geared for it.

Do you think 10 IPCs will be a sufficient incentive to not land Allies aircrafts in Russia?
It is enough to built 1 Fg per turn.

@Baron:

@LHoffman:

I am not interested in giving the USSR consistent free cash, but what do you think about giving Russia more money for the “no Western Allies in USSR territories” NO?

I think the incentive to keep the other Allies out needs to be significant. It may be possible to do this through means other than NOs, but there is one specifically geared for it.

Do you think 10 IPCs will be a sufficient incentive to not land Allies aircrafts in Russia?
It is enough to built 1 Fg per turn.

Yes. I would say we could subtract that extra 5 from elsewhere, but with USSR’s NOs, that is hard to do. It’s a delicate balance so as not to give them too much.

I don’t like the idea of completely legislating restrictions on Allied units in the USSR. Incentivizing is better, but it has its limits.

Solomon Islands must be Allied for ANZAC to get either of its two island objectives. So. . .

1. Solomon Islands, Gilbert, Samoa, Fiji = 3 PUS

2. Solomon Islands, New Britain, Dutch New Guinea, New Guinea = 3 PUS

Thus, Japan can negate both objectives by taking and holding Solomon

This is from Balanced Mode 3.0

Do you think we should put Dutch New Guinea into ANZAC NO?
+3 for each Allied controlled territory, if at War with Japan: Solomons, New Guinea, Dutch New Guinea, New Britain, Malaya.

@LHoffman:

@Baron:

@LHoffman:

I am not interested in giving the USSR consistent free cash, but what do you think about giving Russia more money for the “no Western Allies in USSR territories” NO?

I think the incentive to keep the other Allies out needs to be significant. It may be possible to do this through means other than NOs, but there is one specifically geared for it.

Do you think 10 IPCs will be a sufficient incentive to not land Allies aircrafts in Russia?
It is enough to built 1 Fg per turn.

Yes. I would say we could subtract that extra 5 from elsewhere, but with USSR’s NOs, that is hard to do. It’s a delicate balance so as not to give them too much.

I don’t like the idea of completely legislating restrictions on Allied units in the USSR. Incentivizing is better, but it has its limits.

It is not that tragic because Germans C5 bombers will do a lot of damage on russian ICs.