I have been reading up on my Chinese military history (you know light reading before bed :lol:) and read that it was the policy of the Nationalist Government to adhear to a nonresistance rule when dealing with advancing Japanese troops.
Soldiers were encouraged not to fight back, stow weapons and comply with Japanese demands.
I was wondering what the reasoning whould be. Was it Buddism pushing this? Did China think that Japan only wanted coastal areas and would stop?
Just wondering your two cents,
LT
My guess would be that the chinese knew they coulod not stop the japanese war machine, though I’m not sure.
Perhaps the Nationalist wanted to gain Japanese favor to help wage war on the Communist.
:|
It is difficult to speculate on this issue, but if I were to, then my guess would be that the Nationalists did not want several hundreds of thousands of troops and their families pouring into the western Provinces of China, just too many mouths to feed. So instead, they told them to hide their weapons and just lay low until it was more advantages to re-activate them.
Just an edjucated guess though. :wink:
Did China ever try an uprising that would lead you to think that? I’m not trying to be mean or any thing but I am asking in sincerity how did you arive at that conclusion?
LT
I would be very interested in exactly what source you have for that. Looking through the reports of the 14th Air Force and Japanese reports on the Chinese campaign, I do not see much support for that as a universal policy.
Timerover51,
I have been scouring the internet looking for where I read that. (I know you can’t believe every thing you read on the internet.)
I don’t know as it was a long term policy. I read about it in reference to the attack Japan staged on a railway. It was a lesser used track that the Japanese rigged to blow. It wasn’t very far from a Chinese post of some kind.
Japan had smuggled some ART units to an officer’s club nearby that sat on a hill overlooking that area. This was done very secretly. Japan was hoping that the explosion would luir the Chinese out to investigate and then Japan would have probable cause to lead a charge in defence of their railway.
The Chinese in this area outnumbered the Japanese by something like 2 or 3 to 1. I think the Japanese attacked first killed 600 Chinese. I don’t know if they were like Army Regular’s or more like a reserve or militia unit. The Japanese only lost 2 soldiers in this attack.
The reason believed for the overwhelming loss of Chinese life was that the commanding office of the Chinese was ordered to comply with the nationalist policy of nonresistance.
I think after the land assult that the Japanese then shelled the Chinese post with the ART. Although I may be wrong they may have done that first then the land assult.
I can’t remember the name of given to the whole mess. It had something to do with bridge in the title. I read that the Japanese gave the incident this name to embelish the story that a Japanese railway on such-and-such bridge was attacked. No bridge was involved in the real event.
Some believe this to be the single largest cause (if there ever can be a single larges cause) as to why Japan stormed mainland China so hard.
I’ll keep looking for more information.
LT
The charge didn’t work as well as planned
Here is a quote I found on Wiki, Under “4 invasion of Manchuria” section.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukden_Incident
“Zhang Xueliang, under implicit instructions from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government to adhere to a nonresistance policy, had already urged his men to not put up a fight, and to store away any weapons in case the Japanese invaded.”
LT
After reading furthur (in the Aftermath section) I came across this.
“Chinese public opinion strongly criticized Zhang Xueliang for his nonresistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang (KMT) central government was indirectly responsible for this policy. Many charged that Zhang’s Northeastern Army of nearly a quarter million could have withstood the Kwantung Army of only 11,000 men. In addition, Zhang’s arsenal in Manchuria was considered the most modern in China and his troops had tanks, around sixty combat aircraft, four thousand machine guns, and a couple of artillery battalions.”
If this sorce is correct it wasn’t the people’s choice to be nonresistant.
If the logistical information is correct That would have been a bitter pill to take as China. Regardless of the quality of soldier (regular, reserve, militia weighed agienst green, seasoned or veteran) the equipment and the quantity of equipment lost is just amazing.
Why was China so crapy???
LT
I checked my copy of Nomonhan, Japan’s War Against Russia, 1939 by Alvin Coox, two volumes, information on the Mukden Incident in 1931 contained in volume one. The Chinese were well aware of the Japanese’s interest it taking over Manchuria, and were try to avoid giving the Japanese any pretext to launch an offensive. Part of the Chinese forces, 110,000, mentioned were actually located in North China, in the vicinity of Peking and Tientsin. The remainder were scattered across Manchuria. They did have some aircraft, but I am more than a bit dubious about the claim of tanks. If they had any, they would have been Carden-Lloye Mark VI tankettes. The Chinese put some faith in the guarantees of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty governing foriegn penetration in China following WW One.
