What if U.S. invaded Soviet Union?

Thank you both for the story and adjustment. Missed it, when first posted.

@ABWorsham:

Churchill proposed an invasion of Northern Norway and Sweden in 1939 to remove half of Germany iron ore. As a new leader he did not have credibility to get this invasion quickly planned before the Germans reacted.

How does the war progress if the Allied Expeditionary Force invades Norway and Sweden?

I was reading this over again. I don’t think it would be possible with an Allied invasion during 1939. Since the mountains are pretty much impassable during winter, which is from October to April, the invasion would have to be done from the start of the war in September and finished before October. This was not likely to happen. The first window of opportunity opened in November when Russia attacked Finland. But in the case of Finland, snow and ice was a necessity for a successful campaign, since that part of Finland is impassable swamps and marshes during summer. In Norway it is the other way around, since mountains are impassable during winter. And that give Britain a first possible D-day on April 8th 1940, the day before Germany did actually attack Norway.

The reason Britain did not attack on April 8th is IMHO that they got reports of a German breakout into the sea, so they ditched the infantry already onboard, and sailed to intercept the German fleet. But as w know, the Germans had then walked down the gangway in all major Norwegian ports. And they could do so because the ports were not defended. But here comes the twist. Next day Britain sailed in 25 000 troops bound for the Narvik area, but they was not able to kick out the 1900 Germans, because at that time Britain lacked landing ships and landing crafts. And you can not amphibious assault a defended coast without landing crafts, as proven in the Normandy landings 1944.

So basically the 25 000 Allied troops sat in the port of Harstad waiting for landing crafts to be build and this took 7 weeks, before they ware able to invade Narvik late in June , by then defended by 40 Germans. In the meantime 10 000 Norwegians equipped with winter gear and trained in mountain warfare, were pushing the bulk of the Germans towards the Swedish border.

I figure, if the Brits had landed in Narvik April 8th 1940 and walked down the gangway as friends, the Germans would for sure be cut of from the iron ore. But if the Norwegian socialist government had declared war, then I cant see how the Brits could have been able to break out from Narvik and cross the mountain range over to Sweden. None of the total 35 000 Brits, French and Polish soldiers in Norway 1940 had winter equipment nor training in mountain warfare. The last blizzard was in may, and they would be stuck in Narvik until then, surrounded by a Norwegian mountain division. And on the other side of the border, 320 000 Swedish soldiers, also trained in winter and mountain warfare, would wait for them, protecting the iron mines. So Churchills plan could only work if Norway and Sweden did cooperate volunterely

Thanks for sharing

would it not be better keeping producing Panzer III and IV and keep on developing new Support Tanks etc like Hummel, Nashorn, Wirbelwind, kugelblitz etc.?…It would have been far better to satisfy the needs of the troops instead of longing for bigger tanks.
The Panzer IV was maybe not equal to all the counterparts of the allied tanks but further development of panzer III and IV´s and increasing production of it would be better in the long run!..E series might have been better and easier in production but it is not guaranteed that it would satisfy the need!
I dare even to say that a 5cm gun for panzer III series and a 7,5-cm-KwK 40 L/43 for the Panzer IV´s would have made a big diffrence!
In the end the Panzer IV was the backbone of all Panzerdivisions to the end of the war…

Sounds a bit like the plot of the Len Deighton novel “XPD”.

I suppose that if you’re a POW, there are worse places to be held than that camp. I wonder if any of these men stayed in Canada after the war, if that option was available.

Just noticed the German West losses I gave earlier is for  Sept 1939 to April 1945. It includes the 1940 losses, an extra 156,556.

**Heer Losses in the Polish, Norwegian, French, and Balkan Campaigns
(Organizationsabteilung d. Gen,Stb. d. OKH. 6 Feb 45, NARA T78, R414, F3226-3227

Losses in the Feldheer**
……KIA…WIA…MIA…Total
Poland …8,082…27,278…5,029…40,389
Norway …1,166…1,548 …1,091…3,805
France… 27,650…115,299…13,607… 156,556
Balkans…1,593…4,845…644…7,082
Total …38,491…148,970…20,371 …207,832

So the claims made in the Third Army  book are even further off!

In some of my other posts on this forum, I’ve described how even in 1940 (when the U.S. was still technically at peace with Germany), it had devoted a significant amount of industrial potential toward winning the air war against Germany; with plans to considerably expand the effort over the next several years. America’s strongest single asset was her industrial potential, as Hitler clearly understood. But that potential was going to be increasingly turned against Germany, whether the U.S. was technically at war or not.

Hitler’s plan to counter this was to expand Germany’s industrial output over the short-term, so that he could at least keep pace with the air war over Germany in the long haul. His method of expanding Germany’s output included industrialization and conquest. The industrialization aspect of his plan meant that instead of putting everything he had into weapons output for 1941 or 1942–in a massive effort to crush the Soviet Union–he had to divide his nation’s economic activity between short-term military production and long-term output increases. The result of all that industrial investment was that Germany increased its aircraft output from 16,000 planes per year in 1941 to over 40,000 planes per year by 1944. It also increased its military production in other categories, such as tanks and V2 rockets.

In late 1941, Hitler knew that his window of opportunity to win the war was relatively slim; and that 1942 would be critical. Germany had to win a decisive victory over the Soviet Union in that year, both to take pressure off its eastern front, and to provide it with the raw materials and manpower it needed to hold its own in the air war over the long haul. Hitler believed that the overwhelming majority of America’s naval strength would be needed in the Pacific to counter the Japanese; at least until the end of 1943. That gave him what he believed was a two year window with which he could sink the American Lend-Lease Aid pouring into Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Sinking those ships would increase Germany’s chances of obtaining the victory over the Soviet Union it desperately needed.

However, the Japanese Navy proved less adept than Hitler had hoped. The Battle of Midway occurred six months after Pearl Harbor. That battle took the naval pressure off the U.S. in the Pacific, and allowed it to focus more of its efforts on convoy protection in the Atlantic. More generally, the failure of the Japanese military meant that Japan would be far less successful in taking military pressure off of Germany than Hitler had hoped.

In 1942, the Soviet Union outproduced Germany 3:1 - 4:1 in tanks, artillery, and other land combat categories, and even 2:1 in military aircraft. It also fielded a much larger army than Germany. Thus evaporated Hitler’s hope of a decisive victory on his eastern front.

Had Hitler not declared war against the U.S., large amounts of American Lend-Lease aid would still have flowed to his enemies in Europe. Over the long-term, he still would have needed to devote a significant portion of his military production to defending German skies and German cities against American-made bombers. He would have lost out on the Second Happy Time (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Happy_Time ), which would have resulted in a stronger Soviet war effort for 1942. On the other hand, he wouldn’t have had to deal with the U.S. invasion of Algeria in 1942, its invasion of Sicily and Italy in 1943, or the Normandy invasion of '44. It’s easy to say in hindsight that the harm of the American invasions exceeded the benefit of sinking that Lend-Lease shipping in '42. But that distinction was less obvious at the time.