I agree with the Battle of Britain.
If the battle of Britain had been lost then operation Sealion would have happened and there is little debate that the germans could have taken the island.
North Africa would have fallen.
Operation Barbarossa would have been delayed one or two more years, which is what the german generals originally wanted.
America would take much longer to get into the war without the use and aid of British bases and forces, they would also probably focus much more on the european theatre leaving Japan more unopposed and also have to liberate britain before taking france.
Therefore if we are talking single battles, the battle of britain was without a doubt the most Decisive.
i also agree the battle for britian was the beginning of the end for germany. not only didnt they take the uk, but then germany turns around and starts a war with russia, creating the old, 2 front war, which is very hard to win. :-)
@Weezer:
If the battle of Britain had been lost then operation Sealion would have happened and there is little debate that the germans could have taken the island.
Look at the invasion of France in 1944, the Allies had 5,000 ships to pull off an invasion and bad weather seriously hurt the ability to supply that army. How do you think German barges would fair in a battle with the Royal Navy? Germany’s navy could do little more than harass Allied shipping. A large part of the German navy was sunk in Norway.
Had the Germans been able to establish a beachhead, i believe it would have played out like Gallipoli or Anzio.
THE WAR WAS UNWINNABLE FROM THE START YOU DING DONGS
No, the axis could have won if Russia stayed on the axis side
yeah, if germany never attacked russia, england woulda fell, hitler just didnt have the patience to wait england out and had 2 use all his pretty toys and the only target left for his tanks was russia. and germany still had a small chance to win even after they attacked russia, but lets face it, hitler wasnt a general and he made mistakes that say, rommel or other generals wouldnt have made.
No, the axis could have won if Russia stayed on the axis side
Had the B.E.F been destroyed in France in 1940, the war would have been very near winning for the Axis.
@ABWorsham:
No, the axis could have won if Russia stayed on the axis side
Had the B.E.F been destroyed in France in 1940, the war would have been very near winning for the Axis.
Not true. In fact, most of those evacuated from Dunkirk were returned to France to continue the fight. Thus, their loss would not matter in an invasion of England, which was impossible anyway.
A little known fact that was Stalin had offered the Germans military support if the western allies had ever come close to destroying the germans. (this was before Hitler attacked the Soviet Union)
Check out “world war two behind close doors” by Laurence rees
@The:
A little known fact that was Stalin had offered the Germans military support if the western allies had ever come close to destroying the germans. (this was before Hitler attacked the Soviet Union)
Check out “world war two behind close doors” by Laurence rees
But suppose French and British troops were storming Berlin. Would Stalin enter the war on Hitlers side at that point? I doubt it. If the allies were close to destroying the Germans, why would Stalin (despite any promises - and he wasn’t the type who would necessarily keep his word) unnecessarily enter a war on what could very well be the losing side?
I have heard theories that the Germans attacked Russia because of a lack of any other option that could result in a victory. Having “Fortress Europe” would provide Hitler with all the necessary resources imaginable. And with only one front to defend would enable a concentration of the best forces where necessary.
Not sure I agree as Stalin was giving Hitler anything he wanted before this, but strategically what other options did Hitler have for a victory? Sealion was not going to happen. Possibly a U-boat blockade, but that seems unlikely to work…possibly something in Africa, though even a victory here doesn’t seem to provide a decisive victory. Possibly the Amerika bomber, but that was still in development and could eventually be copied and/or countered…
What i meant by ever cxame close was if Germany was struggling to get more troops also Stalin may of done this because he would be able to capture the rest of poland and territories under “the german sphere of influence” on his way to help and if they really were in that much trouble Stalin’s forces wouldn’t get there in time and so he would just get extra territories for free
So, Russian assistance under the assumption of a manpower draining trench warfare (like WWI). Interesting…when I get more time I will have to look up your reference and read it.
Before deciding which battle best represents the turning point, it’s important to look at the strategic situation faced by the Axis (and in particular by Germany), starting in early 1939.
It has been argued that Germany lost the war when it attacked Poland. However, various plans had been made or discussed in the mid-‘30s to get the Western democracies to join the Soviet Union in ganging up on Germany. Those plans fell through not because of any hesitation on the Western democracies’ part, but because Stalin regarded both Germany and the Western democracies as enemies. He wanted a long war between those two sides–a war that would bleed both sides dry. Then the Red Army would move in to pick up the pieces.
In 1939, the combined British/French military production exceeded Germany’s; with plans underway to further expand the former source of military production. Moreover, Britain and France could draw upon the extensive resources of their colonies, and could import weapons from the United States; while Germany could do neither. Even before German tanks crossed the Polish border, Germany was in a position of strategic weakness, and had been largely isolated diplomatically by Western leaders who (in most cases) strongly preferred Soviet communism to Nazism. The French prime minister of the time–Daladier–had participated in a coalition government with the French communist party. FDR liked, looked up to, and wanted to form a long-term alliance with Joseph Stalin. Had Germany not invaded Poland, various Western politicians would have sought other pretexts for war with it. Had they failed, it’s very possible the Soviet Union would have invaded once Stalin had become convinced that his invasion would succeed, and that the hoped-for war between the Western democracies and Germany would not occur. Everything that happened from August of 1939 onward represented an ultimately unsuccessful attempt by Germany to escape that position of strategic weakness, and to secure itself against the dual threat of the Western democracies and the Red Army.
In 1940, Germany produced 11,000 military aircraft, compared to 15,000 for Britain. The U.S. shipped large numbers of aircraft and aircraft engines to Britain. It had been agreed that, over the course of the next few years, the U.S. would expand its military aircraft production to a staggering 72,000 planes per year; with half being sent to Britain for use against Germany. Even though the U.S. was still technically at peace in 1940, its industrial strength was increasingly being brought to bear against Germany.
In 1940, Hitler did not have the industrial capacity or access to raw materials or labor he required to match the Anglo-American war effort being waged against Germany. One of the reasons for his invasion of the Soviet Union was to acquire these things; thereby allowing him to match the Western democracies’ aircraft production over the long haul. Victory over the Soviet Union would also secure Germany’s eastern front before any serious invasion of its western front could be launched.
However, Germany’s population in 1939 was 69 million; as compared to 169 million for the Soviets. That gave the Red Army a staggering advantage in manpower. Moreover, the Soviets’ military production exceeded that of Germany’s by a factor of between three and four for most major land categories in 1942. The Soviets also produced nearly twice as many military aircraft as Germany did that year. The overwhelming advantage the Soviets had in manpower, together with their equally overwhelming edge in military production, were why Germany could not hope to win a long war against the Soviets.
It is also worth noting that Britain had imposed a food blockade on Germany, which created a severe food shortage. German occupation policy in the Soviet Union was harsh because its lack of available food meant it had no choice but to starve many millions of people. There just wasn’t food to feed everyone. People in conquered Soviet territories were among the millions starved. That meant that the Germans could not be seen as liberators, but were rather cast in the role of hostile invaders who must be resisted at all costs.
In 1941, Japanese industrial capacity was only a tenth that of the U.S. The U.S. produced 48,000 military aircraft in 1942, compared to just 9,000 for Japan.
The phrase “turning point” implies that there was some time in the war before which the Axis had the advantage, and after which the Allies had the edge. At least from a strategic perspective, there was no turning point in WWII. Germany was at a significant disadvantage before the war began, and that disadvantage remained throughout the war’s duration. It experienced some remarkable tactical victories during that time; particularly its conquest of France and the western parts of the Soviet Union. But those tactical victories were never enough to create strategic parity with the Allies. Nor could Japan’s early victories in the Pacific offset the U.S.'s massive advantage in industrial capacity.
It could be pointed out that early in the war, the Axis had a brief window of tactical opportunity: a time for it to win victories before the overwhelming Allied strategic advantages could be fully brought to bear. On Germany’s western front, its string of such victories ended with the Battle of Britain. On its eastern front, they (mostly) ended with the battle of Moscow. And in the Pacific, Japan’s string of early victories ended at Midway.
It would have been very difficult or impossible for Germany to have launched a serious invasion of Britain. It lacked the transport capacity and surface fleet to do so. Moreover, with Britain producing more and better aircraft than Germany in 1940, Germany’s window of opportunity to invade was clearly very brief. While a successful invasion of Britain would have been extremely beneficial to the Axis war effort, British victory in that battle was never in much doubt.
The Battle of Moscow was similar. Germany lacked access to much oil. Therefore, its supply lines could not primarily rely on trucks. Instead, it would use coal-powered locomotives to carry supplies most of the way to where they were needed, and horses to transport them the rest of the way. The need for rail significantly slowed the German advance, so that Soviet rail lines could be converted to the German gauge, and so that the rails could be repaired or replaced. Germany had enough oil and military trucks to provide some motorized supply for its troops; and that helped speed the invasion of the Soviet Union. But by the Battle of Moscow, its fragile supply lines had been stretched to the limit. Its soldiers lacked the food, medical supplies, ammunition, and winter uniforms they required. Germany’s failure at the Battle of Moscow was a function of the strategic weakness it had experienced even before the war began. That battle also reflected the Soviets’ enormous manpower reserves and overall military strength.
Kurt,
Very excellent analysis, and I agree.
I would like to point out, however that possibilities for Germany other than that actually tried by the Nazis were possible.
England’s weakness (same as her strength) lies in the sea. Had Germany launched a sufficiently massive U-boat construction effort in time ( before countermeasures were developed), it might have been possible to starve England to the peace table.
With Russia, more concentration on Moscow (or perhaps Stalingrad) at the (to be hoped temporary) expense of the other fronts to maximize the initial Nazi advantage at one strategic concentration of forces might have fragmented Russia for a victory there.
Not that either of these would necessarily bring victory either…
However, the fact that Nazi Germany did not put their economy on a war time basis until 1944 is perhaps their greatest reason for failing to win the war. It is telling that Nazi armament production peaked in fall of 1944 despite the then constant bombing, loss of manpower, shortages of material, loss of conquered territory (and subsequent labor and materials to aid munitions production), etc. Had Germany utilized their economy on a war basis earlier the outcome might have been different. But then, there were political considerations Hitler had to contend with…
good post kurt, if u have time u should submit more posts like this.
With the factions of the soviets, us,uk vs. germany,italy, and japan, the axis were doomed before day 1. Good analysis by Kurt.
I tend to disagree and for various reasons.
First you assume the results of the war determine its course. The war could have played out many different ways. Japan might have never attacked USA and just finished off China in another 10 years. Germany could have started her war in 1943 when German economists projected a better economic picture. Italy too was not ready for war early, but drew into conflict due to the quick succession of German military victory and a feeling in Europe that some form of peace was imminent with UK.
If Hitler left the Czechoslovakia alone it stands to reason that Chamberlain would remain in power and he had an entirely different outlook for UK when compared to Churchill. Hitler could have been another Bismarck and slowly built up the German economy as it was pre-1914.
The Soviets were building up to be true, but the economics according to Historian Mark Harrison showed they were not producing as well as Germany till late 1943, with a small advantage in 1940 of 417 to 387 in wartime GDP. The decline of Germany since 1943, was due to among other things the RESULT of the course of the war. In a peacetime setting Germany would have continued to enjoy an advantage over the Soviet Union ( as well as everybody else sake USA).
The Soviets were building inferior plane and tank types and superior numbers does not equate with military victories. Looking as her fight with the Finns and the bulk of the 1941 campaign proved that point. The Germans had much better military doctrine than anybody in Europe and she could win any campaign of limited duration.
A German campaign in the Soviet Union of limited duration was possible, but due to the compilation of numerous mistakes was not to be. Again the results of what happened cannot measure the truth of what could have been possible.
Hitlers decision to become an enemy of Stalin was only one of many pitfalls that led to his decision to invade in 1941. Hitler and Stalin could have reached an accommodation of interests of which would have served both parties like carving up the British Empire, but to Hitler this was not to his liking as he admired the British people as the bulwark and ‘protector’ of civilization for many centuries. He would much rather see communism get destroyed. It didn’t have to go this way. IN Dec 1940 in talks with Molotov, the tone of this accommodation was clear: Stalin wanted Finland and had eyes on Besserabia. If the Soviets could have been inclined to get Persia and Iraq and agree to join the tripartite pact, both could have just made mincemeat out of UK colonial holdings and UK would be in no position to do anything.
The lost year ( which i call June 1940- June 1941) was the perfect opportunity to peruse this strategy and weaken UK by other means. This was advocated by Admiral Raeder featuring a Mediterranean strategy to weaken UK by taking all her colonial supports.
Sealion was not really possible unless it was planned more in advance, if Hitler prevented the Dunkirk episode and forced the British army into surrender, a landing in England in June 1940 would have been much easier. UK would not have any army or equipment to stop them, and the navy was scattered all over in various ports and dealing with Italy, which just entered the war. German airborne was the best trained and much of the operations initial attacks were airborne.
The economic advantage over the axis was only realized once Japan attacked USA and Hitler DOW USA on 12/11/41, which was biggest mistake possible. Until that time the combined figures ( Harrison) showed a very close combined axis /allied ratio. adding USA basically doubled the ratio to 2:1.
Economic considerations are not the determining factor in war. In the Great War, the Central Powers faced a similar Allied advantage and almost won twice. Only the result of military victories and strategies determines who might win. An economic explanation might work to account for a number of things, but then we should have lost the war with England during the revolutionary war.
If only we could talk about the American Civil War on here… and what would have happend if the confederates won.
The world would be a different place.
u ever see the movie,
CSA: Confederate States of America
(2004) PG-13
its not that good but its something 2 watch if u r into this subject.
Part 1 of 2
Thanks to everyone for their compliments! The things people wrote have inspired me to write another post along similar lines.
For hundreds of years, French foreign policy had been based on the idea of keeping Germany weak and divided. The Treaty of Versailles was consistent with that age-old policy. Large chunks of German territory were given to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and (in the case of the Rhineland) were put under French military occupation. Those territorial gifts also weakened Germany diplomatically, because Germany would naturally be at odds with some foreign nation that occupied German territory.
Poland and the Soviet Union went to war in 1919. No major Western democracy sent troops to help. By 1920 the Soviets were on the verge of achieving an outright victory, which would have allowed them to make Poland into the newest Soviet Socialist Republic. The Western democracies advised Poland to make the best peace treaty it could. Instead, Poland won a major victory outside Warsaw–a victory which allowed it to keep its freedom and independence.
The Western democracies were no more interested in stopping Soviet expansionism in the '30s or early '40s than they had been in the '20s. The treaty Britain and France signed with Poland in 1939 protected it against a German invasion but not a Soviet invasion. Moreover, that treaty misled the Poles into thinking France would launch a general offensive against Germany if Germany attacked. France was responsible for the fact that Poland occupied some of Germany’s territory in the first place. Its false promises to Poland’s leaders made them overconfident about their military options if Germany attacked. That overconfidence led Poland to reject the idea of pursuing a diplomatic option.
Allied diplomatic policy in 1939–and specifically that of France–was war-seeking. Had its goal been to prevent war and contain German expansionism, it would not have misled Polish leaders about its military intentions. Daladier, however, was firmly of the opinion that Hitler had to be stopped. France in general was distrustful of a strong Germany. Daladier firmly opposed the course of action Chamberlain had decided upon in 1938 at Munich. But the Soviet Union was not willing to go to war for Czechoslovakia, even though the two nations had signed a defensive alliance in 1935. Stalin regarded both Germany and the Western democracies as enemies, and hoped the two sides would bleed each other dry in a long war. With neither British nor Soviet support for the idea of Czechoslovakia holding onto its German territory, Daladier decided to unhappily go along with Chamberlain’s policy. But the mood was very different in 1939, and Poland became the opportunity to be the flashpoint for the war between France and Germany Daladier thought was necessary. Poland had to be misled and sacrificed for that war to occur, but that was evidently a price Daladier evidently was willing to pay.
It’s also worth paying attention to the actions of the communist parties in Western Europe. Prior to Hitler’s ascension to power, the leadership of the international communist party had believed that fascism was the penultimate step on the road that would ultimately lead a nation to communism. In the early '30s, German communists did not cooperate with other leftist groups in an anti-Hitler coalition government, but rather went their own way. After Hitler came to power, he placed the leadership of Germany’s communist party in concentration camps, improved the economy, improved wages and working conditions, strongly reduced the crime rate, and generally created a nation that was strongly unified, politically stable, and highly anti-communist. That result had to be very disappointing for a communist movement that had been hoping for instability, weakness, and subsequent communist revolution.
Communist leaders learned from that mistake and began formulating new policies instead. In 1936, the Popular Front government took power in France. Nearly 20% of that government’s seats came from the French Communist Party, with another 40% from the French Section of the Workers’ International. (The remaining 40% came from the Radical and Socialist Party–Daladier’s party.) (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Front_(France) .) Daladier had been Minister of War under the Popular Front, and became the prime minister of France in the post-Popular Front France of 1938. In terms of foreign policy, Dalaider picked up right where the Popular Front had left off. (Which is one of the reasons the Popular Front government made him Minister of War in the first place.) During the mid- and late '30s, the far left was promoting “anti-fascism.” If the far left had its way, the Western democracies would fight Germany while the Soviet Union stayed neutral. This foreign policy was intended to give Stalin the conflict between his two sets of enemies that he wanted. If that kind of foreign policy seemed to do a much better job of advancing Soviet interests and Soviet expansionism than of promoting France’s interests, it was because that policy had been formulated in Moscow. In this case, the goals of the French communist and other radical leftist movements dovetailed almost perfectly with France’s centuries-old strongly anti-German foreign policy–the kind of foreign policy favored by Daladier.
France was not the only nation in which political leaders regarded communism with fondness, and Nazism with fear and hate. In the U.S., FDR’s vice president, Henry Wallace, believed that "both the American and the Russian revolution were part of ‘the march to freedom of the past 150 years.’ " See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Wallace#Vice_President . Wallace ran for President in 1948, and advocated friendly relations with the Soviet Union and an end to the Cold War. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_A._Wallace#The_1948_Presidential_election ). Also from that section,
Wallace was endorsed by the Communist Party (USA), and his subsequent refusal to publicly disavow any Communist support cost him the backing of many anti-Communist liberals and socialists, such as Norman Thomas. Christopher Andrew, a University of Cambridge historian working with evidence in the famed Mitrokhin Archive, has stated publicly[8][9] that he believed Wallace was a confirmed KGB agent, though evidence for this was never produced.[citation needed]
FDR’s views about the Soviet Union and communism seem to have been very similar to those of his vice president. The main difference was that FDR was more politically astute about avoiding potentially embarrassing public statements than Wallace had been. FDR did, however, gravitate to pro-Soviet propaganda whenever the opportunity arose to do so without paying a high political cost. The following propaganda poster is consistent with the pro-Soviet message his administration sent during WWII: http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc230/small/ More reading about FDR’s pro-communist leanings is available here: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no1/article02.html
One of the conditions FDR agreed to at Yalta was to hand over citizens of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia to their respective governments, regardless of their consent. He also agreed to hand over captured German military personnel to whichever nation against which they had done the most fighting, which in practice meant that most German servicemen would be turned over to the Soviets. The highest scoring fighter ace in human history, Erich Hartmann, was handed over to the Soviets as a result of this provision. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Hartmann#Prisoner_of_war . FDR’s willingness to hand over large numbers of refugees and captured German servicemen to the Soviet Union demonstrates that he was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union in anything, up to and including Soviet mass murder.
The nightmare scenario for Germany’s military planners was that in which Germany was encircled with anti-German diplomatic alliances over the short-term, and invaded by the Soviet Union in the long run. Western democracies would have remained neutral in the Soviet Union’s favor. Some of them–particularly France and Czechoslovakia, had defensive alliances with the Soviet Union and at least in the case of France had leaders who would have loved nothing more than to come in on the Soviet side. FDR would also have supported the Soviet Union to the maximum extent political circumstances allowed. Germany lacked the manpower, natural resources, and industrial strength necessary to win such a war, especially if it had remained confined to the borders it had in January of 1938.
The other question we need ask is whether Germany could have avoided war with the Western democracies. Daladier and FDR both wanted their respective nations to go to war with Germany; as did Winston Churchill. Their short-term failure to achieve the desired war was because of political constraints on their available actions. Hitler was responsible for the circumstances which led those political constraints to disappear, as well as those which led Churchill to replace Chamberlain in power. But might the political climates in France and the U.S. have slowly changed in favor of interventionism anyway? I have heard that isolationist U.S. newspapers were being bought up by those who favored interventionism. This suggests that institutional pressures–not just among political leaders, but also among those who were gaining control of the media–were being brought to bear to cause Allied policy to become gradually more interventionist. (And it was understood that the interventionism would be directed against Germany, rather than against the Soviet Union.)
The above is not to suggest that the Nazis’ military/foreign policy of the late '30s and early '40s was mistake-free. It was not. But the diplomatic options available to them were far narrower than many people realize.
The U.S. produced 2,000 military aircraft in 1939, and 19,000 in 1941. According to Adam Tooze, that dramatic increase in aircraft production was the result of decisions that had been made several years prior to 1941. The production increase may itself seem innocent enough, except that the other part of FDR’s foreign policy involved sending as much Lend Lease Aid as possible. American isolationists might stop FDR from getting a declaration of war unless the U.S. was attacked first. They would not stop him from turning American industrial strength against Germany, whether Germany attacked first or not.
