@CWO:
@MrMalachiCrunch:
Losing a million young men in the trenches of WW I ensured France had no stomach for WW II.��
Yes, this is basically the argument which is put forward by a former French government official (whose name I forget) in the “France Fall” episode of "The World at War."� He feels that the great losses which France suffered in WWI led to a period of deep decay for the French army in the 1920s and 30s.� The political and economic turmoil which France underwent at this time didn’t help either.� He also says that the French leadership made the mistake (which they were not alone in making) of getting lulled into complacency by the fact that they had won the First World War, and hence believing that they would know how to win the next war too – meaning pretty much as they’d won the first one.� The Maginot Line, it should be noted, was in some ways a WWI trench on steroids: a fixed line from which to fight, but made of concrete rather than earth.�
All in all, France’s problem wasn’t that it had a bad army; its problem was that it had bad political and military leadership.� They weren’t alone in this: Chamberlain, for instance, was primarily interested in keeping the war away from Britain, and prosecuted it with little energy during the “Sitzkrieg” period (during which one of his preferred tactics was to drop propaganda leaflets on Germany).� France had an impressively large army in 1939, but it was put to little use because General Gamelin’s strategy was basically to wait a couple of years until France had built up enough strength to crush Germany.� Unfortunately for France, Germany had other plans.� Once France had been knocked out of the war in June 1940, it spent the next four years on the margins, with only the Free French forces keeping up the war against the Axis powers.� Even after France, under a new provisional government, re-entered the war in the summer of 1944, the demands of recovering from the Occupation kept France in a secondary role until the end of the war.� So it’s understandable that France is regarded as having been a minor player for much of WWII.�
Very good points. I’d like to expand upon what you and Imperious Leader have written. As Imperious Leader noted, France could have (but did not) launched a major offensive against Germany while the German Army was focused on acquiring Poland. Gamelin and Daladier had falsely promised the Polish they would launch exactly such an attack within ten days of mobilization. In 1939, Poland’s diplomatic and military strategy had that promise as its foundation. (Which is why Poland as a nation had ceased to exist by the end of '39.)
Why did France’s leaders lie to the Polish? To me, this kind of false promise displays not just the cynical willingness to deliberately mislead and then cold-bloodedly betray a purported ally. It also demonstrates that Daladier and Gamelin were confident they could win a war against Germany.
In 1940, the combined Allied forces on the French/Belgian front were numerically equal to the German Army they faced. France had as many tanks as Germany. Many French tanks were heavy; whereas the vast majority of German tanks were obsolete light tanks unsuited for tank-to-tank combat. Even Germany’s medium tanks were no match for French heavy tanks in one-on-one combat. The Maginot Line was heavily fortified, supposedly forcing the German Army to attack through Belgium and Holland. Britain and France had far more industrial capacity and access to natural resources than did Germany. That, combined with their ability to purchase weapons from the United States, gave Britain and France a decided edge in a long war.
In 1919, Poland and the Soviet Union went to war. In 1920, the Soviets were on the verge of making Poland the newest Soviet Socialist Republic. While the major Western democracies failed to send any soldiers to Poland’s aid, France at least sent some military advisors. These advisors recommended a purely defensive strategy. Ignoring this advice, the Polish military adopted a strategy based on mobility, offense, and encirclements. Using offense-oriented tactics, they were able to thwart the Soviet invasion.
French military leaders apparently learned nothing from that war; even though their own military had served as Poland’s principal military advisor. France was well-prepared to deal with another Schleiffen Plan–a German invasion through Belgium and Holland. This was what the German generals had originally proposed, and what would have been done had Hitler not listened to Guderian and von Mannstein. During the beginning portion of the invasion of France, Germany had launched an invasion through Belgium and Holland to give the illusion that it was in fact executing the Schleiffen Plan. This was what the Allied leaders had been expecting. At least at first, they felt their response was going according to plan.
The German plan for the invasion of France had two parts. The first part was to cut off and destroy the northern Allied force. (The Germans would break through at the Ardennes Forest, and race to the English Channel.) Stage 1 ended with the Dunkirk evacuation. After that first part had been achieved, the Germans proceeded to stage 2. Stage 2 consisted of a southward push against Paris. What’s important to note here is that the French continued fighting during stage 2, after the British had left. After stage 2 succeeded and Paris fell, it had become clear that further conflict between the German and French armies could have only one outcome. Should the French have continued fighting anyway?
For hundreds of years, France’s foreign policy had been based on an instinctive desire to keep Germany weak and divided. Even after the unification of Germany, and France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the French felt that Germany was the enemy, and an enemy that could and should be beaten. The fact that Germany was able to defeat France so quickly and effectively in 1940 forced French leaders to rethink this anti-German bias. A smaller, Vichy France could continue to exist–but it would not be allowed to continue France’s traditional policy of doing everything possible to weaken Germany. Another factor which changed people’s minds was that, at least initially, the Nazi occupation was far milder than the French had expected. German soldiers accused of rape were tried by military courts. If convicted, a soldier would be immediately shot. German soldiers were also prevented from looting or stealing. A third factor in Germany’s favor was the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The existence of that pact meant that French communists had one less reason to oppose German occupation. (At least until the spring of '41.)
The peace treaty between Germany and France allowed France to keep the land it had left–an outcome which would not have occurred had France continued fighting. In 1944, Germany annexed Vichy France. But the French correctly regarded this as a violation of the treaty they had signed back in 1940. That occupation served to significantly worsen diplomatic relations between Germany and the Vichy French leaders in Africa.
After a nation has been clearly and soundly defeated, it’s normal for it to accept surrender terms. I do not feel France deserves to be castigated for having surrendered to Germany, especially because it’s clear that further resistance would only worsen the surrender terms ultimately imposed. Nor do I feel French leaders should be blamed for rethinking their nation’s centuries-old anti-German foreign policy. I do feel, strongly, that France’s leaders deserved blame for allying themselves with the Soviet Union in 1935; despite the Soviets’ grim track record of mass murder.