On July 4, 1863 – 150 years ago today – Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg. Ten days later, he ultimately succeeded in getting a substantial portion of his army across the Potomac and back into Virginia. Lincoln was anguished when he learned that the Army of Northern Viginia had gotten away. He drafted a letter to Meade which stressed “the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee’s escape,” because “to have closed upon him would…have ended the war.” Lincoln added, “Your golden opportunity is gone.” The President then changed his mind about dispatching the letter and wrote “Never sent, or signed” on the envelope.
Was the criticism in Lincoln’s draft letter fair? Could Meade realistically have pursued, cornered and eliminated Lee’s A.N.V. during its ten-day retreat from Gettysburg? Can the situation be accurately described as one in which Meade had the physical capability (in terms of his available resources and whatever other factors were involved) to destroy Lee, but wasted that opportunity through a combination of his own decisions and those of his subordinate officers?
No Marc.
Meade was not the man to do it. And his army was not in a position to do so, even under another man.
Not winning at Gettysburg, losing the ability to continue attacking, was not the end of the ANV. The 1864 overland campaigns are testament to that. Admittedly, the ANV was fighting in its backyard with all the advantages of knowledge of terrain.
Go back to Sept 62. The Army had its back to the Potomac and was far less outnumbered then it was now. That army was as dogged in defence as it was in attack.
Lincoln had no idea if he thought the ANV was finished.
All Lee(and Longstreet) needed was a defensive battle to put then back on a parr with the Army of the Potomac.
On the 3rd evening Brigadier Farnsworth was killed in a futile operation orders by his useless and vain Cavalry commander, Pleasanton, when they ran on to the rifles of the 4th Texas.
Apologies: it was the 1st Texas.
Like a lot of others here, I can get obsessed with a subject(or game!). It happened to be your war all those years ago at university.
I find it easy to sympathise with the commanders as there are fewer than WW2 and they were mostly from the same (military) background and thought and believed in similar things.
And one day I will walk the battlefields.
wittmann, I’m just a few miles from Antietam and 1/2 hour from Gettysburg. You’re welcome to stay when you come.
Thank you. Those two battles is where I would start.
Then get lost in the Wilderness!
15-20k more cavalry
5k marines and
a big navy would have enabled such a victory.
The bulk of this non existent cavalry could have raced parallel to Lee’s army to the Potomac as a blocking pincer by Hagerstown.
The Union navy could then rush mortar boats, fresh marines, and other gun boats into support range.
That would buy enough time for the rest of the Union Army + reinforcements to roll in under an aggressive group of generals.
Expecting Meade’s infantry to detrench and rapidly pursue would have been disasterous.
Linkon: are you saying your answer is no then?
Otherwise your post is certainly the beginnings of a plan. I would like to think if the Union had have had those kind of reserves, the South and Lee would have had some contingency plan themselves.
Something or someone would have to slow down Lee’s withdrawal.
Thank you.
I must confess I have never read about the movements of the two armies after the 3rd.
I will look in Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants, as I am not sure I will find much information in any of my other books.
