Hi Baker,
Good to hear from you. I agree with your sentiment. Opinion polls in Taiwan have shown a slight, but general trend away from integration with China. Around 10-15% of Taiwanese oppose reunification, while around 5% are favorable towards it. In any assessment, however, there are the 80% who are largely undecided. If President Chen or the DPP ever puts out a referendum on independence, the balance of numbers will likely favor independence, but that’s not fully guaranteed.
Also, the people of Taiwan already think of themselves as not Chinese, or at least, only aesthetically Chinese. Yes, artistic culture, etc. the people on Taiwan are very similar. Even the Taiwanese language has strong roots in the Mainland. However, the history of Japanese occupation, the political culture engendered by democracy, and the widespread use of Taiwanese as opposed to Mandarin put firm social and cultural barriers to reunification. Plus, what’s going on in Hong Kong isn’t exactly inspiring confidence for Taiwan’s leaders.
That’s the limitation with SUD and Mary’s points, and I think you’re absolutely right to point out that China would be impatient in that regard. The PRC are fighting against multiple pressures: internally with separatist groups in Xinjiang and Tibet, internally with rising labor riots, internally with gigantic gaps in wealth. Externally in their ability to secure sufficient energy resources to maintain growth and satisfy those internal concerns, a regional security system which really isn’t all that secure, etc. In all that, however, the issue of Taiwan has been a steady policy concern, no matter the idealism of Mao, the retrenchment of Deng, or the technocracy of the current rulers. As such, even if China goes democratic, it likely will maintain its position of sovereignty over Taiwan. The question is the actual political and security environment they operate in, and the possibility that Taiwan will break away amid some internal upheaval. This is why the PRC gets so rattled about any sign that the international community recognizes Taiwanese political sovereignty. In some sense, they are racing or operating against themselves.
For IL’s point, you haven’t been paying attention to security affairs in that region. It’s not necessarily true that the US will defend Taiwan. Bush won big points in the Taiwanese community for saying that the US will do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan. He then backtracked the next day. Last year, during the Taiwanese Presidential election and the referendum controversy, the Bush administration made a stated policy of “no unilateral separation,” despite the fact that if Taiwan did hold a referendum and it passed, it would have been legal in international terms and the US probably would have recognized it. But, that statement was taken as a sign that the U.S. does not consider a “unilateral separation” to be part of a criteria to “defend Taiwan,” as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act. In such an environment, the temptation towards earlier invasion is stronger. And like I said, strategically, China may not even have to invade, just launch a couple missiles. As part of its rise, China is developing more military and political options, so don’t discount them and think only of invasion. As a small but important point, I don’t see how you can say you have a better impression of what China is doing under the surface.
