@Flashman:
Kurt; 2 points:
One of the principle reasons for attacking in the Mediterranean/Middle East is to establish a southern front against Russia (i.e. through the Caucasus), enabling Germany to grab the vital oil centres early in the attack. Having to divert large forces to attack the area from the north in summer 1942 (rather than press towards Moscow) fatally wounded the last chances of winning in Russia.
Also, its been calculated that Germany gained far more in raw materials from Russia under the Hitler-Stalin pact than it ever did by occupying the most productive areas of the USSR. Of course Hitler believed he would have the lot before very long…
Actually Germany should get an IPC boost from Russia as long as they are not at war, as Stalin was keen to see Germany and the UK grind each other down and was very happy to supply the Germans with what they needed. It was when they tried to take what they needed that their war economy began to break down.
These are excellent points. I agree with everything you said, with one disclaimer: a successful North African/Middle Eastern campaign would have required a favorable naval situation for the Axis in the Mediterranean. I don’t know how close the Axis was to being able to achieve that. Beyond that, however, what you’ve described sounds like it would have been a much better policy, especially in hindsight.
While the idea of a North African/Middle Eastern strategy was discussed, Hitler opted against it for several reasons:
- He underestimated the present strength of the Soviet Union. Germany’s military planners thought the Soviets had 200 divisions. They had 600.
- Hitler’s impulse was to destroy the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, thereby depriving it of the time to complete its industrialization. What neither he nor other German leaders realized was that the Soviets were much further along in the process of industrialization and militarization than had been realized. It was not the Soviet Union which needed time to catch up with Germany–it was Germany that needed time to catch up with the Soviet Union!
- The Soviets had purged their army a few years earlier. That purge created a temporary leadership void–a void exacerbated by a subsequent switch from one kind of military doctrine to another. These factors seemed to present a very tempting (if relatively short) window of opportunity during which the Soviets could be quickly and easily defeated.
- Even though the U.S. was still neutral in the spring of '41, its industrial might was being increasingly turned against Germany. In 1940, American aircraft shipments to Britain were in the same ballpark as German aircraft production. And the U.S. had plans to increase its aircraft production capacity many-fold, with those aircraft to be sent to Britain to bomb German cities. Hitler’s fear of America’s industrial strength made him impatient to do something quickly, before American industrial strength could have a decisive impact. His hope was to gobble up the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, because later on he would need all Germany’s strength to defend against Anglo-American aircraft production.
But I agree that whether or not Hitler could afford to wait that extra year to invade the Soviet Union, he needed to wait. To grab the oil and raw materials you mentioned, to gain the extra places from which to invade, to give Germany’s military production a chance to start catching up to the Soviets’, and to weaken the British war effort. Still, my conclusion is based mostly on information which was not available to the German leadership at the time. If I had had only the information the German military planners had had, the decision to wait a year before invading would seem a lot less obvious.
