When you let your opponent dictate events without contesting them, you lose.
If the Allies do not contest the money islands early and often, Japan can do as it wishes. Given ANZAC’s position and limited income, it really has only one effective sphere of influence and that is the Dutch East Indies. Until the US can effectively contest Japan there, it is ANZAC’s job. Failure to do it will result in a loss. Yes, that means throwing transports away so that Japan will have to counterattack the Dutch East Indies (a 13 IPC swing for taking any one of three members in the chain). It means having some kind of offensive force that can contest the waters around the Dutch East Indies.
Given ANZAC’s limited income, it might be necessary for the US to shuck two infantry or a fighter each turn down to ANZAC to free up ANZAC’s income for build transports and ground troops to contest the Dutch East indies. If Japan reacts by sending an invasion force down to ANZAC, so much the better because that takes pressure off India, China, Russia, and the US if the US and ANZAC have defended properly.
Simply put, ANZAC’s job is to poke the bear and get it to charge, then crawl into it’s shell and ride out the mauling. The US can help build the shell.
It is easiest for ANZAC to contest Java and sea zone 42. However, if ANZAC can manage to build a minor industrial complex on Queensland it can also reach all the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and Malaya with only a one turn delay. This is often possible if Japan does not strip ANZAC of both it’s objectives (typically in the interest of killing India faster).
The Allies as a whole are an exercise in balance between offense and defense, and that includes ANZAC.
Marsh