@Imperious:
top 10 list:
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should have enlisted the Soviets into the Axis block by assigning territorial spears of influence to each partner. Molitov and Von Ribbentrop had such a discussion in late 1940 of this and Molitov was more worried about Finland and Bessarabia to give it the reflection and potential it deserved
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Left Yugoslavia alone ( save 6 weeks for barbarossa)
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should not have demoblised 40 divisions after the fall of france
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began total war mobilization ( didnt start till jan 1943 and the results were not achieved untill 1944)
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making Leningrad and Moscow the prize. No shift of forces in Oct 41 from AGC to AGS ( e.g the Kiev pocket). The loss of moscow was a central tie to all other parts of western Russia and deployments in the south would have been cut off to the north. Archangel would have fallen and Finnish troops would have been freed up– and more couragious for garrison duty in Leningrad and archangel, while Whermacht forces would still have cut the kiev pocket and bagged even more Soviet armies.
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stripped reinforcements from western front ( allies had no prospect of landing in 1942 and a few additional forces would have carried the campaign to conclusion)
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preparations for winter fighting. In the first winter hitlers no retreat order saved the german army, but he still had horrible loses due to inefficient logistical systems, and all germanys victories were “on the cheap” they had no intention of long term campaigns.
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The unity of command was a blessing and a curse. The original strategy should have been maintained and any flexibility should have been decided by the generals in charge … not a corporal from WW1
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Hitlers declaration of war on dec 11th 1941 was a waste of unimaginable proportions
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Inability to create a 5th column in Ukraine. Germany treated the slavs as cattle and that the campaign was a war of extermination. A total waste of potential manpower and the ability to sap the vital strength of the Soviet system with a replacement system that would potentially impart less harsh conditions for ordinary people. That could have been the propaganda and it would have been taken at face value. Soviet forces would have surrenderd much easier if the whole affair was a crusade against communisim.
- should have enlisted the Soviets into the Axis block
This may not have been an option. Evidence strongly suggests Stalin was planning to expand westward at Germany’s expense. Stalin might have agreed to join the Axis bloc–right up until the day his tanks rolled across the Nazi-Soviet border.
- Left Yugoslavia alone ( save 6 weeks for barbarossa)
I have mixed feelings about this. On the one hand, six extra weeks of invading the Soviet Union before winter sets in sure sounds like a good idea. On the other hand, my understanding is that spring rains had been heavy that year, and that the six weeks in question might have been associated with muddy roads and a bogged down advance. I don’t like the idea of getting only partial benefit from the first six weeks of surprise.
- should not have demoblised 40 divisions after the fall of france
Agreed. According to Suvorov, Hitler did not anticipate a Soviet invasion of Germany in 1940. (Which would explain the demobilization of those divisions.) But due to massive Red Army troop movements to the Nazi-Soviet border, and due to forcible Soviet annexation of Finnish and Romanian territory, Hitler figured out what Stalin had brewing. Then decided to launch his own invasion of the Soviet Union, before the Soviets’ preparations to invade Germany were complete.
- began total war mobilization ( didnt start till jan 1943 and the results were not achieved untill 1944)
In addition to agreeing with the above, I also feel that Albert Speer should have been put in charge of armaments production several years earlier than had been the case.
- making Leningrad and Moscow the prize. No shift of forces in Oct 41 from AGC to AGS
Another good point. Also, von Manstein should have been placed in charge of Barbarossa. Von Manstein was the best general on either side of the war. Had he been in charge of the invasion of the Soviet Union, Moscow and Leningrad would have fallen.
- stripped reinforcements from western front
Agreed. Too many troops were tied down in places like France and Norway.
- preparations for winter fighting. In the first winter hitlers no retreat order saved the german army, but he still had horrible loses due to inefficient logistical system
You make a good point, but this is a rather complex subject. Germany has almost no oil deposits. During WWII, it relied partly on synthetic fuel (made from coal), and partly on Romanian oil. But even in combination, those fuel sources were not sufficient for more than the first 2 - 3 months of Barbarossa. After that, there was a need for Germany to alter the tempo of its operations due to fuel shortages.
It’s possible to have an oil-free supply line. A coal-powered train moves supplies most of the way to the soldiers. Horses then carry the supplies the rest of the way. However, the Soviets’ rail system used a different gauge than Germany’s, and Stalin’s scorched earth policy resulted in the destruction of a significant portion of Soviet rail lines. As a result, supplies often had to be transported over long distances via petroleum-powered trucks. Manufacturing large numbers of winter uniforms in Germany was not necessarily as big a challenge as was getting those uniforms to Germany troops. By the time winter set in, German soldiers lacked ammunition, food, medical supplies, and yes, winter uniforms. The supply situation was abysmal due to lack of petroleum, inadequacy of rail lines, and the difficulty of moving supplies during a Russian winter.
- The unity of command was a blessing and a curse.
Agreed. But it would have been strictly a blessing, had command been unified under von Manstein.
- Hitlers declaration of war on dec 11th 1941 was a waste of unimaginable proportions
Obviously, war against the United States offered no possible benefit for Germany. Hitler had recognized this, and had exercised restraint in the face of FDR’s undeclared naval war against Germany. But it was felt that sooner or later American political and economic leaders would succeed in getting America into a war against Germany–regardless of the wishes of the American people. Herbert Hoover noted that prior to the election of 1940, FDR made numerous promises about keeping America out of war. After FDR won that election, he ceased providing such assurances, and his rhetoric became more warlike. Had Hitler not declared war in late '41, America would probably have gone to war eventually–much like it had in 1917.
Hitler felt that since war against the United States was inevitable anyway, better to speed the process up a bit so that he could sink the Lend Lease aid being sent to the Soviet Union and to Britain. To put the quantity of that aid into perspective: Erich Hartmann was the highest scoring fighter ace in history. He fought exclusively on the eastern front, and all his victories were against Soviet-operated aircraft. About 1/3 of the aircraft he shot down were American-made.
- Inability to create a 5th column in Ukraine. Germany treated the slavs as cattle
I disagree with your use of the term “fifth column.” Do we call America’s Founding Fathers “fifth column” because they lacked loyalty to King George III? No! Neither should we apply that label to the brave Ukrainian men and women who resisted Stalin’s evil regime. Some of the chief complaints against George III involved his tax on tea, and the fact that British soldiers were sometimes quartered in Americans’ homes. Some of Ukrainians’ chief complaints about Stalin involved the fact that he used an artificial, government-created famine to murder 7 million Ukrainians, including 3 million children. The Boston Massacre (five people killed) was an important factor in many Americans’ decision to rebel. Stalin murdered over a million Ukrainians for every one victim of the Boston Massacre. If the men and women who stood up to George III were “patriots,” why not also use that word to describe the men and women who stood up to Stalin?
Germany’s opportunities to treat the Slavs well were limited by its severe wartime food shortages. That being said, there were a number of German government officials assigned the task of administering the eastern occupied territories. Those officials should have been drawn from the more pro-Slavic ranks of the Nazi Party or the German government. Instead of that, Hitler often appointed officials who were strongly anti-Slavic in their outlook. Those who saw Slavs as potential allies against the evil of communism might have been able to garner far more support and cooperation than those who viewed Slavs as cattle.