I develop a third option for Anti-Tank Gun, and better describe the general behaviour of 3 games unit (from which I will pick one), I just don’t know what is the real historical facts on ATG:
Sorry Marc, I jumped from historical POV to game POV without notice.
So I edited the post to give more details and sort out the confusion.
In game terms, which Anti-Tank Gun seems more consistent with historical uses of this weapon?
Could you help me by giving an advice?
Anti-Tank Gun-1
On offense, it is acting like Artillery on Infantry support, no big difference.
Attack 2
Defense 3
Move 1
Cost 5
Gives +1 Attack to 1 Infantry
Or
Anti-Tank Gun-2
Not very useful on offensive action and of no real help for Infantry, artillery is very much better.
(Absolutely needs to be mechanized to have some mobility on offense, to give some support to Infantry.)
Better for defensive action, acting better in coordination with entrenched Infantry.
Attack 2
Defend 3
Move 1
Cost 5
Gives +1 Defense to 1 Infantry
Or
Anti-Tank Gun-3
On offense, it is acting like Artillery on Infantry support,
slightly inferior, since it needs to be transported within sight of the enemy,
but it is clearly better on defense with deep entrenched position combined with Infantry.
Attack 2
Defense 3
Move 1
Cost 5
Gives +1 Attack/Defense to 1 Infantry
For the last two ATGs, I think about Fury movie in which German Infantry were help by ATGs against US Tanks and 1 Tank Destroyer which was commanded by Brad Pitt as Sgt.
And also about Russian defensive lines near Kursk against Germans’ Tigers.
@DessertFox599:
I say we should have an artillery for defense. Like a unit that can pair with an infantry or artillery that give them a +1 on defense.
Thanks, I keep the idea.
Below, I found some interesting facts on Anti-tank warfare:
Anti-tank tactics developed rapidly during the war but along different paths in different armies based on the threats they faced and the technologies they were able to produce. Very little development took place in UK because weapons available in 1940 were judged adequate for engaging Italian and German tanks during most of the North African Campaign. Its experience therefore failed to influence US Army’s anti-tank doctrine prior to 1944. From 1941 German anti-tank tactics developed rapidly as a result of being surprised by the previously unknown Soviet tank designs, forcing introduction of new technologies and new tactics. The Red Army was also faced with a new challenge in anti-tank warfare after losing most of its tank fleet and a considerable part of its anti-tank capable cannons.
Anti-tank tactics during the war were largely integrated with the offensive or defensive posture of the troops being supported, usually infantry. Much of anti-tank tactics depend on the range effectiveness of various weapons and weapon systems available. These are divided as follows:
Operational range over the horizon (20-40 km range) bomber aircraft and long range artillery
Tactical staging areas (7-20 km range) ground attack aircraft and field artillery including MRLs
Tactical zone forming-up area and rear combat zone (2-7 km range) heavy anti-tank guns and mortars
Tactical forward combat zone (1-2 km range) anti-tank guns and tanks deployed in defense
Engagement distance (200-1000 m range) mines and anti-tank rifles
Close combat distance (25-200 m range) infantry anti-tank weapons
Ground-to-air cooperation was not yet systematic in any army of the period, but given sufficient warning ground attack aircraft could support ground troops even during an enemy attack in an attempt to interdict the enemy units before they come into tactical combat zone. Various bomb loads can be used depending on what type of tank unit is engaged in at the time or who its accompanying troops are. This is an indirect form of anti-tank warfare where the tanks are denied the opportunity to even reach combat.
Field artillery was particularly effective in firing against tank formations because although they were rarely able to destroy a tank by direct penetration, they would severely crater the area preventing the tanks from moving therefore causing them to become nearly stationary targets for the ground attack aircraft, or disrupting the enemy schedule and allowing own troops more time to prepare their defense.
Anti-tank defense proper was by 1942 designed in First World War fashion with several prepared trench lines incorporating anti-tank weapons of different capabilities. Depending on terrain and available line-of-sight, the longer-ranged guns could begin to fire on approaching tanks from as far as 2 kilometers, which was also the range at which German Panther and Tiger tank gunners were trained to fire. Anti-tank guns were usually deployed to cover terrain more suitable for tanks, and were protected by minefields laid at about 500 meters to 1 kilometer from their positions by combat engineers. In the Red Army the anti-tank rifle units would be positioned throughout the forward trench line and would engage the lighter tanks and any other vehicles, such as infantry half-tracks in an attempt to separate them from the tanks. The anti-tank guns deployed further back would often hold their fire until enemy tanks were within the most effective range for their ammunition. Where there were insufficient anti-tank weapons, engineers would construct anti-tank obstacles such as dragon’s teeth or czech hedgehog.
Towed anti-tank guns were thought to be the primary means of defeating tanks. At the battle of Kursk for example, the Red Army deployed more artillery regiments than infantry regiments and towed gun densities reached over 20 guns per kilometer of defended tactical zone. A towed gun was much cheaper than a tank and could be concealed in a shallow position. When time allowed, dugouts with strong overhead cover could be constructed. Guns deployed on reverse slopes and in flanking positions could take a toll of attacking tanks. However, gun crews were vulnerable to artillery, mortar HE fire and enemy infantry. Their positions had to be carefully selected and once engaged, they generally could not redeploy. Experience strongly suggested that towed AT guns were less effective than self-propelled AT weapons and took heavier casualties.
Self-propelled anti-tank guns were rare at the beginning of WW2, although the Belgian Army deployed a few T.15 tank destroyers and the French army was developing several wheeled and tracked designs. The advantages of mobility and even thin armor protection were so compelling that most armies were using self-propelled AT guns by mid-war. Examples of these weapons included the US M10, German Marder II, and Soviet SU-85.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-tank_warfare