Montanelli is very clear about it. Italy needed time before it could join the war:
Ma sopratutto bisognava rimediare alle gravi lacune della nostra preparazione militare. Del milione e trecentomila uomini che lo Stato Maggiore riteneva indispensabile per la difesa delle nostre frontiere, non ne avevamo sotto le arme che quattrocentomila. E Salandra, dopo aver dichiarato alla Camera ch’eravamo in grado di equipaggiarne tre volti tanti, scopr� che i magazzini, svuotati dalla guerra di Libia, non erano stati riforniti. Se l’Austria - scrisse pi� tardi Cadorna - ci avesse attaccato, ci saremmo trovati alla sua merc�.
San Giuliano tranquillizz� il Generale scrivendogli alla fine di agosto che l’Italia non sarebbe entrata nel conflitto senza un novantanove per cento di probabilit� di vittoria perch� una campagna come quella del 1866 avrebbe significato la fine della monarchia, e ribad� ufficialmente la neutralit�. - p. 146, L’Italia di Giolitti, 1974, Rizzoli Editore, Milano, reprinted 2010 RCS Libri S.p.A., Milano.
_But above all it was necessary to remedy the serious gaps in our military preparedness. Of the one million and three hundred thousand men that the General Staff considered indispensable for the defense of our borders, we did not have more than four hundred thousand under arms. And Salandra, having declared in the House that we were able to equip as many as three times that much, discovered that the warehouses, emptied by the war in Libya, had not been replenished. If Austria - later wrote Cadorna - had attacked us, we would be at its mercy.
San Giuliano reassured the General writing to him at the end of August that Italy would not have entered into the conflict without a ninety-nine percent chance of winning because a campaign like the one in 1866 would have meant the end of the monarchy, and officially reaffirmed the policy of neutrality._
As to which side to join, Montanelli two sentences later explains that the first overtures were made to the British. However, the government of Salandra was weak. Popular forces, particularly the irredentists, were making waves. Montanelli notes that the group “Secolo” had formed, that Peppino Garibaldi had already formed a volunteer legion, and others like Marinetti coined mottos such as “marciare, non marcire” (to march, not to rot), advocating an active role to support France. Giuriati also advocated fiercely for a pro-French, anti-Austrian point. The socialists, under Filippo Corridoni, supported by Michele Bianchi, Edmondo Rossoni, Alceste De Ambris and Giuseppe Giulietti, had all gone to the banner of irredentism and advocated attacking Austria. Of course, it was when the editors of “Avanti” didn’t like the anti-Austrian writings of Benito Mussolini that he founded a new paper, “Il Popolo d’Italia”, to advocate for intervention. His exact phrase was “O guerra, o rivoluzione”. Of the major newspapers, “Giornale d’Italia”, “La Tribuna”, “L’Idea Nazionale”, “Il Secolo” and “Corriere della Sera” all advocated intervention against Austria, with only “La Stampa” from Turin advocating neutrality.
No one advocated for intervention on the side of the Central Powers outside the government, and hardly anyone inside had. One of the only Italians in government in favor of the Central Powers was Sonnino, who replaced San Giuliano as Foreign Minister in October 1914 (San Giuliano died). However, Sonnino had taken that position only when the Germans were advancing quickly, and he rebuffed the Austrian offers, just as Giolitti rebuffed von B�low when the two met face to face.
In short, in 376 pages there is ample evidence to refute any allegation that Italy was seriously considering joining the Central Powers. Italy had to play for time, however, because it was not ready in 1914 to declare war, and so of course the various ministers and ambassadors met to discuss theoretical alliances.
