@ncscswitch:
As I said, 150 IPC is probably a moot point as far as actual numbers. But the ratios and CONCEPTS are valid at all levels
I humbly disagree.
Say Germany drives all-out to take the Caucasus, and succeeds, after which Japan flies in fighter reinforcements on its turn. Just there, you have an example of using a multinational force to defend a crucial territory; a concept that the “150 IPC ultimate army” approach does not encompass.
Now say that Russia wanted to maintain an attack against Germany AND Japan, so used fodder infantry on both fronts and mass tanks to provide a serious threat, so that Russia has infantry and tanks massed. Say also that Russia saw the attack on the Caucasus coming, so built mass artillery for a round. In other words, say that Russia’s early builds and logistics may have been maximized, but that those early builds must have affected the later total army composition, so that Russia might be stuck with a sub-optimal force in the present, because of early optimization.
Now say that there is an ideal offensive-defensive infantry-artillery-tank ratio - I think it clear that the “ideal ratio” would change after a single round of combat, as infantry died. (The most optimal force for attacking is a 1:1 infantry-artillery force, but after a single round of combat, there would be more artillery than infantry, so the attack power would no longer be optimized.) You could then say that the “ideal ratio” of the attacking forces would have to depend on the composition of the defending force, so you could estimate the initial casualties from the attacking force, but by doing so, you abandon the concept of an “ideal ratio”, favoring instead a scenario-specific calculation to estimate optimal chances.
Above are three good reasons why trying to calculate an “ultimate 150 IPC army” is not a profitable endeavor. Too much depends on the situation at hand.
